French Efforts to Purchase Warplanes
in the United States in 1938

[Extracted from The Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers 1938. Vol. II: The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa (Washington, DC: The Department of State, 1955), pp. 297-310]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control (Green)

[WASHINGTON,] January 18,1938. Baron Amaury de La Grange, a member of the French Senate and of the Commission des Finances and of the Commission de l'Air of that body, called on Mr. Norman Davis by appointment this afternoon. This appointment was made at the suggestion of the President with whom the Baron had recently discussed his mission in the United States. I was present during the conversation in Mr. Davis's office in which the Baron explained briefly that he had come to this country for the purpose of purchasing bombing planes, attack planes, and pursuit planes, airplane engines, airplane parts, patent rights for the construction of airplanes and airplane engines, and machine tools for the construction of airplanes and airplane engines. At Mr. Davis's suggestion, the Baron accompanied me to my office where he explained his mission at great length and in considerable detail.

He said that he had recently prepared a report for the Commission des Finances of the French Senate in which he had demonstrated that by the end of 1938 Germany would have at least 4,000 high speed military airplanes of the most modern types, whereas France at that time would have not more than 300 such planes. Furthermore, German industry was geared to produce modern high speed fighting planes in tremendous quantities, whereas it would require two years or more for French industry to produce such planes in comparable quantities. Moreover, in case of war, Germany could spare a large proportion of its man-power for work in factories, whereas France would require a much larger proportion of its man-power in the fighting forces. He explained that on the basis of this report, he had been commissioned by the Air Minister to visit the United States with a view to purchasing perhaps as many as 1,000 planes of types now in use in the American Army to be delivered as rapidly as possible, additional planes built according to French plans and specifications to be delivered later, modern high speed engines to replace worn engines now installed in French military planes, patent rights to various types of planes and engines so that French industry could begin to construct them in the near future, and large quantities of all the necessary machine tools for the construction of these planes and engines. He explained that in general what he had in mind was attempting to "harness American industry to the French war machine". He said that he realized that the Neutrality Act 45 to which the President had invited his particular attention would, if proclaimed to be in effect in respect to a war in which France was involved, prevent American industry from continuing to supply the French Army with the planes and engines which he hoped France could purchase in vast quantities in this country in case of war, but he said that he thought it probable that even in case an embargo were proclaimed the friendship of this Government for France would be sufficient to induce us to permit surreptitious indirect shipments via Canada.

I told the Baron something of the history of the recent Neutrality Act and of the weight of public opinion in support of it and stated emphatically that as long as that Act remained on the statute books unmodified, his Government must face the fact that in case of a war in which France was involved, the exportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war from this country to France would be prohibited, and that this Government would not connive at any violations of the embargo.

The Baron said that even in view of what I had just told him, he felt that his Government was justified in the present emergency in making a series of long-time contracts with American manufacturers in the hope that when France and England were attacked by Germany-as he expected they would be before 1940-the Neutrality Act would be repealed and American manufacturers would be permitted to supply the great democracies with arms.

I explained briefly the pertinent provisions of the Espionage Act of June 15X 1917X44 and of the present policy in regard to the release of arms for export. The Baron seemed to be more or less familiar with the provisions of the law in question. He said that he felt sure that his Government could find planes and engines to suit its immediate purposes among the types already released.

I suggested to the Baron that the Military Attaché [Lt. Col. Emmanuel Lombard] of the French Embassy could probably supply him with detailed information in regard to the types of planes and engines which had already been released, and in regard to the dates at which the release of other types might be expected.

The Baron said that his mission was very confidential and that he did not intend to explain its purpose to the French Embassy in Washington. His statement that he felt that he might have confidence in Colonel Champsaur [Col. Norbert Champsaur. French Air Attaché in the United States] and other remarks which he made, in regard to other members of the Embassy staff, indicated clearly that he had little confidence in anyone at the Embassy except Colonel Champsaur, and that he did not wish the others to know anything of his mission. He said that he did not intend to explain fully why he was in the United States to anyone but the President, Mr. Norman Davis, and me.

I asked the Baron whether he had as yet begun negotiations with any American manufacturer. He replied that he had spent most of yesterday afternoon with Mr. Martin and Mr. Hartson of the Glenn L. Martin Company from which he hoped to purchase a large number of bombing planes, and that he had made an appointment to see Mr. Guy Vaughan, President of the Curtiss Wright Export Corporation, next week. He said that he doubted whether he would wish to deal with any other companies. In speaking of manufacturers of American planes and engines, he showed great familiarity, not only with the planes and engines manufactured in this country, but also with the personalities of the important manufacturers. He said that he knew most of these men well. He added that he already had an agent visiting Cleveland, Dayton, and other cities making arrangements to purchase machine tools and that he expected to encounter no difficulties in that field.

As the Baron did not ask me to do anything for him, I came to the conclusion that the purpose of his call was merely to inform the Department of the purpose of his mission.

JOSEPH C. GREEN

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, January 21,1938.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I enclose for your information, a copy of a memorandum of a highly confidential conversation which Mr. Green had on January 18 with Baron de La Grange, in regard to a proposal of the French Government to purchase arms in large quantity in this country. The Baron spent the weekend at the White House and he described his mission to the President who suggested that he see Mr. Davis. I don't know how much significance we should attach to this project. We would be interested in any information which you may have or may be able to obtain in regard to it.

With best wishes [etc.] CORDELL HULL.

Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, January 24,1938--1 p. m.

[Received January 24--11:15 a. m.]

124. Delbos [Yvon Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs] said to me this morning that the French Government had just concluded a careful examination of the situation of French military aviation. The stories of the inferiority of French aviation which were being circulated industriously throughout Central and Eastern Europe to the detriment of French prestige were exaggerated. Nevertheless the conclusion had been reached that the system of the army of building prototypes for future production but having small present production was one which was most dangerous. At the present moment the German and Italian aviation forces were so much more powerful than the French that they could do immense damage before France could have time to manufacture a great number of planes.

The conclusion had been reached therefore that it was essential for the French Government to purchase military planes. It had been decided that these planes should be purchased if possible in the United States. Chautemps [Camille Chautemps, President of the French Council of Ministers] had thought of the following method of procedure: that the French Government should place orders now in the United States for a considerable quantity of planes for delivery as soon as possible and should place also at the present time much larger orders for delivery in case of war.

I said at once that I felt that deliveries of American planes in case of war would be forbidden by the provisions of the Neutrality Act. Delbos argued that the French had been able to continue to send war supplies to China by stating to the Japanese that all these supplies had been ordered before the outbreak of hostilities. He suggested that the same argument might be made by the United States. I said that I did not believe such a position could be taken by the United States.

There was also a brief reference to the possibility of obtaining the latest models of American planes. I said that I was under the impression that it was the policy of our Government not to permit any company making planes for the Government to deliver the latest models to any foreign government for a minimum period of 2 or 3 years.

After some further discussion I asked Delbos if I should regard his statements to me as a formal request to be transmitted officially to my Government. He said that he had discussed the matter at length with Chautemps and knew that Chautemps had intended to speak to me about it. He would see Chautemps at luncheon today and define the Government's position exactly.

Delbos then invited me to dine with him alone this evening and said he would go into the matter further at that time.

The question of whether or not we should permit delivery of planes after the proclamation that a state of war exists in case such planes should have been ordered before the outbreak of war, is one which has doubtless been studied by the Department. I do not feel that it is necessary for me to be in a position to give any reply to Delbos this evening. I will report further with regard to this matter after talking with Delbos.

BULLITT

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt)

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1938-8 p. m.

46. Your No. 124, January 24,1 p. m., and No. 134, January 25, 2 p. m. The questions raised by Delbos were fully canvassed in a recent conversation between Green and Senator de La Grange. A memorandum of this conversation 30 is being transmitted to you in the pouch leaving Washington January 26. From this conversation, it would appear that the French Government with full knowledge of the implications of the Neutrality Act is already negotiating with American manufacturers with a view to making such contracts as those suggested by Delbos in his conversations with you.

The sale for exportation of planes of the very latest models is prohibited in the interests of the National Defense under the provisions of the Espionage Act. Nevertheless, the French could obtain from American manufacturers planes of models almost as recent as those of which the exportation is temporarily prohibited, and some of these models which could be purchased at this time are of the particularly high speed types which, according to de La Grange, the French are particularly anxious to obtain. New types of planes purchased by the Army or the Navy are considered military secrets and hence not available for export for a period of 1 year after the second plane of such types is delivered to this Government. Thereafter they may be sold for export provided that such sales do not interfere with production under contracts with the Army or Navy. The Army and Navy are reluctant to permit sales interfering with deliveries to them, but they have on occasion granted permission for such sales when such action seemed to be in the interest of the National Defense.

You were correct in your statement in regard to the provisions of the Neutrality Act. The French Government should understand that as long as that Act remains on the statute book in its present form, the outbreak of armed conflict among European powers would almost inevitably require the President to issue a proclamation under Section 1. Were such a proclamation issued, any exportation of arms, direct or indirect, to any of the belligerents would be prohibited. Therefore, such indirect shipment through Canada as Delbos suggested would be impossible. Furthermore, the Act not only makes no exception in regard to contracts already entered into, but even provides for the immediate revocation of licenses already issued if shipment has not taken place at the time of the issuance of a proclamation.....

HULL

The French Ambassador (Saint-Quentin) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1938.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, on May 16 last, the French Government decided to order from the Curtiss-Wright Company one hundred planes of the type Hawk, 75a (a type similar to the type P-36 of the American army). The manufacturers had already definitely assured the French Government that the American regulations would permit the exportation of these planes.

The French air corps intends by this means not only to satisfy its needs in respect to pursuit planes, but also to instruct its technicians in American methods of production which are stated to be the best.

Consequently, the contract will provide permission for missions of French engineers and technicians to be present in the Curtiss factories for long periods. These missions will serve a double purpose- first, the supervision of the production of the planes manufactured for the French Government and, second, the instruction of personnel in the means and methods of production appropriate to these planes.

A first mission, probably composed of Captain Amouroux, Engineer Cambois, and Monsieur Detroyat, will arrive in the United States about the middle of June. Its principal purpose will be to undertake trial flights in planes of the type which the French Government has ordered, either with the permission of the War Department at Wright Field in planes of the type P-36, or at the Curtiss factory at Buffalo in planes of the type Hawk 75. Also, it will visit certain airplane factories.

The second mission, which will probably be composed of Engineer-in-Chief Volpert, Major Badart, Engineer Maillet and two representatives of the Societés Nationales, will arrive about the end of June. It is charged with studying, by means of visits to factories, the conditions of production in American industry. Two of its members will be charged, in addition, if authorized by the Departments of War and of the Navy, to spend several weeks in the factories of Curtiss-Wright and Pratt-Whitney, manufacturers of the planes and engines which the French Government has ordered.

I would be grateful to Your Excellency if you would inform me whether the interested Departments have any objection in principle to the plans of these missions, especially in regard to prolonged visits to the factories, dealing with the orders placed by the French Government. Furthermore, I should appreciate it if I might be informed whether the first mission could be authorized to make trial flights in American army planes of the type P-36.

The necessary authorizations for the visits in question will be requested each time in advance by the Air Attaché of the French Embassy, who will furnish all necessary information in regard to the program and dates of these visits.

Accept [etc.]

R. DE SAINT QUENTIN