The principal military operations of the year have been in the Philippine Islands. At the date of the last annual report the Eighth Army Corps, under the command of Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, held possession of the city of Manila under the provisions of the protocol of August 12, 1898, which required the United States to occupy and hold that city pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace, and which imposed upon the troops in possession at once the obligation to protect life and property within the city and to refrain from infringing upon Spanish territory outside of the city limits. In the performance of this duty many annoyances were experienced from the army of the Tagalogs, who were in insurrection against the Government of Spain, and who had been collected about the city, after its capture by the American forces had become inevitable, under the promise of their leaders that they should share in the plunder of the inhabitants.

General Otis was ordered to avoid any conflict with them, and, strictly complying with these orders, he made every effort to secure a peaceable understanding. The peaceable attitude of the American forces was unfortunately misconstrued as indicating weakness and fear of a conflict. On the night of the 4th of February, 1899, our forces were attacked by the Tagalogs, who attempted to capture the city. They were promptly repulsed in a series of active engagements which extended through the night of the 4th, and the 5th, 6th, and 10th days of February. Our lines were extended and established at a considerable distance from the city in every direction. On the 22d of February a concerted rising of the Tagalogs in the city of Manila, of whom there are about 200,()00, was attempted, under instructions to massacre all the Americans and Europeans in the city. This attempt was promptly suppressed and the city was placed under strict control.

The troops composing the Eighth Army Corps under General Otis's command at that time were of regulars 171 officers and 5,201 enlisted men and of volunteers 667 officers and 14,831 enlisted men, making an aggregate of 838 officers and 20,032 enlisted men.

All of the volunteers and 1,650 of the regulars were, or were about to become, entitled to their discharge, and their right was perfected by the exchange of ratifications of the treaty on the 11th of April.

The total force which Major-General Otis was thus entitled to command for any considerable period consisted of only 171 officers and 3,561 enlisted men. The numbers of the Eighth Army Corps, above stated, give the entire numerical strength of all troops present in the islands, including those at Cavite and Iloilo, the sick and wounded, those serving in the civil departments and in the staff organizations, and deducting these, the effective men of the line, officers and soldiers, were about 14,000. Of these 3,000 constituted a provost guard necessary to preserve order within Manila and prevent the known intention of the secret hostile organizations in that city to burn and sack the city when our troops were engaged on the lines of defense. Including, therefore, all the troops who were entitled to be discharged, there were not more than 11,000 officers and men available to engage the insurgent army, which was two or three times that number, well armed and equipped, and included many of the native troops formerly comprised in the Spanish army, and to occupy and hold positions in a comparatively unknown country, densely populated by inhabitants speaking in the main an unknown language. The months of the most intense heat, followed by the very severe rainy season of that climate, were immediately approaching, and for any effective occupation of the country it was necessary to await both the close of the rainy season and the supply of new troops to take the place of those about to be discharged. Practically all the volunteers who were then in the Philippines consented to forego the just expectation of an immediate return to their homes, and to remain in the field until their places could be supplied by new troops. They voluntarily subjected themselves to the dangers and casualties of numerous engagements, and to the very great hardships of the climate. They exhibited fortitude and courage, and are entitled to high commendation for their patriotic spirit and soldierly conduct.

The operations of the period extending from February to the 31st day of August, the date of the annual report of General Otis as commander of the Department of the Pacific, were marked by a steady maintenance and strengthening of the position occupied by our forces, a gradual extension of our lines, a restoration of security and confidence in the city of Manila, numerous sharp engagements in the field marked by unbroken success, and many instances of very gratifying conduct on the part of both officers and men. It is probable that at any time a column of troops could have been sent anywhere on the island of Luzon as against any armed resistance which the insurgents could have offered after the demoralization in their ranks, resulting from the severe defeats inflicted upon them in February; but there were not the troops necessary to garrison the towns or to maintain any far extended lines of communication. No attempt was accordingly made to occupy the country, except in the vicinity of Manila and at such points as were important for the protection of our lines. Such movements as passed beyond this territory were designed primarily to break up threatening concentrations of insurgent troops and to prevent undue annoyance to the positions which we occupied.

On the 11th of February the city of Iloilo, on the island of Panay, the second port of the Philippines in importance, was occupied. After the capture of Iloilo the navy took possession of the city of Cebu, on the island of Cebu, and on the 26th of February a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry was dispatched to that port for the protection of the inhabitants and property.

On the 1st of March a military district comprising the islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu, and such other Visayan islands as might be thereafter designated, to be known as the Visayan military district," was established and placed under the supervision of Brig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller, commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, with headquarters at Iloilo.

The Third Battalion of the First California Volunteer Infantry was thereupon ordered to the island of Negros, under the command of Col. (now Brig. Gen.) Fames F. Smith, and took possession of the city of Bacolod, on that island, without resistance.

On the 5th of May Brig. Gen. James F. Smith assumed temporary command of the Visayan military district, and on the 25th of May Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes, United States Volunteers, was assigned to the command of the district.

On the 19th of May the Spanish garrison at Jolo, in the Sulu Archipelago, was replaced by American troops.

By the 31st of August the number of troops stationed at Jolo and the Visayan Islands, including a small guard at the Cavite Arsenal, amounted to 4,145.

These operations are set forth fully in General Otis's report, which is submitted herewith.

All of the forces who were entitled to be discharged as above mentioned have now been returned to this country and mustered out. The new troops designed to take the place of those returning to this country, and to constitute an effective army for the occupation of the Philippines, have been transported to Manila to the number of 581 officers and 26,322 enlisted men of the Regular Army and 594 officers and 15,388 enlisted men of the new volunteer force. Five hundred and four officers and 14,119 men of the volunteer force have sailed from New York and San Francisco and have not yet arrived at Manila. One regiment has reached San Francisco, but has not yet sailed.

The troops now in the Philippines comprise 905 officers and 30,578 men of the regular force and 594 officers and 15,388 men of the volunteer force; making an aggregate of 1,499 officers and 45,966 men and when the troops on the way have arrived the. total force constituting the Eighth Army Corps will be 2,051 officers and 63,483 men.

By the 10th of October the process of changing armies and the approach of the dry season had reached a point where an advance toward the general occupation of the country was justified.

At that time the American lines extended from the Bay of Manila to Laguna de Bay, and included considerable parts of the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, and Morong to the south and east of Manila, substantially all of the province of Manila and the southern parts of Bulacan and Pampanga, dividing the insurgent forces into two widely separated parts. To the south and east of our lines in Cavite and Morong were numerous bands occasionally concentrating for attack on our lines and as frequently dispersed and driven back toward the mountains. On the 8th of October, the insurgents in this region having again gathered and attacked our lines of communication, General Schwan, with z column of 1,726 men, commenced a movement from Bacoor, in the province of Cavite, driving the enemy through Old Cavite, Noveleta, Santa Cruz, San Francisco de Malabon, Saban, and Perez das Marinas, punishing them severely, scattering them and destroying them as organized forces, and returning on the 13th to Bacoor.

On the north of our lines stretched the great plain of central Luzon, extending north from Manila about 120 miles. This plain comprises parts of the provinces of Manila, Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, and Pangasinan. It is, roughly speaking, bounded on the south by the Bay of Manila; on the east and west by high mountain ranges separating it from the seacoasts, and on the north by mountains and the Gulf of Lingayen. Through the northeast and central portion flows the Rio Grande from the northern mountains southwesterly to the Bay of Manila, and near the western edge runs the only railroad on the island of Luzon, in a general southeasterly direction from Dagupan, on the Bay of Lingayen, to Manila. In this territory Aguinaldo exercised a military dictatorship, and with a so-called cabinet imitated the forms of civil government, having his headquarters at Tarlac, which he called his capital, and which is situated near the center of the western boundary of the plain.

The operations commenced in October involved the movement of three separate forces: (1) A column proceeding up the Rio Grande and along the northeastern borders of the plain and bending around to the westward across the northern boundary toward the Gulf of Lingayen, garrisoning the towns and occupying the mountain passes which gave exit into the northeastern division of the island. (2) An expedition proceeding by transports to the Gulf of Lingayen, there to land at the northwestern corner of the plain and occupy the great coast road which from that point runs between the mountains and the sea to the northern extremity of the island, and to proceed eastward to a junction with the first column. (3) A third column proceeding directly up the railroad to the capture of Tarlac, and thence still up the road to Dagupan, driving the insurgent forces before it toward the line held by the first two columns. These movements were executed with energy, rapidity, and success, notwithstanding the exceedingly unfavorable weather and deluges of rain, which rendered the progress of troops and transportation of subsistence most difficult.

On the 12th of October a strong column, under General Lawton, with General Young commanding the advance, commenced the northerly movement up the Rio Grande from Arayat, driving the insurgents before it to the northward and westward. On the 18th the advance reached Cabiao. On the 19th San Isidro was captured, and a garrison established; on the 27th Cabanatuan was occupied and a permanent station established there. On the 1st of November Aliaga and Talavera were occupied. In the meantime detachments, chiefly of Young's cavalry, were operating to the west of the general line of advance, striking insurgent parties wherever they were found and driving them toward the line of the railroad. By the 13th of November the advance had turned to the westward, and our troops had captured San Jose, Lupao, Humingan, San Quintin, Tayug, and San Nicolas. By the 18th of November the advance had occupied Asingan and Rosales, and was moving on Pozorrubio, a strongly intrenched post about 12 miles east of San Fabian. General Lawton's forces now held a line of posts extending up the eastern side of the plain and curving around and across the northern end to within a few miles of the Gulf of Lingayen.

On the 6th of November a force of 2,500, under command of General Wheaton, sailed from Manila for the Gulf of Lingayen, convoyed by ships of the Navy, and on the 7th the expedition was successfully landed at San Fabian with effective assistance from a naval convoy against spirited opposition. On the 12th the Thirty-third Volunteers, of Wheaton's command, under Colonel Hare, proceeded southeastward to San Jacinto, attacked and routed 1,200 intrenched insurgents, with the loss of the gallant Maj. John A. Logan and 6 enlisted men killed, and 1 officer and 11 men wounded. The enemy left 81 dead in the trenches and suffered a total loss estimated at 300.

In the meantime, on the 5th of November, a column under General McArthur advanced up the railroad from Angeles to Magalang, clearing the country between Angeles and Arayat, encountering and routing bodies of the enemy at different points, and capturing Magalang. On the 11th it took Bamban, Capas, and Concepcion, and on the 12th of November entered Tarlac, from which the enemy fled on its approach. Meantime parties, mainly of the Thirty-sixth Volunteers, under Col. J. F. Bell, cleared the country to the right of the line of advance as far east as the points reached by General Lawton's flanking parties. On the 17th of November McArthur's column had occupied Gerona and Panique, to the north of Tarlac. On the 19th, Wheaton's troops, and on the 20th, MacArthur's troops, entered Dagupan.

On the 24th of November General Otis was able to telegraph to the Department as follows:

Claim to Government by insurgents can be made no longer under any fiction. Its treasurer, secretary of the interior, and president of congress in our hands; its president and remaining cabinet officers in hiding, evidently in different central Luzon provinces; its generals and troops in small bands scattered through these provinces, acting as banditti, or dispersed, playing the role of "Amigos," with arms concealed.

Since that time our troops have been actively pursuing the flying and scattered bands of insurgents, further dispersing them, making many prisoners, and releasing many Spanish prisoners who had been in the insurgents' hands.

On the 23d General Young's column had reached Namacpacan, 30 miles north of San Fernando, in the province of Union, and passed north into the mountains; and on the 24th Vigan, the principal port of the northwest coast, was occupied by a body of marines landed from the battle ship Oregon. In the meantime the destruction of the organized insurgent power in central Luzon found a response from the natives of the province of Nueva Viscaya, offering their services to drive out the insurgents who were in possession of Bayambong, the capital of that province, upon which the insurgents army had been prevented from retreating by the disposition of General Lawton's forces, commanding the passes of the mountains; and which Lawton's troops were rapidly approaching.

All these movements were accomplished under great difficulties owing to the almost impassable condition of the country. In the course of them, large quantities of insurgent supplies of all descriptions were captured, including stores of food, clothing, arms, munitions of war, quick-firing and Kruppe guns, powder factory and arsenal, engineering tools, money, war department records, personal effects of officers, and numerous private dispatches.

It is gratifying to know that as our troops got away from the immediate vicinity of Manila they found the natives of the country exceedingly friendly, and both men and animals were able to live upon the country, and for considerable periods leave their supply trains behind. This was doubtless due in some measure to the fact that the Pampangos, who inhabit the provinces of Pampanga and Tarlac, and the Pangasinanes, who inhabit Pangasinan, as well as the more northerly tribes, are unfriendly to the Tagalogs, and had simply submitted to the military domination of that tribe, from which they were glad to be relieved. This is emphasized by a report from General Wheaton that he had been obliged to guard the mother and infant son of Aguinaldo to prevent the natives of Pampanga from killing them.

I submit herewith, marked "Appendix A," the cable dispatches received from General Otis since the date of his annual report of August 31, 1899, which briefly describe these various operations, together with other operations of interest, both on the island of Luzon and in the Visayan and southern islands, which I have not thought it necessary to set forth specifically in this report.

I think it proper to quote from a dispatch from General Otis of November 13, m which he says:

Our troops have suffered great hardships and have performed most severe service, but are reported in excellent condition and spirits. The enterprise and indomitable will displayed by officers never excelled.

And to refer to his dispatch of November 18, in which he quotes from General Lawton a tribute to the fortitude, endurance, and cheerfulness of his command.

Acknowledgments are due to the naval forces of the United States for their cheerful and efficient cooperation with the operations of the army on land upon many occasions.

Military Operations in the Philippines, 1900. [pp. 80-86]

At the date of the last report (November 29, 1899) the government established by the Philippine insurgents in central Luzon and the organized armed forces by which it was maintained had been destroyed, and the principal civil and military leaders of the insurrection, accompanied by small and scattered bands of troops, were the objects of pursuit in the western and the northern parts of the island. That pursuit was prosecuted with vigor and success under conditions of extraordinary difficulty and hardship, and resulted in the further and practically complete disintegration of the insurrectionary bands in those regions, in the rescue of nearly all the American prisoners and the greater part of the Spanish prisoners held by the insurgents, in the capture of many of the leading insurgents, and in the capture and destruction of large quantities of arms, ammunition, and supplies.

There still remained a large force of insurgents in Cavite and the adjacent provinces south of Manila, and a considerable force to the east of the Rio Grande de Pampanga, chiefly in the province of Bulacan, while in the extreme southeastern portions of Luzon, and in the various Visayan islands, except the island of Negros, armed bodies of Tagalogs had taken possession of the principal seacoast towns, and were exercising military control over the peaceful inhabitants. Between the insurgent troops in Bulacan and the mountains to the north, and the insurgents in the south, communication was maintained by road and trail, running along and near the eastern bank of the Mariquina River, and through the towns of Mariquina, San Mateo, and Montalban and the province of Morong. This line of communication, passing through rough and easily defended country, was strongly fortified and held by numerous bodies of insurgents.

On the 18th of December, 1899, a column under the command of Maj . Gen. Henry W. Lawton proceeded from Manila, and between that date and the 29th of December captured all the fortified posts of the insurgents, took possession of the line of communication, which has ever since been maintained, and destroyed, captured, or dispersed the insurgent force in that part of the island. In the course of this movement was sustained the irremediable loss of General Lawton, who was shot and instantly killed while too fearlessly exposing his person in supervising the passing of his troops over the river Mariquina at San Mateo. The following general order announced his death:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 209.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Washington, December 21, 1899.

The following order has been received from the War Department:

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, December 21, 1899.

" With deep regret the Secretary of War announces the death on the field of battle of Henry W. Lawton, major-general of Volunteers, and colonel and inspector-general of the-Regular Army.

" On the 18th of April, 1861, three days after President Lincoln's first call for volunteers in the war for the Union, at the age of 18, he enlisted as a private in the Ninth Indiana Volunteers. He served with his regiment in the field in the Army of the Tennessee throughout that war, and at its close was mustered out, at the age of 22, as lieutenant-colonel, after being brevetted colonel for gallant and meritorious service and awarded a medal of honor for distinguished gallantry.

" He was commissioned second lieutenant in the Regular Army on the 28th of July, 1866, and served in the infantry until 1869, then in the cavalry until 1888, and thereafter as inspector-general until the commencement of the war with Spain.

" He was repeatedly commended in general orders ' for vigilance and zeal, rapidity and persistence of pursuit,' ' for great skill, perseverance, and gallantry,' in services on the frontier against hostile Indians.

"Upon the declaration of war with Spain he was made brigadier-general, and on the 8th of July following major-general of volunteers. His nomination for brigadier-general of the Regular Army was determined upon and was ready to be sent to the Senate upon the day of his death. He commanded the Second Division of the Fifth Army Corps in the Cuban campaign, rendering distinguished service in the battles before Santiago, and subsequently commanded the Department of Santiago and the Fourth Army Corps. On the 18th of March, 1899, he assumed command of the First Division of the Eighth Army Corps in the Philippine Islands, and remained in command of this division in practically continuous and most eventful service in the field until he fell, on the 18th of December, 1899, pierced by an insurgent bullet while leading his troops near San Mateo, on the island of Luzon. The swift and resistless movement of his column up the Rio Grande and across the northern boundary of the plain of central Luzon, which had just been completed, was the chief factor in the destruction of the insurgent power, and was the crowning achievement of his arduous life.

"He fell in the fullness of his powers, in the joy of conflict, in the consciousness of assured victory. He leaves to his comrades and his country the memory and the example of dauntless courage, of unsparing devotion to duty, of manly character, and of high qualities of command which inspired his troops with his own indomitable spirit.

"The flag will be placed at half staff and thirteen minute guns will be fired at every military post and station on the day after the receipt of this order, and the usual badges of mourning will be worn for thirty days.

By command of Major-General Miles:

ELIHU ROOT, Secretary of War. "

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant- General.

On the 4th of January, 1900, Gen. J. C. Bates, UT. S. V., was assigned to the command of the First Division of the Eighth Army Corps, and an active campaign under his direction was commenced in southern Luzon. The plan adopted was to confront and hold the strong force of the enemy near Imus and to the west of Bacoor by a body of troops under General Wheaton, while a column, under General Schwan, should move rapidly down the west shore of the Laguna de Bay to Binang, thence turn southwesterly and seize the Silang, Indang, and Naic road, capture the enemy's supplies supposed to be at the towns of Silang and Indang, and arrest the retreat of the enemy, when he should be driven from northern Cavite by our troops designated to attack him there, and thus prevent his reassembling in the mountains of southern Cavite and northern Batangas. This plan was successfully executed.

General Schwan's column moved over the lines indicated with great rapidity, marching a distance of over 600 miles, striking and defeating numerous bodies of insurgents and capturing many intrenched positions, taking possession of and garrisoning towns along the line, and scattering and demoralizing all the organized forces of the enemy within that section of country. From these operations and the simultaneous attacks by our troops under General Wheaton in the north the rebel forces in the Cavite region practically disappeared, the members either being killed or captured or returning to their homes as unarmed citizens, and a few scattered parties escaping through General Schwan's line to the south. By the 8th of February the organized forces of the insurgents in the region mentioned had ceased to exist. In large portions of the country the inhabitants were returning to their homes and resuming their industries, and active trade with Manila was resumed.

In the course of these operations about 600 Spanish prisoners were released from the insurgents, leaving about 600 more still in their hands in the extreme southeastern provinces of Camarines and Albay, nearly all of whom were afterwards liberated by our troops. In the meantime an expedition was organized under the command of Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbe, U. S. V., to expel the Tagalogs who had taken possession of the principal hemp ports of the islands situated in Albay, the extreme southeastern province of Luzon, and in the islands of Leyte, Samar, and Catanduanes.

This expedition sailed from Manila on the 18th of January and accomplished its object. All of the principal hemp ports were relieved from control of the insurgents, garrisoned by American troops, and opened to commerce by order of the military governor of the islands on the 30th of January and the 10th and 14th of February. The expedition met with strong resistance at Legaspi by an intrenched force under the Chinese general, Paua. He was speedily overcome and went into the interior. After a few days he reassembled his forces and threatened the garrisons which had been left in Albay and Legaspi, whereupon he was attacked, and defeated, and surrendered. Thirty pieces of artillery, a large quantity of ammunition, a good many rifles, and a considerable amount of money were captured by this expedition.

On the 15th of February an expedition, under the supervision of Major-General Bates and under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. James M. Bell, U. S. V., sailed from Manila to take possession of the North and South Camarines provinces and Western Albay, in which the insurgent forces had been swelled by the individuals and scattered bands escaping from our operations in various sections of the north. The insurgent force was defeated aft~ a sharp engagement near the mouth of the Bicol River, pursued, and scattered. Large amounts of artillery and war material were captured. The normal conditions of industry and trade relations with Manila were resumed by the inhabitants.

On the 20th of March the region covered by the last described operations was created a district of southeastern Luzon, under the command of Gen. James M. Bell, who was instructed to proceed to the establishment of the necessary customs and internal-revenue service in the district. In the meantime similar expeditions were successfully made through the mountains of the various islands of the Visayan Group, striking and scattering and severely punishing the bands of bandits and insurgents who infested those islands. In the latter part of March General Bates proceeded with the Fortieth Infantry to establish garrisons in Mindanao. The only resistance was of a trifling character at Cagayan, the insurgent general in northeastern Mindanao surrendering and turning over the ordnance in his possession. These movements, and many others incidental to them, are particularly described in the report of Major-General Otis, which is submitted herewith.

With their execution all formal and open resistance to American authority in the Philippines terminated, leaving only an exceedingly vexatious and annoying guerrilla warfare of a character closely approaching brigandage, which will require time, patience, and good judgment to finally suppress. As rapidly as we have occupied territory, the policy of inviting inhabitants to return to their peaceful vocations, and aiding them in the reestablishment of their local governments has been followed, and the protection of the United States has been promised to them. The giving of this protection has led to the distribution of troops in the Philippine Islands to over 400 different posts, with the consequent labor of administration and supply.

The maintenance of these posts involves the continued employment of a large force, but as the Tagalogs who are in rebellion have deliberately adopted the policy of murdering, so far as they are able, all of their countrymen who are friendly to the United States, the maintenance of garrisons is at present necessary to the protection of the peaceful and unarmed Filipinos who have submitted to our authority; and if we are to discharge our obligations in that regard their reduction must necessarily be gradual.

The most efficient measures for the reduction of the number of posts, and consequently of the number of troops, necessary in the Philippines will be the construction of roads, making possible rapid communication, so that each post may effectually protect the people of a larger section of country; the establishment of personal relations between our officers and the people of the country with whom they are brought in contact, so that we can tell who are trustworthy sources of information and who are not, the gradually growing appreciation of the benefits of our control and the sincerity of our professions of good intention, which will naturally follow the benefits of good civil government, and the organization of native troops under American officers.

At the date of my last report (November 30,1900) formal and open resistance to American authority in the Philippines had practically terminated, and the Filipino insurgent forces had adopted a system of guerrilla warfare closely approaching brigandage. To successfully contend against this condition and to suppress it, to afford protection to the peaceful and unarmed inhabitants, and to reestablish local civil governments had necessitated the distribution of our forces to more than 400 stations. This process continued until a maximum of 502 stations were occupied, holding every important town and strategic point in the archipelago. The scattered guerrilla insurgent bands obtained funds and supplies from the towns and the country in the vicinity of their operations. The people thus contributing to the support of these guerrillas had been rarely interfered with. Prisoners taken in battle had been disarmed and immediately released.

This policy had been adhered to in the hope that it might make friendly neighbors of the natives, but, on the contrary, they seemed suspicious of this beneficence, and looked upon it as an evidence of weakness. It was therefore decided to apply more rigidly to the residents of the archipelago the laws of war touching the government of occupied places. Notice of this intention was given by a proclamation issued by the military governor December 20,1900, fully explaining the law, supplemented by letters of instruction, and followed by more vigorous field operations. It was followed immediately by the deportation to the island of Guam of about fifty prominent Filipino insurgent army officers, civil officials, insurgent agents, sympathizers, and agitators. The details of the proclamation, letters of instruction, and orders governing the deportation are embodied in the report of Major General MacArthur submitted herewith.

The field work of the army was continued with renewed vigor from each of the 500 stations and was conducted simultaneously throughout the entire archipelago with such telling results that, with the exception of Lukban in Samar and Malvar in southern Luzon, all prominent insurgent leaders with their commands were captured or surrendered.

These field operations were prosecuted notwithstanding the withdrawal from the Philippines and return to the United States of the volunteer army, comprising 1 regiment of cavalry and 25 regiments of infantry, a total of nearly 1,400 officers and 29,000 enlisted men, whose transfer across 8,000 miles of sea to San Francisco, where they were mustered out of service as required by law, was accomplished without loss.

The most important single military event of the year in the Philippines was the capture of Aguinaldo, successfully accomplished by Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston U. S. A., under the supervision and guidance of his department and division commanders, Major-Generals Wheaton and MacArthur. Soon after his capture Aguinaldo voluntarily subscribed to the oath of allegiance and issued a proclamation to the Filipino people, urging the termination of hostilities, that " lasting peace might come to them under the glorious banner of the United States."

His capture was soon followed by the surrender of such prominent Filipino leaders as Tinio, Aglipay, Trias, and Cailles, with their entire following.

The operations of the field forces were so vigorous and unrelenting that more than 1,000 contacts occurred between our troops and the insurgents from May, 1900, to June 30, 1901, in which the insurgent casualties were: Killed, 3,854; wounded, 1,193; captured, 6,572; surrendered, 23,095; with a total of 15,693 rifles and nearly 300,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition captured and surrendered. Our casualties during the same period were: Killed, 245; wounded, 490; captured, 118; missing, 20.

I can not speak too highly of the work of the army in the Philippines. The officers and men have been equal to the best requirements, not only of military service, but of the civil administration with which they were charged in all its details from the date of our occupancy in August, 1898, until the inauguration of a civil governor on the 4th of July, 1901.

The recent disturbances in Samar and southern Luzon are of minor consequence, and are being stamped out by the vigorous operations of the troops. Small disturbances of this character are, unfortunately, to be expected, but will be controlled and guarded against by every means possible. The difficulties of this description are not more but less than were anticipated when the following paragraphs of my report of last year were written:

In the Philippine Islands the restoration of order will necessarily be a work of time. The mountains of those islands have always been infested by bandits, who have committed depredations and levied blackmail upon the peaceful inhabitants, and for the repression of whom the Spaniards do not appear to have ever taken any very active measures.

The practical inclusion of these bands among the insurgent forces, enabling them to rob and murder under color of patriotism, has greatly increased their numbers, as the disturbed conditions of the past two years and a half have increased their opportunities. However completely the leaders and the rank and file of the real insurgents may come in and acknowledge the sovereignty of the United States, it is certain that great numbers of men who prefer to live by robbery rather than by labor will continue to call themselves guerrillas, and will require a considerable army for their suppression and for the protection of the peaceful inhabitants in the meantime.

The army in the Philippines has been reduced since my last report from 2,367 officers and 71,727 enlisted men to 1,111 officers and 42,128 enlisted men. When the organizations now remaining in the Philippines shall by the force of ordinary casualties and expiration of enlistments be reduced to the numbers established by the order of May 8, 1901, mentioned on page 4 of this report, the total enlisted strength of those organizations, exclusive of hospital corps, will be 32,079 men. The reduction already .made was effected partly by bringing home the volunteers and partly by bringing home the regular organizations which had been longest in the Philippines. So far as the regular troops are concerned, the movement is still in progress, four regiments of the present Philippine force which have been longest in the islands being now under orders to return to the United States. They will be replaced in part by two regiments and part of a third now under orders to sail from the United States. It is the design of the Department not to subject any of our forces to the effect of a tropical climate for a longer period than three years without an intervening tour of service in a colder climate. With the reorganized army we are getting into a position where this can be accomplished systematically as a matter of routine.

The policy indicated in my report of last year, of creating a native Philippine force which shall in time release a large part of the American Army from the necessity of remaining in the Philippines, has not been neglected. The authority then asked was granted by section 36 of the act of February 2, 1901, Congress in that provision wisely empowering the President to proceed in his discretion by successive steps, beginning with a simple organization of scouts, and following, when the proper time should arrive, by the more complicated and fully officered organization of the Regular Army. Pursuing this policy, the small bodies of scouts mentioned in my last report have during the year been enlarged and multiplied until there are now 4,973 in the service. As command in these bodies requires special qualifications for dealing with the native soldiers, all the appointments
of officers (98 in number) have been made upon the recommendations of the commanding officer in the Philippines. The mustering out of these organizations as employees of the insular government, and their reenlistment and reorganization as companies of scouts, under the act of February 2, 1901, is now in progress and is far advanced.

Reduction of expenses.-The War Department has realized the importance and the duty of following the improved conditions by a reduction of expenditures and the enforcement of economy. War always and inevitably tends toward extravagance. The conditions of active military operations frequently require that things shall be done without regard to cost. The uncertainties of the future make very liberal and often excessive estimates and requisitions the part of prudence. The difficulties of rapid transportation and extemporized storage of supplies make it impossible to enforce the ordinary standards of official accountability. The large sums expended and the greater interests involved discourage small economies. Habits are acquired which can not be thrown off without a positive and vigorous effort. We are making such an effort and, I think, with success. To call the attention of the Army to this necessity the following order was published on the 1st of May:

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 61

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

ADJUTANT-GENERALS OFFICE,

Washington, May 1, 1901.

The following is published to the Army for the information and guidance of all concerned:

The Secretary of War directs that the attention of department commanders and of all officers charged with the duty of making or approving estimates or requisitions for the expenditure of money be called to the importance of careful scrutiny and painstaking to avoid unnecessary expense. The requirements of active military operations always tend toward habits of expense not justified in time of peace. With the gradual disappearance of those military necessities which must be met without regard to cost the Army will be held responsible by the people of the country for a reduction of expenses and a rigid economy. The Secretary desires the assistance of all officers in bringing about this result.

By command of Lieutenant-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General, Major-General, U. S. Army.

During the past summer the Adjutant-General, the Inspector - General, the Quartermaster - General, the Commissary - General, and the Surgeon - General of the Army have all been sent to the Philippines with instructions to ascertain, each in his own department, what measures of retrenchment can be taken without impairing efficiency, and many such measures have been recommended and undertaken.

The military administration in the Philippines has been simplified and made less expensive by the reduction of the number of military departments in the Division of the Philippines from four to two. The quartermaster's stores and the military hospitals have been concentrated.

The quantity of bulky fodder shipped from the United States to the Philippines for the cavalry, artillery, and transportation animals, which now number about 20,000, has been reduced by one-half, and native fodder substituted. The list of sales stores kept by the Commissary Department has been unduly extended in number and variety, and after consideration and investigation it has been materially reduced. The great and constantly increasing number of civil employees in the various insular governments, who were supplied from army stores during the unsettled conditions of military occupation, had much increased this branch of the work of the Subsistence Department. The amounts received from all sales of subsistence stores during the fiscal year have aggregated $3,290,234.52. These sales to officers and enlisted men are under the statute required to be at cost, and to civilians at cost with 10 per cent added.

The price thus fixed by statute does not include the cost of doing the business, of transportation, of loss of goods, of deterioration, or of interest on the moneys invested, and the result is a large annual loss to the Government. An undue extension of the system would inevitably open the door to irregularity and abuses, because the Subsistence Department is not and can not be properly organized for the conduct of a general grocery business all over the world . I have accordingly felt bound, with regret for the inconvenience caused to the great body of civil employees in the Philippines, to direct that the practice of commissary sales should be confined to the persons expressly entitled to the privilege under the statute. At the same time the civil government of the Philippines has been authorized to establish a supply store for the purpose of furnishing officers, employees, and servants of the various departments of the insular and provincial governments, including all teachers in public schools, with food supplies and other necessaries of life at reasonable prices; and such a store will hereafter be conducted under the direction of the chief of the Philippine constabulary, in conjunction with an insular purchasing agent. The chief quartermaster and chief commissary of the Division of the Philippines have been authorized to sell in bulk to such purchasing agent a sufficient quantity of surplus sales stores on hand in the Philippines to enable such a supply store to commence business.

A number of improvements in the methods of transacting the business of the supply departments suited to the conditions in the Philippines have been formulated and will be followed. The economical handling of supplies will be greatly promoted by the proposed construction of much-needed storehouses and by the progressive concentration of troops at fewer stations, while the quantity of supplies required will be reduced by the gradual substitution of native troops and civil constabulary for American soldiers in maintaining order.

Early in the year a number of small peculations by persons concerned in the business of the commissary department at Manila were discovered and received great prominence in the public press. Thorough investigation proved that the demoralization which they indicated was confined to a few individuals, who were promptly tried, convicted, and sentenced, and are now undergoing punishment. The whole amount of loss to the Government proved to be less than $1,000.

At the time of my last report Malvar, in the provinces of Batangas and Tayabas, in the island of Luzon, and Lukban, in the island of Samar, were the only insurgent leaders of importance who still maintained guerrilla warfare. We hoped that these leaders with their followers would yield to the example and advice of the great body of the Philippine people who had become friendly to the United States, and would voluntarily lay down their arms. It soon became evident, however, that this would not be the case. Malvar grew stronger, rather than weaker, under the effect of a conciliatory and peaceful policy; and the fierce natives of Samar were excited to greater hostile activity by a successful surprise at Balangiga in September, by which the people of the town, who had given every appearance of friendliness and were treated as friends, set upon a company of the Ninth Infantry while at breakfast and murdered most of them.

Active campaigns were accordingly inaugurated in both regions; and these resulted in the surrender of Malvar on the 16th of April, and in the capture of Lukban and the surrender of Guevara, his successor, on the 27th of April. Gen. Frederick D. Grant reports that the surrenders in Samar included every gun known to exist in the island except two; and Glen. J. F. Bell, who conducted operations against Malvar, in Batangas, reports that during the campaign we secured 3,561 guns, 625 revolvers, with many thousand bolos, rounds of ammunition, etc., and detected, captured, or forced to surrender some eight or ten thousand persons actively engaged in one capacity or another in the insurrection. These surrenders put an end to the guerrilla warfare in the Philippines, which had been waged with great ferocity ever since the destruction of Aguinaldo's government in the latter part of 1899, and had been accompanied by constant treachery, assassination, cruelty, and disregard of the laws- of war.

The way was now clear to complete the establishment of civil government, and by energetic action and hearty cooperation on the part of both the civil and military authorities in the Philippines this was accomplished coincidentally with the enactment by Congress of the Philippine government bill of July 1, 1902.

On the 4th of July, 1902, the remainder of the military government was ended by the following order:

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, July 4, 1902.

The insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippine Archipelago having ended, and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, under the instructions of the President to the Philippine Commission, dated April 7, 1900, now ratified and confirmed by the act of Congress approved July 1, 1902, entitled " An act temporarily to provide for the administration of affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," the general commanding the Division of the Philippines is hereby relieved from the further performance of the duties of military governor, and the office of military governor in said archipelago is terminated. The general commanding the Division of the Philippines, and all military officers in authority therein, will continue to observe the direction contained in the aforesaid instructions of the President, that the military forces in the Division of the Philippines shall be at all times subject, under the orders of the military commander, to the call of the civil authorities for the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of their authority.

By the President:

ELIHU ROOT, Secretary of War.

On the same day the President issued a proclamation of peace and amnesty, a copy of which is annexed as "Appendix C."

The dual process by which the military power had steadily acquired control over the various provinces of the archipelago, and at the same time had been superseded progressively by civil administration, was finished, and a complete system of civil government, built up under the authority of the President, was in operation, ready to go on under the authority of Congress.

I described in my last report the important bearing which the continuous offer and bestowal of civil rights and local self-government as the result of pacification had upon the attitude of the people toward the insurrection. It is evident that the insurrection has been brought to an end both by making a war distressing and hopeless on the one hand and by making peace attractive, through immediate and present demonstration of the sincerity of our purpose to give to the people just and free government on the other. This result could not have been accomplished except by genuine and hearty cooperation of both the military and civil authorities acting together under the general direction of the War Department. The good temper and mutual consideration and helpfulness, and subordination of personal to public interests, displayed by General MacArthur and General Chaffee on the one hand, and by Governor Taft, Vice-Governor Wright, and the Civil Commission on the other, frequently under circumstances of great delicacy and difficulty, are worthy of high praise. Some of their subordinates, through incomplete knowledge and- from widely differing points of view, have sometimes expressed discordant opinions, but both soldiers and civilians, with very few exceptions, have rendered loyal and devoted support to the prescribed policy.

There was at one time in the public press and on the floor of Congress much criticism of the conduct of the army in the Philippines, as being cruel and inhuman. All wars are cruel. This conflict consisted chiefly of guerrilla warfare. It lasted for some three years and a half and extended over thousands of miles of territory. Over 120,000 men were engaged upon o~e and much greater numbers upon the other, and we~e fighting against enemies who totally disregarded the laws of civilized warfare, and who were guilty of the most atrocious treachery and inhuman cruelty. It was impossible that some individuals should not be found upon our side who were unnecessarily and unjustifiably cruel. Such instances, however, after five months of searching investigation by a committee of the Senate, who took some three thousand printed pages of testimony, appear to have been comparatively few, and they were in violation of strict orders, obedience to which characterized the conduct of the army as a whole.

The two observers who, as the heads of the civil government in the Philippines, had the best opportunities for information, and at the same time were naturally free from any military bias, have given what I believe to be a true statement of the character of our military operations.

Vice-Governor Luke E. Wright says, in a letter written on the 20th of July last:

General Chaffee, as a matter of course, had no patience with any acts of oppression or cruelty, and whenever his attention has been called to them has at once taken proper steps. The howl against the Army has been made mainly for political purposes, and the cruelties practiced have been largely exaggerated. Of course, numerous instances of this character have occurred. There never was and never will be a war of which the same may not be said; but taken as a whole, and when the character of the warfare here is considered, I think the officers and men of the American Army have been forbearing and humane in their dealings with the natives, and the attempt to create a contrary impression is not only unjust to them, but, it seems to me, unpatriotic as well.

Governor Taft, in his testimony under oath before the Philippine Committee of the Senate on the 4th of February last said:

After a good deal of study about the matter (and although I have never been prejudiced in favor of the military branch, for when the civil and military branches are exercising concurrent jurisdiction there is some inevitable friction), I desire to say that it is my deliberate judgment that there never was a war conducted, whether against inferior races or not, in which there was more compassion and more restraint and more generosity, assuming that there was war at all, than there have been in the Philippine Islands.

SUMMARY OF SERVICE IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES.

The conduct and service of the army, both in Cuba and in the Philippines, were summed up in the following order:

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, July 4, 1902.

To the Army of the United States:

The President upon this anniversary of national independence wishes to express to the officers and enlisted men of the United States Army his deep appreciation of the service they have rendered to the country in the great and difficult undertakings which they have brought to a successful conclusion during the past year.

He thanks the officers and the enlisted men who have been maintaining order and carrying on the military government in Cuba, because they have faithfully given effect to the humane purposes of the American people. They have with sincere kindness helped the Cuban people to take all the successive steps necessary to the establishment of their own constitutional government. During the time required for that process they have governed ,Cuba wisely, regarding justice and respecting individual liberty; have honestly collected and expended for the best interests of the Cuban people the revenues, amounting to over $60,000,000; have carried out practical and thorough sanitary measures, greatly improving the health and lowering the death rate of the island. By patient, scientific research they have ascertained the causes of yellow fever, and by good administration have put an end to that most dreadful disease, which has long destroyed the lives and hindered the commercial prosperity of the Cubans. They have expedited justice and secured protection for the rights of the innocent, while they have cleansed the prisons and established sound discipline and healthful conditions for the punishment of the guilty. They have reestablished and renovated and put upon a substantial basis adequate hospitals and asylums for the care of the unfortunate. They have established a general system of free common schools throughout the island, in which over 200,000 children are in actual attendance. They have constructed great and necessary public works. They have gradually trained the Cubans themselves in all branches of administration, so that the new government upon assuming power has begun its work with an experienced force of Cuban civil-service employees competent to execute its orders. They have borne themselves with dignity and self-control, so that nearly four years of military occupation have passed unmarred by injury or insult to man or woman. They have transferred the government of Cuba to the Cuban people amid universal expressions of friendship and good will, and have left a record of ordered justice and liberty, of rapid improvement in material and moral conditions, and progress in the art of government which reflects great credit upon the people of the United States.

The President thanks the officers and enlisted men of the army in the Philippines, both regulars and volunteers, for the courage and fortitude, the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with which they have put down and ended the great insurrection which has raged throughout the archipelago against the lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United States. The task was peculiarly difficult and trying. They were required at first to overcome organized resistance of superior numbers, well equipped with modern arms of precision, intrenched in an unknown country of mountain defiles, jungles, and swamps, apparently capable of interminable defense. When this resistance had been overcome they were required to crush out a general system of guerrilla warfare conducted among a people speaking unknown tongues, from whom it was almost impossible to obtain the information necessary for successful pursuit or to guard against surprise and ambush.

The enemies by whom they were surrounded were regardless of all obligations of good faith and of all the limitations which humanity has imposed upon civilized warfare. Bound themselves by the laws of war, our soldiers were called upon to meet every device of unscrupulous treachery and to contemplate without reprisal the infliction of barbarous cruelties upon their comrades and friendly natives. They were instructed, while punishing armed resistance, to conciliate the friendship of the peaceful, yet had to do with a population among whom it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and who in countless instances used a false appearance of friendship for ambush and assassination. They were obliged to deal with problems of communication and transportation in a country without roads and frequently made impassable by torrential rains. They were weakened by tropical heat and tropical disease. Widely scattered over a great archipelago, extending a thousand miles from north to south, the gravest responsibilities, involving the life or death of their commands, frequently devolved upon young and inexperienced officers beyond the reach of specific orders or advice.

Under all these adverse circumstances the army of the Philippines has accomplished its task rapidly and completely. In more than two thousand combats, great and small, within three years, it has exhibited unvarying courage and resolution. Utilizing the lessons of the Indian wars, it has relentlessly followed the guerrilla bands to their fastnesses in mountain and jungle and crushed them. It has put an end to the vast system of intimidation and secret assassination by which the peaceful natives were prevented from taking a genuine part in government under American authority. It has captured or forced to surrender substantially all the leaders of the insurrection. It has submitted to no discouragement and halted at no obstacle. Its officers have shown high qualities of command, and its men have shown devotion and discipline. Its splendid virile energy has been accompanied by self-control, patience, and magnanimity. With surprisingly few individual exceptions, its course has been characterized by humanity and kindness to the prisoner and the noncombatant. With admirable good temper, sympathy, and loyalty to American ideals its commanding generals have joined with the civilian agents of the Government in healing the wounds of war and assuring to the people of the Philippines the blessings of peace and prosperity. Individual liberty, protection of personal rights, civil order, public instruction, and religious freedom have followed its footsteps. It has added honor to the flag which it defended, and has justified increased confidence in the future of the American people, whose soldiers do not shrink from labor or death, yet love liberty and peace.

The President feels that he expresses the sentiments of all the loyal people of the United States in doing honor to the whole Army which has joined in the performance and shares in the credit of these honorable services.

This general order will be read aloud at parade in every military post on the 4th day of July, 1902, or on the first day after it shall have been received.

ELIHU ROOT,

Secretary of War.

THE CONTROL OF THE MOROS.

The establishment of civil government in the Philippines still left a function for the Army to perform in the control of the Moros in the Sulu Archipelago, Southern Mindanao, and the southern part of Palawan very similar to that which it has long performed in relation to the Indian tribes in the western part of the United States. It was only through an extended series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States, dealing with specific questions as they arose in the early years of the last century, that the precise legal relations between the Federal Government, the State and Territorial governments, and the Indian tribes of North America were determined.

The court said in the case of the Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia (5 Peters, 1):

The Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable and heretofore an unquestioned right to the lands they occupy until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to the Government. It may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can with strict accuracy be denominated foreign nations. They may more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy territory to which we assert a title, independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases; meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our Government for protection, rely upon its kindness and its power, appeal to it for relief to their wants, and address the President as their great father.

A similar process of judicial decision will probably be called for by the numerous questions certain to arise from our relations to the Moro tribes; but in the meantime the close general analogy to the relations of the North American Indians indicates a duty, for the present at least, of limited supervision and control operating upon the tribal governments of the Moros, rather than an attempt to substitute an American or Philippine government acting directly upon the individual Moros. In the performance of this duty we find ourselves exercising powers and following methods plainly contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the judicial decisions and established usage of the entire existence of the Government of the United States.

The instructions of the President to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, contained the following direction based upon the foregoing view:

In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the islands the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by a civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation, and without undue or petty interference constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.

The same instructions provide that the military forces in the Philippines shall be at all times subject, under the orders of the military commander, to the call of the civil authorities for the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of their authority.

These instructions were approved and adopted by Congress in the Philippine government act of July 1, 1902, and they will continue to guide the civil and military authorities in the-Philippines in their dealings with the Moros. The questions to be worked out in that process are altogether apart from the general questions of government in the Philippines, and such measures of force as are necessary to control the various Moro tribes have no more relation to the recent Philippine insurrection than our troubles with the Sioux or the Apaches had to do with the suppression of the Southern rebellion.

The Moros of the Sulu Archipelago and Palawan, and those living upon or in immediate communication with the seacoast in Mindanao, have been as a rule friendly and well behaved. Some of the Malanao Moros who inhabit the borders of Lake Lanao, in the interior of Mindanao, resented attempts made by Americans to examine the interior of the country, and in the spring of this year entered upon a regular system of attacking our men when found alone or in small parties, and stealing our horses and mules. Several of our men were murdered, and in April a demand was made for the return of the property and the surrender of the murderers. This demand was met by defiance, and after long continued and repeated efforts to secure redress and a discontinuance of the practice by peaceable means, an expedition was organized under Col. (now Brig. Gen.) Frank D. Baldwin, which on the 2d and 3d of May attacked and captured the strongholds of the Sultan of Bayang and the dato of Binadayan on Lake Lanao, with a loss of 7 killed and 44 wounded. A part of the Twenty-seventh Infantry and the Twenty-fifth Mountain Battery were engaged. It was a brilliant affair, and the conduct of officers and men merited the high praise conveyed in the following dispatch from the President:

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 5, 1902.

CHAFFEE, Manila:

Accept for the army under your command, and express to General Davis and Colonel Baldwin ill especially, my congratulations and thanks for the splendid courage and fidelity which have again carried our flag to victory. Your fellow-countrymen at home will ever reverence the memory of the fallen and be faithful to the survivors who have themselves been faithful unto death for their country's sake.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

After this lesson many of the lake dattos came in and established friendly relations. Some of them, however, remained recalcitrant, and continued the practice of annoyance and attack. General Chaffee reported on the 6th of September that since the 2d of May our troops had been attacked twelve times, with a loss of 4 killed and 12 wounded. On the 28th of September another well conducted expedition under Capt. John F. Pershing, of the Fifteenth Cavalry, composed of a battalion of the Seventh Infantry, a troop of the Fifteenth Cavalry, and two platoons of the Twenty-fifth Field Artillery, inflicted severe punishment upon the Maciu Moros, capturing many of their fortified places, killing 1 of their sultans and 40 or 50 of their fighting men, with a loss of 2 Americans wounded.

Some further punishment may yet be necessary, but the present indications since this last experience seem to be peaceful.

The numbers of the Lake Lanao Moros are estimated variously from 100,000 to 400,000. The smaller number is probably nearer the fact. No attempts appear to have been made by Spain to exercise any control over them between the middle of the seventeenth century and the year 1890. Some unsuccessful efforts were made by small forces in the years 1890 and 1891; and in 1898, before the war between Spain and the United States, extensive preparations had been made by the Spanish forces in the Philippines for the subjugation of the lake tribes.

Farther in the interior of Midanao are numerous heathen tribes still more savage and lower in the scale of civilization than the Moros. In 1897 the Spanish governor of
Mindanao estimated the numbers of sixteen of these tribes at an aggregate of 262,000. From time immemorial the Moros have been in the habit of raiding their villages and carrying away captives into slavery, and a considerable slave trade appears to have been carried on between the southwest coast of Mindanao and ports in the Sulu Archipelago. It is only by asserting and establishing our right of control over the Moro tribes that we can put a stop to this nefarious business; and if there were no other reason, that alone would make it impossible for us to follow the example of Spain and leave the Moros of the interior to themselves.

Now that the insurrection has been disposed of we shall be able to turn our attention, not merely to the slave trade, but to the already existing slavery among the Moros. We can not immediately free the slaves by a single act, first, because it would require a war of extermination in which a large part of the slaves would probably be found fighting against us; and, second, because a large part of them would have nowhere to go and no way to live if deprived of the protection and support of their present masters. I believe, however, that we can maintain a process of gradual and steady reduction, resulting ultimately in the extinction of the practice of slavery. Some of the results of our efforts in that direction are stated in my last report. The process will be slow, and will require patience and good judgment, but I believe the result will be worth the trouble. The task of improving the Moros is by no means hopeless. Glen. George W. Davis, who commanded in Mindanao, and now commands the Division of the Philippines, says of them:

Whatever may be the number of Moros, whether a few, or many hundred thousands, all, and many times more than all, of these people will be needed as agricultural and mechanical laborers and helpers in the cultivation of the soil and the utilization of its productions for the benefit of themselves and mankind. They are able to produce rice, sugar cane, coffee, corn, cattle, beautiful woven fabrics, and thrusting and cutting weapons; they manufacture bronze cannon and gunpowder, and give surprising proofs of their ingenuity and industry. Their Moro boats are fashioned and rigged and sailed with the utmost skill, and are admired by all strangers. A race of men who are capable of doing all this and who possess many manly qualities, should be kept alive and not shot down in war. They should be aided and encouraged and taught how to improve their own natural and social condition, and benefit us at the same time. Mohammedans in Turkey and India and Java have proved to be industrious and useful members of the communities. Mohammedans Malays in Sarawak, a British protectorate in Borneo, perform all the skilled and unskilled labor of that prosperous colony, and are as plainly showing their adaptability for the higher duties and occupations as did the Japanese. The Moros have certainly equal or greater capacity for usefulness.

The report from which this quotation is taken is among those transmitted herewith, and I commend it to special attention. It exhibits the breadth of view and sound judgment which uniformly characterize that officer's work.

On the 15th of October, 1903, the American troops in the Philippines consisted of 843 officers and 14,667 enlisted men. Gen. George W. Davis, the division commander until the 25th of July, has reported that the number can be still further reduced, and I agree with that opinion. It is not desirable, however, to make any further reduction until the construction of barracks and quarters in the United States has made further progress. There are also 99 officers and 4,805 enlisted men of the Philippine Scouts. There is not at present much occasion for the use of American troops outside of the Moro country, but the moral effect of their presence is undoubtedly salutary. We are following the policy of drawing them together in the comparatively few large posts which are in course of construction, where their discipline, health, and opportunities for instruction will be improved and the cost of maintenance will be decreased. Such smaller posts as are required will be generally, and are now to a considerable extent, occupied by the Philippine Scouts. General Davis reports, under the head of "Public order," as follows:

In all the cities and large towns throughout the archipelago, and throughout a very large part of the rural districts inhabited by Christian Filipinos, life and property have been secured and the inhabitants have pursued their ordinary avocations without annoyance by the lawbreakers. There have been a few cases of serious disturbance of the peace in the smaller towns and rural districts which have resulted in some loss of life and property; such disturbances of the peace have had the effect of discouraging industrial efforts, and in many extensive regions little attention to agriculture, the mainstay of the island, has been practicable. The lawless element generally consists of roving bands whose members are descendants of former generations of men engaged in similar avocations-lawbreakers and robbers-by occupation. They sometimes call themselves "insurrectos " and resent the characterization of "ladrones;" but the real motive of almost all of these outlaws is loot, pure and simple, and to be supported by the peaceful and industrious inhabitants.

A number of conflicts have occurred during the year between these lawless bands and the Philippine scouts, in which the scouts have conducted themselves admirably. In two cases during the year small bodies of white troops were called upon. The suppression of this kind of disorder is necessarily the work of time, but it is evidently progressing as rapidly as can be expected.

THE MOROS.

The last report of the Secretary of War contained an account of the punitive expeditions which had been found necessary in the Lake Lanao region in the months of May and September, 1902. I then said:

Some further punishment may yet be necessary, but the present indications since this last experience seem to be peaceful.

In April, 1903, a body of American troops under Capt. John F. Pershing, engaged in the exploration of the west shore of Lake Lanao, was attacked by the Sultan of Baccalod and the Sultan's fort was captured and destroyed. In May, while exploring the east shore of the lake, the force under Captain Pershing was opposed and fired upon by the Taraca Moros, and their forts were assaulted and captured. Both General Sumner, in command of the Department, and General Davis, in command of the Division, characterize the conduct of Captain Pershing and his officers and men in terms of high commendation. On the 11th of May the following dispatch was sent by the Secretary of War to General Davis:

I congratulate you and Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner on the work done in Mindanao. Express to Capt. John J. Pershing and the officers and men under his command the thanks of the War Department for their able and effective accomplishment of their difficult and important task.

In the Sulu Archipelago the conduct of the Moros has been growing steadily more unsatisfactory during the entire year. The agreement made by General Bates with the Sultan of Jolo on the 10th day of August, 1899, and submitted to Congress February 1, 1900, recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan and depended upon him for the maintenance of order. Fuller experience with these people, however, has shown that the sovereignty of the Sultan is little more than nominal and that he has not the power, even if he has the will, to maintain order. The people are really governed by a number of chiefs or " dattos," who pay very little attention to the theoretical authority of the Sultan. Some of these are friendly to the Americans and some of them have become exceedingly insolent and defiant, committing or permitting their people to commit frequent thefts and assaults and contemptuously repudiating any subordination to American sovereignty. I said in my last report:

Now that the insurrection has been disposed of we shall be able to turn our attention, not merely to the slave trade, but to the already existing slavery among the Moros. We can not immediately free the slaves by a single act, first, because it would require a war of extermination, in which a large part of the slaves would probably be found fighting against us, and second, because a large part of them would have nowhere to go and no way to live if deprived of the protection and support of their present masters. I believe, however, that we can maintain a process of gradual and steady reduction, resulting ultimately in the extinction of the practice of slavery.

The conditions which I have described, as long as they exist, will be an insuperable barrier to carrying out the intention thus expressed, as it is found that the Sulu Moros are not only continuing the practice of slavery, but are actively engaged in the slave trade.

It has thus become plain that the Bates agreement of 1899, which served a useful purpose at that time, can no longer be depended upon as an instrument of government, and that a new arrangement must be substituted in its place under which American authority operates directly upon the dattos, who are the real controlling powers in the Sulu Archipelago. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner, commanding the Department, in his report of June 30, 1903, said of that agreement:

Without going into a discussion of the Bates agreement, I do not believe any development can take place or any advance be made so long as the treaty stands . It was made, as I am informed, to meet and cover an emergency; its use as a temporary measure has passed, and we should now replace it by some wise and just measures that will allow us to get into personal contact and have more direct control and supervision of these people.

General Davis, commanding the Division of the Philippines, says in his report of July 26, 1903:

The Bates agreement with the Sultan of Sulu, which it appears was advised by the Schurman Commission, is an obstacle to the establishment of good government; but there have been many instances of failure on the Sultan's part to observe the requirements of the contract, and the bargain is voidable on the part of the United States in its discretion. The Filipino legislation by Congress of March 2, 1902, makes no mention of this agreement; although it is expressly provided in the conditional approval of it by the President, notice of which was communicated to General Otis by the Secretary of War on October 27, 1899, that the agreement was made subject to the action of Congress under the Paris Treaty; also, that the Sultan and his dattos be made to distinctly understand that this agreement was not to be understood as in any way to authorize or give the consent of the United States to the existence of slavery in the Sulu Archipelago. As slavery has been continuously practiced there and is now common, and as the Sulu Moros are known to have continued to purchase slaves from outside the Sulu group and themselves to have engaged in the slave trade continuously and persistently, the United States has further justification for declaring the agreement as null and void.

On June 1, 1903, proceeding in accordance with the views of future government above expressed, the Philippine Commission enacted a new law for the government of the Sulu Moros, prepared in conference with General Davis, the commander of the Division of the Philippines, and receiving his approval. This statute provides for a civil government of simple form, with a governor who maybe the officer commanding the military forces in that region, and aims to bring the Sulu Moros under the immediate control of the law without intervention of the Sultan, and to deal directly with the practice of slavery. A copy of the law is annexed hereto as Appendix H. Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, formerly military governor of Cuba, was selected for the dual position of military commander and civil governor under this statute. He reached Manila in July last, and is now at his post. It was anticipated that the establishment of the new system of government and the bringing of the defiant dattos under American control would probably result in resistance and hostilities by some of them. That has proved to be the case, and recent telegraphic dispatches show that it has been necessary to administer to one of the strongest of those dattos the same kind of lesson which had already been given in the Lake Lanao district.