[Note: This manuscript was prepared by the Army's historians based in Heidelberg, Germany, in 1957. It was subsequently deposited at the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH; now US Army Center of Military History) for reference use by historians preparing the official history of the Army. It is typical of the kinds of detailed studies routinely carried out by those field historical offices following World War II which continue to be relevant for current military planners. The original is on file in the Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC) under file number 8-3.1 CN 1, which should be cited in footnotes, along with the title. It is reproduced here with only those limited modifications required to adapt to the World Wide Web; spelling, punctuation, and slang usage have not been altered from the original. Where modern explanatory notes were required, they have been inserted as italicized text in square brackets. This item originally carried a SECRET security classification, but is now unclassified; all references to that past classification have been omitted.]

FOREWORD

The purpose of this monograph is to tell the story of Operation GYROSCOPE in the United States Army, Europe, from its proposal in 1954 through the principal interchanges of Fiscal Year 1957. The study analyzes some of the problems associated with maintaining combat readiness during Gyroscope movements and points out the importance of advance planning. It was prepared by Dr. David A. Lane, SP3 Robert Gumerove, and Mrs. Elizabeth W. Holtzworth of the Current History Branch, Historical Division, and is based on research in USAREUR headquarters files and on interviews with key personnel.

Recent monographs and special studies published by this Division are listed on the inside front cover. A limited number of these publications is available for distribution upon request addressed to the Chief, Historical Division, USAREUR Headquarters, APO 164.

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CONTENTS

Page

FOREWORD	i
CHAPTER 1: THE GYROSCOPE CONCEPT
1. Motivation for the Gyroscope Program	2
2. Basic Principles of Gyroscope	5
CHAPTER 2: PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIRST GYROSCOPE OPERATION
3. Initial Steps	9
4. Assignment and Coordination of Staff Responsibilities	11
5. The "Little Gyroscope" Experiment	14
CHAPTER 3: IMPLEMENTATION OF USAREUR POLICIES
6. Enlisted Personnel Policies	16
7. Officer Personnel Policies	19
8. Medical Personnel Policies	20
9. Seventh Army Training Policies	20
10. Problems of Unit Location	21
11. Family Accommodations in Germany	21
CHAPTER 4: EXCHANGE PROCEDURES
12. Interchange of 1st and 10th Infantry Divisions	26
13. The Rotation of Unlike Divisions	32
14. The 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions	39
15. The Exchange of the 2d and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiments	40
16. Rotation of Battalion-Size Units	41
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
17. Goals Fulfilled?	44
18. Size of Units to be Rotated	48

Chart

Chart 1--Rotation of X and Y Divisions Under Gyroscope

7

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CHAPTER 1

The Gyroscope Concept

When the vanguard of the 1st Infantry Division-"Big Red One"-steamed into New York harbor aboard the USNS Upshur on 23 July 1955, it was accorded the most impressive reception given any military organization since World War II. In a traditional New York welcome, whistles of ships in the harbor heralded the Upshur's arrival as fireboats, cascading towering columns of water, accompanied it to its Brooklyn pier. Crowds lined the approach and five former commanders of the division were at dockside.1 The event was given full radio, television, and newspaper coverage; for it was not only the division's first homecoming since 1942, but the first large movement of personnel from Europe to the United States under Operation GYROSCOPE,2 a new and revolutionary system of troop rotation and replacement.

Contrasting with the older system of individual replacement, Operation GYROSCOPE would periodically interchange entire divisions, separate regiments, or separate battalions between overseas locations and their permanent stations in the United States.3 As far as possible the families of married personnel would accompany them concurrently. Moreover, after the completion of basic training an individual soldier normally would remain with one and the same unit for all, or at least a very substantial part, of his Army career.4

1. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 24 Jul 55.

2. According to the American Traveler, 1st Division newspaper, for 20 May 1955, the sketched drawing of a gyroscope on the cover of an August 1954 briefing chart gave the project its name.

3. The gyroscope rotation of company-size logistical service units began in 1956.

4. AR 220-20, 7 Apr 55, sub: Operation Gyroscope, Unit Rotation.

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1. Motivation for the Gyroscope Program

The new system was expected to raise the morale of troops and their families, increase the combat effectiveness of the Army, and lower the cost of maintaining the Military Establishment.5

a. Morale Factors. In the opinion of Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, then Army Chief of Staff, the most important consideration favoring the new plan was the likelihood that troop morale would be improved through greater permanency of enlisted men's assignments.6

(1) Stability of Family Life. Under the individual replacement system a soldier was never certain of his next assignment, nor did he know when necessity would bring about an emergency reassignment. In time of war, of course, he would have to accept the prospect of long separations from his family, but during peace the married serviceman would be likely to look upon such separations as an unnecessary hardship. Believing an Army career to be incompatible with marriage, many experienced noncommissioned officers and trained technicians were leaving the service, to the Army's loss.

Under the Gyroscope plan, however, a career soldier would know his next assignments for years in advance and could plan accordingly. Since a unit would normally return to the same U.S. station after each tour of overseas duty, military families would be able to buy homes and thereby establish roots in local American communities. Concurrent or simultaneous overseas travel of dependents with their military sponsors would eliminate the long waiting periods during which families were separated that had become characteristic of overseas assignments. In fact, the elimination of long family separations might well become the principal virtue of the unit rotation plan from the standpoint of morale.

(2) Esprit de Corps. As long as the personnel of a unit were in a continual state of flux, as under the individual rotation system, the development of a sense of "belonging," around which to create esprit de corps, was difficult. Deep-seated loyalty to an organization could scarcely result from a succession of transient assignments. The Gyroscope procedure, on the other hand, would provide the permanency of assignment necessary for establishing pride in unit, This would be especially true for career personnel.

(3) Attitude of Separating Draftees. The Army was well aware, moreover, that many draftees returned to civilian life with a strong distaste for military service. Since the Army was so heavily dependent upon popular support, such distaste could become severely detrimental to both the military establishment and the nation. The Gyroscope

5. Cable DA-552139, DA from CINFO to all comds, 29 Sep 54. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1954), B/P.

6. The Army Times, 25 Oct 54.

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planners believed that any major improvement in the attitude of Regular Army enlisted personnel would be reflected in the morale of selectees, and that contented leaders would make contented followers. Furthermore, the esprit developed during two or more consecutive years of association with the same personnel might carry over into civilian life, enabling the Army to count on "alumni support."7

b. Military-Factors. Among the favorable military factors expected to grow out of the unit rotation plan were retention of experienced personnel, better teamwork, improved utilization of manpower, a strengthened ready reserve, and valuable experience in directing mass movements.

(l) Retention of Experienced Personnel. Under the old system all units could expect a complete turnover in personnel within the course of three years. Moreover, with every reenlistment a soldier would have to adjust to a new job, no matter how many years he had been in the service. Under the Gyroscope system, in which the variable factor would be locale rather than personnel, both the loss of experienced manpower and the necessity of training newcomers would be reduced to a minimum.8

(2) Better Teamwork. Teamwork in combat is essential. However, the mutual respect and trust that are necessary to effective teamwork can come only with lengthy association. Many top-ranking officers believed that the old system of replacement was directly responsible for the poor combat records of some soldiers. Maj. Gen. Norman B. Cota, commander of the 28th Infantry Division during World War II, is quoted as having made the following statement on this subject:

This [our replacement system] was a cruel system, probably necessitated by the nature of the war, but it was cruel, nevertheless, and I never liked it. Men have a right to go into battle as members of a trained unit, flanked by friends and associates and, if possible, led by leaders who have trained them and whom they have come to trust. To thrust an individual, no matter how well trained as an individual he may be, into battle as a member of a strange unit is in my opinion expecting more than many men are capable of giving. I'm glad that the Army is now moving in this [new] direction.9

The Gyroscope plan, which aimed at providing this security and trust by allowing men to spend their entire Army careers with the same friends

7. The Baltimore Sun, 22 Jun 55.

8. DA Study on Unit Rotation, 17 Jun 54. In USAREUR G3 files.

9. William Bradford Huie, The Execution of Private Slovak, (New York, 1954), p. 245.

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and leaders, was seen as a great improvement over the old replacement system. Since Gyroscope procedures could be easily readjusted to wartime conditions, teamwork in combat would improve.

(3) Improved Utilization of Manpower. Under the old system much time and the services of many people were needed to ship a single USAREUR replacement from his basic training unit to his overseas organization. He would first be processed through a replacement center in the United States, be placed in a group headed overseas, and then be shipped to a replacement center at Zweibruecken, Germany. From there he would be sent, frequently over much of the same route by which he had come, to a divisional replacement unit for final assignment to a company, battery, or detachment. The foregoing procedure might take as long as a month. Under Gyroscope procedures, however most of the processing, including assignment to a unit, would be done during an individual's basic training, After the first six months of service he would be sent directly to a port of embarkation with his training unit, and immediately upon arrival overseas he would be transported directly to his new station. Personnel formerly manning intermediate processing stations could be relieved for other duties, and time spent in the unproductive pipeline would be reduced to a minimum.10

(4) Strengthened General Reserve. In 1954 the Army had 11 combat divisions overseas and 8 at home as a general reserve. Since the Gyroscope program called for the periodic interchange of overseas and stateside divisions, a balanced pairing of such divisions seemed indicated. To achieve this balance, with 12 divisions at home and 12 overseas, 5 training divisions in the United States would be converted into TOE units; issued equipment, and assigned experienced cadres to train the filler personnel.11

(5) Experience in Directing Mass Movements. While the Gyroscope procedures would have to be modified in an emergency, their peacetime implementation required essentially the same types of planning and coordination as would wartime operations. Thus, personnel engaged in rail and sea transportation movements, as well as the staffs of posts camps, and stations, would gain valuable experience in processing and moving large units.

c. Monetary Factors. It was also believed that the application of Gyroscope methods would result in financial savings amounting to millions of dollars annually, largely through an increased reenlistment rate, mass movement and processing, and improved maintenance of equipment.

10. DA Study on Unit Rotation, 17 Jun 54. In USAREUR G3 files.

11. The Army Times, 12 Oct 54.

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(1) Increased Reenlistment Rate. By making a military career more attractive and eliminating some of its unpleasant features, the Gyroscope program would increase the reenlistment rate. Personnel turnover would be reduced correspondingly, and savings in paper work, processing, clothing, and training would be realized.

(2) Mass Movement. Savings through mass processing and mass movement would also be considerable. It was estimated, for example, that the cost of moving a division from the geographic center of the United States to a port of embarkation would be lowered by more than $100,000.12 Rolling stock and vessels carrying one unit to its overseas station would be employed to take another unit home, assuring full use of transportation facilities in both directions. Mass packing would lower shipping costs. The Medical Corps could organize special teams for the mass inoculation of Gyroscope units, and many other services could be furnished more expeditiously and economically.

(3) Better Maintenance of Equipment. Personnel of rotating Gyroscope elements would carry their individual equipment with them, but the organizational and special equipment would be left behind for the incoming units. Since this procedure would require the periodic turnover of an organization's entire equipment, the heightened sense of responsibility would lead commanders to require more careful maintenance with resultant financial savings.13

2. Basic Principles of Gyroscope

AR 220-20, published on 20 October 1954 and revised six months later, governed the initial movements under the program and set forth its operating principles.14

a. Assumptions. The regulation was based on the assumptions that the size of the Army would remain constant, that 50 percent of its strength would be Regular Army personnel, and that the other 50 percent would consist of Selective Service draftees inducted for two years. It was also assumed that the law requiring enlisted personnel without previous military service to receive four months of basic training in the United States before being sent overseas would remain in force.

b. Movement by Regimental Combat Teams. If the United States' NATO and other Western Hemisphere obligations were to be fulfilled, neither

12. Cable DA-552139, DA from CINF0 to all comds, 29 Sep 54. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1954), B/P.

13. DA Study of Unit Rotation, 17 Jun 54. In USAREUR G3 files.

14. AR 220-20, 7 Apr 55, sub: Operation Gyroscote, Unit Rotation.

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any weakening of the defenses at home nor a diminution of the combat readiness of the units abroad could be permitted during Gyroscope interchanges. For this reason divisions would not be rotated en masse. Instead, each of the three regimental combat teams (RCT)15 off a division would move separately at 2-month intervals, and the entire movement would take six months. To make sure that no combat team would be separated from its parent unit for more than two months, the division headquarters would move with the second increment.

Each team would assume its mission immediately upon arrival in Europe and would have to be trained to the point of operational effectiveness prior to moving overseas. Therefore, during the last six months in the United States each rotating increment would be at full strength, plus overstrength to allow for attrition, and would be engaged in training the personnel it was to take overseas.

c. Length of Tours. Overseas tours of 33 months and U.S. tours of 31, plus 2 months of travel time, were estimated to be most expedient. A draftee would thus be able to complete 6 months of basic and advanced training and half of an overseas or U.S. tour within his 2-year period of service. On the other hand, a Regular Army soldier who wished to be assigned to a Gyroscope unit after completing basic training could include a full oversees or U.S. tour within his 3-year enlistment.

A division's overseas assignments would normally be alternated among the European and Pacific commands and Alaska, thereby offering expanded opportunities for world travel as an inducement for continued service. Chart 1 shows how paired divisions would rotate during the course of nine years, or three consecutive 3-year enlistments.

In general, any enlisted individual might be assigned to, transfer to, or remain with a Gyroscope unit by enlisting, reenlisting, or extending active duty for a minimum of three years, or by filing a certificate of intention to reenlist. Final approval of such an initial request for transfer to a non-Gyroscope unit, or of any subsequent request, would be in the hands of the appropriate army commander in the United States or overseas.

Officers initially required would be phased into Gyroscope units without regard to the normal requisitioning cycle and would be assigned generally as follows: Company grade officers, for from 2 to 6 years; majors, from approximately 14 months to 4 years; lieutenant colonels and colonels, for from 14 to 18 months, and preferably 16 months.

d. The General Reserve. Each Gyroscope unit, while assigned to a tour in the United States, would have one, or at most two, of the following missions:

15. A regimental combat team consisted normally of a regiment of infantry, a battalion of artillery, a company of engineers, and a battery of antiaircraft artillery, but its composition was flexible.

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(1) Maintaining combat readiness as a high priority force.

(2) Maintaining combat readiness for a mission with the Western Hemisphere reserve.

(3) Performing special missions, such as testing equipment or organizational structure.

(4) Conducting training of selectees. (Selectees to accompany a unit overseas would join that unit six months before its embarkation and would be trained by it. Selectees to be assigned to a unit already overseas would be trained by its paired unit in the United States).

(5) Conducting basic combat training and/or advanced individual replacement training of non-Gyroscope and specialist personnel according to procedures outlined for replacement training centers.16

16. AR 220-20, 7 Apr 55, sub: Operation Gyroscope, Unit Rotation.

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CHAPTER 2

Preparations for the First Gyroscope Operations

3. Initial Steps

The merits of unit rotation were never seriously questioned, but its introduction was delayed by the heavy requirements of the Korean conflict.1 With the end of those hostilities Department of the Army plans began to take shape, and in the summer of 1954 they were submitted to the major overseas commands for comment. To USAREUR the plan was presented formally by a Department of the Army briefing team, at a headquarters staff conference in Heidelberg on 9 August 1954. On the following day representatives of Seventh Army, VII Corps, and USAREUR general and technical staff divisions attended another briefing, followed by a conference to coordinate their positions.

a. Command Reactions. The initial conclusions, which were favorable, were reported in a letter that the briefing team took back to Washington. No commander in Europe had been satisfied with the existing personnel replacement procedures. The proposed plan had many favorable features to recommend it. USAREUR would be ready to initiate the new program on 1 July 1955, although the command would have less than 11 months in which to overhaul its procedures.2

The Commanding General, Seventh Army, commented two weeks later that several points needed clarification. What, for example, would be the rotation scheme for officers? How would mid-cycle replacements in a Gyroscope unit be handled? However, despite the many problems that were bound to arise, he was of the opinion that the benefits of the new plan

1. Comments of Gen Charles L. Bolte, VCOFSA, in Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 14 Nov 54.

2. Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen M. Be Ridgway, COFSA, 11 Aug 54, no sub. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1954), B/P.

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would be so great that every effort ought to be made to put it into effect.3

With further consideration, the opinions of USAREUR staff divisions continued to be generally favorable, although there was some apprehension that a few units directly subordinate to these staff divisions would be hampered in performing their missions if included in the plan.4 The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, for example, urged that certain military police and counterintelligence detachments not be rotated as units because of the nature of their missions and the need for continuity of operation. Provision for the exemption of these units was made in later Department of the Army directives. The Medical Division felt that its efficiency and training would be affected adversely. Since most medical officers were draftees serving for two years, a division designated for Gyroscope rotation would experience a virtually complete replacement of; its medical staff at some point during its overseas tour. On the other hand, the Chaplain Division, whose officers usually served for longer periods, was most enthusiastic, believing that it would be extremely beneficial for troops to be under the influence of the same chaplain over a two- or three-year period.5

Since unit replacement with no time overlap except that of the incoming unit's advance party would reduce USAREUR's combat effectiveness temporarily, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, recommended a general overlap of some two weeks to permit the incoming unit to become acquainted with its overseas duties. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G1 and G4, were quick to point out, however, that the benefits of such an overlap would be offset by its disadvantages: first, much of the monetary saving achieved by unit rotation would be lost if the ships and trains that transported incoming units were not utilized immediately by returning units; second, during the period of overlap it would be extremely difficult to house the incoming troops; and finally, concurrent travel of dependents, one of the most desirable features of unit rotation, would be entirely out of the question. The Department of the Army recognized the validity of these objections to a general overlap. Obviously, special efforts would have to be made, through training in the United States, so that units arriving overseas would be ready to assume their missions immediately.

3. Ltr, Lt Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CG 7th Army, to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Aug 54, no sub. In file above.

4. Through FY 1957, Gyroscope movements to and from Europe involved Seventh Army units exclusively. No USAREUR units had been rotated and no such movements were being planned.

5. Ltr, Gen Hoge to Gen Ridgway, 10 Sep 54, no sub. In file above.

6. Incl 1, USAREUR G3, to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFS, 10 Sep 54, no sub. In file above.

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The Department of the Army team had stated that in the first Gyroscope operation the 1st Infantry Division in USAREUR would probably interchange with the 82d Airborne Infantry Division in the United States. Although USAREUR had long advocated the assignment of an airborne division to Europe, the mission of the 1st Infantry Division was considered such that an airborne division would not be capable of fulfilling it. Thus, although it was realized that the 82d Airborne had prestige to recommend it, USAREUR objected to it as a replacement in Europe for the 1st Division. The consensus was that the interchange of like units would avoid many operational complications and would be more prudent initially.7

b. Approval of the Plan. Although many rumors concerning unit rotation had been in circulation, the first official public confirmation of the plan appeared in a press release distributed in September 1954.8 In mid-October the Secretary of the Army announced his approval of the program, to begin on 1 July 1955.9 In Gyroscope I the 10th Infantry Division, Ft. Riley, Kansas, would exchange stations with the 1st Infantry Division in USAREUR, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland, would replace the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in USAREUR.10 Two days later the Army Chief of Staff released the necessary message of confirmation.ll

4. Assignment and Coordination of Staff Responsibilities

USAREUR staff agencies were now able to begin detailed planning for participation in the largest peacetime troop movement in U.S. history. Time was short and immediate action was necessary if the program was to be implemented by the target date. Unable to wait for detailed instructions from the Department of the Army, USAREUR based its initial plans upon the broad outlines as announced, and drafted its own instructions. It was a rare opportunity for a major command to establish practices for the entire Army on the basis of its own experience.

7. Memo, Col A. S. Collins, GS to Gen card, 12 Aug 54, no sub. In file above.

8. Cable DA-552139, DA from CIAO to all comas, 29 Sep 54. In file above.

9. Cable DA-555631, DA to all comas, 12 Oct 54. In file above.

10. The 187th Airborne Infantry Regimental Combat Team in Japan would also exchange stations with the 508th Airborne Infantry Regimental Combat Team at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky.

11. Cable DA-556391, HA to all comas, 14 Oct 54. In file above.

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a. The Control Room. To centralize and facilitate the monitoring of plans and to enable the USAREUR Chief of Staff and Deputy Chiefs of Staff to check on the current status of planning, the establishment of a War Room was suggested by G1, initially designated as the monitoring agency. In December 1954, when the task of monitorship wan transferred to G3, the establishment of such a room was left to the latter's discretion. G3 preferred to receive weekly reports from the various staff divisions and to summarize them at the weekly Staff conferences. However, the reports were rarely received in time to be useful. Information concerning delays in construction, shortages in transportation for non-Gyroscope personnel, and other matters of importance was not being brought to the attention of all interested staff agencies. The Gyroscope Control Room was therefore established in July 1955 to centralize all pertinent information and to keep it current.12 The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G1, G3, and G4, and the technical services concerned were assigned will and cabinet space for posting information requested by the Control Officer, as well ad other material of general interest. The Control Room also served as a briefing room for visitors.13

b. The Role of the Technical Services. The Transportation, Engineer, and Quartermaster Divisions were to play important roles in Operation Gyroscope.

(1) The Transportation Division. It was estimated that the 1st Infantry Division would return to the United States with more than 16,000 enlisted personnel, approximately 825 officers, 5,500 dependents, over 1,000 private automobiles, and 33 family pets. The Transportation Division-the technical service most concerned-would be responsible for carrying out the move as expeditiously and economically as possible.

To cut transfer time to a minimum and reduce costs accordingly, incoming units would be moved directly from ship to train upon arrival. Vessels and rail transportation provided for the incoming increment would also be utilized by the outgoing increment. Returnees would depart within four to six hours after the arrival of their replacements, and ships would not be delayed in the harbor for more than four days. Thus, few additional housing facilities would be required at the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and the need for temporary housing at posts and stations would be eliminated. Close coordination would be maintained between German and American rail officials and the units being moved.14 Since it

12. USAREUR Stf Memo 39, 8 Jul 55, sub: Coordinated Control of Operation GYROSCOPE.

13. The Control Room was discontinued in 1956 after Gyroscope had become a routine matter under G3 control.

14. (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to sub comds, 17 Feb 55, sub: Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), Vol. I, B/P, Tab #1. (2) AR 220-20, 7 Apr 55, sub: Operation Gyroscope, Unit Rotation.

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was Department of Army policy to provide concurrent or simultaneous travel for the maximum number of families, the ships used in the operation would be of the type that afforded facilities for dependents. When ship space was not available, provisions would be made to move eligible dependents by air.

Problem areas soon developed in the transportation of privately owned vehicles. Those of the outgoing unit had to be sent to the port of embarkation before rotation day, but those of the replacing unit would not be available immediately upon the owners' arrival. During the interim dependents would be without private means of transportation; if an alert was called they would be seriously handicapped unless other evacuation vehicles were provided. The Transportation Division, therefore, would not only have to step up its regularly scheduled military bus service in the affected areas during the vulnerable period; but would have to hold a number of busses in reserve for evacuation purposes. Moreover, to hold to a minimum the number of individuals off duty during the period, administrative leaves for driving privately-owned vehicles to and from the port of embarkation would have to be staggered carefully.

(2) The Engineer Division. The Engineer Division would have the tasks of supervising individual clearances of quarters and the turn over of much government property, as well as of packing household goods and other personal property of the personnel of outgoing units. The 1st Infantry Division was expected to ship approximately 5,000 short tons of household goods and 1,500 tons of hold baggage. Time and money would be saved by mass processing, but individual engineer units would be overburdened to such an extent that outside assistance would become imperative. Therefore the use of labor service personnel to assist in packing, crating, and loading household goods during peak periods was authorized.15

(3) The Quartermaster Division. USAREUR quartermaster units were concerned with making housing facilities ready for immediate occupancy by dependents. During the 60 days before the rotation date all unserviceable household furniture and equipment would have to be repaired or replaced, and before families departed, their apartments would have to be checked again carefully. Area commanders were instructed to supply incoming families temporarily with essential bed linen, minimum kitchen utensils for immediate housekeeping, and subsistence sufficient to maintain them until they could obtain supplies through normal channels.

c. The Public Information Division's Role. Operation GYROSCOPE presented the Army with a story loaded with personal appeal.16 If

15. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 10, 19 Apr 55, p. 5.

16. The Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, 12 Mar 55.

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increased enlistments and reenlistments, together with the necessary volunteers for Gyroscope units, were to be obtained, the story would have to be told both to the public and to the Army itself. Public information officers therefore tried to get full accounts into both the military and the civilian press. External publicity centered around travel opportunities and the increased stability of family life offered by Gyroscope, and upon the ceremonies to be held when the first increments of the 1st and 10th Divisions reached New York and Bremerhaven, respectively. In addition to fact sheets on the operation, histories of the two divisions were prepared and distributed to the American and German press. All Army publications were alerted, and arrangements were made to house and feed reporters covering the events. Original plans called for a ticker tape parade of 1st Division units up New York's Fifth Avenue to City Hall, but problems of assembly, the probable resultant delays in movement, and the fact that the units would be without field equipment other than rifles made it advisable to substitute dockside ceremonies for the parade.17

The USAREUR internal publicity campaign began in April 1955 with recruiting and reenlistment efforts among 1st Division personnel The same features and benefits of Gyroscope emphasized in the popular appeals were stressed to troops. Concurrent travel, stabilized tours, unit pride, fewer housing problems, and a sense of belonging were among the features most stressed. The campaign also informed personnel about better chances for promotion, the prospect for better-trained and more efficient teams, decreased likelihood of misassignment, easier handling of personal problems, the tendency toward better officer-enlisted men relations, chances of more schooling and gains from the experience of others, better discipline, and the opportunity to establish friendships comparable to the long-term relationships of civilian life. The purpose of this internal publicity program was to retain the maximum number of qualified enlisted personnel for the Gyroscope program before the division returned to the United States. Similar efforts were also made in the 10th Division.18

5. The "Little Gyroscope'' Experiment

To test Gyroscope plans, in the spring of 1955 the 216th Field Artillery Battalion was moved as a unit in a "Little Gyroscope" from the United States to the Darmstadt area of West Germany. Fifty-four wives and 102 children accompanied the military personnel of the unit on board the USNS Patch. When the ship docked at Bremerhaven on 25 March 1955, the unit, including dependents, moved directly to waiting trains. Within 24 hours all personnel were at their new posts. Each dependent family

17. USAREUR PID Public Relations Plan, Gyroscope, 1 May 55. In USAREUR PID files.

18. The American Traveler, 7 Apr 550 In Hist Div Lib.

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was met at the Darmstadt railroad station by a member of the 760th Field Artillery Battalion, and was driven in the host's automobile to its new home. The apartments had been prepared for the new occupants; each kitchen was filled with provisions calculated to last for three days, beds had been made, individual commissary accounts had been opened, and post exchange and class VI cards were distributed immediately.19

With the success of "Little Gyroscope," the command was ready to undertake Gyroscope I..

19. UP Press Release, 25 Mar 55. In USAREUR PID files.

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CHAPTER 3

Implementation of USAREUR Policies

6. Enlisted Personnel Policies

a. Outgoing Units. One of the most difficult personnel problems in the actual implementation of the Gyroscope program was to achieve the authorized posture, or strength and composition, of interchanging units. The posture of a Gyroscope unit, set by the Department of the Army in April 1955, was: Regular Army component (prior service), 30 percent; additional RA personnel, up to 25 percent; and selective service fillers, 45 percent. The Department also stipulated that Gyroscope units returning to the United States were to be at 90 percent of authorized TOE strength.1

Seventh Army estimated that 10,000 replacements would be required to sustain the combat effectiveness of the 1st Infantry Division and the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment between 1 February 1955 and their respective rotation dates. Approximately 3,000 were obtained by mandatory levies on Seventh Army units that were filled with short-term personnel. However, to maintain operational efficiency after the initial source of replacements was exhausted it was necessary to assign personnel directly from the replacement stream. These replacements would have to remain in Europe when the units rotated. Planners foresaw, moreover, that this problem would be intensified for future Gyroscope units, since forecasts indicated that the number of available qualified replacements, both from the United States and from within the command, would be reduced.2

1. (1) AR 220-20, 7 Apr 55, sub: Operation Gyroscope, Unit Rotation, p. 11. (2) USAREUR CINC's Weekly Stf Conf, No. 11, 26 Apr 55.

2. (1) Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55, p. 25. (2) Cable SC-27686, USAREUR to DA for G1, 16 Apr 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.

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USAREUR authorities felt that for outgoing units the requirement of 45 percent selective service filler personnel was least essential, since many of these draftees would be separated from the service upon arrival in the United States. Therefore, a system of priorities in achieving the posture of returning units was established: first, the minimum of 30 percent RA personnel, as the stable core of the unit; second, a non-RA component of 45 percent, consisting of selective service personnel with less than 3 months to expiration of term of service (ETS); and third, to "reinforce" the RA's, a component consisting of selected trainees with from 3 to 6 months of service remaining at the time of unit rotation.3

In the spring of 1955, when it became evident that replacements from Seventh Army units and the normal replacement channels together would not yield a sufficient number of qualified personnel for returning Gyroscope units, USAREUR requested authority to extend foreign service tours involuntarily during the stabilization period.4 This measure was considered necessary to insure the minimum RA percentage in units returning to the United States, as well as to maintain operational efficiency until departure.5 The Department of the Army did not grant this authority, but stated that there would be no objection to returning the 1st Infantry Division at 80 instead of 90 percent strength. The strength of each unit leaving Europe would be determined on a case-by-case basis; no maximum strength would be established. Instead, strength factors would be determined by the mission of the unit upon its return to the United States and USAREUR's ability to remain within its established personnel strength ceiling.6

In early June 1955 the Department of the Army reconsidered the question of granting to theater commanders 'tine authority to extend overseas tours of non-Gyroscope enlisted personnel involuntarily for a reasonable period.7 USAREUR held that the primary reasons for needing

3. Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to TAG, 29 Apr 55, subs Enlisted Personnel Policies for USAREUR Gyroscope Units. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.

4. The stabilization period is the time during which a unit makes preparation for movement. It usually begins about six months before its scheduled departure date (R-day).

5. Cable SC-29792, USAREUR to DA, 29 Apr 55. In file above.

6. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 13, 23 May 55.

7. Cable DA-31S334, DA from G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jun 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. II.

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this authority were to maintain the combat efficiency of Gyroscope units while in the command; to assure the minimum Gyroscope RA cadre organization, established as 30 percent of a unit's authorized strength; and to reduce the number of personnel reassignments upon the departure of the unit from the command. In the 1st Infantry Division the RA enlisted personnel whose tours would be extended were predominantly senior NCO's, whose loss would have a definite impact on operational readiness. The suggested duration of the involuntary extension period was 6 months-sufficient time to cover the Gyroscope unit's stabilization period without seriously conflicting with the desires of the individuals concerned.8

USAREUR opinion, however, did not prevail. In August 1955 the Department of the Army finally rejected the principle of involuntary extension of overseas tours as incompatible with the voluntary nature of Operation GYROSCOPE. Suggested alternatives were maximum planning effort and judicious transfer of personnel, especially those without dependents.9

b. Incoming Units. Units arriving in Europe were to be at 110 percent of their TOE strength. However, when the first increment of the 10th Division arrived, the strength of some of its units was discovered to be as low as 90 percent. The understrength caused some alarm, for a continuation of such arrivals would seriously jeopardize USAREUR's operational readiness. The understrength apparently occurred because some personnel had already arrived in the theater as part of the advance party and others, though assigned to the first increment, would travel with later increments.10

After definite strength figures had been ascertained there were still understrengths. The Department of the Army promised to correct the situation by air transporting at the end of September 1955 the proper number of 16-weeks-trained enlisted men to fill the ranks of the first increment. In the future, attempts would be made to send all increments at 110 percent strength. If this proved impossible, because of unforeseen attrition losses between readiness for overseas movement and the actual departure, the necessary replacements would be made.11

However, as further Gyroscope exchanges were implemented it was discovered that the large overstrengths granted to incoming Gyroscope

8. Comment 3, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 11 Jun 55, sub: Foreign Service Tour Extension, Gyroscope Personnel. In file above.

9. Cable DA-335267, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Aug 55. In file above.

10. ODE, USAREUR COFS to G1, 21 Jul 55, sub: understrength in Initial Elements of the 10th Division. In file above.

11. Cable DA-350944, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Sep 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III.

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units at a time when USAREUR manning levels were being reduced created shortages in USAREUR non-Gyroscope units.12 Studies of this situation based on the arrivals of the 10th Infantry, 11th Airborne, and 3d Armored Divisions, indicated that a Gyroscope division should arrive in Germany at 105 instead of 110 percent of TOE-strength. The Department of the Army in late 1956 agreed to this change in arrival strength, thereby alleviating Seventh Army's enlisted strength difficulties.13

7. Officer Personnel Policies

The assignment of officers and the determination of the length of their tour with a Gyroscope unit also caused some difficulties in the planning and implementation of the operation. Early in 1955, the Department of the Army decided that officers assigned to Gyroscope unit a during the stabilization period would be returned to the United States with those units, regardless of the length of individual overseen tours and if necessary by involuntary extension of overseas tours. The only exception to this rule was that reassignment within USAREUR was possible for officers whose families had been in the command for less than 12 months at R-day.14

This policy was amended by AR 220-20, which stipulated that an officer assigned to a Gyroscope unit at the time of return to the United States would be rotated with the unit only if he had completed at least two-thirds (24 months) of his current overseas tour. The amended policy was followed for the departing 1st Infantry Division, but as succeeding units were designated to gyroscope the number of eligible officers dwindled. Seventh Army no longer had a sufficient number of officers with the required 24 months overseas time.15 Moreover, unless an adjustment was made there would not be sufficient housing for all incoming officers plus the officers forced to remain in the command after their units had rotated. In July 1955, therefore, USAREUR strongly recommended to the Department of the Army that 4th and 5th Infantry Division officer personnel with dependents be returned to the United States with their units even if they had served only 18 months of their current tours. At first the Department of the Army disapproved

the suggestion because of budgetary cute in FY 1956 travel funds, and continued to insist upon the 24 months overseas criterion. Finally an

12. Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56.

13. (1) Cable SC-2828, USAREUR to DA, 21 Nov 56. (2) Cable SC-30845, USAREUR to Seventh Arty, 17 Dec 56. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).

14. USAREUR ltr, 1 Feb 55, sub: Operation Gyroscope. AG 370.2 GOT-AGO.

15. Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56.

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exception was made in the case of the 5th Division. It was to return at from 80 to 100 percent officer strength, and officers who had completed 18 months of their current foreign service tour would be allowed to return if their families had been in the command for at least 12 months. USAREUR had urged this exception because it reduced the number of intratheater transfers of officers from 549 to 191.16

8. Medical Personnel Policies

In the early stages of Gyroscope planning the Medical Corps had stated that its efficiency and training would be adversely affected by participation in unit rotation. To meet this objection, it was agreed in January 1955 that USAREUR would submit to the Department of the Army its recommendations for the medical staffing of incoming units and also that units returning to the United States would be staffed accordingly. The requirement thus set for a rotating infantry division was 15 Medical Corps, 2 Dental Corps, and 38 Medical Service Corps officers.17

In February 1955, however, the Department of the Army announced that a larger number of medical personnel would be shipped overseas with the 10th Division and asked that the 1st Division be returned at the same medical strength. It had already been stipulated that after a unites arrival overseas the medical staffing could be adjusted in accordance with the commend' a capability and that the staff of returning Gyroscope units should be composed of officers scheduled for early separation. In addition, the Office of the Surgeon General required that Medical and Dental Corps officers continue to rotate between fixed and field assignments as far as possible. It soon became apparent that if the several requirements were to be met, overseas commanders would have to be allowed discretionary judgment. In Day 1955, therefore, the Department returned to the earlier policy under which overseas theaters would be asked for a statement of their medical personnel requirements for Gyroscope units. Units leaving the United States would be staffed accordingly.18

9. Seventh Army Training Policies

The Seventh Army training policy for incoming Gyroscope Units provided that formal training would begin immediately upon the unit's

16. (1) Cable SC-1497, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 28 Jul 55. (2) Cable SC-42792, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 30 Jun 55. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. II. (3) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 21, 30 Aug 55.

17. Cable SC-11284, USAREUR to DA, 10 Jan 55. In file above.

18. (1) Cable DA-58806, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Feb 55. (2) Cable DA-579035, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Jan 55. (3) Cable DA-313841, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 18 May 55. All in file above.

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arrival at its overseas home station. Each battalion was expected to conduct a reinforced battalion FTX no later than the second week after coming to Germany. Corps commanders had the authority to determine whether newly arrived Gyroscope units were to participate in war games. Occasionally units were excused from annual training tests, CPX's, and FTX's, including regimental combat team and combat command exercises. Gyroscope units scheduled to leave USAREUR continued training, within the limits of movement requirements, until their actual rotation dates.19

10. Problems of Unit Location

Two problems arose in connection with the location of units scheduled to gyroscope. One developed after the Department of the Army had restricted, on a need-to-know basis, the knowledge of where the 1st Division would be stationed in the United States and had prevented the use of its publication channels for disseminating this information. The 1st Division commander, however, pointed out that the refusal to release information affected the morale of the troops and that maximum recruiting results for Gyroscope could be obtained only through universal knowledge of the unit's future location. The Department of the Army agreed, and in March 1955 the 1st Division was authorized to announce that its future station in the United States would be Fort Riley, Kansas.20

Another difficulty was that many individuals, both military and civilian, had received the impression from various publicity releases that the Department of the Army would guarantee the return of a given Gyroscope unit to the same home station in the United States. The actual policy was that units would be returned to the same U.S. station when feasible and that exceptions would be announced well in advance. It was emphasized that changing world conditions might cancel even an unqualified commitment.21

11. Family Accommodations in Germany

One of the great inducements to reenlist or volunteer for a Gyroscope unit had been the prospect of concurrent travel; but almost from the inception of Gyroscope planning USAREUR was beset by the problem of fulfilling this virtual promise and providing adequate housing facilities for the incoming units. Initially the command proposed that

19. Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56. In Hist Div Lib.

20. (1) DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 24 Feb 55, sub: CONUS Destination of 1st Division. (2) Cable DA-592617, DA from G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Mar 55. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.

21. DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 3 Nov 55, sub: Item for Weekly Directive, Re: Station of Gyroscope Units. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III.

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families of personnel assigned to incoming Gyroscope units should not travel concurrently, but should arrive about two weeks after their sponsors. On the other hand, dependents of personnel of outbound units should travel concurrently to the extent that cabin spaces and requirements for single and unaccompanied officers and NCO's traveling with troops would permit. Outbound dependents not able to obtain concurrent travel should precede their sponsors by about a week.22

The Department of the Army objected to this suggestion, principally because it did not meet the basic objectives of family stability and welfare. USAREUR replied that the command's basic policy was to provide the maximum possible concurrent travel, subject to housing availability, transportation arrangements, composition of travel increments, the overriding requirements of operational efficiency, and other factors certain to develop. It was stressed that sponsors and dependents should not be allowed to believe that concurrent travelers assured for all families eligible for quarters. The command reiterated that initially some families would not be able to travel concurrently and that the waiting time for them would be approximately from 15 to 20 Weeks. Moreover, concurrent travel for Gyroscope units should not take precedence over all other concurrent travel.23

a. Estimated Requirements. As early as the first week in January 1955 USAREUR requested the 10th Division to estimate its housing unit requirement, by increments, sad also a date when a final requirement could be stated.24 After the receipt of the approximate strength figures for the first increment, USAREUR estimated that 680 family units would be needed for that increment, but that only 598 would be available. Based on experience factors with an infantry division already in the command, 1,965 of a total requirement of 2,250 units could be provided, leaving a deficiency of about 285 units. Again it was stressed that concurrent travel would have to be limited by the housing available.25

A later and more precise 10th Division statement of requirements indicated that for the first increment along USAREUR would be short 281 sets of quarters-a deficiency of about 200 more than originally predicted. Very grave results were anticipated by USAREUR if this deficiency was allowed to develop. In some localities the requirements of the 10th Division alone would absorb all of the dependent housing

22. Cables SC-26267, 9 Dec 54, and SC-26432, 10 Dec 54, USAREUR to DA. In USAREUR SGS 510 (1954), B/P, Vol. II.

23. Cables SC-27196, 17 Dec 54, and SC-28705, 30 Dec 54, USAREUR to DA. In file above.

24. Cable SC-10115, USAREUR to Fifth Army, Second Army, 4 Jan 55. In USAREUR SGS 510 (1955), B/P, Vol. I.

25. Cable SC-13495, USAREUR to DA for G1, 24 Jan 55. In file above.

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and preclude the housing of dependents of other units; in others it would exceed the total number of government quarters. The 10th Division had asked that USAREUR waive experience factors as criteria for housing requirements, because the widespread publicity regarding Gyroscope concurrent travel and other family benefits had brought an unusually large number of married personnel into the division.26 USAREUR pointed out that the suggested waiver of experience factors as criteria in no way increased the availability of housing in Germany, that the influx of married personnel into the Division would have to be curbed, and the erroneous publicity corrected.27 However, in spite of USAREUR's strong remonstrances, the 10th Division still hoped to obtain more government housing facilities.

Both points of view had considerable justification. On the one hand, USAREUR lacked sufficient housing. On the other, the impression had grown among 10th Division personnel that the families of all eligible men would travel concurrently, and the Department of the Army feared the effect of broken promises on the future of Operation GYROSCOPE. Since the Department estimated that the unit rotation plan would continue to attract increased numbers of married Regular Army personnel-a development desirable from many points of view-Washington officials urged that everything possible be done to obtain the necessary housing.28

b. Planning Agreement Reached. An agreement was finally reached when the 10th Division promised to make a breakdown of dependents by areas that its several units would occupy; to redistribute married personnel within the division whenever possible; and to inform personnel that availability of housing overseas would govern the degree of concurrent or subsequent travel. Moreover, the division accepted the total housing availability submitted by USAREUR as final, and all sponsors of dependents were informed of prevailing conditions.29

By then the Department of the Army and USAREUR had jointly recognized every major aspect of the housing program. USAREUR was making every effort to provide the maximum housing for incoming Gyroscope units short of materially slowing the German housing derequisition program or of permitting Gyroscope units to absorb an inordinate percentage of

26. Cable ALRD-GA-2-100, 10th Infantry Div to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Feb 55. In file above.

27. DF, USAREUR G1 to ACOFS sgd Newman, 5 Feb 55, sub: Concurrent Travel (GYROSCOPE). In file above.

28. (1) Telecon, Maj Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR COFS, with Maj Gen R. N. Young, ACOFS G1, 6 Feb 55. (2) Ltr, Gen Young to Gen Uncles, 9 Feb 55. Both in file above.

29. Cable SC-15374, CG 10th Div to ACOFS G1, n.d. In file above.

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family housing. In addition, plans were under way for shifting to Gyroscope areas 250 new housing units scheduled for construction elsewhere.30

c. Other Attempted Solutions. While the availability of government housing in Germany had become the determining factor in assigning married personnel to a Gyroscope unit, the 10th Division continued to express doubts about this policy. The division maintained that transferring its volunteer personnel in the first three grades to other units in the United States would break faith completely with the personnel involved, affect the division's operational efficiency adversely, and result in poor publicity for the entire operation.31 Because of this point of view, attempts to find more housing were continued.

(1) Additional Allocations. The 10th Division's required housing estimates rose slightly during the winter months, but by early March 1955 USAREUR was able to offer more housing-a gain created by additional allocations of 137 housing units. Another helpful factor was that the 10th Division needed 135 fewer units for officers' dependents than did the 1st Division. The surplus could be used for families of enlisted sponsors, thus reducing the over-all shortage to about 300 units.32

(2) Use of Requisitioned Housing. One suggested method of accommodating more dependent families was to quarter them temporarily in nearby areas. For example, it would be possible to put 70 families of the 86th Regimental Combat Team (first increment) into requisitioned housing in Wuerzburg, a nearby community. In this was concurrent travel could be authorized for all 482 families of that organization's personnel. The disadvantage of this procedure was that a few months after the arrival of the 70 families the requisitioned housing would have to be returned to the West German Government. Sponsors would then be forced to rent quarters for themselves from private German owners or would have to be transferred to other communities. USAREUR recommended that the 70 sets of requisitioned quarters not be retained, since such a solution would be only temporary. However, they were retained in the interest of the success of Operation GYROSCOPE.33

30. Ltr, Gen Uncles to Gen Young, 21 Feb 55. In file above.

31. Cable DA-59078, DA from G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Mar 55. In file above.

32. DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 10 Mar 55, sub: Housing for 10th Division Dependents. In file above.

33. (1) DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 10 Mar 55, cited above. (2) DF, USAREUR COFS to ACOFS G1, 29 Mar 55, sub: Family Housing for 10th Infantry Division. (3) Cable SC-21781, CINCUSAREUR to CG 10th Div. 12 Mar 55. All in file above.

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(3) Private Rentals. The 10th Division had also suggested that private rentals from German landlords might relieve the housing congestion in each area. By mid-April 1955 it was evident that a number of eligible E-5's would not be assigned government quarters for their families. Several solutions were possible: (a) to train them with the division, transport them to Bremerhaven with their families, and then reassign them to other divisions in areas of Germany where quarters would be available; (b) to move them with the division to Germany, but to move their dependents only after the sponsors had secured private rental housing; (c) to transfer them in the United States-to other Gyroscope units destined for Germany; or (d) to allow them to complete training with the 10th Division in the United States and be reported for levy shipment to Germany. It was believed that offering these alternatives would lessen the adverse effect upon the morale of those eligible E-5's whose dependents could not travel concurrently.34

USAREUR advocated that all unacommodated married personnel of the 10th Division be transferred in the United States to other units destined to gyroscope to Germany. The sponsor would thus join a unit whose ratio of married personnel was dictated by the dependent housing available in Germany. It was not believed desirable to grant concurrent travel to 10th Division personnel in the hope that they might rent German quarters after arrival, Difficulties in contract negotiation and the generally unsatisfactory conditions associated with residence in rented German housing made it advisable for the individual sponsor to see his future home in person before entering into a rental agreement.35

However, USAREUR finally agreed to the establishment of a housing board, composed of members of the advance party of the 10th Division and authorized to negotiate for German rental housing. Concurrent travel for dependents who were to live in rented facilities would be permitted only when the facilities were comparable to government quarters. However, the maximum number of such housing units available was estimated at 19. Therefore, personnel action would still have to be taken in the United States to prevent the Gyroscope movement to Europe of married personnel for whom no family quarters were available.36

34. Cable ALFD-GA-4-134; 10th Div to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Apr 55. In file above.

35. (1) Cable SC-29344, USAREUR to DA for G1, 26 Apr 55. (2) DF, USAREUR COFS to ACOFS G1, 19 Apr 55, sub: Family Housing for the 10th Infantry Division. Both in file above.

36. Cable SC-28906, CINCUSAREUR to CG 10th Div. 23 Apr 55. In file above.

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CHAPTER 4

Exchange Procedures

12. Interchange of 1st and 10th Infantry Divisions

a. Stateside Preparations. A great measure of the success of Operation GYROSCOPE depended upon the attitude and preparation of the men and dependents involved. In the 10th Division the way for the change was paved by various types of orientation and special training of men and their families in the United States. The Transportation Section prepared a guide booklet that provided maps, explained the historical significance of various cities en route, and presented diagrams of the port of embarkation for personnel planning to drive from Fort Riley to New York. For those utilizing commercial transportation there were train and air schedules, as well as instructions on how to proceed after arrival in New York. Men with dependents found information on how to ship household goods and data pertaining to billeting at the port.1

In addition, 10th Division troops attended a wide variety of schools ranging from mountain and cold-weather training schools to bath and fumigation courses. Ninety-eight percent of the specialists were school-trained-the highest percentage of school-trained personnel ever to staff the division. Military personnel and their families filled the enrollment capacity of special German-language classes. German road signs were placed under their English counterparts along highways in the Fort Riley area.2

b. USAREUR Preparations. "As Commanding General, Northern Area Command, I take this opportunity to welcome you as a new member of our American community." With these introductory words Maj. Gen. Richard

1. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 17 Mar 55.

2. Ibid., 31 Mar, 2 Jun 55.

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W. Stephens, in Europe, prefaced a specially prepared 30-page booklet designed to orient incoming families concerning the command's facilities and services. The booklet provided information on the organization of Northern Area Command, a description of subarea cities, copies of regulations, furniture lists, lists of items for loan, and miscellaneous household data. There were also lists of commissaries, a grocery order blank, applications for commissary privileges, and requests for telephone service.3

c. The Actual Interchange.

(1) Advance Planning Groups and Parties. The movement of the 10th Division to USAREUR, its first return to Europe since World War II, was facilitated by several advance planning groups.

The first group arrived in Germany on 5 January 1955 and remained for over two weeks. Its members visited 1st Division installations and discussed many important matters: the composition and arrival dates of advance parties, the movement of increments to the New York Port of Embarkation and further destinations, the composition of shiploads of the first increment, the training program, and the uniform and equipment of arriving troops, among others.4 The planning group member interested in personnel matters obtained general information on USAREUR personnel policies and procedures, dependents' schools, housing, facilities such as banking and Special Services, and the division newspaper. The finance officer arranged for the pay of the advance party and the first increment. The intelligence officer discussed clearance requirements, arrangements for transfer of classified documents, and intelligence training needs. Another group member learned about scheduled field exercises, training grounds, maneuver and trespass rights, and ammunition requirements. The logistics group received a general briefing on procurement, the transfer of property, and facilities of casernes where 10th Division troops were to be stationed. These discussions laid the groundwork for the actual move and contributed much to the initial Gyroscope success.5

On 9 May 1955 a liaison officer, attached by the 10th Division to the 1st Division, left the United States to prepare for the arrival of the advance party.

The first segment of the advance party, consisting of 91 officers and men, arrived at Rhine-Main Airbase, Frankfurt, on 26 May, remained in Frankfurt overnight, and left the next morning for Wuerzburg. "Big Red One's" Operation WELCOME began on 29 May when the commanding general of the 1st Division and a representative of the mayor of Wuerzburg greeted

3. Ibid., 20 Apr 55.

4. Adv Planning Gp Opn GYROSCOPE Rept, 5 Jan-22 Jan 55. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.

5. Ibid.

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this party. The entire group, consisting of 60 officers, l22 enlisted men, 285 dependents, and 3 dogs, had arrived by 1 June 1955.6

They began work immediately. The historical background of the cities where they lived, their mission in Europe, and their training and specific duties were explained during orientation talks. The military personnel took over the jobs of their counterparts of the lst Division, who had left Wuerzburg during the first two weeks of May for rotation to the United States.7

(2) Increments. On 11 July the first shipload of the first main increment of the 10th Division, consisting of 1,494 officers, enlisted men, and dependents of the 86th Infantry Regiment, arrived at Bremerhaven. On 14 July the 16th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division, including 1,164 officers, EM, and dependents, as well as 12 dogs, boarded the same ship that had brought the 86th Infantry overseas. Another serial of the 10th Division first increment reached Bremerhaven on 17 July, and on 29 July change-of-command ceremonies were held at Wuerzburg before a large audience of senior officers, visiting German dignitaries, and newly arrived dependents.8

The movement of the second increment of the 10th Division began on 2 September, and its 1st Division counterpart embarked on 11 September. The exchange followed the pattern set by the first increment. When this second phase ended on 27 September, an additional 1,687 officers, EM, and dependents had arrived.9

The actual divisional change-of-command ceremony was conducted on 27 September when Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Jr., handed over the area and responsibilities to Maj. Gen. George E. Martin. These formalities completed the rotation of the second increment, and the 10th Division was officially in charge.10

6. (1) UP Press Release, 8 May 55. (2) USAREUR Press Release, 25 May 55. Both in USAREUR PID files. (3) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 14, 7 Jun 55.

7. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 5 Jun 55.

8. (1) AP Press Release, 10 Jul 55. (2) Bremerhaven PIO Press Release, 16 Jul 55. Both in USAREUR PID files. (3) Cable N-571, 1st Inf Div to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jul 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. II. (4) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 30 Jul 55.

9. (1) Cable BPE-A-11874, BPE to DA, 14 Sep 55. (2) Cable N-1019, 1st Inf Div to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Sep 55. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III.

10. Cable P271730Z, PIO 10th Inf Div Press Traffic Release, 27 Sep 55. In USAREUR PID files.

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On 13 November the first ship of the third increment docked in Bremerhaven with 1,492 soldiers and dependents of the 85th Regimental Combat Team. On 18 November the 41st Engineer Battalion assumed the duties of the departing 1st Division engineers in the last of the change-of-command ceremonies.11

d. Problem Areas. The first Operation GYROSCOPE was completed within 5 months.12 During this divisional interchange some basic patterns emerged and some difficulties that were to influence subsequent unit rotation operations developed.

(1) Transportation. All transportation phases functioned smoothly, both at the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and in the areas where incoming units were to be stationed. Incoming troops stepped off the ships and immediately boarded southbound trains, followed within a few hours by their dependents. Waiting buses at the various depots took the families immediately to their furnished quarters, which had been cleaned and stocked with an initial supply of food. Twelve hours after the 10th Division troops arrived at their final destinations, the same buses and trains in which they had been transported took the 1st Division men to the port, where their dependents, who had left a day earlier, were waiting. Since all processing and staging had been done at the home stations,-delay in sailing was eliminated. Baggage had been inspected, sent to the port, and leaded on the ship to be sorted and claimed by the men at sea.l3

(2) Operation WELCOME. Operation WELCOME played a big part in helping the newcomers feel "at home." Each family was met by a sponsor of the same rank who remained with the new arrivals for at least 24 hours, provided them with information, and helped them to get settled in their new homes. There was even an "Operation LITTLE GYRO," a special welcome in which wives not eligible for government quarters were greeted by 1st Division wives and escorted to furnished German apartments stocked with food. Officers and men of other units put cars at the disposal of the new families during the first two weeks to help them become familiar with the area.14

The new surroundings of the 10th Division were pleasant. The 1st Division had spent more than $5,000 in a post beautification programs new signs denoting various buildings had been painted; grass had been

11. (1) Cable AETEAG-11-56, 10th Inf Div to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Nov 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III. (2) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 18 Nov 55.

12. The revised AR 220-20, 17 Oct 56, sub: Field Organizations, Operation GYROSCOPE, prescribed a divisional rotation period of 3 months.

13. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 11 Jul 55.

14. (1) The American Traveler, 22 Jul 55. (2) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 24 Sep 55.

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planted and the streets and parade ground had been re-paved; there was even a new flagpole with the insignia of the 10th and 1st Divisions embedded in the base.15

(3) Unit Properly. The transfer and disposal of unit fund property presented a problem of major proportions in this first Gryoscope exchange, because the 1st Division had accumulated much organizational property during its 12-year stay in Germany. Three alternative courses were proposed: that the USAREUR Central Welfare Fund make an outright grant to the 10th Division, so that it might purchase the property from the 1st Division; that the Central Welfare Fund buy the property and issue it to the 10th Division on a permanent basis; or that the Central Welfare Fund advance a loan, to be repaid over a specified period. The 10th Division preferred the second suggestions but USAREUR decided to advance the funds and request repayment. After the property of the 1st Division was evaluated by a disinterested board, each 10th Division unit was to receive a loan not to exceed Sl,000, to be repaid quarterly.

It was expected that once the Gyroscope program was under way such inequalities in unit fund property would eventually disappear.16

(4) Transfer of Military Equipment. Ten carloads of lumber, H of a ton of paper for orders, more than 1 million nails, and 7 tons of steel were used to move personal effects, not involving the transfer of heavy military equipment. However, one of the unsung features of Gyroscope was the exchange of equipment between rotating units.17

Upon its arrival in Germany the 10th Division took over all the 1st Division's equipment-everything from 21 -ton trucks to small items in the dayrooms. The dual purpose of the exchange was, of course, to save shipping costs and to maintain the operational readiness of both units. In carrying it out, the aim of the 1st Division was to have everything in such condition that the 10th would need to make no initial repairs or technical inspections immediately after arrival. Most of the gear had received a new coat of paint, and all TOE equipment had been thoroughly examined for possible defects.18

(5) Officer Personnel. According to the personnel policy that was valid at the beginning of Gyroscope, some officers were assigned to

15. The American Traveler, 9 Sep 55.

16. Ltr, 10th Inf Div to DA, 8 Feb 56, sub: Final Letter Report for Operation GYROSCOPE to Department of the Army. AG 370.2 AETA-CG. Copy in USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.

17. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 2 Jun 55.

18. The American Traveler, 9 Sep 55.

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the 10th Division as late as 2 months before items scheduled to rotate from the United States-a policy that prevented such officers from participating in the training of their assigned units. In addition, some 10th Division officers who had been sent to California for special training did not return to their units at all before departing from the United States. Thus they arrived overseas with little or no idea of the unit's capabilities. To correct these difficulties, the 10th Division suggested that, in the future, officers be thoroughly integrated before movement overseas and that, when possible, complete officer cadres be assigned to Gyroscope units before the training period.19

(6) Enlisted Personnel. AR 220-20 established three replacement or "filler" groups of enlisted men, one for each increment. This plan worked out well for the first increment, but thereafter fillers entered the division in a continuous flow, because of increasing enlistments for Gyroscope. This development facilitated reception and did not hamper training excessively. On the other hand, enlistees thus incorporated into the second and third increments would be ready to return to the United States as early as three months before their units' rotation date. This situation created a need for filler personnel from the pipeline to keep the unit at operational strength while in Germany.

Although not expecting to face large RA separations until January 1958, the 10th Division recommended a continuing and energetic recruiting campaign to offset losses.

Looking to the future, the division suggested that trainees in the United States be incorporated into Gyroscope units over as short a period as possible, in order to facilitate troop replacement upon separation.20

(7) Housing. After much persuasion, stateside planners had realized that there would probably never be enough dependent housing for all eligibles. Therefore, since one of the chief purposes of Operation GYROSCOPE was to give added incentive to the career soldier, the possibility of assigning a higher dependent housing priority to career NCO's than to non-career NCO's would have to be seriously considered. The 10th Division held that the Army should not assume any obligation to transport families of non-career NCO's overseas for short periods.

Other suggestions pertaining to the housing situation were to appoint a liaison officer in the overseas command to coordinate housing; to establish a roster as of R-minus-60 instead of the previously required R-minus-120, so that units would be better stabilized before housing requirements were stated; and to make bulk allotment of quarters

19. Ltr, 10th Div to DA, 8 Feb 56, cited above.

20. Ibid.

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to the division, which would then submit a roster of the personnel being assigned.21

(8) General. Other minor suggestions included slight alterations in the composition of the regimental combat team; more accurate estimates by the overseas command of the number and types of security clearances required; inclusion of the Civil Affair/Military Government section in the advance party instead of the second increment; and issuance of passport letters to all personnel likely to be granted concurrent travel, in order to avoid last minute delays.

In the final analysis, however, the first Gyroscope movement was a distinct success. The general logistics annex to AR 220-20 was found to be a sound and workable plan, and no criticisms of the supply or transportation arrangements were expressed.

13. The Rotation of Unlike Divisions

The exchange of the 1st and 10th Infantry Divisions, involving like units as visualized initially by Gyroscope planners, had created many problems, most of which were solved. However, the next Gyroscope moves-exchanging two infantry divisions with an airborne and an armored -division, respectively-brought new difficulties to light.

a. The 3d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions. The Department of the Army announced in March 1955 that the 3d Armored Division, in the United States, would be converted from a training to a full-strength tactical division and designated to gyroscope with the 4th Infantry Division, USAREUR, in May 1956. Moreover, the armored division's new cadre and filler personnel were to be Gyroscope-qualified. Thus this division was presented with the double problem of internal reorganization and full attainment of Gyroscope posture, all within one year's time.23

(1) Training. Originally, the 3d Armored Division was to be operationally ready within 72 hours after arrival in Germany, but later instructions stipulated that it was to be ready immediately upon arrival. Training would have to be conducted in the United States on the basis of available information about lock conditions and requirements in Germany. Some of the first personnel to depart for Europe would have to begin their preparations within 6 months. Intensive training would be necessary to develop individual soldiers capable of becoming useful members of small-unit teams, combat units trained in depth, and a combat-ready division

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. (1) Cables DA-97939, 2 Mar 55, and DA-977515, 11 Mar 55, DA to CINCUSAREUR. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I. (2) Spearhead, A History of the 3d Armored Division, (Darmstadt, Germany, 1957), Ch. IX.

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capable of carrying out sustained operations of a tactical nature.24

As an approach to the training problem, the division requested training directives from USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters in Germany. This information and guidance was incorporated into the division's training plans. To facilitate their fulfillment, several measures were adopted: emphasis was placed on subjects listed as mandatory in USAREUR directives; unit training was started at an early stage; battalion tests were given after the 18th week; combat field exercises took place after the completion of battalion tests; instruction through practice was given precedence over lectures; and routine training, such as drills, was limited to a minimum.25

Seventh Army had emphasized the importance of M-48 tank training in the United States because of the critical area in which the division was to be stationed. Such training was to include complete familiarization with the vehicle, as well as completion of qualification firing, because the USAREUR gunnery program at Belsen-Hohne was to end in May 1956 and the next divisional training program in Europe might not begin for another year after the division's arrival. To accomplish this training in the United States, the division was granted permission to complete its firing in two increments during the winter of 1955-56.26

(2) Equipment. Other problems grew out of the difficulty of exchanging equipment between an armored and an infantry division. The Department of the Army stated that the only items to be brought to Europe by the 3d Armored Division would be those that could not be obtained either from the departing 4th Infantry Division or from USAREUR stocks. Under the tank modernization program, USAREUR would be provided with some medium tanks directly, and would be able to furnish them to the 3d Armored, whereas M-48 tanks and special artillery were to be furnished in the United States and shipped overseas with the division.27 Moreover, an advance group reached an agreement with USAREUR headquarters that all armored personnel carriers would be shipped with the division, in order to reduce the number of changes in the installation of vehicular radios.28

24. Ltr, 3d Armd Div to COFSA, 21 Jul 56, sub: Final Report, Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.

5. Ibid.

26. (1) Cable 5258, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Sep 55. (2) Cable SC-2670, USAREUR to DA, 6 Oct 55. (3) Cable DA-991441, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Nov 55. All in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III.

27. Cable DA-988229, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Sep 55. In file above.

28. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 23, 20 Sep 55.

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When it was recommended that all future M-48 tanks issued to the 4th Infantry Division be equipped with armored-type radios, to eliminate the issue of additional radio equipment, the division requested the conversion of 46 radios from infantry- to armored-type and the issuance of 16 new sets. The new sets issued were boxed and installed before the 3d Armored Division actually arrived. It February 1956 additional signal equipment for the armored division began to arrive from the United States, and thereafter the plans for transferring equipment worked on schedule until the rotation was completed. All 4th Infantry Division equipment that would not be needed by the 3d Armored was inventoried and returned to supply depots in Germany.29

Coordinating the delivery of the 3d Armored Division's equipment with the arrival of its personnel presented difficulties. The equipment was originally scheduled to arrive at the casernes approximately 30 days before the personnel. Seventh Army disagreed with this plan, because the approximately 700 vehicles involved could not be evacuated in an emergency. The alternative adopted was Seventh Army's suggestion to receive, reprocess, and store the equipment in depots west of the Rhine, pending delivery to the units' home stations on the arrival dates of the 3d Division's increments.30 The Rhine Ordnance Depot was considered the only suitable storage location, and the USAREUR Transportation Division could make the necessary rail movements within a 72-hour period.31

In the early spring of 1956 it appeared that the exchange would create a shortage of such equipment as gas masks, QM spare parts, and post, camp and station-type property in Europe. Shelter halves, blankets, field range components, and mess gear were in too short supply to allot for the replacement of the 4th Infantry Division's unserviceable equipment before its rotation date. In April it also became obvious that adequate supplies of organizational clothing and equipment would not be available for the incoming 3d Armored Division unless prompt action was taken. Moreover, about 3,000 members of the 4th Armored, which was not returning to the United States as a unit but was to be scattered and its personnel reassigned, were temporarily assigned to the incoming 3d Armored, creating additional supply problems for that division. The situation was corrected by a rapid build-up of theater stocks, and supplies of clothing and individual equipment were adequate when the division arrived. Spare parts were also acquired on a rush basis. The requisitions were processed as preparation for overseas movement

29. (1) Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56. (2) USAREUR Sig Div Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56.

30. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 28, 20 Dec 55.

31. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Confs, No. 1, 10 Jan 56; No. 3, 24 Jan 56.

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shortages and the pertinent items were shipped directly to Europe.32

(3) The Movement. The original plans for the movement of the 3d Armored Division provided for it to be shipped as a unit over a 30-day period beginning 1 May 1956.33 Movement in exact increments, as prescribed in AR 220-20, was impractical, primarily because of the division's mission and the unbalanced deployment of its combat commands after arrival in Germany.34 The actual move took more than 6 weeks. The first group of 1,600 men and dependents arrived in Europe on 12 May 1956, and change-of-command ceremonies were held on 10 June, but the movement was not completed entirely until 30 June.35

The technical details of Gyroscope-type movement continued to be well-executed in this exchange. Maj. Gen. Robert W. Porter, Jr., commander of the advance party of the 3d Armored Division, made this comment on the arrival of the first increment of that division in May 1956:

The entire operation was conducted in an outstandingly efficient manner; appearance, morale, and conduct of the troops was superior and the subject of much favorable comment from impartial observers; despite the arrival of three ships on 12 May and berthing schedule being disrupted by morning fog, the port staff maintained excellent control and the planned debarkation and entraining schedules were met; troop train on which I rode was not overcrowded, had comfortable berths, and served hot meals promptly; the dependent trains were on schedule; splendid planning job at the Kaserne-upon arrival troops began a constructive program which will attain full operational readiness in the least possible time; full supply and equipment were available on station for the units; housing was assigned and hosts with keys were present.38

32. (1) USAREUB CINC's Wkly Stf Confs, No. 1, 10 Jan 56; No. 3, 24 Jan 56; No. 7, 14 Mar 56. (2) Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56. (3) Ltr, 3d Armd Div to COFSA, 21 Jul 56, cited above. (4) Cable DA-387391, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Feb 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956). (5) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 16 Jun 56.

33. Cable SC-2035, USAREUR to DA, 2 Mar 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.

34. Ltr, 3d Armd Div to COFSA, 21 Jul 56, cited above.

35. 4th Inf Div Press Release, n.d. In USAREUR PID files.

36. Cable AETFCS-7-5, 3d Armd Div Adv Party, sgd Porter, to 3d Armd Div. 13 May 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).

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(4) Summary. In several respects the interchange of the 4th Infantry and 3d Armored Divisions was not a true Gyroscope operation. In the first place, the 4th Infantry Division was phased out, not rotated and almost 3,000 men were left behind with the 3d Armored, to be returned to the United States as casuals. Moreover, the 3d Armored Division arrived and closed in at its overseas station in much less than the stipulated time for a Gyroscope move. Finally, equipping the armored division overseas was a special problem because it took over from an unlike organization. The division's final report37 reviewed its supply difficulties but endorsed the Gyroscope program enthusiastically. It stated that the operation had contributed to greater individual and unit proficiency, higher esprit, and improved morale. Moreover, it predicted that the extension and continuation of Gyroscope would result in greater economy and efficiency in the field. Besides making a number of suggestions for correcting supply procedures, the report recommended placing small-unit exercises earlier in the training schedules of divisions destined for Gyroscope.

b. The 11th Airborne and 5th Infantry Divisions. In early 1955, when it was announced that the 5th Infantry Division in Germany was to be replaced by the 11th Airborne Division, it was realized that this second Gyroscope interchange of unlike divisions would create many new logistical, budgetary, and training problems. For example, the maintenance of jump qualifications would not only necessitate additional construction and financial expenditure, but would probably reduce the infantry capability of the airborne division. Although it was felt that at least one year would be required to execute the necessary planning for the exchange, the problems were not considered insurmountable.38

(1) Training. The degree of airborne capability to be maintained by the 11th Airborne Division after its arrival in Europe was one of the first problems discussed. The Department of the Army stated the various alternatives, taking into consideration not only USAREUR's needs and facilities, but the necessity for maintaining the division's morale. The division could maintain individual jump proficiency with only one-third of the special airborne TOE equipment usually required, thus easing local logistical problems. It could maintain airborne capability training-wise if provided with enough equipment to train one regimental combat team at a time. Finally, it could retain its full airborne operational capability if its entire complement of equipment was made available in Europe.39

USAREUR held that only individual jump proficiency should be required, because the division would be deployed and utilized as an ordinary

37. Ltr, 3d Armd Div to COFSA, 21 Jul 56, cited above.

38. Memo, Col W. R. Peers, C/OACOFS G3, Unit Reqmts Sec, to USAREUR ACOFS, G3, 19 Feb 55, sub: Report of G3 Staff Visit to USAREUR. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.

39. Cable DA-979235, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Apr 55. In file above.

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infantry division. Its mission would be one of delay and defense training. The schedule of training as a normal infantry division would allow time for only minimum airborne training. Facilities for developing more than individual proficiency were lacking, and any attempt to maintain 100 percent airborne divisional capability would mean a vastly increased logistical problem.40

The Department of the Army did not make an immediate decision. As the summer advanced the question became more urgent because of the time required for construction, acquisition of supplies, and other preparatory measures.41 The final Departmental decision was that after rotation to Europe the 11th Airborne Division would be required to carry on individual jump proficiency training only, although airborne capability should be maintained to the maximum degree possible without interfering with the command's operational mission.42

(2) Construction and Funds. The conduct of minimum airborne training for the division in Europe would require construction projects amounting to an estimated $700,000.43 The projects planned were two 34-foot jump towers and one parachute rigging and packing building in each area designated for an airborne regiment. Since there were no funds available for the purpose, USAREUR hoped to persuade the Department of the Army either to provide FY 1956 contingency funds or to reprogram to Germany funds scheduled for France but not required there until FY 1957. In any case, the difficulties were not considered critical enough to warrant a request for a delay in the arrival of the airborne division.44

In August 1955 the required construction projects were awaiting Department of the Army approval. Since, as initially planned, they were also subject to the approval of four Congressional committees, it seemed that they could not possibly be completed before April to November 1956, depending on the approval date and the type of project.45 Concerned about the possible delay, 11th Airborne representatives who visited Germany in September 1955 requested that special funding action be taken, so that the facilities might be ready before the arrival of the division

40. Cable SC-3296, USAREUR to DA, 16 May 55. In file above.

41. DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 1 Jul 55, sub: Airborne Training and Capability for 11th Airborne Division. In file above.

42. Cable DA-985200, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 55. In file above, B/P, Vol. II.

43. Cable SC-1956, USAREUR to DA, 25 Feb 55. In file above.

44. Memo, Maj Gen B. P. Storke, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 20 Jul 55, sub: Reference SC-1275. In file above.

45. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 18, 2 Aug 55.

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in March 1956.46 Finally, the construction needed was made a Repairs and Utilities project in January 1956 and was accomplished at a cost of $507,000.47

(3) Equipment. The 11th Airborne Division originally was to take overseas all TOE equipment not organic to a regularly constituted infantry division.48 However, in August 1955, after the Department of the Army had decided that the division would maintain only individual airborne proficiency in Europe, instructions were issued that only one-third of the special airborne equipment would accompany the division to Germany.49

The Seventh Army Ordnance Division assisted greatly in the difficult interchange. It completed technical inspections of equipment to be exchanged and also provided ordnance support to both the incoming and outgoing divisions until approximately one month after the arrival of the 11th's own ordnance battalion.50

(4) The Movement. The 11th Airborne Division began to arrive in Germany on 23 January 1956, when the first increment of approximately 1,900 officers, troops, and dependents landed at Bremerhaven. The official change-of-command ceremonies took place on 28 February, and the exchange of the prescribed three increments was completed by the first of April.51 Thereafter the division could not follow the usual Gyroscope pattern because of the large Regular Army component-about 98 percent-inherent in an airborne outfit. Because there were 80 few draftees in the division, large personnel losses could be expected to occur monthly as RA enlistments expired. Thus, instead of receiving its replacements in one packet filler group mid-way through the European tour, the division

46. Cable FCPJO-30-9-30, 11th Abn Div to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Sep 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III.

47. Program 11, USAREUR Cons Program, FY 57, Schedule 11-6 (GER), 15 Jan 56, sub: USAREUR Military Construction Line Item Status Report, Germany, FY 1954-55-56. In USAREUR Hist Div Lib.

48. Cable SC-25096, USAREUR to DA, 2 Apr 55. DECLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.

49. Cable DA-985921, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Aug 55. In file above, B/P, Vol. II.

50. Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56.

51. (1) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 24 Jan, 28 Feb. 1 Mar, and 2 Apr 56. (2) Ltr, 11th Abn Div to CG VII Corps, n.d., sub: Final Report of Movement Problems for Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.

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required a continuous stream of replacements to maintain at least 90 percent strength.52

(5) Summary. As in the case of the 3d Armored Division, the movement of the 11th Airborne to Europe was not a true Gyroscope operation.53 To the difficulties of supply and equipment inherent in the interchange of unlike divisions another problem was added: providing a certain amount of airborne training to a division whose assigned mission was strictly that of an infantry division. A solution was worked out.

No difficulty was experienced with the transportation mechanics of the over-all movement, but the division, in its final report, made a number of recommendations concerning other factors. One was that earlier and more definite information should be given to units scheduled for gyroscoping, both for publicity purposes and facilitating training. Another was that the Gyroscope posture of airborne units transferring from the United States to overseas stations should be 130 percent of TOE enlisted strength, instead of 110, because of the constant losses through enlistment expirations of such a unit's Regular Army enlisted personnel. Further, the arrival of replacements should be spaced accordingly over a period of months, instead of concentrated at the mid-cycle.54

14. The 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions

The Gyroscope exchange of the 8th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado, with the 9th Infantry Division, USAREUR, was a return to the original scheme of exchanging like divisions. The 8th's advance planning group came to Germany in February 1956 to prepare for the move scheduled for August and September 1956. Since this was the second full-scale exchange of infantry divisions the problems were fewer than when the 1st and 10th Divisions rotated.55

The 8th Division's major problems, like those of the 3d Armored, were caused by the necessity to convert from a training division to a full-strength TOE combat Gyroscope division while continuing to perform normal functions in the United States. New key officers were assigned very late and had little time to become familiar with the unit policies and problems. The recruiting program began late, causing difficulty in acquiring qualified NCO's. Enlisted personnel entered the division too

52. Comment 2, USAREUR G3 to G1, 21 Aug 56, sub: 11th Airborne Final Letter for Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.

53. Ibid.

54. Ltr, 11th Abn Div to CG VII Corps, cited above.

55. Cable ALCDS-G-7, 8th Inf Div to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Jan 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).

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late to receive the prescribed 20 weeks training. There were also problems of equipping the division within a short time for the movement overseas; and a shortage of automotive parts made it necessary for some equipment to be turned over to the incoming 9th Division in poor condition.56

In spite of these preparatory difficulties, the interchange was carried out according to schedule. The training program, which included courses in interior guard duty, code of conduct, battle drill, effect of special weapons, and German traffic signs and relations, was continued on board ship. The first contingent of the 8th Division, consisting of 1,500 soldiers and dependents, arrived in Germany on 24 August 1956. The commanding general reached Germany by mid-September, and the actual transfer of mission and responsibility from the 9th to the 8th took place on 9 October 1956.57

15. The Exchange of the 2d and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiments

Regimental-size units, as well as entire divisions, were incorporated into the Gyroscope exchange program. The first regiments chosen were the 2d Armored Cavalry, USAREUR, and the 3d Armored Cavalry in the United States. Advance planning groups were exchanged in January 1955 in preparation for the rotation in August 1955.58

Contrary to existing directives, under which armored cavalry regiments assigned to USAREUR were to retain three separate 105-mm howitzer self-propelled battalions instead of howitzer companies, the incoming regiment was to include organic howitzer companies. This organizational change, which saved 800 personnel spaces, was made because of directed strength reductions.59

The principal difficulty in the rotation of these two regiments grew out of operating commitments requiring three companies of the 2d Armored Cavalry to continue border surveillance through July 1955. It was feared that the time remaining before the exchange in August

56. Ltr, Col L. D. Smith, 8th Inf Div COFS, to TAG, 4 Apr 57, sub: Gyroscope Rotation Movement Problems. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.

57. (1) Cable AETHGC-11, 8th Inf Div to 5th Army, 10 Oct 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956). (2) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 6 and 25 Aug 56.

58. Cable SC-10325, USAREUR to DA, 5 Jan 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.

59. Memo, Col W. R. Peers, C/OACOFS G3, Unit Requirements Section, to ACOFS G3, 19 Feb 55, sub: Report of G3 Staff Visit to USAREUR. In file above.

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would be insufficient for that organization to complete technical inspections and to turn over property to the incoming 3d. USAREUR therefore requested that the advance parties from the 3d Armored Cavalry arrive in Germany not later than the first week in June.60 When it was found that training and processing requirements would not permit the advance party to be sent from the United States before the last week in June, the Department of the Army asked that the 2d Armored Cavalry's operational commitments on the border be given to adjacent units.61

The final solution was to attach the advance party and the 1st and 2d battalions of the 3d Armored Cavalry directly to the 2d, thus allowing the 2d to retain responsibility for its emergency mission, tactical readiness, and border operations until completely relieved by the 3d. From 11 to 15 August the missions were to be carried out by a task organization consisting of one battalion of the 2d Armored Cavalry plus two newly-arrived battalions of the 3d. On 15 August the 3d was to assume command completely, but until that date the 2d Armored Cavalry would retain responsibility for all missions.62

The movement was carried out as planned. Two battalions of each regiment exchanged places on 11 and 12 August. By 15 August the third battalion, plus headquarters units, of the 3d Armored Cavalry had arrived and taken command. Thus the exchange was carried out with minimum disruption of the important border mission.

16. Rotation of Battalion-Size units

The Army Regulation establishing Gyroscope procedures stipulated that antiaircraft artillery units and administrative and technical service units not organic to divisions would not be included in the program initially. However, after experience with the unit rotation system the feasibility of rotating battalion-size units was to be considered.64

In the spring of 1955 the question of rotating battalions was examined, looking toward the nomination by USAREUR of an engineer construction battalion, a signal corps construction battalion, and a transportation truck battalion to begin such a program.65 At first

60. Cable SC-2472, USAREUR to DA, 25 Mar 55. In file above.

61. Cable DA-978642, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Mar 55. In file above.

62. Cable 210900Z, 3d Armd Cav to VII Corps, 21 Apr 55. In file above.

63. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ad.), 13 Aug 55.

64. AR 220-20, cited above, p. 2.

65. Cable DA-301889, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Apr 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.

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USAREUR planners believed that signal and engineer construction battalions were two widely scattered, in small increments, throughout Germany and France to benefit from unit rotation, but agreed to discuss the problem with Department of the Army representatives at a conference in April.66 As a result of the discussions, USAREUR proposed that all nondivisional TOE technical service units in the command participate in unit rotation beginning early in 1956. Units were to be nominated by calendar quarters for exchange during 1956, 1957, and 1958. Moreover, the units scheduled were to be so distributed throughout the command as to reduce peak loads of packing and crating in any one locality.67

A Department of the Army announcement in September 1955 stated that 20 battalions were scheduled to exchange duty stations between Europe and the United States in the spring and summer of 1956. Thus, the program was officially begun.68

a. Interchange of the 25th and 40th Signal Battalions. The 25th Signal Battalion (Construction) in the United States was chosen to rotate with the 40th Signal Battalion, Germany, in the first of these smaller unit moves. As was often the case with units in the United States that were earmarked for Gyroscope movements, the time before rotation was insufficient for the completion of normal training schedules.69 However, the 25th solved the training problem by instituting an on-the-job program to make seasoned linemen, drivers, mechanics, and clerks out of 600 recruits in about 8 weeks. None of these recruits had had any previous Signal Corps training. Bypassing the usual schools because of the early Gyroscope deadline, the battalion offered 4 courses that ran simultaneously for the 8 weeks and consisted almost entirely of practical experience, except for 5 days of classroom work for prospective drivers.70

The advance party of this first technical service unit to rotate from the United States to a foreign post left on 10 February 1956. The main body of the battalion arrived in Germany on 9 April, and the 40th Signal Battalion departed the next day. Only 152 dependents sailed with the main increment, and all of these seemed to be satisfied with the usual Gyroscope family benefits.71

66. Cable SC-27920, USAREUR to DA, 18 Apr 55. In file above.

67. Cable SC-33853, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 20 easy 55. In file above.

68. Cable DA-548967, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Sep 55. In file above.

69. Cable AHFKC-7-456, First Army to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Oct. 55. In file above, B/P, Vol. III.

70. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 22 Mar 56.

71. USAREUR Press Release, 9 Apr 55, sub: Six Battalions "Gyroing" in April. In USAREUR PID files.

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b. Exchange of Unlike Field Artillery Battalions. The problem of interchanging unlike units was as difficult on the battalion level as on the divisional. In February 1956 plans to rotate certain unlike field artillery battalions were announced. Similarity of TOE provided the basis for the rotation of such units.72 Seventh Army, which preferred the interchange of artillery units of like caliber and type, noted that units earmarked for rotation to Europe should be reorganized and retrained to allow the exchange of like units.73 USAREUR's ability to perform its combat mission was likewise considered to be dependent upon having units operationally ready upon arrival in Germany to take over the mission of the unit it was replacing. The exchange of a 155-mm towed gun battalion for an 8-inch self-propelled howitzer battalion-as suggested by the Department of the Army-would necessitate considerable retraining of chiefs of howitzer sections, cannoneers, prime-mover drivers, and artillery and vehicle mechanics. It would also prolong the period before the incoming units would be ready to assume their mission.74

Seventh Army later modified its position, noting that the retraining and reorganization it had recommended for exchanges of this kind were desirable but not essential.75 USAREUR likewise thought it would be possible to rotate 155-mm towed gun battalions with 8-inch towed-instead of self-propelled-howitzer battalions without retraining the entire units, if the special weapons assembly technicians and gun mechanics were trained in the United States. When the question was revived in the fall of 1956, the Department of the Army stated that all training in forward assembly techniques and the handling of atomic ammunition would be accomplished-in the United States before units were sent to Europe. Furthermore, 155-mm towed gun battalions sent to Germany would be redesignated as 8-inch towed howitzer battalions after arrival. These stipulations were acceptable to USAREUR, and the rotations were scheduled.76

72. Cable DA-998097, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Feb 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).

73. Cable 5261, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Bar 56. In file above.

74. Cable 5270, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Her 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).

75. DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to COPS, 5 Apr 56, sub: Rotation of Separate Battalions. In file above.

76. DF, Col R. E. Haines, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G3 to SGS, 19 Oct 56, sub: Rotation of Field Artillery Battalions. In file above.

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CHAPTER 5

Conclusions

17. Goals Fulfilled?

Operation GYROSCOPE planners envisioned 3 areas-morale, military efficiency, and monetary savings-in which the program would be of particular value. Since the system has been in operation for two years, some conclusion may be drawn about its effectiveness in Europe and whether it has, or has not, lived up to expectations.

a. Morale Factors. Morale was to have been improved by increased stability of family life, heightened esprit de corps, and a more favorable attitude of separated draftees toward the Army.

There is evidence that there were fewer family separations because opportunities for concurrent travel among Regular Army personnel of Gyroscope units were improved. Each full Gyroscope increment brought with it at least 200 to 300 dependents, many or most of whom would formerly have waited several months before joining their sponsors in Germany.

With respect to the other two morale factors, better esprit de corps and more favorable attitudes among separated draftees, many of the inducted filler personnel distinguished themselves by responsible leadership and by enthusiasm for making a success of their time in the service. This healthy attitude was attributed, in part at least, to the immediate feeling of "belonging" created by the Gyroscope plan.1 No doubt the effect of Operation GYROSCOPE on morale and esprit de corps was good. The sense of belonging as well as being able to train as a group for a specific length of time contributed to the formation of close-knit

1. Ltr, 3d Armd Div to COFSA, 21 Jul 56, sub: Final Report, Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.

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organizations. The majority of individual soldiers and officers questioned by a Department of the Army team visiting Germany felt that Gyroscope was a good thing for both personal and unit morale.2

In December 1956 operational requirements unexpectedly forced the Department of the Army to plan the return of the 10th Infantry Division to Fort Benning, Georgia, instead of to Fort Riley, Kansas, its original station. Concerned about personal hardships for men who had assumed obligations, such as the establishment of homes, in the Fort Riley area, the Department requested CINCUSAREUR to conduct an informal survey to determine the extent of the hardship or inconvenience that would result from this change.3 The resulting confidential surrey revealed that only about 15 enlisted men had actually undertaken personal obligations in the Fort Riley area.4 These few were given the option of reassignment to that station.5 Moreover, it was discovered that a high percentage of enlisted men with family ties in the East would prefer serving at Fort Benning. Thus it appeared that inability to return a Gyroscope unit to its scheduled home station would have little or no adverse effect upon morale.

With respect to the state of discipline, usually considered an indication of morale, the record of Gyroscope unite was somewhat contradictory. Offenses against Germans committed by personnel of incoming units did not exceed or were fewer than those of the replaced units. On the other hand, courts-martial rates as a whole were higher. For instance, from October 1954 to September 1955 the 1st Division had a total of 1,630 courts-martial, while the newly arrived 10th Division had 2,558 for the same months of 1955-56. The contrast was particularly striking in the 11th Airborne Division, which had 3,527 courts-martial from March to October 1956, while the 5th Infantry Division, which it replaced, had only 1,094 during the corresponding period in 1955. The increased number of courts-martial of new Gyroscope units in the command as attributed to the shortage in experienced NCO's-which was in turn caused by the shortage of family housing in Germany-as well as to all the difficulties inherent in placing great numbers of men in a new and strange environment.6

2. (1) Incl 2, to ltr, Seventy Army COFS to DA, 12 Apr 57, sub: Report on Status of Operation Gyroscope. (2) Memo, Lt Col R. P. Hatcher, USAREUR G3, to Col Anderson C/G3 Opns Br, 13 Mar 57, sub: DA Gyroscope Team Visit. Both in file above.

3. Cable DA-915253, DA fr DCSPER sgd Weible to CINCUSAREUR excl for Hodes, 20 Dec 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).

4. Cable SC-3776, CINCUSAREUR sgd Hodes to DA excl for Weible, 29 Dec 56. In file above.

5. Cable DA-486356, DA to CONARC, 5 Jan 57. In file cited above.

6. TAB E, to Comment 2, G1 to G3, to DF, G3 to G1, 2 Nov 56, sub: Status of Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opus Br files.

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b. Military Factors. Among military factors expected to be improved by Gyroscope rotation, the retention of experienced personnel, most of whom were married, varied with the availability of family quarters. There is no doubt that greater stability of assignment enhanced training and teamwork. Unit rotation and packet replacements, by decreasing the number of casual assignments and the man-hours required to process casuals, tended toward better utilization of manpower. The general reserve was strengthened by the conversion of training divisions into TOE combat organizations.

(1) Execution of Mass Movements. Certainly one area of positive military achievement was in directing mass movements. There can be no doubt that from the first exchange the technical aspects of the operation were handled extremely well and provided much valuable experience. Gyroscope moves generally went according to schedule; in many ways they facilitated the tasks of the transportation and other technical services. Although the interchange of unlike units imposed an undue workload on some supply activities, the exchange of like units caused no great difficulty.7

(2) Effects on Combat Readiness. Since the major mission of the United States Army, Europe, was to be combat ready at all times, perhaps the most significant factor in the Gyroscope operation was its effect on the command's ability to carry out this mission. Training was the most important single factor in operational readiness. Incoming personnel had to complete the following training before departure from the United States: complete basic training; complete advanced individual training appropriate for the type of unit concerned; and a minimum basic unit training consisting of 2 weeks each of squad, section, platoon, and company tactics. However, the training could be modified according to the time available, and Army training tests were not mandatory on any level.8 Battalion- and larger-unit training would be conducted principally overseas.

In practice, three periods of reduced combat readiness occurred during the Gyroscope exchanges. The first such period was from the time a new unit arrived in the command until it completed battalion tests. The length of time required by any specific unit to attain a satisfactory degree of combat readiness depended upon the amount of training it had already received in the United States and upon the opportunities provided for it to function in an operational capacity before departing for Europe.9 The FY 1956 army training tests showed the proficiency and

7. Comment 2, USAREUR G4 to G3, to DF, USAREUR G3 to G4, 16 Mar 57, sub: Report on Status of Operation GYROSCOPE In file above.

8. AR 220-20, cited above, p. 15.

9. (1) Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56. (2) Ltr, Seventh Army COFS to DA, 12 Apr 57, cited above.

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training of 10th Infantry Division officers and NCO's to be satisfactory after 4 months. All officers and NCO's in the 3d Armored Division were considered capable of performing their assigned jobs after a short time in the theater. After 4 months, 11th Airborne Division officers in the grade of captain and above, together with the higher-ranking noncommissioned officers, were considered proficient, although the junior officers and the lower-ranking NCO's were in a state of readiness equivalent only to the squad or platoon level of training. Because of training area limitations and other priority commitments, the 8th Infantry Division was not able then to undertake the tests until it had been in the command for 7 months.10

USAREUR's combat readiness was therefore affected by insufficient training of Gyroscope units in the United States before their departure for Germany. In late 1955 Seventh Army recommended that this training include company and battery tests, as a minimum, before units were transferred to Germany.11 The request was repeated and emphasized by Gyroscope divisions, such as the 10th, whose commanding general said: "It is highly desirable that a revision be made in the Gyroscope training policy, to require that company/battery ATT's (Army Training Tests) be completed before departure from the United States. The tactical operational mission and responsibilities which must be immediately assumed upon arrival in USAREUR are such that company/battery-sized units must be capable of performing as units upon arrival."12

A few months later USAREUR indicated that the completion of battalion training tests before departure from the United States was not feasible and that training after arrival in Europe would better equip the units for their mission in Germany.13 This stand may have been based on the realization that a Gyroscope unit's training benefited from continuity and stability of personnel, and that the low training level of incoming Gyroscope units was offset to a great extent by such stability and the resulting high morale. Moreover, Europe provided a fresh outlook for forming combat plans, analyzing terrain, and developing combat SOP's.14

10. (1) Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56. (2) Incl 1, to ltr, Seventh Army COFS to DA, 12 Apr 57, cited above.

11. Ltr, Seventh Army to DA, 5 Dee 55, sub: Rotation of Units under Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III.

12. TAB F to DF, USAREUR G1 to G3, 2 Nov 56, sub: Report on Status of Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opus Br files.

13. Ltr, Maj Gen E. D. Post, USAREUR DCOFS, to DA, 12 Apr 57, sub: Report on Status of Operation GYROSCOPE. In file above.

14. Comment 2, USAREUR G1 to G3, to DF, USAREUR G3 to G1, 2 Nov 56, sub: Report on Status of Operation GYROSCOPE.

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The second period of reduced combat readiness began when the midterm replacement packets were received and continued, in decreasing importance, until the replacements became fully integrated into the unit.

The third period occurred about three months before a unit's return to the United States. The main causes of reduced efficiency at this time were transfers of key personnel because of Gyroscope criteria; losses through the departure of the advance party; and the channeling of energies into administrative preparations for departure, such as technical inspections and the turnover of property and equipment.15

c. Monetary Factors. The third reason for initiating Operation GYROSCOPE was anticipated monetary savings. These were expected to be achieved through increased reenlistment rates, better utilisation of transportation facilities through mass movement, and better maintenance of equipment.

Reenlistment rates rose, on the whole, after the announcement that a given unit would participate in the Gyroscope program. However, no conclusive figures could be produced because of the variety of factors upon which enlistments depended. The commanders of units already gyroscoped to Europe agreed that it was as yet too early to make any valid assessment.16

The financial advantages of moving large groups of men and dependents stemmed from complete utilization of transportation facilities. During each Gyroscope move all means of transportation were fully used. Ships arrived at Bremerhaven filled to capacity and returned to the United States on the following day, also with complete passenger loads. The same was true of trains and busses. Other areas of savings were in the decreased use of transient billeting facilities and in the reduced burden of allowance payments to families waiting in the United States for transportation to Germany.

The Gyroscope program requirement that all unit equipment be inspected before turnover to the incoming unit resulted in much better maintenance as well as in an increased sense of responsibility for equipment. The care and maintenance of dependent housing was also facilitated through simultaneous signing in and out, since there was no interim period during which no one was responsible for the quarters.

18. Size of Units to be Rotated

In almost every aspect of the exchanges, difficulties increased with the size of the rotating units. It was found that rotation of

15. Ltr, Seventh Army COPS to DA, 12 Apr 57, cited above.

16. Comment 2, USAREUR G1 to G3, to DF, USAREUR G3 to G1, 2 Nov 56, sub: Report on the Status of Operation Gyroscope. In file above.

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entire divisions affected operational readiness more adversely than did exchange of smaller units, which could before quickly integrated into the command's operational structure. When the units of a division, including commend and staff agencies, were rotated in large increments, the newly arrived personnel were unfamiliar with the terrain, with war plans, and with command procedures dealing with operations, training, intelligence, administration, and logistics. On a divisional scale the necessary-familiarization period often continued for as much as 4 to 6 months, but was appreciably shorter for smaller units.17

The attempt to interchange unlike divisions, such as an airborne or armored division with an infantry division, greatly added to the difficulties by aggravating problems of equipment, mission, and training; by hindering USAREUR's combat efficiency; and by causing personnel and morale problems within the divisions. For example, delay in the construction of airborne facilities affected the 11th Airborne's mission as well as troop morale adversely.18

The technical services also found their tasks more difficult when an entire division rotated. USAREUR transportation authorities found that battalion- and company-size rotations caused fewer problems because the smaller units were better integrated, more aware of personnel problems, and not as likely to require last-minute transfers. Logistical problems were also greater when divisions were exchanged. For example, the inspection of equipment and procurement of replacements for unserviceable equipment created inordinate workloads that decreased proportionately when smaller units made the change.19

Personnel problems were greatly magnified when entire divisional attempted to achieve Gyroscope posture. Twenty-five thousand assignments were made in order to place the four departing divisions in Gyroscope posture. Nevertheless, not a single division gyroscoping to the United States was able to fulfill the eligibility requirements of AR 220-20 without reservation.20

17. (1) Ltr, Seventh Army COFS, to DA, 12 Apr 57, cited above. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 Apr 57, same sub. In SGS 322 GYRO (1957).

18. Memo, Brig Gen R. Hackett, USAREUR Compt, to Mr. C. L. Burgess, Asst Secy of Def, 20 Oct 55, sub: Army Request for Authorization to Use Dollars Instead of DM in Germany. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1955), Vol.III, Item 62.

19. (1) Ibid. (2) 1st Ind, to ltr, USAREUR to CO BPE, 15 Dec 56, sub: Report on Status of Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.

20. DF, USAREUR G3 to Gl, 2 Nov 56, cited above.

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To summarize: rotation of battalion- or regimental-size units brought most of the anticipated Gyroscope advantages, with far fewer difficulties than did division-size exchanges. From the standpoint of the individual soldier, the anticipated goals of assignment stability, a sense of security, concurrent travel of dependents, a sense of goal and mission, and a higher motivation for an Army career were adequately provided by the smaller unit moves. Moreover, small-unit exchanges brought about much less disruption of combat readiness, placed a lighter workload on the technical services, and required fewer personnel reassignments.21

21. Ibid.

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Chronology

Date	Event	Page Reference
1 9 5 4
9 Aug	Unit rotation plan (Gyroscope) is formally presented to USAREUR.	9
12 Oct	Army announces selection of the 10th and 1st Infantry Divisions and the 2d and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiments for Gyroscope I from July to August 1955.	11
29 Oct	AR 220-20, Operation Gyroscope, is published.	5
1 9 5 5
5 Jan	The 10th Infantry Division planning group arrives in Germany.	27
25 Mar	The 216th Field Artillery Battalion docks at Bremerhaven in experimental "Little Gyroscope."	14
7 Apr	AR 220-20, Operation Gyroscope, is revised.	5
10 May	The 10th Infantry Division liaison officer arrives.	27
26 May	The first segment of the 10th Division advance party arrives.	27
29 May	Operation WELCOME for the 10th Division is conducted at Wuerzburg.	27
11 Jul	The first main increment of the 10th Division begins to arrive; 2d and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiments begin Gyroscope movement.	28
25 Jul	Gyroscope Control Room established at USAREUR headquarters.	12
15 Aug	The 2d and 3d Armored Regiments complete their movement.	41
27 Sep	Interchange of the second main increment of the 1st and 10th Divisions is completed with change-of-command ceremony.	28

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13 Nov	First elements of the third main increment of the 10th Division arrives.	29
18 Nov	Last elements of the third increment of the 10th Division arrives.	29
1 9 5 6
23 Jan	First increment of the 11th Airborne Division arrives in Germany.	38
28 Feb	Change-of-command ceremony for the 11th Airborne and 5th Infantry Divisions occurs.	38
1 Apr	Interchange of the 11th Airborne and 5th Infantry Divisions is completed.	38
9-10 Apr	The 25th and 40th Signal Battalions exchange stations in first battalion-size Gyroscope movement.	42
12 May	The first increment of the 3d Armored Division arrives in Germany.	35
10 Jun	Change-of-command ceremony for the 3d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions takes place.	35
30 Jun	Interchange of the 3d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions is completed.	35
	USAREUR Gyroscope Control Room is discontinued.	12n
24 Aug	The first increment of the 8th Division arrives in Germany.	40
9 Oct	The 8th and 9th Divisions participate in change-of-command ceremony.	40
17 Oct	Revised AR 220-20, Gyroscope, prescribes divisional rotation period of three months.	29n
20 Dec	10th Division personnel are surveyed about changing U.S. home station.	45
1 9 5 7
12 Apr	Seventh Army submits Gyroscope report to the Department of the Army.	45n

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