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Although a variety of Ouspensky's writings are currently in print the author's intention was to prepare only certain selected writings for general publication. His views regarding the text which came to be known as 'In Search of the Miraculous: Fragments of An Unknown Teaching' are certainly not clear. 1 And if we attempt an interpretation of the strictly native thought of Ouspensky the matter is further complicated. Containing material gathered during his studies with G.I. Gurdjieff, 'Fragments' was never an attempt to represent his own ideas apart from those of Gurdjieff but was, rather, an attempt to bring to a more general audience and within an historical setting a brief overview of already thought out principles of the then existing Gurdjieff system. In a similar vein 'The Psychology of Man's Possible Evolution' was originally intended only as a primer for certain of his own private study groups while both 'The Fourth Way', 'A Further Record', and 'A Record of Meetings' are not authorized works but simply transcripts of talks held between Ouspensky and his students. Whether he expected them to eventually be released subsequent to his death remains an open question. 2 The screenplay, 'Strange Life of Ivan Osokin', and 'Tertium Organum: A Key to the Enigmas of the World', along with 'A New Model of the Universe: Principles of the Psychological Method in Its Application to the Problems of Science, Religion, and Art' remain. As the authorized works, then, we will consider only these. 3
EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS
Upon our very first steps towards cognition, writes Ouspensky, certain conditions determine both our usual way of thinking and understanding. Much of what we take as known and familiar in our daily lives is, in reality, far from certain and when pondered remains highly enigmatic. The question of time and its relation to space, problems associated with the mysteries of life and death, along with man's various conceptions of God remain distant and, as it were, obscured from unaided reason. Yet, recognition of these problems as enigmas along with attempts at possible solutions remains fundamental to any comprehensive understanding of the world.
Generally we believe in the progress of ideas; we believe we are able to know both ourselves and the world, and to a lesser or greater degree we also believe that that which remains unknown must eventually be revealed through the application of the logic of scientific discovery. But what with certainty can we definitely say we know? Our two primary intuitions of being relate to the division between internal subject and external object. Beyond this, that is, beyond the recognition of our internal life and a world 'outside,' all phenomenal knowledge must be discovered and validated through the application of reason in conjunction with a strict empirical methodology.
Discursive knowledge relies on concept formation, however concepts are not primary intuitions but, instead, result from perceptions integrated by our cognitive faculty--the process of analysis--and in this we have no direct link or intuitive nexus between the logical (i.e. conceptual) foundation of our empiricism and its object. Derived as it is from conceptual knowledge mankind's intellectual edifice necessarily remains an abstraction relying on vagaries inherent within linguistic construction (which, after all, is the means or the tool by which we represent to ourselves concepts). In a real sense reason and experimental knowledge are aesthetic creations.
We infer the world of objects to be ontologically independent from the caprices of personal sensation but, for Ouspensky, such a view is strictly conventional. Further, knowledge of being (in contrast to empirical or phenomenal knowledge) derives from the degree of correspondence between a noumenal form (which we can never directly intuit but from whence comes, somehow, the phenomenal object of perception and, therefore, empirical knowledge) and corresponding conceptual formulations derived from experience and reason. Thus, the goal is really the elucidation of an accurate, or at least closely approximate, conception of a likely world form independent of confluence between our perceptive and conceptual faculties. This is the true theme of 'A New Model of the Universe'.
Ouspensky accepts Kant's exposition of that doctrine written in the first 'Critique' and called 'Transcendental Aesthetic' wherein Kant argues that the intuition of space and time are predicated upon forms particular to our sensibilities and not actual sensual existents. Kant dispels the common sensical view whereby we generally think of time and space as discrete objects functioning not unlike a container within which our life and the things affecting our life reside and evolve. From this latter and traditional view it makes little practical difference to the average man whether modern scientific thought premises spatio-temporal relations ontologically different. In our lives sensual space exists as an external three dimensional Euclidean continuum while time shows itself as an internal sensation not necessarily grounded upon any preexisting spatial relationship. Although space is felt three dimensionally, we experience time linearly but, like space, it remains one and the same for all existence. Where time comes from or where it may go remains obscured, and in an effort to communicate to ourselves and by way of an attempt to understand the physical "properties" of both space and time we are forced to offer up vague and indefinite descriptive terms such as "infinity" which, while having a definite mathematical definition, nevertheless remains tenuous when viewed from the standpoint of a physical property.
By considering space and time as perceptual forms and not as direct objects of sensual intuition a critical analysis of our conventional understanding of spatio-temporal relations cannot rest solely on an empirical analysis. It's predicate must be psychological material. Ouspensky argues that we need first specify all necessary psychological parameters inherent within the human perceptual faculty prior to constructing theory. In keeping with the line of thought outlined by Kant he accepts a supersensible or noumenal substrate as the material cause of our world. It therefore follows that although our world intuition is grounded in spatio-temporally based physical relations, the noumenal ground upon which the perceptual object of experience ultimately derives its being possesses neither the properties of space nor of time. Now, inasmuch as our outward form of perception can be said to correspond to (or at least be described by) normal geometrical laws and inasmuch as noumena can be understood, phenomenally speaking, it is true, as that base metaphysical something which is extended into our everyday world of objective intuition and hence responsible for the things we perceive, Ouspensky finds it not unreasonable to hypothesize that that which we cannot perceive, i.e., noumenal forms, should nevertheless be amenable to description by means of a corresponding metaphysical (or more exactly, metageometrical) extension of conventional geometric laws. And just as the science of geometry exists to describe phenomena in normal space, a new 'metageometry' postulates properties of an extended or higher space. 4
The material form of space has at least until recently been almost always based upon the geometry of Euclid. Traditional Euclidean geometric space is conceptualized as a three dimensional infinite sphere; that is, a line rotated on its axis 360 degrees and, then, bisected by another line perpendicular to the first which is also rotated 360 degrees. Within this sphere any convergent set of coordinates constitutes a point of space. Constructed as an extension or expansion of a geometric point into a solid (the point being one boundary of the continuum and its complete expansion, the three dimensional solid in time, the other) normal space serves as a paradigm for the science of metageometry. Using the rules of geometrical expansion we can describe how a "point" of matter (or a collection of such points) becomes a solid of three dimensions.
First, when extended into space the point becomes a line of the first dimension. The subsequent perpendicular extension of the line "into space" creates the figure of a plane surface, i.e. the second dimension. Likewise, a surface extended perpendicularly becomes a figure of three dimensions, a solid. Far from a purely speculative endeavor it should be noted that the actual existence of a geometrical point in physical space has perceptual reality in that bit of matter of which no smaller can be observed. In everyday life we observe instances of each of these phenomena, although it is generally accepted that each exists, in reality, differently than perception holds, the difference being attributed to a difference between the relation (i.e. relative position) of the perceiving subject to its object. In 'A New Model' Ouspensky describes a star (the point) in the night sky (a surface). Reason tells us that these appearances are entirely subjective, contingent upon our own unique perspective. Yet, if we consider the previously recounted specifics of geometric expansion we find that the dissimilarity between any "higher" or "lower" dimension is, in itself, strictly a matter of perspective also, for the difference between our abstract understanding of respective dimensions is no more than the alterity between viewing various cross sections of an object: the point is a cross section of a line, the line is a cross section of a surface, and a surface exists as the cross section of a solid. The obvious question, then, is how we can possibly represent to our minds the form of a four dimensional "solid" of which our present reality is but a section?
Perceptually, a "point of three dimensional space" exists as a moment in time, although we remain unaware of isolated static moments just as we are not cognizant of any singular spatial point. Instead, we experience objects (extensions) in motion relative to each other. Motion is our conscious awareness of a sufficient number of discrete points of time and can be represented geometrically as a segment on a greater line of time. We experience segments on the timeline as duration. For each and every three dimensional object encountered we know of its existence by its extension along the timeline. Thus, from the standpoint of metageometry our experience of the present is really the perception of a cross section of a fuller or extended spatial existence spanning the entire line of time.
Owing to the limitedness of our cognitive faculty we can be immediately conscious of no more than a fairly short but usually "continuous" string of present moments. Moments past are generally considered, ontologically speaking, fictional existents known only through the persistence of memory; likewise, they are usually considered fixed and unchangeable. Future events, if they can be said to exist at all, exist only as a possibility, the Aristotelian entelechy. Nevertheless it can at least be supposed that, unlike the past, the future possesses varying degrees of potential changeability. And if the past remains only a function of memory while the future exists only as an uncertainty delimited by various probabilities of occurrences then we must accept as the final and true reality simply the present. From the metageometer's view, however, these conventional ways of thinking are turned upside-down. Understanding our experience of time as the partial experience of what is in reality the perpendicular extension of a three dimensional object into higher space allows a radical expansion of the definition of actuality, or, to be more precise, the form of the world.
In metageometrical space objects possess one or more dimensions than we are able to clearly perceive. Our immediate experience of any object consists of perception limited to one point (or at the most, a segment) of its temporal existence. Owing to the limitations of sensation we cannot directly intuit the being of an object in four dimensional space, but, instead, we perceive three dimensional objects bounded by unidimensional time. The temporal moment is, metageometrically speaking, no more and no less than a section of a larger four dimensional continuum, whereas an object's entire life corresponds to a more sizable "chunk" of four dimensional "stuff." Hence, if we could suffer objects four dimensionally we would know them very differently. First, they would be static and never changing, complete, and unevolving. We would simultaneously observe a thing's birth, its subsequent life, as well as its death. 5
Let us attempt to visualize the metageometrical form of a four dimensional solid using as a model the planetary world. From this view when looking into the sky we are actually observing cross sections of the sun and the moon. Planetary movement is no more than our perception of a succession of discrete points along the greater line of time. Yet in order for us to appreciate the magnitude of a four dimensional form we must take as our subject of investigation a sufficient number of points along the timeline of our solar system. But inasmuch as our own individual lives are quite trivial relative to the solar existence we cannot hope to formulate an interesting or even approximately accurate representation unless we view a much longer span of time than that occupied by the mere life of either a man or, for that matter, mankind. Therefore, let us take as our "point in time" a one million year segment.
In order to simplify our model let us first presume that the direction of the sun comprises a straight line. The four dimensional body or form of the sun over a million years would appear to an observer capable of perceiving such a thing as a large burning rod . Bound and tightly coiled about the rod spiral twelve much smaller concentric threads These are the planets. Upon closer examination we detect even smaller ridges spiraling the planetary threads. These are various moons and satellites. We could further complicate our model to include asteroids and comets as they traverse the sun, and as a matter of course we would have to significantly expand this now growing model if we were to place the sun in its proper place, because the sun itself spirals "through space" on its own predetermined path within the much larger galactic cosmos. Thus, instead of a straight rigid rod we would likely observe a curved, twisted, and spiraling rod. In fine, within this new model our time has become space.
Imagining space thusly (i.e. in four dimensions) begs the question, "What of a man's life?" Dissecting tightly wound threads from the central core and subsequently stripping away the outer threads (planets) we would eventually reach the third to the last thread, our earth. If we had a powerful enough viewing instrument we might discover various geologic ages. And if our microscope were capable of finer resolution we might even be able to discern the age of man. As yet, an individual man, or even a single civilization would not be apparent. Perhaps certain age old relics would be observable such as the Sphinx or the Great Pyramids. And maybe the period between 1945 and 1965 would somehow be detected as the many above ground atomic explosions conducted by the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China were measured as strange bursts of nuclear energy. Still, the life of any individual would be missed. The wars, deaths, and all the suffering of mankind would be a minor thing indeed. And what we revere in our science, religion, and art would be nothing. In reality and if such a thing were possible it would be even less than nothing since we must remember that we are dealing with an almost instantaneous fragment of the life of the sun, i.e., a mere one million years.
PENONLENAL COMMENSURABILITY
Accepting that logic cannot, derived as it is from cognition tempered by unique perceptual forms, grasp noumenal existence then there is no reason to suppose that the logical attributes of our phenomenal world have any other than a partial relation to the real world as it might exist separate from sensation. The foundation of epistemology must be based on an understood and agreed upon logic rooted in experience, and the practical results of logical inference must correspond to our actual world expectations. Nevertheless, sometimes even the simplest and seemingly most obvious occurrences remain obscured, and what we take as known is actually something very vague and indefinite, Something, more often than not, simply labeled for convenience sake and then passed over in silence as if a thing now named were actually understood. This is undoubtedly the reason why many attempts to explain the world are so often met with incredulity and confusion. For Ouspensky, an example of this type of thinking is found in the physical theory of relativity. Nowadays it is common for the average man to be familiar (at least in name) with "the theory" and most would unthinkingly affirm the incontrovertible truth of this idea. At the same time the average man would be hard pressed to formulate the theory in any coherent or meaningful fashion. And when one attempts to come to grips with the fundamentals of relativity one is immediately struck by its obvious non-logical nature. Nevertheless, we do not usually stop to consider whether this illogic might result from a fundamental misunderstanding of various ideas usually taken as self evident and certain. Ouspensky regards the origin of the notion of contradictory properties of observed phenomena to be resident in the idea of scale. To cite an example, our primary misunderstanding and, hence, ensuing misrepresentation of natural law as it relates to relativity originates from the generally accepted notion of phenomenal homogeneity. That is, we have traditionally presumed the consistency of phenomena and made this view a fundamental axiom of theory formation. This conviction was never challenged so long as our perception involved only events which were commensurate with our primary cognitive faculty, i.e., our biological senses and concomitant reason. As a result consistency between theory and experience was maintained.
If we consider the various technologies as extensions of our physical and psychic being it is probably easier to understand how our present confusion in formulating coherent theory arose. Everyday life allows no conflict between what we perceive and what we expect to perceive. This, again, is fundamental to the logic of our perceptual categories and, as Ouspensky notes, is nothing less than the experience of the general consecutiveness of phenomena. Although trivial, it is nevertheless worth repeating that if this were not the case there would be no foundation whatsoever for positive science. Now, beginning in the latter part of the 19th century certain discoveries confounded the usual logical relations which heretofore established the principles of natural law. These new "discoveries" which in no way could be explained with existing scientific or philosophic material corresponded directly to the amplification of our senses by technology. Our perception became expanded in a heretofore unprecedented manner and, teleologically speaking it is true, unanticipated by our biology. For the first time we experienced events which had been hidden from our natural means of perception.
In our normal everyday world we exist within a three dimensional continuum bounded by time. By technologically extending our perception we became aware of, on the one hand, a "higher" world of astronomical space and, conversely, a "lower" electronic world each existing independently from the day to day world available to direct, nonenhanced perception. And because our preexisting logic was never adapted to or prepared for engaging these "new worlds" we became confounded in our attempt at logically interpreting fundamentally incommensurate phenomena and its attendant properties. Thus we were unwilling to accept outright the possibility that our given logic would not naturally apply to non-commensurate worlds when viewed within the conventions of a traditional perspective.
From a common sense point of view the world is one and the same for all phenomena (or possible phenomena). However, if spatio-temporal relations are categories intrinsic to the mechanism of perception and not "things" separately perceived then there is no reason to presume that phenomena not meant to be perceived (again, teleologically speaking) ought necessarily conform to our logical expectations. 6 It is as though the limits of our natural perception delineates a boundary which allows consistent logical relations within its own scale, yet once this proportion is exceeded our logic cannot accurately interpret the data. Hence reason is consequently forced to construct new logical modes. For Ouspensky, relativity theory is an example of this kind of struggle inasmuch as it is an attempt to reconcile at first contradictory intuitions such as the fact that all terrestrial velocities are relative whereas the velocity of light remains constant. A similar paradox can be found in the quantum theory.
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ESOTERIC IDEA
'Tertium Organum' is primarily a study of psychology even though it is far removed from what we typically consider under the rubric of psychological studies. The book's theme is not the psychology of everyday life, but, rather, noumenal psychology. That is, the psychology of higher dimensional perception or the psychology of higher mind. Inasmuch as the science of higher geometric space is called metageometry, perhaps it would be better to call the study of higher consciousness metapsychology, however we know this subject more familiarly under the common name mysticism.
An analysis of the psychological foundations of our present epistemology finds its basis in the standard logic generally ascribed to and flowing from Aristotle. As mentioned previously, traditional logical convenances carry with them the weight of describing the form of a three dimensional world in time whereas the coterminous psychology is idealized by the "rational mind." That is, a means of thinking and behaving consistent with laws existing in the everyday world. Also, a way of thinking which allows an explanation of phenomena in a manner consonant with our collective life experiences. Indeed, explanations which do not portend the sensual world are considered fantastic and, today, at least by certain philosophical schools, unworthy of recognition. In the extreme, non-rational ideas may be considered pathological, indicative of certain psychological disorders. 7
Side by side with the rational there exists widely promulgated nonrational beliefs accepted and encouraged by every class of human association from the most loosely knit and primitive bands to the great civilizations. Beginning with an oral tradition later codified certain of these beliefs evolved making the major religions. In the West the chief place among these ideas is occupied by various divisions of the Christian faith. The psychological significance the role religious thought plays in the life of man cannot be underestimated. Contrary to a modernist positivistic thread grounded in an essentially materialist psycho-epistemolgy which understands the metaphysical problems of man to be wrongheaded and moot at best, the majority of mankind has known either vaguely or explicitly that certain questions cannot be approached much less solved using the intellectual material at hand. For this majority religious thought suffices to assuage the anxieties of not knowing using what at first appears to be simplistic answers to complex questions. Many modern psychological critiques have rightly understood the pacifying effects of seemingly foolish and quite simply, if taken literally, absurd religious explanations. 8 In their attempts at criticism they have routinely dismissed not only the drive towards religious activity which has been incorrectly interpreted as unsophisticated naivete, but also denied the inward or esoteric idea contained within the germ of outward or exoteric religiosity. And it is in the varieties of religious thought that Ouspensky finds a key or a possible avenue for approaching the noumenal world.
Throughout his life Ouspensky believed that mind can operate on qualitatively different levels, however in our normal day to day existence we typically experience or recognize mere quantitative differences within the same level of mind. Different levels of mind are directly associated with different levels of Being and not related to our notions of either genius or idiocy which are but ranges on a continuum within the level of normal everyday mind. Separate and distinct levels of mind manifest as fundamental differences in the evolution of individual human consciousness. That is to say, higher mind represents the development within a single person of an entirely new and different way of understanding. As a qualitative difference in knowledge and understanding there is no guarantee that all men can be privy to these distinctions; the acquisition of esoteric knowledge is not a democratic process, and it remains a big question as to how one may become associated with esoteric ideas and how one begins to recognize higher mind.
Acroamatic relics are our only link, albeit an indirect one, with higher mind. Simply, it is the task of certain artifacts to convey ideas which cannot be related in ordinary discursive language due to the paucity or limitedness of language in passing on superincumbent thought. Just as metageometry is limited in the ways it can convey the idea of higher dimensional space by using surface analogies so too is esotericism limited in the manner it transmits the science of higher mind. Ouspensky believed that esoteric ideas are necessarily communicated symbolically within the traditional framework of art, science, and religion but cannot be approached without special preparation. Generally speaking, modern philosophy (at least the philosophy which has been prominent in 20th century institutions) denies the possibility of a knowledge which surpasses ordinary thought and requires not only specially prepared material but training before it can be addressed. Yet modern philosophy has rightly understood its position even if this ultimately meant abandoning what has traditionally fallen within the rubric of philosophy. 9 Therefore, if one is to take philosophy seriously as a means of satisfying man's desire to apprehend the unexplainable we must abandon the line of positivism represented by certain modern schools and look elsewhere. For Ouspensky, the radical embrace of both the esoteric idea and the psychological method as a channel for understanding satisfied this condition.
Ouspensky taught that throughout history certain artifacts of higher mind have appeared and those with the ability to translate or decipher the meanings of the authors of these works can, themselves, attain at least the possibility of reaching higher mind. Examples in art given by Ouspensky include the Sphinx of Ghiza, certain Gothic cathedrals 10, selected "religious" texts such as the Gospels and the Upanishads (even though the interpretation of each of these as works of esoteric art must necessarily transcend the usual archaeological interpretations and, in the case of the Gospels, the usual church interpretations). For instance, Ouspensky rejects the dogmatic Christian view of the Gospels as popular religious texts considering them, instead, principally psychological arguments the purpose of which was never intended to create and subsequently support an eschatological bureaucratic religion. And in the case of the Gospels it has been their usurpation by men of ordinary mind which has led to the creation and popularization of Christianity with its attendant simplistic doctrines and less than inspired but often base and contemptible history.
A strictly pedantic or theoretical understanding of higher mind is no more than an approach to a fuller understanding of the real or noumenal world but does not yet offer authentic knowledge. A real appreciation of the principals of higher mind cannot be gleaned by way of intellectual or artistic apprehension because of the character of our present condition. As stated previously, an understanding of esotericism necessitates a qualitative change in being and not simply a familiarity with new concepts filtered through the vagaries of our mind. This is perhaps the most difficult tenant of Ouspensky's teaching to grasp. Usually we approach an unlearned subject with the attitude that although we are presently unfamiliar with the particular argument we can, by protracted effort of our conventional faculties of apprehension, come to know the unknown. Ouspensky tells us that in with our present subject this is not the case. Before we can understand the noumenal world of "higher space" we must first develop, within ourselves, the beginnings of higher mind. Of course, the obvious question is how does one proceed? 11
THE THEORY OF ETERNAL RETURN
A central belief of Ouspensky is the doctrine known variously as eternal return or recurrence. Surprisingly, in spite of the relative obscurity of this idea the theory has nevertheless had adherents throughout the ages and influenced many notable thinkers. The most recent well known champion of the theory was James Joyce whose novel , 'Finnegans Wake', is based wholly on the idea. As a philosophical tenant we generally associate the name of Nietzsche with this view, and in spite of the relatively lesser impact this idea has had upon many of his academic commentators, within the corpus of Nietzsche's writings it has been recognized as central by certain influential reviewers.12 In Western thought the doctrine is associated by reference to Pythagorus through the commentaries of Eudemus of Rhodes, by Archytas of Tarentum, perhaps Plotinus, and the sixth-centurian Neoplatonist, Simplicius. With its emphasis on eschatology modern Christianity never supported the doctrine, although Ouspensky cites several passages within the Gospels which, in his opinion, indicate that Christ himself was conversant with the notion of repetition, and he offers a passage in Origen's 'On First Principles' as an indication of early Christianity's attempt to discredit the idea. 13 Recurrence as a cosmogonical hypothesis was never considered tenable, although as a moral foundation it possesses a certain appeal. That is, if all actions are repeated eternally the imperative to maximize one's condition might be heightened. Still, with few exceptions this too was found lacking as a foundation of any deontic theory, and today the average man would be surprised to encounter the idea. Of course for Ouspensky recurrence was neither a physical nor a moral theory but was, instead, a metaphysical ground flowing from his metageometrical conception of the form of the world.
Looking back on our speculative discussion regarding the four dimensional representation of our life we recall that any four dimensional figure necessarily encompasses the entire life of a thing and is not just a series of discrete moments hung together by memory. To understand the relation of the theory of recurrence to Ouspensky's so called "new model" let us imagine a specific geometrical form in its relation to our life. We start with the line making up the life of a man. One point, birth, begins in the year 1900 while the line ends with the death of the subject in, say, 1970. The entire figure of the complete life of the man constitutes a four dimensional form. Now, let us curve the line into an angle of 360 degrees. Here, the end of the line connects to the beginning. Death ends in birth. A man is born in 1900, lives his life, dies in 1970 and is reborn again in 1900 encountering the exact same circumstances of his previous existence. Consciousness limited to the three dimensional phenomenal form does not recognize the endlessness of the loop of existence, but only the static moment. A man understands his birth but never comprehends what could come "before" nor, with any real knowledge, does he understand what awaits "after" death even though, depending upon his life circumstances, there exist numerous "religious" expositions regarding the supposed afterlife which he might embrace with varying degrees of confidence..
Embracing the fixity of recurrence would seemingly negate any possibility of real change or evolution in the state of an individual man for if one is destined to relive one's life over in all aspects can anyone hope to escape the hand he or she is dealt? This is an open question but one Ouspensky attempts to address with the doctrine of possibilities. That is, at every moment in time various possibilities of action present themselves, at least potentially. As we move through time a set course unfolds consisting in the actualization of certain possibilities. Certainly, as long as we remain unconscious to the several possibilities inherent within each moment we are unwittingly carried along within our particular time. If alternate life circumstances are even possible it can only occur after the attainment of a level of consciousness which allows an individual to recognize the potential for change inherent within each moment of one's life. For Ouspensky, man as he currently exists is tied to a particular line and has absolutely no possibility of changing his condition, however it is the purpose of the esoteric idea to show a way out of our current unproductive cycle of recurrence. 14
MISC. THOUGHTS
POLITICS: Ouspensky wrote that while politics could not solve man's fundamental problems, it could certainly create conditions necessary for impeding the possibility of individual development. He was disillusioned with communism, especially the regime of the Bolsheviks, and warned against Western association with Russian communism. Indeed, had he not escaped to the West it is likely he would have been killed during the Stalin era. At best one might infer from his positions on non political matters that, perhaps, Western style liberal democracy with a strong component of individual rights best suited his views.
INSTITUTIONALISM: Established cultural institutions received little respect. Ouspensky generally regarded institutional forms to be stultifying and, in the long run, a hindrance for free thought. He termed modern Christianity in its bureaucratic hierarchical form a "sham" and viewed the academy with similar distrust. A well known saying from Ouspensky is that, in his view, professors were killing the university in the same manner that priests had killed the church.
PSYCHOLOGY: Modern psychology lost all connection with it's roots which, from the beginning, was never known as "psychology" proper, a separate and distinct discipline apart from science and the humanities but was, instead, connected with true religion, certain philosophical schools, and, in the East, yogic practices the purpose which led to transformation or evolution of the human psyche. In this sense, modern psychology existed simply for the edification and classification of certain so-called psychic pathologies or abnormalities. His views on Freud were particularly disparaging.
PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENCES: Ouspensky was particularly impressed with the nature of scientific and philosophical thought inasmuch as inside these disciplines were contained the germ or at least the possibility of a beginning grasp of ways leading to possible solutions of the fundamental problems of man's existence. Of all Western philosophers Kant probably fares best but only to the extent that he (Kant) offered an important reading of the noumena-phenomena distinction. The movement of modern philosophy away from metaphysics, particularly the development of logical analysis was, for Ouspensky, wrongheaded. He likely would have agreed with Wittgenstein who, in the preface of the Tractatus, admits how little is really gained following this particular line. Nietzsche also fares surprising well. Here, we are impressed by the agreement between the two on the importance of the Superman and the doctrine of eternal return, even though in the latter Ouspensky criticizes Nietzsche's explanation of the necessity of return in physical space and in local time. As an aside to the poetics (some might say, obfuscations) of Nietzsche, Ouspensky had a fondness for the occult literature prevalent during his day but only inasmuch as it indicated a possible avenue for further explorations of questions which philosophy and science had long since abandoned. All the same he discounted any authentic value such writings might possess in the way of offering real knowledge, and considered most of the material mere fancy.
Ouspensky had the highest regard for mathematicians and geometers, especially those whose investigations paved the ground for understanding the, then, new ideas being introduced in physics. The names of Bolyai, Gauss, Riemann, and Lobatchevsky are prominent. In physics Minkovsky, Fitzgerald and Lorentz, Bohr, and Einstein are discussed, however Ouspensky always maintained that the introduction of mathematical physics into the analysis of strictly physical phenomena along with the development and pervasive acceptance of relativity theory was an instance of a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of phenomena derived from an inherently limited perspective. As mentioned previously and to cite an example, the idea of universal gravitation falls away once we rid ourselves of the idea of separate "things" moving in space and time.
NOTES
1) See, 'Gnosis: Study and Commentaries on the Esoteric Tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy, Book One, Exoteric Cycle', by Boris Mouravieff, Praxis Institute Press, Newbury, MA, 1989. In the Foreword Mouravieff writes, "My own relations with Ouspensky, who I knew well, were described in an article of the review 'Syntheses'. I must reaffirm here that although Ouspensky had a spirited desire to publish his book during his lifetime, he always hesitated to do so. I myself had stressed the danger of fragmentary disclosure, and uncertainties in the exposition of certain essential points. The fact that 'Fragments' was only published after the death of the author, more than twenty years after it was written, supports these assertions." On the other hand, in 'A New Model of the Universe', Ouspensky wrote of his intention to publish the doctrine of "different time for different cosmoses" in an upcoming book, presumably the 'Fragments', and this particular canon was undoubtedly learnt from Gurdjieff. Towards the end of his life and as transcribed in 'A Record of Meetings' Ouspensky stated unequivocally that he would not publish 'Fragments.'
2) Many of the meetings which Ouspensky held with members of his circle were transcribed literally. One can only speculate on this purpose if not for the express use of future generations of students.
3) There also exists a series of essays originally written in 1919 for A.R. Orage's publication, New Age, describing life in Bolshevik Russia prior to the start of the world war, and released in book form under the title 'Letters from Russia', Arkana, Wrights Lane, London, 1978.
4) Metageometry in this sense must not be confused with standard nonEuclidean geometries, the latter being a revaluation of Euclid's axioms which, by challenging the basic definition of the physical properties of surfaces, led to a new understanding of conventional space. Within this convention the axioms of a given geometry, whether standard Euclidean or not, remain logical properties of surfaces "in space." Thus the form of both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries remains three dimensional whereas metageometry extends geometry into the realm of higher dimensional space.
5) Curiously, such a view is closely related to the properly understood religious idea of eternity. G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware offer the following definition in the Glossary of their translation of 'The Philokalia of St. Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St. Makarios of Corinth', Faber and Faber, London, 1979: "Frequently a distinction is made between the 'present age' and the 'age to come' or 'the new age'. The first corresponds to our present sense of time, the second to time as exists in God, that is, to eternity understood, not as endless time, but as the simultaneous presence of all time. Certain texts, especially in St. Maximos the Confessor, also use the term aeon in a connected but more specific way, to denote a level intermediate between eternity in the full sense (aidiotis) and time as known to us in our present experience (chronos). There are thus three levels: (a) eternity, the totum simul or simultaneous presence of all time and reality as known to God, who alone has neither origin nor end, and who therefore is alone eternal in the full sense; (b) the aeon, the totum simul as known to the angels, and also to human persons who possess experience of the 'age to come': although having no end, these angelic or human beings, since they are created, are not self-originating and therefore are not eternal in the sense that God is eternal; (c) time, that is, temporal succession as known to us in the present age."
In Ch 2 of the Bhaktivedanta translation of Text 12 of the sixth book of the 'Mahabharata', published as 'Bhagavad-Gita: As It Is', Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, New York, 1968, we find the following passage: "Never was there a time when I (Krishna) did not exist, nor you (Arjuna), nor all these kings; nor in the future shall any of us cease to exist." The Barbara Stoller Miller translation, subtitled 'Krishna's Counsel in Time of War', Bantam, New York, 1986, while not as "readable" as that of A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, does, nevertheless, succinctly convey the idea of eternity in her rendering of Text 16: "Nothing of nonbeing comes to be, nor does being cease to exist; the boundary between these two is seen by men who 'see reality' (italics, added)."
In Chapter 5, Book 2 of 'The Idiot', Dostoevsky comments on the strange Biblical passage oft quoted by Ouspensky and found in Revelation 10:6, "there shall be no more time", when describing, in almost mystic terms Myshkin's reminiscence of his epileptic fit as "the very second which was not long enough for the water to be spilt out of Mahomet's pitcher, though the epileptic prophet had time to gaze at all the habitations of Allah." Interestingly, the King James version preserves the meaning of the Russian Orthodox translation undoubtedly used by Dostoevsky, whereas the New International version removes certain words giving the passage an entirely different meaning.
Neither is this distinction lost in philosophy proper. As an example, proposition 6.4311 of Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' reads, "Death is not an event in life: we do not experience death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. Our life has no end just as our visual field has no limits."
6) When speaking of phenomena we are necessarily speaking of things perceived. Thus it is awkward to discuss "phenomena not meant to be perceived." Yet by extending our natural perceptive faculties through technological means we are able to intuit phenomena not directly meant for our purview. Of course what is subsequently discovered as a result of the use of various technologies remains phenomenal in nature since it is only a partial intuition of a larger, noumenal whole.
7) It must be stated that the current taxonomy of psychological disorders meticulously categorized in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, at least those not explicitly attributable to organic causes, are for the most part politically or socially validated. This can especially be seen in certain sexual deviancies which over the years have been "declassified" from the official list of mental illnesses along with certain antisocial behaviors now admitted as "mental disorders". Of course in most instances of "psychological illness" the medical profession is simply classifying unusual behavior and not, strictly speaking, identifying disease.
8) An exhaustive list of thinkers typifying this view would be long indeed, however any list of the most influential would likely have Marx and Freud at the top.
9) In his 'History of Western Philosophy' Bertrand Russell briefly discusses the tenants of the philosophy of logical analysis and its relation to usual conceptions of philosophy as propaedeutic to moral and political behavior flowing from a transcendental or metaphysical warrant. In Russell's view natural science becomes the paradigm for philosophical investigations whereas non-empirical speculative philosophy based on reason is essentially untenable. He writes, "in regard to certain problems [logical analysis can] achieve definite answers which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy." Russell openly admits a that "vast" field of concerns not amenable to scientific methodology necessarily remains but casually dismisses these affairs to the realm of mere feeling. Not surprisingly, because of these delimits philosophy cannot, in Russell's opinion, answer simple questions such as why we should not 'enjoy' inflicting cruelty. Faced with such dilemmas, "they [logical analysts] confess frankly that the human intellect is unable to find conclusive answers to many questions of profound importance to mankind, but they refuse to believe that there is some "higher" way of knowing by which we can discover truths hidden from science and the intellect."
10) Chapter Two, Book Five of 'Notre Dame de Paris' offers a brief but nevertheless interesting analysis of architectural symbolism making special note of the famous Parisian cathedral. Victor Hugo writes, "from the beginning of things to the fifteenth century of the Christian era inclusive, architecture was the great book of the human race, man's principal means of expressing the various stages of his development, physical and mental." When speaking specifically of the great cathedrals he points out that, "sometimes a door, a facade, an entire church presents a symbolical meaning, absolutely unconnected with the worship, even hostile to the teaching of the Church." And, "because architecture was the only free medium, it therefore found full expression in those books called edifices. Without them, new ideas would have been burned in the public square."
11) At this point in the discussion it is difficult to separate the psychology contained within Ouspensky's own books with the teaching he learned from his association with G.I. Gurdjieff. In many respects the authorized works are really only a starting point, and anyone considering a further exposition of the actual psychological method practiced and taught by Ouspensky would do well to consult 'Fragments'. There are many secondary works concerning the teachings of G.I. Gurdjieff and, to a lesser extent, Ouspensky. Perhaps the most in depth is a five volume work, 'Psychological Commentaries on the Teaching of G.I. Gurdjieff and P.D. Ouspensky' by Dr. Maurice Nicoll , which has been available from time to time (although it is evidently out of print as of this writing). These are a collection of lectures covering many aspects of this subject and offer, perhaps, a more practical accounting of the subject.
12) As an example, Martin Heidegger devotes an entire book, 'The Eternal Recurrence of the Same', to this topic in his four volume analysis of Nietzsche. 'The Will to Power as Art', 'The Will to Power as Knowledge', and, finally, 'Nihilism' make up the remainder.
13) Piecing together the beliefs of a quasi-historical figure such as Christ, or attributing a line of thought to the likes of Pythagorus, both whom never wrote or if they did their writings are lost to the ages, is problematical at best. Even with contemporary figures certain major ambiguities in meaning often manifest. For instance, when speaking of recurrence Ouspensky mentions Lermontoff, an author who made a strong impression on him at an early age. A certain passage taken from a 1928 translation of 'A Hero of Our Time' and quoted by PDO in 'A New Model' follows: "I was exhilarated to feel myself so high above the world. It was a childish feeling, of course, but when we get away from artificial conditions and approach nearer to Nature we cannot help becoming children. All that we have acquired falls away from our being and we become once more what we were and what we shall one day assuredly be again (italics added). " Contrast this with the 1966 Paul Foote translation (Penguin Books, Wrights Lane, London) of the same passage: "I felt somehow happy to be so high above the world-- a childish feeling, I grant, but we can't but help becoming children when we leave social conventions behind and come nearer to nature. All life's experience is shed from us and the soul becomes anew what it once was and will surely be again." The latter meaning is much more abstract, poetical and nonspecific than the text quoted by Ouspensky.
14) This line of thought is, in a certain way, a line of thought central to the teachings of Gurdjieff, however inasmuch as it bears a relation to recurrence it is probably germane to include in an exposition of Ouspensky's native views.