[Excerpted from W. T. Sherman, "The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion,"The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine, Vol. 36 (1888), pp. 597-598]
In 1872 I visited Europe in the frigate Wabash, and was landed at Gibraltar, held by England with a full war garrison, composed of all arms of service, commanded by Sir Fenwick Williams of Kars, a general of great renown, whose officers were thoroughly educated and of marked intelligence. They-naturally questioned me as to the conduct of our civil war; they could comprehend how we might, out of our intelligent citizens, create battalions of infantry, but were incredulous when I explained that we had been equally successful with artillery, engineers, ordnance and staff, the scientific branches of the military service; and when I further claimed that most of our campaigns had been conducted according to the highest military principles, as taught by their General Hamley in the staff school at Aldershot, I could read in their faces signs of more than doubt. The same or similar experiences occurred afterwards at Malta, and in the clubs of London.
In Russia I found the army officers specially well informed about American affairs. At Vladi Kavkas, a city at the north base of the Caucasian range of mountains, Mr. Curtin and I, with our party, were entertained by a brigadier-general and the officers of his command, who welcomed us in a speech referring to Grant and Sheridan, Farragut and Porter, with as much precision as could have been expected at Denver. In Italy also there prevailed a similar public feeling, and there I encountered several who had been to America, and had shared in some of our campaigns.
In Germany the army officers seemed so well satisfied with themselves, by reason of their then recent victories over the French, that they gave little heed to our affairs on this side of the Atlantic. In all their garrisoned towns they were drilling morning, noon, and night, at the squad drill, at the company drill, and in the school of the battalion; and if industry and attention to details are ruling elements in the science of war, then will the German battalions maintain the cohesion and strength they displayed in the war of 1870-71, With such battalions as units, there can be no scarcity of skilled officers and generals.
In like manner the French had not yet recovered from their defeats at Woerth, Metz, Gravelotte, Sedan, and Paris. With them the separation of the officer from the soldier was much more marked than in any other of the military establishments I witnessed in Europe, and one of their most renowned generals attributed to this cause their defeat and national humiliation; specifying that when their armies were hastily assembled on the Rhine, the soldiers did not personally know their captains and company officers, and these in turn could not distinguish their own commanders. I infer, however, from recent accounts, that General Boulanger, who attended our centennial celebration at Yorktown in 1881, has corrected much of this, and has infused into the French army somewhat of his own youthful ardor and spirit, so that if a new war should arise in Europe we may expect different results.
Nevertheless, for service in our wooded country, where battles must be
fought chiefly by skirmishers and " thin lines," I prefer our
own people. They possess more individuality, more self-reliance, learn more
quickly the necessity for organization and discipline, and will follow where
they have skilled leaders in whom they have confidence. Any one of the corps
of the Army of the Potomac, or of the West, would not have hesitated to
meet after 1863, in open ground, an equal number of the best drilled German
troops. This, of course, may seem an idle boast; it is only meant to convey
my opinion that the American people need not fear a just comparison in warlike
qualities with those of any other nation. We are more likely to err in the
other direction, in over-confidence, by compelling inferior numbers and
undisciplined men to encounter superior troops, exposing them to certain
defeat-a "cruel and inhuman " act on the part of any government.
Strength in war results from organization, cohesion, and discipline, which
require time and experience; but war is an expensive luxury, too costly
to maintain even to secure these important results: therefore the greater
necessity for fostering a national militia, and supporting military schools
like that at West Point, which has proven its inestimable value to the nation
as General Washington predicted, and as every war in America during this
century has demonstrated.