U.S. Diplomatic Dispatches
on the Nazi Movment in Germany in 1932

[Extracted from The Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers 1932. Vol. II: The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa (Washington, DC: The Department of State, 1947), pp. 276-323]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1931.

The following are certain brief observations regarding events m Germany:

(1) Hitler's position, both on the basis of votes cast and psychologically, is unquestionably obtaining increased strength and there is a general expectation that his groups will attain power soon, either as part of the present Government or in charge of the Government. Certain characteristics of the Hitler program are becoming increasingly evident:

(a) The extent to which his program and ideas seem to resemble those of Fascist Italy. As a matter of fact, the Bruening decrees are already creating a relationship between government and industry that approaches the Italian scheme and the step over to the Hitler program would not be very great. The chief difference might turn out to be that the trade unions, instead of retaining their international socialist character, would take on a national Fascist complexion and be under the control of the central Government.

(b) Hitler seems to be making a very strong play for the favor of international private banking groups by promising complete respect for their debts and a curb upon future German borrowings. This is calculated in the first place to reassure them, and in the second place to rally them against France.

(c) For the rest, his patriotic utterances in general resemble those of Mussolini a very few years ago--national war cries without any defined objective.

(2) The reaction of the French and the French Government to all this is not yet clear.

The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Boal)

BERLIN, 12 January, 1932. [Received January 27.]

MY DEAR MR. BOAL: Your letter of December 10th, enclosing memorandum of certain brief observations regarding events in Germany, was duly received by pouch and I have been at work compiling the necessary data to give you the Embassy's views on the subject matter.

While they may not be in exact accord with what you have worked out, they are not far from it. You will find among the Embassy's despatches one, No. 1326, dated 7 December, 1931, which gives perhaps a few observations that may be of interest in this connection.

The enclosed memorandum is a composite of the Embassy's views, which has been prepared by Mr. Kliefoth and subjected to a few amendments by the rest of us. The only statement in connection with it which I cannot quite agree with occurs at the bottom of the second page, where it gives an estimate of what would be the results if a general election were now held. I am inclined to think that the Social Democrat and Communist group would be a larger percentage of the total than that stated. In fact, in an interview with the Chancellor today, he made the statement to me that if an election were held today it would be found that the Social Democratic group was still the largest party in Germany.

Assuring you of my pleasure in being able to send you this material [etc.]

FREDERIC M. SACKETT

Memorandum by the American Embassy

(1) Hitler's political future.

Hitler's political movement, which was practically down and out following the abortive putsch in Munich in 1923, has since gained a large ascendency with the increase of unemployment in Germany. The past year particularly has witnessed a phenomenal gain in successive local elections, the Nazis having profited tremendously by the depression and the growing unemployment. The belief, however, that there is no limit to future Nazi gains and that they will continue in geometric progression is undoubtedly erroneous.

The returns of the general election in September, 1930, showed that the Nazis had, throughout the Reich, on an average of 18.3 per cent of the qualified voters. These elections showed that Hitler's gains were made mostly at the expense of the non-Socialist parties of the Middle and the Right. Hitler has been unable to draw appreciably from the strength of the two Catholic parties (Bavarian People's Party and Center Party), or to affect the combined strength of the Socialist parties of the Left (Communists and Social-Democrats) as the considerable losses of the Social-Democrats, during the past year, were absorbed by an equivalent increase in the Communist vote.

The most significant local election during the year 1931 was that of the Free State of Hesse. Unlike the other local elections, as pointed out in the Embassy's despatch No. 1279 of November 17, 1931~S it had more than local significance. The distribution of political strength in Hesse resembles more closely the political constellation throughout the Reich. On the basis of the returns of local elections throughout the Reich during the past year and particularly considering that in Hesse, but not taking into consideration further unexpected popular support of the Nazis, it is estimated that, if a general election were now held, the Catholic parties would obtain about 15 per cent of the votes cast, the non-Socialist parties (from the State Party up to and including the Nationalists) 15 per cent, the Marxist parties of the Left (Social-Democrats and Communists) about 35 per cent, and the Nazis 35 per cent. The Nazis would certainly become the strongest party in a new Reichstag. That they can collect, as Hitler claims, in a new general election over 50 per cent of all the votes cast and assume power alone, that is, without entering into a coalition with other parties, does not seem at all probable. On the other hand, a coalition with the two Catholic parties seems probable, as a necessary condition precedent to Hitler's entering the Government.

Hitler's interview with the foreign press, on December 4, in which he stressed his capitalistic program assuming the sanctity of private foreign debts, has, according to his own lieutenants, cooled the ardor of many of the more radical elements within the "National-Socialist" Party, but while it has allayed their fears it has failed to attract to his cause outstanding individuals. The prominent Germans who are avowed followers of Hitler may be counted on the fingers of two hands though several rich industrialists would be included. The recent assurances in Hitler's speeches on economic matters have won over certain business elements but have very much slowed up the intensity of his appeal to the particularly undigested youth of the country who were previously attracted to him as a crusader. As the latter far outnumber the former from a voting standpoint it is felt in most circles that Nazi gains in voting strength will be considerably diminished in the immediate future.

Though the Nazis' gains in the communal elections held in the Free State of Lippe on January 10th were about 40 per cent as compared with the Reichstag election in September, 1930, the result was far below their gains in other similar elections in the past year, particularly in Hesse... where they were able to double their following.

a) The extent to which his program and ideas seem to resemble those of Fascist Italy.

The program of Fascist Italy really has little in common with that of the Nazis in Germany. Whereas Fascism is based on the idea of a cooperative state, Hitlerism is based on the old Hohenzollern and Prussian idea of strong centralization, imperialism and expansion (Hitler's advocacy of centralized government was undoubtedly responsible for the present hostile attitude toward him by the Bavarian Government). The programs are similar in that both Fascism and Hitlerism depend on chauvinism and are opposed to emigration of their peoples. Whereas in the latter the element of anti-Semitism plays a prominent role, it is entirely lacking in the former. The substance of Fascism is Mussolini's personality; the same applies in a much lesser degree to Hitlerism. Mussolini has the intellect and bearing of a martial hero; Hitler has the intellect of a crusading sectarian leader--oblivious of dangers which surround him--but with intense energy and relentless in the pursuit of his aims.

The Brüning Government by emergency decrees has established a situation which under certain circumstances would enable a complete transition to government by dictatorship without upsetting the country. Banking, commerce and industry are already accustomed to function under a semi-dictatorial government and the change to a Hitler dictatorship would not be great, provided Hitler did not impose compulsory measures. It is doubtful, however, whether Hitler would succeed in bringing the German trade unions under a Nazi national dictatorship. The present existing trade unions make up the Social-Democratic Party, oppose dictatorship and constitute the strongest opposition to Hitler, and the two movements are irreconcilable. The strongest of these are the trade unions organized by the Social-Democrats, which are in control of communications and the key industries. The conservative Catholic trade unions are next in strength. They constitute the Left wing of the Center Party and the link with the Social-Democrats. The rest of the trade unions are under the control of the Communists. The workers controlled by Hitler are principally those who represent the floating labor population of Germany, who lack the disciplined organization of the trade unionists. They are also apt to drop away from Hitler the minute the depression ends. The opposition trade unionists possess a most powerful weapon against Hitler, that is, the general strike, which they would probably employ in case the Nazis attempt to obtain control by use of force. The Nazis, on the other hand, claim that their S. A. troops are organized principally for the purpose of dealing with internal disorders and would be able to cope with a general strike....

b) Hitler, especially during the last two months, has taken a very strong stand to obtain the favor of international private banking groups. He promised them the full payment of Germany's private debts, but not "a cent of tribute," that is, the cancellation of all political debts, reparations, etc. His purpose was to reassure them and, quite obviously, to gain their support in opposing the French reparations demands.

c) Hitler's patriotic utterances in general resemble those of Mussolini a few years ago--national war cries without defined objective.

Both Hitler and Mussolini demand territorial expansion for their peoples. Hitler apparently hopes to achieve the union of all German nations, that is, Austria and Germany, and the return of all former German territory, as Memel, Danzig, Upper Silesia, and not excluding Alsace-Lorraine, under a strongly federalized German state, and a return of German colonies. Hitler's war cries, especially up to last December, greatly resembled those of Mussolini of a few years ago. Now he endeavors to be more diplomatic, especially in order not to offend Great Britain, Italy and the United States. The real program of Hitler, especially in the field of foreign affairs and the economic reform of Germany, has not been sufficiently revealed to enable careful examination.

d) The reaction of the French and the French Government to the Nazis.

Following Hitler's recent interview to the representatives of the American and British press in Berlin, the French press showed increased interest in the Nazis aspirations. A spirit of dismay, uneasiness and alarm characterized the editorial comment. The French Nationalist press seems to be in constant fear of a Hitlerized Germany, and of an alliance between Hitler and Mussolini although men like Leon Daudet welcome a Nazi regime of intransigence, as this, they feel, would give France an opportunity to down Germany. The French Government points to the agitation of the Nazis as an argument in support of the French demands for security. The French, too, are much concerned over the attitude of the British. Great Britain they fear, would not sympathize with another invasion of the Ruhr, in case the Germans under Hitler repudiate reparations

Poland, the ally of France and the Eastern neighbor of Germany, would welcome the advent of Hitler. The Polish belief is that little or nothing would be changed in Germany but that the "real aims" of the Reich would be "unmasked." Moreover, a German-French rapprochement would be made impossible, thus eliminating one of Poland's major sources of concern.

JANUARY 5,1932.

The Counselor of Embassy in Germany (Wiley) to the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Boal)

BERLIN, February 17, 1932

[Received March 26(?)]

DEAR PIERRE: Many thanks for your letter of February 2. The Embassy has over a period of years reported pretty much all that it could learn on the National-Socialist movement. The various consulates in Germany have done likewise. Of particular interest is a despatch from the Consulate General at Munich of November 13, 1931, which reports the intellectual conception of the movement in extenso. In attempting to give any concise statement as to the vague aims and vaguer program of the Party, there has been the danger that a report from the Embassy might be more misleading than helpful.

There is a great tendency on the part of the Nazis to talk in generalities and to evade any clear-cut commitment as to the future. To one inquirer Herr Hitler will state that General Motors, for example, need fear nothing from his advent to power. To another, Herr Hitler has declared that of course the Woolworth Stores in Germany would have to go at once. No very clear-cut line t

Since I have been here I have had the opportunity to see a number of Nazi and Stahlhelm leaders. The former, in talking with foreigners, have become very moderate. The Stahlhelm on the contrary has become rabid.

Today I encountered Dr. Goebbels. He is one of the National-Socialist Party's chief orators, edits the Angriff, the evening organ of the Party, with Frick heads the Reichstag faction, and plays a heavy role in the party councils. Government circles regard him as particularly radical. I found him more intelligent than any other Nazi I have met. He obviously has first-rate ability and much personal magnetism.

Goebbels characterizes the Party as a pyramid: at the head is Hitler; under him stand the chief party leader,, such as Epp, Goehring [Goering] (I have previously reported one or two conversations with Goehring), Frick (who may be the Nazi candidate in the first presidential elections) and Goebbels. Goebbels divided the pyramid into sectors. One section of approximately 40 percent represented, he said, the agrarian element; the peasantry, small, middle and large farmers and estate owners. Another 40 percent represented the labor element, the intellectual proletariat and very small bourgeoisie. The remaining sector was mostly taken up by the middle Bourgeoisie, officer and professional classes and small industrialists. There was a tiny participation of big industry. This last element played no role per se but exerted some influence behind the scenes. I suggested to Dr. Goebbels that at the base of his pyramid there was a considerable distance from the extreme Right to the extreme Left. Did that not constitute a great division of opinion within the party ? He admitted that this was the case; there were great contrasts of views. The final decision, however, always rested with Herr Hitler. This is what Captain Goehring has emphasized to me repeatedly in private conversation. Political observers in general in Germany, though, characterize the manifestation of this final authority of Hitler as rather the reflection of pressure on him from party subordinates.

The intellectual conception of the Party, according to Dr. Goebbels, is as follows: Germany has for years been divided sharply in two. On one side of the dividing line were the bourgeois elements; on the other were the Marxists. Neither could overcome the other but one could always negative the other. An element of stalemate has thus characterized the domestic constellation in Germany; a stalemate which threatened to become permanent. National-Socialism was created on the outside. It represented no caste or class or precise political or economic policy. It wished to become a synthesis of all national elements. Its principal objective was to break down this line which divided Germany into two camps. In the process it had broken through into the bourgeois ranks as the point of least resistance. From within the bourgeois ranks it was encroaching on the Marxist ranks. To the same degree as the Communists were eating into the Social Democrats, the National-Socialists were nibbling away at the Communists. On the extreme Left the irreconcilable Communists would remain immune to their propaganda campaign--a campaign which was intended to appeal to the racial instincts of the population--das Nationalgefühl. The power of State, when the Nazis came to power, would be used to bring the recalcitrants to heel.

Dr. Goebbels had made a careful study of the electoral estimates since the beginning of the Party. In all elections they have obtained in votes from 20 to 38 times the inscribed number of their party members. In smaller communities the party organization was more effective than in larger communities. Never, however, had the multiple been less than 20. Dr. Goebbels proceeded to tabulate the results of his findings. He was obviously hypnotized by his own logic. In the first of the forthcoming presidential elections he has estimated that the Nazi candidate will receive 13,500,000 votes. For this estimate he took an average multiple of only 15. Hindenburg would get 10,000,000; Thaelmann, the Communist candidate, 7,000,000; Hugenberg or the Nationalist candidate 2,500,000; and the Stahlhelm candidate, if any, 500,000 votes. In the second election the Nationalist Opposition together (this presupposes that Hugenberg and the Stahlhelm will bow before the inevitable and support unconditionally the Nazi candidate, presumably Hitler himself) 18,000,000 votes; Hindenburg 10,000,000; Thaelmann 6,000,000. I have frequently seen bright-eyed people figure out with pencil and paper that a certain horse must win. I have somewhat the same feeling with regard to Dr. Goebbels' estimated calculation. In other words, I am not yet ready to bet on Hitler or against Hindenburg ! His conclusions were, though, extremely interesting.

With regard to Fascism and Socialism there are many points of analogy. According to Dr. Goebbels the idea of the cooperative state is identic[al]. The Fascists maintain the monarchy. The National-Socialists have not yet decided this question. Nazi ideas in respect of constitution and organization are identic[al] with Fascism. There is no analogy with regard to anti-Semitism or racial questions as these problems do not exist in Italy. I think it has been previously reported to the Department that the Nazi idea is not to harm a hair of any Jewish head, but to treat them as foreigners; to tax them, but not to subject them to military service; to deport eastward as many Polish and Russian Jews as possible. In respect of free-masonry, National-Socialists and Fascists see eye to eye. The National-Socialist opposition to international banking in general is much more accentuated than in Italy. Moreover, the National-Socialists believe in domestic currency--Binnenmark--which they believe would have a very alleviating effect on domestic economy. The Nazis lay much greater emphasis on the role of labor as the backbone of the State; on its material welfare.

In reply to a question as to what the policy of the National-Socialists would be if and when they came into power, Dr. Goebbels stated that from a foreign-political point of view the chief objective of Germany would be to make herself bündnisfähig. In other words, instead of a house divided within itself, Germany should present a united front to the outside world and would thus constitute a country whose yes or no could be expressed authoritatively. I suggested that in making Germany bündnisfähig, the sole implication would be that Germany intended to enter into the system of foreign alliances. Dr. Goebbels said that this was the ease.

In regard to financial-economic matters, he stated that the National-Socialists unitedly recognized private debts. These included the Dawes and Young loans which had been commercialized. The chief purpose of Germany would be, by drastic means, to reestablish Germany's credit. First there would be a drastic emergency program; later an "idealistic" economic program. Neither had been formulated. He said that only a united Germany could succeed in freeing the country from the "yoke" of Versailles and of the "tribute" payments. He was careful not to imply that the National-Socialists intended any policy of repudiation; the implication was that for a strong Germany anything would be possible along peaceful lines. I naively asked how he interpreted German sentiment in respect of a revision of the eastern frontiers. He emphatically replied that German national feeling was united in this respect. I asked, if Germany could not accomplish a revision by peaceful means, would an offensive policy be undertaken. He said he was not able to deny or affirm this.

At a recent lunch with Captain Goehring, who is reputed to be Hitler's chief political lieutenant, he was much more explicit in respect to the East. He declared then that many Poles were in agreement with the idea of cooperation with Germany as against Russia; that National-Socialist policy toward Russia was one of implacable hostility irrespective of the political structure there. There were many Poles, he said, who were willing to cooperate with Germany in an attack on Russia. The National-Socialists, he declared, would be willing to compensate Poland with Kiev, Odessa and access to the Black Sea. Yencken, the First Secretary of the British Embassy here, has been in touch with various National-Socialist leaders too. He describes this Eastern policy of the Nazis as one of "floating frontiers". It sounds like a rather dangerous theory; one of pure conquest.

The Nazis have become, as you have noted, more and more moderate. To the same degree the Stahlhelm has become more and more intransigent. Several acquaintances of mine, who are important provincial Stahlhelm leaders, have been called to Berlin to confer on Stahlhelm policy in respect of the forthcoming presidential elections. Their remarks are amazing. Dr. Wagner, the Berlin head of the Stahlhelm organization, told me yesterday at luncheon that the Stahlhelm could not forgive Brüning for not having hammered his fist on the table at Geneva in respect of the Memel question. Dr. Brüning should have presented a 48-hour ultimatum and at its expiration ought to have sent the Reichswehr to occupy the city. Dr. Wagner's remarks in respect of the reparations settlement and all other outstanding problems were equally farfetched. As the Stahlhelm has always represented a well-disciplined organization representative of the better bourgeois tradition, this Alice-in-Wonderland orientation is certainly disquieting.

Reverting to the Nazis, François-Poncet, the French Ambassador, denied to me that France desired the advent of National-Socialist power in Germany. It would, he said, unduly complicate the situation. Ministerialdirektor Dr. Ritter, the Economic Adviser of the Foreign Office, tells me, however, that the Nationalist elements in France are very anxious to see the Hitler regime come into being as soon as possible. When recently the prolongation of the B.I.S.[Bank for International Settlements] credit to the Reichsbank came before the Banque de France, Moret and the other heads of the bank were entirely disposed to prolong the French part without any difficulty whatsoever. The Board of Regents, however, had endeavored to bring as much political pressure on Germany as possible. Ritter stated that, according to Foreign Office information, de Wendel urged that a financial catastrophe in Germany now would insure Hitler's taking-over the Government. This in turn would have a most salutary effect on the forthcoming French elections; on American "debt cancellation" too.

Rumors are current that a considerable number of French are in Berlin this week to confer with the Nazi leaders. In fact, Dr. Hanffstängel, Hitler's personal adjutant, boasted of this to me today. I mentioned the subject casually to the French Ambassador. He merely shrugged his shoulders and said that it was a question of entirely unrepresentative people; no conversations of importance were going on. I happen to know, however, that the Nazis are doing their best to flirt with the French. An acquaintance of mine was commissioned by Goehring to inform the French at Geneva that the Nazis were prepared to reach an agreement with France in respect of both reparations and armaments. On the subject I suggested to Hanffstängel today that if the Nazis were able to live up to their pretensions in respect of shortly coming into power (which incidentally I do not believe to be the case)*they might influence the French elections in a sense very unfavorable to German interests. He said: "Not at all; we could always more easily reach an understanding with the extreme Right than with any weak Middle government."

The present course of events in Germany is somewhat disquieting. The constant playing of the political passions of the people is certainly not wholesome. The German mind, as the war demonstrated, is particularly susceptible to nationalist appeal.

Other questions mentioned in your letter will be taken up later.

Yours very sincerely, JOHN WILEY

The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

No. 1571---BERLIN, March 16,1932. [Received March 31.]

SIR: Supplementing despatch No. 1562 of March 14, 1932, reporting the results of the presidential elections of March 13, I have the honor to report that the greatest significance which can be read into them has to do with the relatively poor showing of the Communists and the unexpectedly firm discipline in Social-Democratic ranks. That the votes of the latter were brought out so effectively on a negative election "parole" has come as a distinct surprise to political observers. Neither veneration for the person of President von Hindenburg nor affection for the government of Dr. Brüning inspired them. Their sole objective was the defeat of Hitler and the "Third Reich". In this the Social-Democrats have gained what appears to be a clear-cut victory. That they will be able to remain victorious in the forthcoming Prussian elections is, however, in the face of the returns of March 13th, highly dubious.

Hitler's unwisdom in entering the list against President von Hindenburg seems clearly demonstrated. He has obviously suffered a set-back. His position, though, has none of the tragic element which delineates that of Geheimrat Hugenberg, the leader of the German Nationalists. The latter was sanguine that President von Hindenburg would poll less votes than was the case, that Hitler would poll more, and that the votes cast for his candidate, Lieutenant Colonel Duesterberg, would give him the pivotal position. He had looked forward with confidence to playing the decisive role; to holding the balance of power between President von Hindenburg and Hitler for the second ballot. The results, however, of March 13th make Hugenberg's strength insufficient to help Hitler and too insignificant to be of interest to President von Hindenburg, whose reelection on April 10th seems definitely assured.

In the inner circle of the Government a somewhat malicious joy, rather than disappointment, is evident that a supplementary ballot will be necessary to complete the election formalities. It implies for Hitler the chagrin of suffering the same defeat a second time. Moreover, the second ballot involves a further drain of Hitler's campaign resources, already reported to be at a low ebb.

Respectfully yours,

FREDERIC M. SACKETT

No. 1627--BERLIN, April 7, 1932. [Received April 19.]

SIR: With reference to despatch No. 1591 of March 23, 1932, relative to the Prussian police raids on the offices of the Nazi party and homes of the party leaders, I have the honor to report that the Prussian Minister of the Interior has now published a part of the material seized by the police on that occasion. Other incriminating documents which have been transmitted to the Attorney General. it was explained, proved that the Nazis had committed acts of treason, and therefore could not be published since the law prohibits even an intimation of their contents in public.

To representatives of the press the Prussian Minister of the Interior declared that since the Reichstag election of September, 1930, the Prussian Government had been besieged with information from private and official sources about illegal Nazi activities. He repudiated the charge that the police raids were an election maneuver. The Nazi leaders had been reproaching themselves for not having made use of the psychological moment on the day after their phenomenal rise in the Reichstag election on September 14.1930, to seize power by force, and there was reason to believe that they might not let a similar opportunity go by on March 13. However, the Prussian Government felt that the police was fully prepared for any emergency and could promptly put down an attempted uprising by the Nazis. The police had therefore been instructed to hold itself ready for such an emergency but to combat all rumors of a planned Nazi uprising in order not to alarm the public.

After the election on March 13, which was unusually tranquil, local authorities in various parts of the State had reported that armed storm detachments were making the countryside insecure and that a shifting of regional units of the storm troops seemed to indicate preparations for a Nazi Putsch. To verify these reports the Prussian Government had ordered the police raids. In the opinion of the Prussian authorities, the raids showed that the contention of the Nazis that the storm detachments had been mobilized in their quarters on election day in order to avoid clashes with political opponents was incorrect. The confiscated documentary material, said Minister Severing, had proved that the Nazis systematically spied on the civil authorities, the police and the Reichswehr in connection with their plans to seize power by force.

The criminal side of the case is being investigated by the Attorney General at Leipzig. What the political consequences will be the next few days will tell. The indications are that, after the final presidential election on April 10, Prussia, in conjunction with other German States, will probably bring pressure to bear on the Reich Government to prohibit the Nazi semi-military organizations throughout the Reich. The Bavarian Government has only recently published disclosures of secret preparations for a Nazi Putsch on the night after the first presidential election, and similar disclosures are reported in several other German States.

The seized documents would seem to indicate that the Nazis were actually contemplating a Putsch on March 18 in the event Hitler received more votes than von Hindenburg but not enough for an absolute majority to be elected on the first ballot. The preparations for this step, according to the documentary material confiscated by the Prussian police, were carried out to the minutest detail.

These documents resemble in large measure similar disclosures in the past of Communist subversive activities. This is not surprising since many former members and leaders of the Red Front are known to have become members of the Nazi storm detachments following the suppression of the Communist organization.

In addition to an extensive system of espionage in all administrative and executive departments of the Government, the Nazis established a signal corps along military lines with pigeon carriers and secret radio stations. The storm detachments were instructed to make available for emergency service war veterans trained in the various branches of the army. A mobilization order was issued for election day and members of the storm detachments were ordered to provide themselves with iron rations for several days, a new uniform, and other equipment. Regional units were shifted to strategic points, and the members of the storm detachments were pledged to utmost secrecy.

The acts of treason attributed to the Nazis, it appears, consisted of a planned attempt to seize the arms of the Reichswehr, particularly in the eastern frontier sections of Germany, for their struggle against the republican section of the population, notably the Iron Front, from which they expected stiff resistance against a Nazi dictatorial regime. It is pointed out that by disarming the Reichswehr the Nazis would have impaired the national defense by exposing sections of the country to a Polish invasion, and severe punishment is demanded for the Nazi instigators of the plot.

The parties of the Right are endeavoring to disparage the Prussian Government's action, making no effort to conceal their sympathy with Hitler's movement and its aim to overthrow the present order. They argue that a prohibition of the Nazis' semi-military organizations should be followed by a prohibition of the republican Reichsbanner.

Those familiar with the Nazi tactics know that they will not be at a loss to explain their activities even in the face of conclusive evidence. It is of interest that one of the most effective arguments was furnished the Nazis by their political opponents. The tactless threats by the leaders of the Iron Front and the Reichsbanner that they would prevent a Nazi regime in Germany even if that party should accede to power by constitutional means will doubtless make it easier for the Nazis to justify as a measure of self-defense the secret activities unearthed by the police.

Respectfully yours, FREDERIC M. SACKETT

TELEGRAM

The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, April 14, 1932-10 a. m.

[Received 10:10 a. m.]

75. Yesterday by emergency decree issued on unanimous recommendation of the Cabinet the President disbanded all military Nazi organizations, affecting allegedly over four hundred thousand members. No serious disturbances have been reported as yet. It is presumed that storm division will be re-formed in guise of sport organization.

SACKETT

TELEGRAM

The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, April 14, 1932--7 p. m.

[Received April 14--3:15 p. m.] 76. My 75, April 14,10 a. m. Hitler in interview today declared to American journalists that disbanding of his military organizations by government was in response to pressure exerted by Tardieu. Foreign Office has privately but earnestly requested that Department be notified that this allegation lacks any vestige of truth.

SACKETT

[Extracts]

No. 1661---BERLIN, April 19, 1932. [Received April 30.]

SIR: Confirming my telegram No. 75 of April 14, 10 a. m., and with special reference to despatch No. 1627 of April 7, 1932, relative to the police raids on the offices and quarters of the Nazi Party and the homes of its leaders, I have the honor to report that after long deliberations between the Reich Government and the heads of the principal German States, President von Hindenburg has issued an executive decree on the basis of Article 48 of the Constitution dissolving Hitler's semi-military organizations. The importance which the Government attached to this step may be seen from the fact that the decree was countersigned by the Chancellor, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice, as well as the fact that Dr. Brüning deemed it necessary to postpone for one day his departure for Geneva in order to take part in the deliberations.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The mysterious financial backers of such a large private army undoubtedly expected returns on their investment. The assertion that Thyssen, the iron and steel magnate, is one of the principal financial backers of the Nazi movement has never been effectively denied. According to latest reports, Hitler has also foreign financial backers and in this connection Sir Henri Deterding and Ivar Kreuger have been repeatedly mentioned. TS report which appeared in a Swedish Socialist journal several days ago that a receipt for 100,000 marks signed by Hitler had been found among Kreuger's papers was promptly denied by the Nazi leader. The allegations in connection with the financing of the Hitler movement in Germany will be discussed in a separate despatch going forward in this pouch.

As reported in my telegram No. 75 of April 14,10 a. m., the dissolution of Hitler's private army was carried out in almost every part of Germany without serious disturbances. Hitler himself has accepted the dissolution with apparent equanimity, having promptly issued a manifesto to his "former" comrades of the S.S. and S.A. [Schutz-Staffel and Sturm-Abteilung] telling them that henceforth they are only ordinary members of the Nazi Party and consoling them with the prospect of retribution on April 24, the date of the Prussian election.

Being aware of the Government's intentions, the storm detachments had time to take precautionary measures, removing large quantities of documentary and other material, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the police. It is reported that in many instances the police found nothing but the bare walls.

There is reason to believe that the dissolution of the storm detachments was not entirely unwelcome to Hitler. Various units of his army were dissatisfied with his principle of legality; they were tired of waiting for the promised Third Reich. Moreover, the two presidential campaigns had been a drain on Hitler's coffers and the question of financing these organizations threatened to become burdensome. The dissolution of the storm detachments removed also the main obstacle in the way of the Nazis' participation in a coalition government in the Reich and several German states.

In republican quarters the proscription of the storm detachments was hailed as an act that should tend to strengthen the Government's authority both at home and abroad. The belief was widespread that the Government's action will deprive France of an effective argument against Germany at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva.

Respectfully yours,

FREDERIC M. SACKETT

The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

No. 1777-- BERLIN, June 8,1939. [Received June 25.]

SIR: I have the honor to report upon the course of events leading to the fall of the Brüning Government, together with my personal interpretations. It may have some historical interest.

Beginning about Wednesday, the 25th of May, rumors began to circulate in Berlin that all was not well in the relationship between the Chancellor and the Reich President, and yet in the most responsible official quarters each and every such report was categorically denied.

The Reich President was then in Neudeck, his estate in East Prussia beyond the Polish Corridor, having gone there for a visit as he often does. He lives there among many old friends of the Junkers, or large land owners of the former aristocracy, with whom during pre-war times and since he has had close and intimate relations.

His association with these old friends did not raise suspicions of any change in attitude toward Brüning, although the latter's reliance on Socialist support for his political power has always been a source of annoyance to the Junkers, because there was nothing abnormal in the President's visit in that section.

It was only after the President's return to Berlin had been announced for Sunday, May 29th, when I heard that Meissner, the official secretary of the President, who lives in a part of the Presidential palace and has constant contact with the old gentleman, was suddenly leaving for Neudeck, that I began to feel that there was something going on in governmental circles that was sub rosa.

Meissner is very clever, but I knew that some people--and I fancy I must include Dr. Brüning among them--have not entertained complete confidence in his sincerity. His antecedents are of the Army and the old regime. Colonel von Hindenburg, the President's son. an officer in the Reichswehr, who lives with the President and is assigned as his adjutant, is also accredited in the public mind as exercising great influence with his father and with being decidedly anti-Socialistic. In view of these two powers behind the scene. the sudden trip of Meissner to Neudeck just two days before von Hindenburg's announced return, raised some question in my mind as to its purpose.

On Saturday night, May 28th, I attended the annual dinner of the Foreign Press Association, at which Dr. Brüning spoke. In talking with him privately after the dinner, he told me of certain plans he had for attending the Lausanne Conference, and then, certainly as an afterthought and clearly perfunctorily, added "Of course my movements are dependent on my receiving from the President tomorrow on his return public assurance of his complete confidence." I mention this to indicate that as late as Saturday night Brüning had little doubt that the next day his position would be thoroughly assured, and while he intimated that the President must put the Generals in their places, he expected his full cooperation and he had no real suspicion of the extent of the intrigues which surrounded him. On the following Monday, the 30th, he called me to his office at 10.30 in the morning (I being the only foreign diplomat whom he summoned) to tell me that his request had been refused and that nothing remained but his immediate resignation. His surprise and chagrin at the outcome of his conversation with the aged President was quite evident.

Looking back on the events that preceded the fall of the Government, the difficulties in the Army that resulted in the resignation of General Groener as Minister of War, rather plainly point to the existence of a definite plan among the military chiefs to force the overthrow of the Government and bring about a change in German internal politics.

In this connection I enclose an article from the Manchester Guardian, of June 7th, covering the situation.

The conclusion formed in my own mind from the foregoing events which may be of chief interest to the Department, is that the change thus brought about represents a definite challenge on the part of the land owning class and the big industrialists to the power of the German trade unions, which have established and maintained the principle of the fixation of wages by law or government decree, and other elements of paternalism that tend to lessen private ownership's control of their own properties. The Department may recall from previous despatches from this Embassy ... that as far back as the general elections of September. 1930, which so spectacularly increased the strength of Hitler, it seemed clear that certain big industrialists were giving him financial support. Although this policy might well have seemed to be playing with fire, far from being dismayed at the rapid growth of the Nazi power, this industrialist support appears to have increased rather than diminished.... I am also told that Otto Wolff, one of the principal independent German steel manufacturers, is also a large financial backer of Hitler's party.

The motives inducing this policy would likewise naturally appeal to the land owning class; and I am of the opinion that these large landowners and industrialists, feeling that during the two years' tenure of office of Dr. Brüning their efforts to prevail upon him to curb the power of the trade unions had borne no fruit--and would not as long as he remained in office dependent upon the support of the Socialist Party--determined that the time had come for a showdown.

The method pursued took advantage of the discontent among the officers in the Army over the support given by the Brüning Cabinet to the theses of labor unions and socialist policies, and under the redoubtable leadership of von Schleicher, the political strong man of the officer corps, engineered the Coup d'etat which was responsible for the Government's fall.

Respectfully yours,

FREDERIC M. SACKETT

Telegram

The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, August 1, 1932--noon. [Received August 1--10: 45 a. m.]

153. Substantially complete election returns up to 10 o'clock this morning give following approximate results in round figures:

36.8 million votes cast by eligible electorate of 44.4 million. Approximate popular votes of leading parties: Nazis 13.7, Social Democrats 7.9 million, Centrist and Bavarian Peoples Party combined 5.8 million, Communists 5.2, Hugenberg Nationalists 2.1.

Translated into Reichstag seats, 607 seats in all, the foregoing figures are equivalent, respectively to 230, 133, 98, 89, 37. The remaining 20 seats are divided among six additional small groups.

The percentage of votes cast just under 83 is about 1 percent greater than in the Reichstag elections of 1930 but some 3 percent less than the first Presidential elections last March. While this shows relatively keen interest in the elections the vote was not as heavy as we have hoped and expected.

While 304 votes will be needed for a majority in the new Reichstag the Nazis and Hugenberg Nationalists combined together with all the small parties which might be expected to vote with them do not dispose of more than 283 seats.

As a result of yesterday's elections the new Reichstag will reflect the change that has taken place in German political life through the great growth of the Nazi movement in the last 2 years. The elections did not, however, bring about any very substantial change in the voting strength of the five principal parties as shown in the two Presidential elections and the Prussian Diet elections this spring.

The Nazis with a vote of 13.7 million show a fraction over 37 percent of the total vote as against a popular vote of 13.4 million and a percentage of 36.8 in the second Presidential election of last April.

Thus it cannot be said that this result constitutes a decisive setback for the Nazis but on the other hand it does tend to indicate that the consistent level of strength which they have attained and been able to maintain is about the maximum that they can hope for.

SACKETT

The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

No. 1854--BERLIN, August 2, 1932. [Received August 12.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that Chancellor von Papen's radio address to the American public on the night of July 29 has evoked little comment from the German press, apparently because of a realization that, inasmuch as it was obviously intended for American consumption, it need not be thoroughly dissected here. However, various news items in the German press purport to record the fact that the speech created great interest in the United States, and whether or not the degree of interest is exaggerated, I imagine that the Department would care to have the Embassy's comment on the speech.

The Chancellor's statements were perhaps calculated to leave the average American listener under the impression that a civil war would probably have broken out in Germany if his Government had not taken over the reins of power, and that the Nazis are a harmless or even rather estimable patriotic organization. These statements however, require some checking and analysis.

It is true, as has often been pointed out in previous despatches, that Germany has for a long time past been in a situation which could well be termed a state of latent civil war. In spite of the growth of unemployment, however, the Brüning Government had kept this situation well in hand. It is an indisputable fact, moreover, that the political casualty list began to take on formidable proportions only after the lifting of the ban on open-air demonstrations and party uniforms which constituted one of the first official acts of the new Government. Confirmation of this fact was furnished by the Papen Cabinet itself which, a few weeks later, following the disturbances at Altona..... reimposed the ban on open-air demonstrations, but not on party uniforms. Though serious political disturbances ceased with the renewed prohibition of open-air demonstrations, the political tension and the potential dangers of civil war remained, owing largely to the Government's refusal to prohibit the wearing of party uniforms. In my opinion therefore, the Chancellor's claim to having banished these dangers is not well founded.

To further their-own political ends, leaders of the so-called national parties in Germany have frequently been inclined to play up the Communist menace in order to be able to accuse the more moderate parties of laxity in dealing with this problem. The deep-rooted aversion of the American people to Communism has apparently encouraged Chancellor von Papen again to resort to these tactics, this time for foreign consumption. However, it is erroneous to believe that effective resistance to Communism is offered solely by the Right parties in Germany. The Social-Democrats have thus far been in many respects a most effective bulwark against Communism. It was a Social-Democratic Minister of the Interior, who suppressed the Communist Red Front in Prussia, and it is not without reason that Severing, "watch dog" of the Republic, has the distinction of being the man most hated by the Communists. General Groener, an avowed republican, took severe measures to combat Communist propaganda in the Reichswehr, and one of the last acts of the Brüning Cabinet was a decree suppressing Communist atheist organizations.

Chancellor von Papen referred to strong fighting units formed by the Communists. While the dangers of such units can not be ignored, one must not overlook the fact, as von Papen had done, that the Nazis maintain still stronger units which, unlike those of the Communists, are not illegal, are permitted to wear uniforms and are for the most part housed in barracks.

According to von Papen, the Nazis are a constructive force striving only for national regeneration, while the aims of the Communists are purely destructive. As a matter of fact the Nazis have sponsored legislation in the various German parliaments that is no less destructive than that of the Communists. The Chancellor overlooked the many socialistic, revolutionary and anarchistic motions which the Nazis, in cooperation with the Communists, have put through the Prussian Diet only a few weeks ago.

It will be recalled that the Nazis sponsored an amnesty bill in Prussia which practically constituted an inducement for irresponsible elements to attack political opponents. It will also be recalled that, in cooperation with the Communists, they passed a motion to "tax away" all income in excess of 12,000 marks annually. These are only two instances of recent Nazi activity. That "national regeneration" can be achieved through cooperation with the Communists on such demagogic and anarchistic measures is at least open to doubt.

The general tenor of the Chancellor's address reflects the benevolent attitude which the Papen Cabinet has maintained toward the Nazis from the very beginning. In the election last Sunday the Nazis had everything in their favor. Their strategic position was perhaps never more favorable than during the campaign for this election. The Papen Cabinet made numerous and important concessions to them and yet they managed to conduct the campaign as an opposition party, rejecting responsibility for the taxation measures contained in the first Presidential Decree promulgated by the new Government and condemning vociferously various actions of the Minister of the Interior. That, under these conditions, the Nazis in last Sunday's elections were unable to increase their vote to more than a very small extent is a significant and interesting development which is being reported upon in despatch No. 1855 26 going forward by this same pouch.

In writing the foregoing I distinctly do not wish to be understood as implying that the Communists are a negligible factor in Germany or that they are not an actively subversive element. They have been guilty, in recent days, of repeated and serious infractions of law and order, the fact of an election campaign being under way bringing the number of these offences to far above the ordinary high average of week-end political clashes; in last Sunday's elections they made gains which, though not so large relatively speaking, still can not be overlooked; and it must always be borne in mind that a country with such a large amount of unemployment offers constant opportunity for the spread of Communism.

Nevertheless, as this Embassy has frequently reported heretofore, I am of the opinion that the Government authorities have the situation vis-a-vis the Communists well in hand, and are quite able to cope with any serious trouble which they might try to start.

The point of my comments above set forth consequently is that the Chancellor, in his radio speech, portrayed the Nazis in an unduly favorable light, and absolved them of their fair share of the blame for recent disorders in Germany; his presentation of the case, to my mind, having the aspect of yet another phase of the 13 year-old policy persisted in by the German Government of exaggerating the dangers of Communism in order to secure approval for measures which this Government has taken or desires to take.

Respectfully yours, FREDERIC M. SACKETT

The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

No. 1863--BERLIN, August 9, 1932. [Received August 19.]

SIR: With reference to my despatch No. 1854 of August 2, 1932, particularly to that portion concerning political clashes in Germany and the activities of the Nazis in connection therewith, I have the honor to report that since the Reichstag elections of July 31, members of the National Socialist Party have perpetrated acts of atrocious violence at various places throughout the Reich from East Prussia to Bavaria. These political disorders have been of daily occurrence and are too numerous for accurate compilation, but the semi-official Wolff's Telegraphisches Buero reported, between August 1 and August 8, nineteen instances of terrorism resulting in deaths and serious damage to property. |

The worst outbreak occurred at Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia where, early on August 1, a few hours after the results of the elections had been made known and almost immediately following the initiation of the Government's ten days' political truce (from August 1 to August 11--Constitution Day), the Nazis produced a veritable reign of terror. Excited to partisan fury, apparently by their failure to obtain a parliamentary majority in the elections, and incensed by the murder of one of their members on the eve of the elections, persons now known to have been members of the SA and SS (Nazi offensive and defensive organizations) stoned shop-windows, burned gasoline stations after ringing false alarms to divert the fire brigades from these fires, attempted to destroy democratic or socialist newspaper offices by fire and sought out prominent members of the Socialist and Communist parties who were murdered or assaulted in their dwellings, some whilst they were in bed. In this manner the local Communist leader and Town Councillor was assassinated; the former head of the administrative district, Dr. von Bahrfelt, a member of the People's Party who was known to have incurred the enmity of the Nazis and was in consequence recently relieved of his office by the Chancellor was shot, as was the editor-in-chief of the socialist Koenigsherger Volkszeitung, and a leader of the Jewish community at Königsberg was attacked. Shots were fired into the house of a Communist Reichstag deputy, one of them wounding a little girl. l ~

Disorders were reported at other places in East Prussia as well as elsewhere throughout the Reich, and although at first they might have been thought to be sporadic incidents, as fuller details became known, they established the fact that the same methods were being followed everywhere, and made it clear that a premeditated plan of terrorism was being pursued. It should be observed that this premeditated terrorism of last week, with its incendiary bombs and well planned personal attacks on individuals, has little in common with the former seemingly spontaneous street brawls.

While in the majority of instances the perpetrators of these acts of violence have evaded arrest, the fact that the persons involved in the outrages in East Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein were Nazis, and the similarity of the various occurrences--invariably perpetrated against persons of Left political thought or Jews--strongly implicated the Nazis. Also, reports from places where Nazis were arrested or their premises searched after minor disturbances, as well as from those places where serious occurrences have taken place, are to the effect that these persons generally were armed, and stores of arms and ammunitions, including machine guns, have been found. At Hofgeismar, near Cassel, the police discovered a Nazi truck converted into a military armored car.

It is difficult to see how this present course of terrorism can be stemmed save by most energetic measures on the part of the Government which is now virtually obliged to show whether it can maintain order impartially over all political factions or if it again must make concessions to Herr Hitler. Since the appointment of a Reich commissioner for Prussia a number of police and civil officers are reported to have been relieved simply because they were objectionable to the Nazis. This procedure undoubtedly must tend to undermine the morale and the efficiency of a service. A glaring example of this was witnessed during the troubles at Königsberg, whence a certain Major of Police had recently been transferred following a complaint against him by Hitler. It appears that this police officer had refused to permit SA and SS formations to line the streets and to form cordons on the occasion of Hitler's recent visit to that city. The latter protested by telegram to President von Hindenberg and to the Chancellor, and the officer was transferred.

If in fact the morale of the police should become lowered by such examples to the extent of rendering them inefficient, Hitler would then undoubtedly seek to justify acts of terror of his followers on the ground of self-defence against Left partisans--which argument he already has invoked--and demand the policing of Prussia, if not of the Reich, by his "private army". In fact the Reich Minister of the Interior has already held a conference with the Minister-Presidents of the Nazi States of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg-Schwerin and the Minister of the Interior of the Nazi State of Braunschwig with the reported object of discussing the possibility of recruiting extra or emergency police from the ranks of Hitler's Brown Army.

Although urged by all elements in the country, except the extreme Right, to take vigorous measures to check the wave of terrorism, the Cabinet has been loath to take concrete steps, and this has increased popular uneasiness and given rise to the easily comprehensible suspicion that the Government would go to great lengths to avoid action which would lead to direct collision with the Nazis. Although high officials, including Dr. Bracht, the Acting Reich Commissioner have announced that the Government would repress with impartial severity disturbances of public law and order, from whatever direction they might come, the Government has not yet overtly gone beyond the field of threats. However, the Cabinet is known to be considering measures to combat this outbreak of excesses, which are understood to be similar to those prescribed in the decree of July 20 and since revoked--and to envisage more rigorous penalties for political crimes, together with the creation of special Summary Courts empowered to inflict the death penalty.

August 11, 1932.

Since the above was written, on the night of August 9, the Government finally issued three decrees to combat political excesses in the Reich the penal-measures of which resemble in substance those of the decree "concerning the re-establishment of public security and order in Berlin and the Province of Brandenburg" promulgated with Chancellor von Papen's appointment as Reich Commissioner for Prussia...

Of these three decrees two are presidential and one executive, signed by the Chancellor and the Minister of Justice.

The first presidential decree, on the basis of Article 48 of the Constitution, provides death sentence for offences normally punishable by a term in the penitentiary and commitment to a penitentiary for offences normally punishable by imprisonment. The second presidential decree extends until August 31 the political truce which was in effect during the first ten days of this month, thereby prohibiting all political meetings until the end of the month. The executive decree institutes summary civilian courts in the Prussian districts where acts of terrorism have been committed recently.

Translations of these three decrees will be transmitted to the Department in a subsequent despatch.

Respectfully yours, FREDERIC M. SACKETT

Telegram

The Ambassador to Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, August 17, 1932--11 a. m. [Received 1 p. m.33]-

161. Department's 95, August 15, 4 p. m. The political situation has been clarified to the extent of losing its immediate acuteness by the Hitler interviews with the President, Chancellor and Schleicher, in the course of which the President refused Hitler's demand to be appointed Chancellor with full power to form a Nazi government. The fortnight until the Reichstag convenes on August 30th will be chiefly occupied by the political tactical maneuvering and bargaining of the usual Cabinet crisis nature to secure if possible some combination of the Reichstag which would enable the present Cabinet to survive.

The leading possible developments would seem to be:

First, a definite working agreement between the Nazis and the Center Party on which a coalition Cabinet headed by Hitler could be based... Although Hitler refused to enter a Cabinet under Von Papen it is yet possible (though certainly not probable) that he might agree to head a Cabinet containing Centrist ministers. Such a coalition might even be extended to include Hugenberg Nationalists but as they would not be necessary to the formation of a comfortable majority they would not have much to offer in exchange for their inclusion.

Second, short of such a working agreement, these two parties might so vote or abstain from voting in the Reichstag as to give the Papen

Cabinet a breathing spell. However, this again cannot be termed a probability, for as the Papen Cabinet must submit its emergency decrees to the Reichstag for approval, it is difficult--to take only two striking instances--to envisage the Center Party sanctioning the appointment of a Reich Commissary for Prussia, or the Nazis confirming the taxation decree to which they professed to take such exception.

Third, the Nazi movement having for the time being at least, pretty clearly reached its peak at the elections of July 31 and Hitler having suffered some loss of prestige as a result of last week's developments, there is a distinct possibility that the Nazi movement may split into two or more factions; the radical elements of the party may well take the line that they have not been waging as stout a fight as they have merely to see it end in a tame parliamentary opposition, and urge upon Hitler and the more moderate leaders who still wish to remain within the law actions which they have suspended. Thus the demagogue

Goebbels and the militants whom he is constantly inciting to violence may get beyond all control and force Hitler to disavow them.

Fourth, when the Reichstag convenes the Government is likely to have a Presidential dissolution decree up its sleeve, and, if it becomes obvious that votes sanctioning the various emergency decrees cannot be obtained or a vote of lack of confidence avoided, this dissolution decree will be read.

The Department will note that all of the foregoing is conjecture and therefore I have hesitated to telegraph it though most of it will be found in the Embassy's despatches. It must perforce be such and future developments cannot be reported as probabilities on account of the attitude of the Nazis who are stable only in their complete intransigence. The exaggerated demands made by Hitler on the President and the Chancellor at their meetings last Saturday made it easy for the President to refuse to turn the Government over to him and confirmed the belief that Hitler personally does not yet feel really capable of assuming the responsibilities of governing.

At the present writing I regard the fourth possibility above-mentioned as the most likely. In the latter contingency dissolution would constitutionally have to be followed by another election within 60 days and convocation of the Reichstag within a further 30 days (incidentally the possibility of an election for a Constituent Assembly rather than a Reichstag with a view to changing the Constitution is beginning to be mooted, a step for which there would seem to be no constitutional authority) but in the meantime the Government might by decree raise the voting age--Minister of the Interior Gayl definitely advocated this in his Constitution Day speech last week--in the hope of bringing about sensibly different results from the last election. This in itself would obviously be a questionable and risky procedure but the one thing I do feel certain of in this maze of uncertainties is that the President and his advisers will not hesitate to stretch the Constitution to the uttermost limit.

As the Department is aware the Government of Dr. Bruening was a veiled dictatorship under what seemed about as broad an interpretation as possible of Article 48 of the Constitution, but if there is any way of straining it still further I think there is no doubt but that it will be resorted to.

If this strain should prove too great for a large part of the German people to accept the ultimate question becomes one of the demobilization of the Reichswehr. A year ago I should have unhesitatingly affirmed its loyalty. In the interim, however, there is certainly a possibility that the Reichswehr and particularly those units thereof stationed in parts of the country where the Nazis predominate has been impregnated to a certain extent with Nazi doctrines. Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that the Reichswehr would loyally execute the orders of a government enjoying the confidence of the President. I do not think that Hitler is any more ready for a march on Berlin than he is to take over the parliamentary responsibility of the Government. If as indicated above there should be a split in the Nazi Party I think the Reichswehr could positively be counted on to deal in short order with the radical minority if it tried to make trouble.

In conclusion it is my belief that the Von Papen Government will remain in office for at least 3 months more. If the Nazi Party should carry its violent attitude to its logical conclusion it is difficult to see how serious trouble could be avoided. However, it is my opinion that there will be no such consistency on the part of the Nazis, that they will find it expedient to back down and that disorders on a large scale will not be forthcoming.

I have seen the Paris Embassy's telegram 477, August 13, 12 a. m.37 to the Department. The information received by the French Government tallies with the state of mind which I found to exist in members of the British and French Embassies here in Berlin on Constitution Day, August 11. While I realized that the situation at that moment was distinctly delicate with various threatening possibilities I did feel that both of these Embassies were in an unduly nervous way and I preferred not to send a telegram of an alarmist character until the situation had a chance to crystallize somewhat further and therefore did not enlarge upon my. telegram No. 159, August 10, 5 p. m.37 In the immediately following days the situation in fact changed to the extent mentioned in the opening sentence of this telegram.

Copy by pouch to Paris.

SACKETT

The Ambassador to Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 1874--BERLIN, August 17, 1932. [Received August 27.]

In amplification of my telegram No. 161 of this date analysing the political situation, the following may be noted.

The keynote of the present political situation would seem to be Hitler's dogged intention to rule alone. The expectation frequently voiced here that failure of his policies would result in large and immediate losses of following for Hitler does not take into account the blindness of great sections of his adherents. Hitler, one of the biggest show-men since P. T. Barnum, and his silver-tongued lieutenant, Goebbels, are past adepts at twisting events to suit their fancies and purposes, and indefatigable spellbinders. Readers of the Voelkischer Beobachter and Angriff, the two chief Nazi press organs, have read, and will continue to read, of nothing but Nazi successes, and this policy could be pursued all the more brazenly if Hitler were in power, and could suppress the opposition journals at will.

Meanwhile, as a result of a far-sighted policy which makes schoolchildren the objects of active and successful Nazi propaganda, time i3 working in Hitler's favor as successive classes graduate and come of voting age. Immediately after the scholastic Constitution Day celebrations the children were seen issuing from the schools singing the "Horst Wessel Song", the lurid Nazi Marseillaise. Realization of this fact doubtless is one of the main reasons for the present Cabinet's desire to reform the election system.

With Hitler unwilling to enter a Papen Cabinet--or any other than his own--and presumably averse to early new Reichstag elections, especially under a less favorable election system, it is possible that though the Nazis, who have stressed their opposition, will not vote against a motion of lack of confidence in Papen, they may at least, by absenting themselves from the Reichstag on some pretext or other, enable the Centrists to tolerate Papen as a "lesser evil".

While these are what, under present circumstances, may be regarded as normal parliamentary possibilities, the further possibility must be envisaged of a more radical departure from parliamentary practice and the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution, a departure to be sponsored by the President and the Cabinet which enjoys his confidence--with the Reichswehr looming up in the background, as indicated in my telegram under reference.

Respectfully yours,

FREDERIC M. SACKETT

The Ambassador to Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

No. 1929--BERLIN, September 19, 1932. [Received September 30.]

SIR: In connection with despatch No. 1928 of September 19, 1932,38 going forward in this pouch, I have the honor to report further on the recent domestic political situation in Germany.

As pointed out in the fortnightly review of the domestic political situation...there was little doubt even before the Reichstag convened last week that it was doomed to an early death. The general belief at the time was that it would be dissolved after the political debate which usually follows the reading of the Government's program. However, as reported in my telegram No. 177 of September 12, 1932,4° the Reichstag was dissolved sooner than was generally expected. For a proper estimate of the developments in connection with the dissolution of the Reichstag, it may be appropriate here to review briefly the events which led up to the present unusual situation.

It will be recalled that, despite Nazi assertions to the contrary, Brüning's downfall and the speedy formation of the Papen Cabinet this summer were preceded by a secret arrangement between von Papen and Hitler looking to the latter's participation in the Cabinets of the Reich and Prussia following the Reichstag election of July 81. Dissolution of the Reichstag, the lifting of the ban on Hitler's Brown Army and the ousting of the Prussian Ministers were in substance the price which von Papen agreed to pay for Nazi support. The Reich Government promptly fulfilled its part of the bargain but Hitler, encouraged by his success in the election, and apparently under pressure of subordinate Nazi leaders, failed to carry out his part. Although he was offered the Vice-Chancellorship and the post of Prussian Minister-President he demanded for himself not only the Chancellorship but also the "powers of Mussolini".

Since President von Hindenburg's refusal to turn the Government over to the Nazis the latter have been assailing the Papen Cabinet, which had been so generous in making concessions to them, no less violently than the hated Brüning Cabinet, and even the highly respected Chief of State has become the target of abusive Nazi attacks. In order to defeat von Papen by parliamentary means the Nazis entered into coalition negotiations with the Center, Brüning's own party. As a result of these negotiations the tension between the Hitlerites and the Reich Cabinet became increasingly acute. This, in short, was the situation when the newly-elected Reichstag met on Monday, September 12.

As a result of the renewed elimination of the Reichstag and the ousting of the Prussian Ministers, Germany is now being governed virtually by a military directorate which derives its strength principally from the fact that it enjoys the support and confidence of the President and controls the Reichswehr and the police of a State comprising two-thirds of the Reich.

In consequence, we have the amazing paradox of the Nazis, heretofore ardent advocates of a dictatorship and sworn enemies of the parliamentary system, now posing as the champions of Parliament. This attitude of the Nazis was strikingly reflected in one of Herr Goering's letters to President von Hindenburg in connection with the dissolution of the Reichstag. In this letter the Nazi President of the Reichstag upheld the constitutional rights of Parliament in a manner that must have caused great astonishment and displeasure in Nazi ranks. He not only ardently defended the "sovereignty of the people" and the principle embodied in the Weimar Constitution, that "the power emanates from the people", but even went so far as to defend the political parties, which Chancellor von Papen is wont to treat with contemptuous disdain, as a necessary medium for the expression of the will of the people.

Goering is one of Hitler's most trusted lieutenants and political advisers. His attitude is therefore highly significant. It doubtless goes to show that so long as the Nazis had hopes of instituting a dictatorial regime of their own they condemned the Weimar Constitution, the parliamentary system of government, and the political parties in particular, as an evil that must be rooted out. With more than one-third of the Reichstag under Nazi control and the presidency of that body in the hands of a Nazi they apparently no longer look upon Parliament as the source of all evil but on the contrary as an important weapon against a government to which they have become hostile.

The Reichstag election in November makes the fifth important election in Germany this year. The absurdity of a new election which holds out little promise of improvement in the political situation is generally recognized. The people are tired of going constantly to the polls and the coffers of the political parties are depleted. This is believed to apply in large degree to the Nazis who have lost the support of some of their most important financial backers.

The reasons for this are not far to seek. The Papen Cabinet which the Nazis regarded as a transition to Hitler's Third Reich has proved stronger than many at first believed. Industrialists who hoped that Hitler's movement would help to break the influence of the trade unions and reduce the onerous burdens of social legislation enacted since the war have reason to be pleased with the present conservative regime in Germany. The energy with which the Cabinet proceeded to carry out its political and particularly its economic program, measures such as the reduction of the benefits of unemployment insurance, remission of taxes on a large scale and subsidies to business and industry as a means of stimulating economy, have served to win for the Government the active support of many who up to now helped to finance Hitler.

The chauvinistic character of the Papen-Schleicher regime, which the Nazis complain has stolen their thunder, may enable the Hugenberg Nationalists, the only party openly supporting the Cabinet to regain some of their following which flocked to Hitler in the past. To compensate possible losses to Hugenberg the Nazis are even now --as pointed out in despatch No. 1912 of September 12, 193241-- beginning to stress the socialistic part of their program. For this reason also they can not expect the same measure of financial support from business and industry as in the past.

Finally a third reason for the loss of financial support in business and industrial circles is doubtless the fact that these circles hare no desire for frequent and intense elections which, it is widely feared, may retard the salutary effect of the Government's economic reconstruction program.

The principal political parties--Nazis, Center and Social Democrats--will conduct the coming campaign with more or less identical slogans against the "social reactionary course" of the Papen Cabinet. Because of their coalition negotiations during the past weeks, the Nazis and Center will be somewhat handicapped in their campaign activities. The Social-Democrats who conducted the last campaign primarily with arguments and slogans against the Nazis, will now in addition face even more serious Communist opposition, while the parties of the moderate Left and moderate Right, which were practically annihilated in the last general election, can not hope for an effective resuscitation of their respective groups.

The Hugenberg Nationalists might logically be expected to be the chief gainers in the coming election; though in the intervening six weeks some means may be found to enable electors desirous of casting their vote in such manner as to register their unequivocal support of the present Government, to do so without having to accept the unpopular leadership of Hugenberg.

Respectfully yours,

FREDERIC M. SACKETT

Telegram

The Ambassador to Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

BERLIN, December 1, 1932--5 p. m. [Received December 1--2: 30 p. m.]

223. It has been evident for some days that the President was determined to appoint a presidial Cabinet headed by a Chancellor possessing to an extreme degree his own personal confidence and that the only two men whom he was willing to consider as having this requisite qualification were Von Schleicher and Von Papen...

Although the appointment of Papen would constitute open defiance to a large part of the population and would be a gratuitous looking for trouble the President has been reluctant to discard Papen as a possibility. On the other hand, although the German Republic has, I believe, never been in so bad a muddle politically speaking, there has been considerable hesitation to try at least to bring matters to a head by the appointment of Schleicher as Chancellor. This may be due in part to the fact that in view of the seriousness of the situation the President wishes to explore every possibility of Reichstag toleration for the impending Cabinet but probably more to the fact that Schleicher is extremely reluctant to take over the Chancellorship under such difficult conditions. There has been some realization that Schleicher's appointment would not be too well received abroad.

As a result of many days' barren wrangling it now appears that Schleicher at best could definitely count on the toleration of some 155 Reichstag deputies and Papen far less than that. From practically every other serious point of view, including the important one of the attitude of the Nazis who would certainly combat a Papen Cabinet with far greater vigor, Von Schleicher's appointment would appear to offer a better chance of carrying out the President's policies than that of Papen, so it seems that this solution cannot much longer be deferred.

SACKETT

The Ambassador to Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

No. 2063 [Extract]--BERLIN, December 5, 1932. [Received December 15.]

SIR: In amplification of my telegram No. 223 of December 1, and in continuation of section 2 of despatch No. 2058 of December 3 1932,44 I have the honor to report that after more than two weeks of negotiations with party leaders, which were marked by dramatic incidents and political excitations, President von Hindenburg commissioned General von Schleicher on December 2 to form a cabinet.

The die was cast in favor of General von Schleicher at a meeting of the Papen Cabinet on the morning of December 2, when several members of the cabinet expressed apprehension that von Papen's re-appointment would sharpen the political tension. According to a semi-official statement, President von Hindenburg was inclined to re-appoint von Papen, but the latter himself urged him to appoint General von Schleicher because he felt that a cabinet headed by the General had better prospects of averting a clash with the Reichstag.

Quite aside from this semi-official statement, it seems clear to me that the President personally would have much preferred to re-appoint Papen than to make Schleicher Chancellor, and if he could have possibly seen his way to do so would have named the former. From the President's point of view Papen must appear a far more dependable agent, his whole career having shown a readiness to accept orders from high authority and to do his best to carry them out. Schleicher, on the other hand, though also a soldier, is a man of a different stamp, and it is my impression that even the President and his small circle of personal advisers are both somewhat uncertain and apprehensive as to where the General's restless energies and abilities may lead him.

Respectfully yours,

FREDERIC M. SACKETT

The Ambassador to Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

No. 2071--BERLIN, December 12, 1932. [Received December 23.]

SIR: I have the honor to report the following brief summary of a conversation which I had last night with Staatssekretar Dr. Meissner, who, as the Department is aware, is one of the very small group possessing President von Hindenberg's complete confidence and therefore one of the most influential men in the Reich--though, when able to do so, he prefers to operate modestly in the background.

Referring to the recent split in the Nazi ranks . . . . . Dr. Meissner confirmed the view that it was of really serious proportions. The fraction of the party behind Deputies Gregor Strasser and Dr. Frick is ready and willing to cooperate with the present von Schleicher Government, while Hitler seems determined to follow the intransigent course consistently advocated by Goebbels, which of necessity would appear to mean a further veering toward Communism, even though this might be sought to be disguised by the shibboleth, "National Communism".

In passing it may be mentioned that the now familiar sight throughout Berlin of Nazis in uniform with small tin boxes soliciting contributions to party funds bears striking witness to the fact, already reported ..., that some of the Nazis' most substantial backers hitherto--chief among them certain large industrialists--have ceased to be a source of supply for the party coffers.

For his part, Chancellor von Schleicher has always maintained that the Nazi movement contained within it elements of national regeneration which could successfully be exploited by a government, especially one of a non-Marxist complexion.

In this latter connection Dr. Meissner expressed the opinion that the country at large was shaping itself very satisfactorily behind the von Schleicher Government, and even in Reichstag gave indications of proving as malleable as was the case in the recent brief session, which has just terminated with a peaceful and almost uncontested adjournment until January. The Chancellor's present expectation is that the Reichstag will reconvene on or about January 20 for a short session of some 3 or 4 days, after which it will again acquiesce in adjourning itself until after Easter.

Respectfully yours,

FREDERIC M. SACKETT

The Ambassador to Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

No. 2070--BERLIN, December 14, 1932. [Received December 23.]

SIR: With reference to section 7 of despatch No. 2000 of October 24, 1932,47 I have the honor to report that a brief statement to the press by Nazi headquarters last week, to the effect that Gregor Strasser, one of Hitler's right-hand men, had been granted leave of absence for three weeks, had the effect of a political sensation for it showed that the tension between Hitler and Strasser, which the party was trying hard to conceal, had developed into an open conflict.

At about the same time announcement was made that Deputy Feder, one of the economic experts of the Nazi Party, asked Hitler for a leave of absence because he was dissatisfied with certain administrative changes in the party. While Feder's action seems to have been prompted by somewhat different motives, it is nevertheless equally significant of the discord among the Nazi leaders. What is taking place in the Nazi Party now is a palace revolution rather than an open revolt by the rank and file.

It is no mere coincidence that the conflict in the Nazi Party came to a head at about the same time that the party was struggling with the problem of either supporting a motion to adjourn the Reichstag, thus enabling Chancellor von Schleicher to carry on without another dissolution of the Reichstag, or of facing the electorate again in two months.

The recent negotiations between the Nazis and Chancellor von Schleicher showed that there was a strong divergence of views among the Nazi leaders on the question of participation in government. A group headed by Captain Goering, the Nazi President of the Reichstag, and Dr. Goebbels, the Berlin Nazi leader and Strasser's most bitter rival, is opposed to cooperation in government on any basis except with Hitler as Chancellor, while Strasser is the recognized head of a small group of leaders opposed to Hitler's "all or nothing" policy.

Strasser, who no longer believes in the possibility of a purely Nazi dictatorship, has been striving to pave the way to his party's participation in government on a coalition basis in the Reich and Prussia, in which event he was slated for the post of Prussian Minister-President. However, under pressure of an influential group in the party, Hitler agreed to drop Strasser's candidacy for this post in favor of Captain Goering, and this seems to be the immediate cause of the conflict.

It was Strasser who conducted the negotiations with Chancellor von Schleicher early this month which resulted in an invitation by the Chancellor to Hitler to come to Berlin for a conference. This conference, it will be recalled, never took place because Strasser's rivals, Goering and Goebbels, succeeded in keeping Hitler away from Berlin...

It is understood that before going on leave Strasser sent a letter to Hitler complaining that he was not receiving sufficient support in the party. He relinquished the various offices which he held in the party. However, he retained his Reichstag seat and did not resign from the party, and considerable significance is being attached to this fact.

Strasser is a seasoned politician, with recognized talent as an organizer and vote getter. He was one of Hitler's closest and ablest collaborators and held a position analogous to that of National Chairman in control of the party machine. He has been in the party since 1921, taking an active part in the Hitler Putsch in 1923. It was he who held the party together--or what remained of it--after the ill-fated Putsch, while Hitler was serving a term in a fortress.

He belongs to that group of Nazi leaders who realize that if the Nazis should get into power they could not well ignore the wishes and needs of the bulk of their following, namely, the former middle classes which have now become economically dislocated. He is an anti-capitalist with a socialistic philosophy that is not easily definable. While there was still hope that the Nazis might succeed in setting up The Third Reich, it was understood that Strasser was to become the German Stalin while Hitler was to play a decorative role something like that of Kalinin.

Secessionists from political parties in Germany have usually ended in obscurity without being able to do serious damage to the parent party. This was true of the Stennes revolt in the Nazi Party.... as well as of the secession of the Treviranus groups from the Nationalist Party ... and of the various secessions from the Social-Democratic and Communist Parties. In each case the party machine invariably proved strong enough to weather the storm, and until the contrary is proven Hitler must be presumed to have his party machine firmly in hand.

Following the Stennes revolt, Hitler himself took command of the storm detachments, appointing Captain Roehm, who achieved a measure of notoriety....as his chief of staff charged with the actual work. Similarly, Hitler has now taken over Strasser's functions, designating as his deputy Dr. Ley, the militant editor of the Nazi official organ in Cologne who several months ago also achieved some notoriety by beating up the veteran Social-Democratic leader, Wels, and the Police Commissioner of Cologne, for which he was sentenced to a term of three months in prison.

The Nazi press, for obvious reasons, treats the latest developments in the party in a light vein. That Hitler and the other party leaders take the matter seriously may be inferred from the fact that after adjournment of the Reichstag last week the Nazi deputies gave the "Fuehrer" individually and collectively a declaration of loyalty. Similar declarations were transmitted by subordinate leaders from all parts of the Reich.

The Nazi movement, as recent elections have shown, is now on the decline, and Strasser's action has doubtless served to stress this unpleasant fact which Nazi journals and speakers have been trying so hard to explain away. While it would be premature to expect at this time an open split in the Nazi Party as a direct result of Strasser's break with Hitler, the indications are that it may have more serious and far-reaching consequences than similar conflicts which took place during the Nazi boom.

Respectfully yours,

FREDERIC M. SACKETT