Japanese Expansion in China:
A Western View in 1921

[Excerpted from Sidney Osborne, The Japanese Peril (New York: MacMillan, 1921), pp. 91-110]

JAPANESE EXPANSION

So long as Russia remained a great Power and able to resist the aggressive encroachments of Japan in Asia, the Japanese confined their operations in China's northern domains to the extension of their influence over Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. In these two regions, far-reaching claims had been forced upon China in I9I5, when Japan presented the twenty-one demands for Chinese consumption. These demands included (I) the extension of the term of the lease not only of Port Arthur and Dalny but also of the South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Railway; (2) the granting of special privileges to Japanese as regards the ownership of land, and with respect to trade, manufacture and farming in South Manchuria; (3) the right of Japanese subjects to have civil and criminal cases in which they are defendants tried by the Japanese Consul; (4) the grant of certain special mining privileges; (5) the grant to Japanese capital of a preference in case China requires loans for building railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; (6) the grant to Japan of a preference, in political, financial, military or police matters in case China requires foreign instructors or advisers in South Manchuria.

Under the secret agreement of September 24, 1918, China is required to build four railroads in Manchuria and Mongolia and to employ Japanese capital in their construction. This new Japanese demand, together with those referred to in the foregoing paragraph, represents the fixed Japanese policy towards China that by indirect means seeks to destroy every vestige of Chinese sovereignty in the provinces named, and under the cloak of a pretended " friendly co-operation " in economic and financial matters, in reality provides the Japanese with the right to exploit China to the utmost limit of her capacity to endure. By these means South Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia and Shantung had completely fallen under the yoke of Japan. And thus matters stood when, in the course of the year 1918, it became apparent that the Russian State was in process of disorganization and could no longer hope to oppose itself with vigour, as formerly, to the expansion politics of its Japanese neighbour in the Far East. And accordingly, at this juncture, the Nipponese stepped over into North Manchuria and into Outer Mongolia, hitherto the particular spheres of influence that belonged to Russia. Under the pretext that the Bolshevist peril was a menace to Japanese interests in Korea and adjoining regions, Japan sent troops of occupation to the aforementioned former Russian spheres of influence, and in a very short time extended her economic and financial interests over them. Nor was this the crowning limit to her imperialistic designs. There remained for consummation the spread of Japanese influence in the great region of the Amur River, the seizure of Vladivostok and the entire Maritime Province of Russia, and the penetration of all Russian Siberia east of Lake Baikal. All of these fell into the capacious maw of Japan prior to the coming of summer in I920. And to this end nothing could have served Japan's purposes better than the complete fiasco in which ended the expedition of the five Great Powers in Siberia, a project that had been cleverly promoted by Japan, knowing that it was doomed to failure from the very outset, but realizing that no better lesson could be given the Powers than this one that they must leave it to Japan alone to put a check on Bolshevist influences in the Far East. The five Powers came, saw and were conquered. When the last American soldier had been put aboard ship bound for home, the Japanese, who alone remained behind, were given the order to advance, and almost in a twinkling, what the five Great Powers had been unable to Saccomplish in combination, Japan accomplished single-handed, and to-day her influence is paramount in North Manchuria, in Outer Mongolia, -in the Amur region, in the Maritime province, and in all Siberia east of Lake Baikal.

But it was not alone in the acquirement of influence over vast new stretches of the earth's surface that Japan showed her greatness during the war and after. It was likewise in a commercial and financial sense that Japan made good use of her time. The enormous profits that flowed into Japanese coffers as the result of the temporary cessation of European competition, due to the war, resulted in a remarkable expansion of Japanese trade, industry and shipping. New markets were acquired in Australia, the Dutch East Indies, British India, China, South America and South Africa. Immense fortunes were made in the sale of ammunition and other war supplies to the Allies. A large part of Japan's foreign debt, which prior to 1914 had been growing to huge proportions, was paid off, and still Japan had money left over in plentiful amount to invest in French, British and Russian loans. The figure reached by these loans stood at I,I5I million yen in September 1918. The Japanese gold reserve had mounted by December 1918 to a sum total of I,093 million yen. For the first time since she emerged as a modern State Japan became a creditor instead of a debtor nation. She has brought under her influence vast new regions comparable in area with all of Europe, and she has made such strides in industry, commerce and finance as to make her to-day a dangerous rival even of England and America. And all this has been done within the living memory of many of her statesmen. Truly formidable giant.

Apologists for Japan in her aggressive and imperialistic designs are in the habit of citing, as a reason and excuse for Japan's expansion, the fact that it is a most serious problem for Japan to face, namely, to provide food for a population which already exceeds the limit which the country's soil can support, and which is debarred by Exclusion Acts from seeking relief in the less populated regions of America and Australia. With a birth-rate of 32 per thousand and a death-rate of 2I-5 per thousand, the population increases every year by about 750,000. In the last ten years the population of Japan, excluding Korea and Formosa, has increased from 50 to 57 millions, an average of 380 to the square mile. The land under cultivation and the rice production have increased by only 5 per cent., whereas the number of inhabitants has grown by I2 per cent. So long as the present birth-rate is maintained, the nation must depend more and more upon imported food supplies, as it is claimed that the limit of tillable soil and productivity has been reached. So long as Japan can purchase the surplus food she needs by means of a favourable balance of trade the problem may be faced. But with each yearly increase in the population there must come a corresponding increase of imported food, which in turn necessitates an increased sale of Japanese manufactured goods in foreign markets. Facing the matter, therefore, under normal conditions, it is necessary for Japan either to increase her supply of food by means of industrial expansion or to expand territorially into the less populated regions of the Asiatic Continent. In other words, Japan is overcrowded and must overflow along the line of least resistance-that is to say, into Asia. Having stated the case for Japan, we have now to consider the reasonableness of the explanation thus set forth.

Up to the outbreak of the Great War, Japan had acquired as a result of her Chinese War in 1894-5 and of her Russian War in 1904-5, vast increases of territory comprising the island of Formosa, Korea, half of the island of Saghalin, and a practical mastery of South Manchuria, which opened that vast region to Japanese enterprise and Japanese colonization to the same extent as is the case in territory entirely under Japanese sovereignty. And how did Japanese attempts at colonization turn out in these cases ? Very poorly indeed, for the records show that less than I00,000 Japanese left Japan to settle permanently in these countries. Accordingly, having learned from this experience, the Japanese will be the first to admit that they are not a colonizing race and never will be. Take Shantung. What excuse is there for Japanese territorial expansion in Shantung, which is already far more overcrowded than the Japanese Island Empire ? And if Japanese efforts to colonize regions that lie close to their very doors have utterly failed, how little excuse is there for the assertion that they must take over still wider areas in order to satisfy the needs of the Island Empire's growing population. Markets they must have. Raw materials they must have. With all this we agree fully. But are these not to be had without extending Japanese sovereignty over wide tracts of land to which they have no just title ? The answer is, of course, in the affirmative. Economic pressure is neither an explanation nor a justification of Japan's imperialistic designs. We must seek for the reasons elsewhere. And they are to be found, as the writer has pointed out in his former publications, in the continued exercise of irresponsible authority by the Military Party at Tokio, at the head of which is the veteran statesman and Genro, Yamagata. Authoritative Cabinet government does not exist in Japan. The Foreign Office is subservient to the War Office. The Ministers of War and of the Navy must be chosen from those respective services, and have the power to upset any Cabinet, by the simple act of resigning, in case the civilian members thereof prove intractable to their will. Behind the War and Navy Ministries, behind the Cabinet, behind Parliament and behind the Mikado himself stand the Genro or Elder Statesmen, with Yamagata at their head. These are the men, answerable to no authority, who have the deciding voice in the conduct of Japan's policies, internal and external. Many members of the Liberal Party in Japan continue to claim that the influence of the Genro is declining. Do any of Japan's recent actions give support to this claim ? One would have to be very optimistic indeed to believe such a thing. The writer believes, on the contrary, that Japan, led by the stern directing hand of her Military Party, stands only upon the threshold of her designs, which embrace all of Asia. How this is to be accomplished will be understood when we examine the role that China is to play in this future drama.

Japan's purpose has been to demonstrate to the Chinese that they have absolutely nothing to hope for from the Western nations. The Western nations have exploited China; they have stolen from her some of her richest territorial possessions; they forced the opium traffic upon her; they have managed her finances to a great extent for their own unjust enrichment; they have despoiled China of her riches, carried off as loot many of her art and scientific treasures; they called her into the war as an ally, accepted most extraordinary sacrifices made in their behalf, and then abandoned her at the Peace Conference to the rapacious tyranny of her great Eastern enemy. Such is but a rough and utterly incomplete outline of what China has suffered at the hands of the Western nations.

Japan's purpose was, as stated, to prove to the Chinese people that, far from getting better treatment from the Western democratic nations, they would actually get worse treatment from them than by dealing directly with Japan alone. She will try to convince the Chinese that in future the technical and financial resources of Japan will be employed to organize and build up the Chinese Empire, rather than for its exploitation. The doctrine of " Asia for the Asiatics" will then come into its own, and the two nations, working in double harness for their own mutual interests, will show the Western nations the door. If a race war should ensue, Japan is prepared to give battle both on sea and land, and China's hordes will be armed and disciplined to make common cause against the common foe. The Military Party in Japan have resolved to attempt these things, for it is for them the only road to follow if they are to preserve to the Emperor his Imperial prerogatives and to themselves the retention of power and place, which, if any other political course is followed, will gradually slip out of their hands and into the hands of the common people.

With multitudes of agents, sympathizers, propagandists, priests, missionaries, pedlars, etc., pouring into all parts of the country for the one purpose of converting China and pushing on an incessant campaign in favour of a Chino-Japanese Alliance, Japan and the large pro-Japanese party that already exists in China will be able to bring China to the conclusion that it will pay her best to join hands with Japan in order that together they may become the joint masters of the East.

A CHINO-JAPANESE UNION

THERE can be no question of greater interest and importance to the Western nations than the question of Japan's future world-policy. There are some, possessing authority to speak, from whom we have recently grown accustomed to hear that Japan is at the cross-roads. They profess to believe that very soon we are to see an end of Imperialism and the policy of expansion in the Island Empire, which now has gone on its unchecked way for nearly three decades. They are confident that the invisible and irresponsible powers behind the Throne, which actually control Japan's foreign policy, will be replaced by authoritative Cabinet government.

If there were any truth or wisdom in this pronouncement, the Western world could afford to forget that there ever was such a thing as a Japanese peril and turn to the noble task of creating a new world-order, from which suspicions, alarms, wars and rumours of wars are to be entirely eliminated.

There are many considerations, however, which compel the thoughtful observer to think otherwise about Japan's choice at the cross-roads. Indeed, if we could even for a few brief moments place ourselves in the position of the Japanese nation, we might even perceive some reasons for thinking that Japan must either go on in the old way or go under.

For centuries it has been Japan's good fortune that the people of China were not a warlike nation. Not since the days of Gengis Khan and Kublai Khan has Japan had anything to fear from the military prowess of the Chinese.

To-day the case is different. China, like all other Eastern nations, has begun to stir herself. The sleeping giant is awakening from his long slumber and, like Rip Van Winkle, he finds, on awaking, that the world has grown to be something entirely different from what it was when he retired from it. In the hey-day of her might, China possessed a great art, a great literature, flourishing scientific attainments and a remarkable philosophy of life, propounded into a religion by such noble thinkers as Confucius and Meng-tze. For centuries the Japanese have been pupils at the Chinese shrine, and the best that they have in art, literature and religion they obtained from Chinese sources. Only one thing they failed to learn from their teachers, and that is how to keep the peace. But, to be just to the Japanese, that is not their fault so much as it is the fault of the Western nations who forced Japan to open her ports under the mouths of their cannon. Persuaded by the belching fire of the guns that they must either be converted by Western ideas or be conquered by Western arms, the Japanese chose the former alternative. And now it is China's turn to make a similar choice, for the guns have been thundering continuously at her doors for decades past.

China is still vulnerable. The decaying Empire has not yet convalesced from its sleeping-sickness. The Chinese nation is beginning to reform itself, and after a republican revolution is passing through a phase of consolidation and the centralizing of its Government. Presently, it may be too strong for conquest. That is what Japan fears, and that fact is the guide-post of her imperialistic policies. And Japan prefers to merge rather than be submerged-to make common cause with the Chinese against their Western rivals who have willed it that it should be so. It is not a Yellow peril. It is a Japanese peril. Under Japanese leadership the East will be armed and equipped to stand over against the West. If China did not, in its awakening, constitute a real future menace for Japan, the Nipponese could now afford to rest on their laurels and enjoy the rich harvests they have already reaped. For it is not thinkable, except in the face of a real danger, that a nation that is over-populated, too rapidly industrialized and taxed beyond the limits of endurance, should elect to invest half its revenues in armaments. Nor is there any economic justification for such a capital outlay except conquest.

Japan has only to convince Peking that it would pay the Chinese nation to become part of her family and the world will be brough t suddenly face to face with the fait accompli. Japan's first step would be to place Japanese or pro-Japanese officials in every position of importance and to remove every Chinaman that showed opposition. Peking's policy would be telegraphed from Tokio. The reorganization of China's finance, customs, military and naval services would soon follow. The foreigner who, for so long, has been tolerated in China and allowed to batten on his ill-gotten gains, acquired at China's expense in her weakness, would be asked to retire to other fields, and the East would then stand for the first time in ages as a bulwark against all further Western aggression and exploitation. Indeed, if England is permitted to remain in India, without interference, it will be only on condition of recognizing and offering no opposition to the new arrangement. The question of what the new Anglo-Japanese Alliance will contain, provided it is renewed, is left for later discussion. But it will be remembered that the existing amended Alliance included India in its scope, and since the Alliance has required Japan to act in aiding to defend India in certain circumstances, the Japanese have made it the pretext for extending their influence there, and as leader and champion of the Eastern peoples, Japan stands forth in the guise of protector, to whom the existing racial and religious community of interests can no longer be a matter of indifference. This attitude of Japan's towards India has been cleverly devised with the view to strengthening Japan in her position towards China. The Great Powers would like to rescue China from Japan. England, however, the only Power that could be expected to take the initiative in this direction, must decline to do so on account of India.

In judging of the strength of this movement looking towards the union of the Yellow races under Japanese leadership, a number of factors, usually overlooked in the West, must be given consideration. Mention has already been made of the Military Party in Japan, whose ambitions rest upon an historical basis and are founded upon the teachings of Japan's greatest educators since the early part of the eighteenth century. Partly to realize these ambitions, from patriotic motives, and partly to retain for themselves their position of power and privilege, the Military Party have exerted themselves, since the organization of the Island Empire as a modern State, to instil the spirit of Imperialism and selfconfidence into the people, and to lead their minds away from the ideas of democracy and social reform. Every war thus far waged by Japan has aided greatly in the accomplishment of these ends. The idea of a world mission has been propagated and permitted to grow to such proportions that it is fair to say one would have difficulty in finding many, even among the educated classes, who are free from its influence. The idea of race superiority is as firmly fixed in the national consciousness as is the doctrine of the divine descent of the Emperor; and the Shinto worship of the upper classes, with its suggestion of divine direction and control, has exercised a most potent influence upon the lower classes as well. Like the Hebrews of old, the Japanese look upon themselves as a chosen people, whose destiny it is to lead the nations to a higher and nobler fate. Moreover, the contemptuous attitude of the West towards Orientals has done much to stiffen the Japanese desire for world dominion. To carry out his plans, he must first demonstrate his superior military power, and this he can only do when he has been accepted as the leader of the Eastern nations and has succeeded in applying to them his methods of efficiency. With China under Japanese tutelage, the rest would be easy.

Events since the outbreak of the war have greatly aided the Japanese in their designs upon China. The complete absorption of the other Great Powers in Europe afforded Japan a golden opportunity to promote her plans unhindered. And the very uncertainty as to the outcome of the struggle which lasted until the autumn of 1918 made it all the easier to escape the opposition of her European competitors. The United States, standing alone, could only protest for the time being, and besides, the American Government was convinced that China's wrongs would be righted by the Peace Conference. But it was just here that Japan's impregnable position in Asia, in the face of the entire concert of the Powers, became clear to China for the first time. President Wilson's abandonment of his principles was a disillusionment to China such as a nation seldom experiences, and her statesmen saw themselves the dupe of a belief in Western principles of fair play. President Wilson's weakness, moreover, betrayed a lack of political insight remarkable in the head of a State who possessed every facility in the world for correct information and advice. And the blow thus dealt by President Wilson to China's future destinies may be fraught with consequences that will be of concern to the farthest ages. For the bankruptcy of his principles and of the League of Nations idea, upon which China had built all her hopes, has brought the union of China and Japan a long stride nearer, if, indeed, it has not made it inevitable.

What has served to undermine Chinese belief in the good faith of the Western Powers still more is the recognition given in the Covenant of the League of Nations to " regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine." By " regional understandings " are to be understood policies such as that of Austria, before the war, clashing with the similar policy of Russia, with respect to the Balkan States; or such as the policy of England, clashing until yesterday with the similar policy of Russia, towards Persia and Afghanistan; or such a policy as Japan's with respect to North-eastern Asia.

Much as these policies or understandings differ from the Monroe Doctrine, they all have this in common with it, namely, the insistence by some strong Power that no other strong Power shall extend its control into zones where such extension is imputed as a threatened danger to the interests of the first Power. And in all such cases the larger part of the menace which is feared proceeds upon the theory that the older interests may be attacked by the arms of the incoming sovereignty.

Japan has already procured from the United States in the Ishii-Lansing Agreement a recognition of her " special interests " in China. England and the other Allied Powers have recognized those special interests by their action in the Shantung question and by their failure to call for the annulment of the twenty-one demands. By these various steps, therefore, Japan has undoubtedly succeeded in creating a " regional understanding" with respect to China, and by virtue of Article 2I of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the validity thereof is no longer subject to attack on the part of those nations who subscribe to the Covenant. And, indeed, should the United States, which is not a member of the I eague, undertake to attack its validity, then Article I7 of the Covenant comes into play, and if the United States refuses arbitration thereunder and resorts to war, then the provisions of Article I6 of the Covenant become pertinent, involving application of the blockade by all the other members of the League and the use of armed force, if necessary, until America is reduced to submission.

Accordingly, it is not to be wondered at if the Chinese look upon the Covenant of the League of Nations as an instrument for their undoing. Their refusal to sign the Peace Treaty was, therefore, in effect merely a last effort to save their independence; and, severe as the lesson was for them, it was an illuminating one. The absolute lack of good faith of the Allied nations stood forth in all its nakedness. Only the action of the United States Senate saved America from being involved in the same dishonour, and if the American people can only be brought to understand that fact, constitutional government and the cause of democracy will have been greatly strengthened in the Union.

Other factors of importance which will aid greatly in the creation of a Chino-Japanese union are the existence in China of a large and influential pro-Japanese Party and the existing chaos in her finances. The pro-Japanese Party is to be found, for the most part, in the North of China, and numbers a great many of the military leaders among its adherents. While it is true that Japan has advanced a great deal of money in secret loans to these elements, giving colour to the oft-repeated charge of widespread corruption among them, it is nevertheless a fact that many leading Chinese favour the union on purely patriotic grounds. They sincerely believe that no other way lies salvation for China.

The disorganization of her finances has been due to a variety of causes. The revolution in China brought with it a great deal of civil dissension, out of which arose the setting up in each province of a Home Rule government in the hands of a Tuchun or Military Governor. Centralized government ceased to exist; the Tuchuns made war on one another, while at the same time suffering from the ravages of civil war at home. Each of these Tuchuns maintained an army, to a great extent supported by foreign loans. Such a condition of things naturally lent itself easily to the intrigues of any foreign Power that wished to take advantage of the situation. Until these armies are disbanded there would seem to be little hope of improving the condition of China's finances. Japan is, of course, in a position to profit most by these conditions, and in the existing Four-Power Consortium for relieving the financial needs of China, Japan will naturally, from her position and interests, take the leading part. England and France may be somewhat embarrassed by their own pressing needs at home, which leaves the United States to hold the bag with Japan. The latter country, having already secured a first lien on China's most profitable tax-producing means, is thus in a position to exercise a controlling voice in the disposition of whatever assets remain.

Thus we perceive a net spread about China, from which it will be difficult for her to escape. Nor is it a matter entirely free from doubt, under present conditions, whether it is desirable for her to escape.

It is, however, another question whether the great Western Powers, including Russia, can afford in their own selfish interests (leaving moral considerations out of the question) to permit such a union to be consummated between the Yellow races. It is surely fraught with many future perils, and the immediate effect of it would no doubt be disastrous in its economic aspects.

If anything is to be done to forestall China's doom, it must be done without much delay. Peace with Russia is an immediate necessity. Then must follow the creation of the only possible alliance that can save the Chinese Empire, namely, Great Britain, America, Germany and Russia.