[8-3.1 CW 4]
OPERATIONS DRAGON ROUGE AND DRAGON NOIRE
LT. COL. W. H. GLASGOW
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
OPERATIONS DIVISION, HISTORICAL SECTION
1965
[Note: This manuscript was prepared by Lieutenant William H. Glasgow of the 9th Military History Detachment, which supported the Historical Office of United States Army, Europe in Heidelberg, Germany. It was subsequently deposited at the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH; now US Army Center of Military History) for reference use by historians preparing the official history of the Army. It is typical of the kinds of detailed tactical studies of combat and contingency operations routinely carried out by the Army's uniformed and civilian historians to enhance the Army's ability to improve performance (somtimes called "lesson-learning"), particularly through the use of oral history techniques pioneered during World War II. The original is on file in the Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC) under file number 8-3.1 CW 4, which should be cited in footnotes, along with the title. It is reproduced here with only those limited modifications required to adapt to the World Wide Web; spelling, punctuation, and slang usage have not been altered from the original. Where modern explanatory notes were required, they have been inserted as italicized text in square brackets. This item originally carried a SECRET security classification, but is now unclassified; all references to that past classification have been omitted.]
On 18 February 1965 Colonel C. Laurent, Commander of the Belgian Para Commando Regiment, briefed USAREUR officers on Operations DRAGON ROUGE and DRAGON NOIR, during which his regiment had rescued hundreds of hostages in the Republic of Congo. The contents of Colonel Laurent's talk were considered to be so significant that a special historical study covering these unique operations was prepared. It is believed that this study will be of interest to all USAREUR officers who may be called upon to plan or execute contingency operations.
The study was written by Lieutenant Colonel William M. Glasgow, Commanding Officer of the 9th Military History Detachment. He attended Colonel Laurent's briefing, researched pertinent USAREUR and USAFE files, and interviewed knowledgeable USAREUR action officers. He was assisted by the staff of the Historical Section, Operations Division, Headquarters USAREUR.
CONTENTS
PAGE
| FOREWORD | |
| CONTENTS | ii |
| CHAPTER 1 THE NECESSITY FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTION | |
| CHAPTER 2: PLANNING | |
ii
CONTENTS (continued)
PAGE
| CHAPTER 3: EXECUTION | |
| CHAPTER 4: OTHER OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO | |
| CHAPTER 5: REDEPLOYMENT | |
iii
CONTENTS (continued)
PAGE
| CHAPTER 6: LESSONS LEARNED AND SUMMARY | |
| MAP 1: The Republic of the Congo | |
| SKETCH 1: Stanleyville | |
| DISTRIBUTION |
iv
Chapter 1
The Necessity for Humanitarian Action
1. Historical Background, 1960 - 1964
On 1 July 1960 the Republic of the Congo was granted independence from Belgium without the benefit of a transitionary period during which the former colonial power might have educated and trained the Congolese for their future roles. Chaos reigned within a few days, after the lack of effective civil authority became manifest. The soldiers of the Congolese Force Publiqueóa Belgian-officered security forceómutinied and, aided by civilian mobs, raped the white settlers, especially Belgians, and plundered. As the turmoil intensified, the United States evacuated several hundred missionaries and other American citizens living in the Congo and prepared forces to intervene if necessary. In the meantime, however, the United Nations acted by deploying a task force to the troubled land on 16 July 1960.1 The U.N. force's presenceósupported by USAREUR and other U.S. forcesóhelped the Republic of the Congo to establish some measure of stability, and many of the evacuated missionaries and businessmen returned. But in March 1964, when plans for the withdrawal of the U.N.
1. USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, l960, AG TS 34-1.
1
force by the end of June were announced, tribal rivalries and the lack of firm central governmental control led to revolts in outlying areas against the duly constituted government.2
a. Developments in the Congo. By early November 1964 Moise Tshombe, who headed the Democratic Republic of the Congo, had begun to reconstruct its armed forces by bolstering them with mercenaries from European and African countries. His next step was to undertake offensive actions against rebel factions, which had in the meantime received Communistóespecially Chineseóbacking. When his drive gained momentum, the so-called People's Republic of the Congo was threatened by a two-pronged offensiveóone along the Uganda border and the other toward the rebel capital of Stanleyville (See Map 1). At this critical time the self-proclaimed President of the People's Republic, Christophe Gbenye, decided to use international blackmail. He announced that he had taken 60 Americans and 800 Belgians as hostages in order to prevent further governmental attacks into areas that he nominally controlled; and on 9 November, he broadcast over the Stanleyville radio that he could no longer guarantee the lives and property of Belgian, and American citizens.3 Shortly afterward, horror stories from the Congo indicated that Gbenye intended to carry out his threats if the Congolese Army continued to advance on Stanleyville.4
On 16 November the rebels announced that Dr. Paul E. Carlson, an American medical missionary on duty in the Congo, would be executed as a spy. The spy charges, which could not be believed by the non-Communist world, tended to drive home the plight of Carlson and of the other hostages held by the rebels.5
2. Time, Vol. 83, No. 10, 6 Mar 64, p. 28; No. 11,
13 Mar 64, pp. 26-35; and No. 13, 27 Mar 64, p. 31.
3. (1) New York Times, 10 Nov 64, p. 9. (2) Time, Vol.
84, No. 20, 13 Nov 64, p. 32.
4. (1) New York Times, 11 Nov 64, p. 6 and 12 Nov 64, p. 1. (2) Time,
Vol. 84, No. 21, 20 Nov 64, p. 41.
5. New York Times, 17 Nov 64, p. 3.
2
b. Reaction in the West. The United States and Belgium had not remained idle in the face of the Congo rebels' provocations. Now preliminary discussions between representatives of the Belgian and U.S. governments led to the preparation of military plans for rescuing the hostages.6
6. Sum of Rmks Made By Col. C. Laurent, 18 Feb 65. In AEAGC-XH files.
3
Chapter 2
Planning
a. Secrecy. Initial military planning for the operations was conducted with a maximum of secrecy because the decision concerning the use of military forces to rescue the hostages rested on political considerations at the highest levels of government in the United States and Belgium,1 and also because diplomatic efforts to effect the release of the hostages were being undertaken.2
b. Initial Steps to Select a Belgian Unit. On 10 November Colonel Charles Laurent, Commanding Officer of the Belgian Para Commando Regiment, was called to the Ministry of Defense office in Brussels to ascertain the readiness of his command to undertake active operations in the Congo. At that time the Para Commando Regiment consisted of three battalions: the 1st, with ten months of training; the 2d, with five and one-half months, and the 3d, with two weeks. Because they were at three different locations
1. Cable ECJCA-19978, USCINCEUR to JCS et al., 15 Nov 64.
2. New York Times, 18 Nov 64, p 1 and 20 Nov 64, p. 6.
4
in Belgium, sufficient information concerning their readiness condition did not become available until the next day.3
c. The U.S. Planners. On 11 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USCINCEUR to begin combined planning with Belgian military representatives. Security considerations limited the number of U.S. planners to four: Brigadier General R. E. Dougherty, Deputy J-3, USEUCOM; Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Gray, from USAFE headquarters; Captain B. F. Brashears, 8th Infantry Division; and Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Dunn, from the U.S. Joint Staff in Washington. This small group, working in civilian clothes in Brussels with their Belgian counterparts at the Ministry of Defense, planned the initial operation.4
d. Restrictions. On 12 and 13 November the planners held further meetings in Brussels, but as yet the two governments had agreed only on the preparation of plans for a paratroop assault on Stanleyville for the purpose of liberating and protecting the hostages there and evacuating them to Leopoldville. The United States intended to use C-130 aircraft, based in Europe, to transport the Belgian paratroop unit from Belgium to Stanleyville and to evacuate the hostages from Stanleyville to Leopoldville. Included in the operation would be an airdrop and airlandings of Belgian troops, to carry out the assault on Stanleyville.
Another intergovernmental agreement would be necessary before the plan could be executed.5
a. Aircraft Availability. Because only 12 U. S. C-130 aircraft were available for the operation and these were not enough to transport the entire Para Commando regiment, the Belgian commander had to tailor a special task force of carefully selected personnel and equipment.
3. Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above.
4. Cable JCS-001745, JCS to USCINCEUR, 11 Nov 64.
5. Cable ECJCA-19978, 15 Nov 64, cited above.
5
b. Security. It had already been announced that the Para Commando Regiment would parade in Brussels, for the Belgian King's birthday, on 16 November. To prevent public knowledge of the rescue operation, the parade had to be held as scheduled and special plans were prepared to maintain secrecy.
c. Intelligence. Many of the Belgian officers and noncommissioned officers in the Para Commando Regiment had seen previous service in the Congo and were familiar with the Stanleyville area. This knowledge was of value to the planners, but no specific information about the exact location or locations where the hostages were being kept by rebel forces was available. Operational planning therefore had to provide for an extensive search of the area.
d. Political Considerations. The Belgian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense asked that, because of the international and domestic repercussions that might result from the operation, the number of casualties be held to an absolute minimum. Within this policy limitation, the Belgian forces were to liberate the maximum number of white hostages held by rebel forces in Stanleyville and other areas of the Congo.
e. Selection of Drop Zones. Normally Belgian paratroop forcesólike their U.S. counterpartsóused pathfinders, panels, and other means to mark their drop zones (DZ's), but in an operation in which rapid ground exploitation of surprise airborne landings would be a vital factor in saving the lives of hostages, the use of such devices would obviously be impractical. The Belgians felt that a golf course on the east end of the Stanleyville airfield (See Sketch 1) offered the best cleared area for a drop zone in close proximity to the objective. The 8th Infantry Division representative suggested that the airfield itself be the drop zone and that close-look drop proceduresóincluding the computing of serial release points in the cockpitóbe used. Such procedures were standard for all airborne jumps practiced by USAFE and the 8th Infantry Division's airborne brigade in Europe. However, this suggestion did not meet with Belgian concepts
f. Division of Planning Responsibilities. In general, the U.S. planners deferred to Belgian wishes in all matters concerning the timing of the operation and the airdrop. They took the attitude that they were primarily concerned with providing the aircraft required for the operation, delivering the Belgian
6
paratroopers to Stanleyville, and supporting them wherever possible. The actual planning of the ground operationóincluding theódrop was left to the Belgians.
This approach undoubtedly contributed to the success of the operation.
5. The Combined Operations Plan
a. Mission. The U.S. and Belgian officers had to plan a bilateral military operation without the assistance of any existing international staff. The detailed plan was for U.S. assault and evacuation airlift operations in support of a Belgian paratroop attack, on rebel forces in Stanleyville, which would secure the airfield, locate and liberate the hostages held by rebel forces, escort to the airfield those liberated hostages who wanted to be evacuated, and evacuate them by air to Leopoldville for further disposition by their diplomatic representatives.
b. The Enemy Situation. According to the available intelligence information, the town of Stanleyville was in rebel hands and about 800 non-Congolese persons, including approximately 20 U.S. civilians and 5 U.S. Consular officials, were being held as hostages against Congolese Army attacks on the city. The rebels, who had threatened to take the lives of certain or of all of these hostages if an attack was mounted against Stanleyville, were abusing them and inflicting barbaric cruelties upon them.7
(1) Congolese Army Forces. In the face of these rebel threats and actions, Congolese Army forces were mounting ground attacks against Stanleyville from both the south and the west. If the hostages were to survive their ordeal in the face of the Congolese Army advance, the need for extraordinary measures by
6. (1) Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above. (2) Intvw,
Lt Col W. M. Glasgow, 9th Mil Hist Det, with Capt B. F. Brashears, 8th Inf
Div Asst G-3, 9 Mar 65.
7. (1) New York Times, 12 Nov 64, p. 1. (2) Cable ECJCA-19978, 15
Nov 64, cited above.
7
mobile external forces would become more and more urgent. The primary avenue of the Congolese Army advance on Stanleyville was from the south, where a force commanded by Colonel Frederick van de Walle, a former Belgian Consul General in Elizabethville,8 was expected to move north from Punia, on 17 or 18 November, in an effort to reach Stanleyville about 22 November. Following Jungle trails, the Congolese Army forces usually advanced with about 20 personnel of European extraction in the lead, followed by native troopsówho could not leave the trails because of the heavy undergrowthóand by another small force of Europeans forming the rear guard. Whenever the Congolese Army forces reached open areas, they would deploy to give the impression of large numbers.9
(2) The State Department. The U.S. State Department was to be responsible for obtaining en route staging and overflight rights, assuming responsibility for the U.S. civilian evacuees from Stanleyville upon their arrival at Leopoldville, and arranging for appropriate diplomatic representatives to assume responsibility for non-U.S. evacuees arriving at Leopoldville.
(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff would issue the execution order for the operation and direct that most recent intelligence information on the objective area be made available.
(4) The Air Force. The U.S. Air Force was to provide air-sea rescue facilities to support the operation; position search and rescue aircraft at Ascension Island during deployment operations; provide en route weather briefings and other weather informational support as required; and arrange for en route airbase support for operations planned through Ascension Island, including the best available messing and billeting facilities for the U.S. aircrews and Belgian paratroopers.
(5) CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA would provide assistance to the force in the Congo through the facilities and within the capabilities of the U.S. Military Mission
8. (1) Cable ECJCA-19978, cited above. (2) New York
Times, p. 26. Both 15 Nov 64.
9. Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above.
8
and Joint Task Force (JTF) LEO in the Republic of Congo; facilitate the success of the operation; direct the redeployment of the combined task force to Kamina for emergency spare part support during the assault phase; provide U.S. current intelligence briefings for the airlift and airborne commanders at Kamina before the assault phase; provide one JTF LEO C-130E for D-day evacuations; provide JTF LEO support for recovery and redeployment of assault transport aircraft at Leopoldville; provide flash precedence reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USEUCOM, USAREUR, and USAFE upon the arrival of the combined task force at Kamina; launch the assault operation from Kamina; and submit progress reports on the operation.
(6) CINCUSAFE. CINCUSAFE was charged with the initial overall responsibility for executing the U.S. mission and designating the airlift force commander; conducting en route airlift support; providing aircraft and crews for deploying the Belgian paratroops conducting the airborne assault, and redeploying the force; adjusting intercommand airlift requirements and expediting maintenance schedules, as necessary, for all C-130E's within the European theater, so as to guarantee that the maximum number would be available for the operation; providing a minimum of one spare aircraft to back up the airlift force; deploying refueling units and operating personnel to Kamina so that they would arrive in advance of the combined task force; transporting C-rations for rescued hostages from Europe to Stanleyville; loaning the Belgian paratroopers two airdropable radios, thus providing them with air-ground communications; providing an aeromedical team, including an emergency kit; and providing the most current intelligence information concerning the Stanleyville area.
(7) CINCUSAREUR. Initially, CINCUSAREUR was asked to provide only C-rations for the rescued hostages at Stanleyville.
d. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations evolved by Belgian and U.S. planners was based on four operational phases: the movement to the Congo, the assault on Stanleyville, the evacuation of the hostages, and the after-action measures.
(1) Phase IóThe Movement to the Congo. For the movement to the Congo USAGE would employ 12 C-130E aircraft to transport 545 paratroopers, 8 jeeps, and 12 motorized tricycles
9
from Kleine-Brogel Airbase (Belgium) to Stanleyville, by way of Torrejon/Moron (Spain), Las Palmas (Canary Islands), Ascension Island, and Kamina (Republic of the Congo). On takeoff from Kleine-Brogel, aircraft would depart at 15-minute intervals and maintain the same interval during flight, to provide for expeditious loading and refueling at en route stops. Two-hour intervals would be allowed for refueling at the stops in Spain and the Canary Islands. Ascension, a British possession, would be used as a rest stop and for staging for at least 12 hours. The arrival of all aircraft at Ascension had to be timed for daylight hours. The initial briefing of aircrews and
paratroopers for the assault operation would take place at Ascension. Because the accommodations at Ascension were limited, personnel would sleep in improvised shelters in the immediate vicinity of the airfield. The planes would depart from Ascension for Kamina at 30-minute intervals and land at their destinations during the hours of darkness, to insure security for the movement. USAFE would position refueling tankers at both Ascension and Kamina, to augment the limited POL stocks at these locations. C-rations, furnished by USAREUR, would be airlifted to provide the liberated hostages with food. CINCSTRIKE would arrange for additional fuel at Kamina, but if more fuel was needed, the Belgian paratroopers would be offloaded at Kamina and the airlifting planes would fly to Elizabethville for refueling and then return to Kamina. Belgian officials would provide for the security of the Kamina area, to keep the presence of regular Belgian forces in the Congo from becoming known.
(2) Phase IIóThe Assault on Stanleyville.
(a) Airdrop/Airlanding Operations. The final briefing for the aerial assault force would take place at Kamina. Each aircraft would be assigned "chalk" numbers and would depart Kamina in numerical order. Chalk Numbers 1 through 5, carrying the 320 Belgian paratroopers to be dropped at Stanleyville, would depart at minimum intervals and fly in an in-trail formation to the objective. Motorized equipment loaded in Numbers 6 and 7 would depart Kamina 30 minutes after the first five aircraft, so that the radio-equipped armored jeeps would be available in the objective area immediately after the troops on the ground had signaledóby radio or green pyrotechnicsóthat the Stanleyville Airfield had been cleared for airlandings. The next five aircraft would depart one hour after the initial assault elements. The
10
troops loaded in Numbers 8, 9, and 11 would be prepared to airland at Stanleyville or to airdrop on the golf course or the airfield if the field had not been cleared for landing at the time of their arrival. Aircraft Numbers 10 and 12ócarrying motorized tricycles, drivers, medical supplies, rations, and ammunitionówould circle in the immediate objective area until airfield clearance operations would permit landings.
The lead C-130E's would proceed to an initial point (IP) approximately 100 miles down the Congo River west of Stanleyville. At this point either one or two B-26's would rendezvous with them, to provide a last-minute weather report on conditions in the Stanleyville area. This report would be based on a wide peripheral reconnaissance made well out of earshot of the city. The B-26's would escort the lead C-130E to the drop zone and remain in the immediate vicinity of the objective area throughout the airdrop operation, to render fire support on call. Aerial fire support would be delivered only if enemy weapons on the ground posed a threat to transports or paratroopers. In such a case it would be delivered for effect on the source of rebel fires or, if the exact location of the source could not be determined, on suspected areas from which the fire might be coming. To guarantee surprise and to safeguard the hostages, the B-26's would avoid the immediate Stanleyville area until the assault was under way. Preliminary arrangements for B-26 support would be made by Belgian Air Force representatives in the Congo, but the details would be coordinated at Kamina before the takeoff.
The Belgian paratroop commander planned to drop on the golf course just east of the Stanleyville Airfield. Approaching the drop zone from the west, the aircraft would fly in the order of assigned chalk numbers, in an in-trail formation, at 1-minute intervals. Although the airdrop was to be accomplished at 1,200 feet, under emergency conditions a drop altitude of 700 feet would be acceptable to the Belgian paratroopers. Airspeed at the time of drop would be 120 knots. It was estimated that the drop zone would accommodate a 10- to 12-man stick through each C-130E door, and that each aircraft carrying the initial airdrop force would make three passes over the drop zone.
The airlift commander, flying in Number 1, would remain airborne in the immediate objective area throughout the airborne and air-landing operations.
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(b) Ground Operations. Airdrop assault elements would form into three groupsóapproximately company-size unitsóto accomplish three initial tasks: block and control the road leading to the airfield; clear and occupy the airfield tower and the Sabena Guest House; and clear the airfield. The assault elements would be provided with two U.S. radio sets and bilingual Belgian personnel would be trained in their use, so that the paratroop commander could communicate with the airlift commander concerning airfield conditions and transmit special requests.l0
After the airdrop the Belgian paratroopers would clear the runway of obstacles placed there by the rebels. They would then seize Objectives 1, 2, and 3 (See Sketch 1), to provide security for the airfield. At Objective 3óthe Sabena Guest House, which was the former governor's palaceóthe Belgian commander believed that he might find rebel leaders who could revel the places where hostages were being held.
After these objectives had been seized, each company-size force would leave a platoon behind for security. The first company-size unit to complete this stage of the mission would be ordered into the town, with the other units following as soon as possible.
The next stage of the operation envisaged a rapid movement through Stanleyville, in an effort to flush out the hiding places where hostages were being held and to seize Objectives 4, 5, and 6 (See Sketch l), thus blocking rebel reinforcements that might attempt to enter the town. Security forces would be left to hold these objectives, while the bulk of the paratroopers, reinforced by airlanded troops, would conduct a detailed search of the town, to release all hostages held in the area.l1
(3) Phase IIIóEvacuation of the Hostages. Aircraft Numbers 2 through 5 would remain in the vicinity of the objective area until the airlift commander ordered them to proceed
10. Cable ECJCA-19978, 15 Nov 64, cited above.
11. Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above.
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to Leopoldville for refueling and crew rest. Since it was believed that no more than three C-130E's could be parked on the Stanleyville airfield at any one time, Numbers 8, 9, and 11ócarrying troops to be airlandedówould expedite their offloading and departure in order to permit maximum time on the ground for offloading the equipment on Numbers 6, 7, 10, and 12. Evacuation of rescued hostages by Numbers 8, 9, and 11 would therefore be on a random basis, whereas Numbers 6, 7, and 10 would be used as the primary aircraft for evacuating the first hostages arriving at the airfield. Following their offloading, the latter three aircraft would keep their engines running at ground-idle speed for 1 to 11 hours if fuel loads permitted; if not, they would proceed to Leopoldville for refueling. Each aircraft could transport up to 96 rescued hostages.
Aircraft Number 12 would also stay on the ground, for the same time, and would be used as the primary aircraft for evacuating any casualties resulting from the airdrop or from initial enemy actions on the ground. USAFE would furnish a doctor and basic medical equipment to be carried in this plane, which could also evacuate refugees on a space-available basis.
After the airfield had been secured and the initial evacuation capabilities of the C-130E's carrying the assault force had been used, additional C-130E'sópart of the in-country resources of JTF LEOówould be used for evacuation purposes. One JTF LEO C-130E, carrying C-rations furnished by USAREUR, would depart Kamina at 0600 hours12 on D-day, deposit its load at Stanleyville, and evacuate the maximum number of the liberated hostages to Leopoldville. The commander of this plane would be responsible for establishing contact with the Belgian forces in order to ascertain the status of their communications capabilities with Kamina or Kindu, to determine the number of liberated hostages remaining to be evacuated, and to schedule the onloading of aircraft needed to complete the evacuation. This information would be relayed to the JTF LEO commander and U.S. Embassy officials in Leopoldville, so that they could plan additional evacuation missions. Any non-Congolese nationals who did not want to be evacuated would be referred to their respective diplomatic representatives
12. All times given in this document are based on Greenwich Mean Time.
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(4) Phase IVóSubsequent Actions.
(a) Initial Reports. The airlift commander, upon landing at Leopoldville on his first return from the objective area, would render a narrative reportóflash precedenceó13 concerning the conduct of the assault and evacuation phases of the operation.
(b) Redeployment. After the arrival of all USAFE C-130E's at Leopoldville and the necessary crew rest, the airlift commander would prepare to return to Europe by way of Wheelus Airfield, Libya. A separate order to execute the redeployment phase of the operation would be issued.
e. Designation of Responsibilities. Because authority to exercise control over the entire operation was not vested in a single commander, it was necessary to assign specific responsibilities to each of the two nations' representatives, in order to guarantee success. Responsibility for refueling and security at Kamina rested with a Belgian Air Force detachment permanently stationed in the Congo. En route decisions concerning the mission were a responsibility of the airlift commander, but the decision concerning the actual drop rested with the Belgian commander of the Para Commando Regiment. When possible, decisions affecting the mission would be made through mutual discussions and agreements between the two commanders. However, the Belgian commander would provide an experienced paratroop officer in the cockpit of each aircraft to Make individual decisions concerning the drop zone, greenlight,14 and similar matters. Thus the Belgians were responsible for the drop and the U.S. airlift commander was responsible for the airlift operations from Kleine-Brogel to the drop zone. The responsibility for predrop reconnaissance of the objective area and arrangements for close air support, if required, was upon the Belgian Air Force's representative in the Congo. He would arrange the details with the Congolese Air Force at Kamina. A Belgian Air Force officer, who would participate in the operation, would brief the Congolese pilots.
13. The highest priority for electrically transmitted messages.
14. The signal for the paratroopers to drop.
14
f. Abort Procedures. If the task force found, after departing from Kamina, that the airdrop could not be conducted because of bad weather or other circumstances, it would return to Kamina and await orders to execute the mission later.
g. Cover Plan. The cover planóadmittedly weakóto be released by Belgian sources if the operation was compromised, would be that a joint U.S.-Belgian long-range airborne training exercise was taking place.
h. Command and Control. Any substantial changes to the basic operations plan would have to be the subject of agreement between representatives of the United States and Belgium. Insofar as U.S. participation was concerned, execution would be on order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S. and Belgian forces would remain under their respective national commands throughout the operation. USCINCEUR would exercise operational control of the assault airlift force until it arrived at Kamina. At that time operational control would pass to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA who, in turn, would return it to USCINCEUR upon redeployment of the force from Kamina.l5 USCINCEUR would also provide a "talking bird" communications package to establish cryptographically secure circuits.16
a. The Cover Plan. The Stanleyville relief operation, designated DRAGON ROUGE or USCINCEUR Operations Plan (OPLAN) 319/64, provided for air movements in and over populated areas, to be made during the hours of darkness to reduce Chances of compromise. However, if the operation was uncovered, the United States would announce that a no-notice strategic mobility exercise was in progress, the details of which remained classified. Only if Belgian involvement was discovered would the United States admit that the Belgians were participating. All further requests for information would be referred to USEUCOM headquarters. American
15. (1) Cable ECJCA-19978, 15 Nov 64, cited above. (2)
Cable ECJCA-00161, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 19 Nov 64.
16. A "talking bird" consists of a C-130 aircraft with installed
radios capable of long-range secure communications. (Intvw, Lt Col Glasgow
with Col W. L. Hogan, 7th Wea Sqdn (MATS), 1 Mar 65.
15
military personnel participating in the operation would not be told its true purpose unless they needed to know it, and then only after they had departed Ascension Island. The stay at Ascension, if uncovered, would be described as an exercise in bare base existence after a long overwater flight.
If an aircraft was diverted in flight, the commander would disclose only his next destination and then state that he was on a classified mission. At regular stops troops and aircrews would be restricted to an area over which control could be exercised to prevent knowledge of the operation by unauthorized persons.17
b. Additional USAREUR Tasks. On 15 November it appeared that the period during which the forces executing Operation DRAGON ROUGE would have to stay on Ascension might be extended by four to five days. In this event it was doubtful that facilities at Ascension could accommodate approximately 550 Belgian troops plus 100 U.S. aircrewmen and other Air Force maintenance personnel. USEUCOM therefore requested USAFE to determine that facilities severe available at Ascension; what additional equipment and supplies would be needed to support the DRAGON ROUGE task force for up to five days; hour much additional airlift would be required to transport the supplies to Ascension; and which supply sourceóU.S. or Belgianówas the most desirable. If water and shelteróhangars, warehouses, etc.ówere available for the force, it would appear that only sleeping bags, C-rations, and facilities for heating the rations would be required. If USAFE determined that the United States should provide the supplies, USAREUR would have to assist in planning and satisfying the requirements.18
USAFE determined that Ascension had sufficient rations and mess capability to feed the deploying force for five days. However, it had no shelter, of any type, that could be used for billeting. Water supplies would be adequate but would require rationing. Austere billeting would require 40 tents and 750 cots. It appeared more advantageous to use U.S. resources because they were readily available and time was of the essence. USAREUR could deliver the necessary tents and cots to Rhine-Main Airbase, Germany within 24 hours. Eight C-124's would transport them to Ascension.19
17. Cable ECJCA-00040, USCINCEUR to JCS, 16 Nov 64.
18. Cable ECJC-L-19982, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, 15 Nov 64.
19. Cable MDC-40818, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 16 Nov 64.
16
7. Approval of the Operations Plan.
On 17 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved USEUCOM's plan for the conduct of Operation DRAGON ROUGE, subject to a separate order of execution for the operation from Ascension to Kamina. Once the combined task force was in the Congo, a final go or no-go decision to proceed from Kamina would be made by the commander of the Belgian Para Commando Regiment. The Joint Chiefs added that withdrawal from the Congo would be accomplished by way of Ascension and that Wheelus could not be used without their specific approval.20
20. Cable JCS-001930, JCS to USCINCEUR, 17 Nov 64.
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Chapter 3
Execution
Late on 15 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a warning order indicating that Operation DRAGON ROUGE would commence on 17 November in accordance with USCINCEUR OPLAN 319, but that its execution would be subject to further orders.1
On the following day USCINCEUR made several suggestions to the Joint Chiefs. He suggested that, if a political decision to proceed with Operation DRAGON ROUGE was made, it would be prudent, in the face of possible delays and rebel reactions, to deploy the force to Ascension on 17 November, so that it would be readily available for operations in the Congo. He thoroughly agreed, however, that the decision to launch or not to launch the final portion of the operation should rest with the Belgian commander on the scene. USCINCEUR also recognized the possibility that additional operationsósuch as airdrops on Bunia, Paulis, Watsa, and other areasómight be necessary to rescue white hostages held by the rebels. If such operations became necessary, JTF LEO would be the appropriate agency to plan for them. He noted that the suggestion of the U.S. Embassy in Leopoldville that the assault on Stanleyville
1. Cable JCS-001894, JCS to USCINCEUR, 15 Nov 64.
18
be launched directly from Ascension Islandówithout in-Congo stagingócould not be carried out, because the C-130E's fuel capacity would not permit such a long flight. To maintain surprise, the assault had to be undertaken without proper weather reconnaissance, preliminary air attack, or the use of normal pathfinder techniques for marking the drop zone. USCINCEUR therefore held that the need for time to coordinate with tactical air support elements, the necessity for loitering in the drop area, the distance to a suitable recovery base, and the possibility of unforeseen contingencies required that the force be staged through Kamina, so that the aircraft would have as much fuel as possible and the aircraft commander could effect direct coordination on the scene.2
a. Last U.S. Preparations. On the evening of 16 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered that the combined U.S./ Belgian task force for Operation DRAGON ROUGE be moved to Ascension Island on the next day. No deployment beyond Ascension was to be made without additional orders.3 USCINCEUR relayed this order to his component commanders, specifying that USAREUR and USAFE were to implement their previously coordinated plans to provide tents and cots for the support of the force on Ascension, and that stable brooms would be taken along to facilitate the clearing of the runway at Stanleyville.
On 17 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized USCINCEUR to deploy refueling units to Kamina, so that they would be readily available at the final staging area. However, no other aircraft or personnel engaged in the operation were authorized to proceed beyond Ascension.5 All U.S. markings were to be removed from the
2. Cable ECJCA-00039, USCINCEUR to JCS, 16 Nov 64.
3. Cable JCS-001903, JCS to USCINCEUR, 16 Nov 64.
4. Cable ECJCL-00041, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, 16 Nov 64.
5. Cable JCS-001929, JCS to USCINCEUR 17 Nov 64.
19
refueling units before their departure from Europe. The flights would begin as soon as overflight clearances from Spain and France had been obtained.
As of 0301 hours on 17 November no clearance had been received.6 By 1518 hours still no political clearance for the flights had been received at USEUCOM, but the headquarters had been advised that the U.S. Embassy in Paris was informing the French government of Operation DRAGON ROUGE and that all flights were authorized to proceed.7
b. The Belgian Preparations. While the U.S. participants were making their last preparations, the Belgian Para Commando Regiment paraded in Brussels for the King's birthday. Immediately after the parade all personnel were restricted to barracks and told that they were to participate in an Allied Command-Europe Mobile Force-Land8 exercise. This cover story was accepted by most of the personnel, even though the more knowledgeable officers and noncommissioned officers had ideas of their own.9
c. Air Force Actions. USAFE had assigned the primary airlift mission to Detachment 1, 322d Air Division, Military Air Transport Service, which was stationed at Evreux Airbase, France. The 464th Troop Carrier Wing, on rotation duty at Evreux, was to provide the transport aircraft, and the 52d Troop Carrier Squadron the airlift for en route support. This force had been alerted on
6. ECJCL-00046, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 17 Nov 64.
7. Cable ECJCL-00064, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 17 Nov 64.
8. A multinational NATO force directly subordinate to SACEUR.
9. Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above.
20
14 November, and the commander had received his initial briefing on the following day. On 16 November, the commander of Detachment 1 had requested permission to position an airloading team at Kleine-Brogel, but this request was denied for security reasons. Another request for authority to move the support aircraft carrying tents and cots from Rhine-Main to Ascension was also denied. However, permission was granted to load the plane at Rhine-Main, in preparation for the movement.
On the afternoon of 17 November the airlift force departed from Evreux for Kleine-Brogel, where it depended upon the Belgian paratroops for smooth loading operations. At 1858 hours, as soon as its loading was completed, the first aircraft started to depart Kleine-Brogel, but was recalled on orders from USCINCEUR. At that time the maximum permissible hold was 2 hours and 40 minutes, because a later departure would make it impossible to land at Ascension, where the runway was not lighted. However, at 2050 hoursó1 hour and 52 minutes lateróthe hold was lifted and the first aircraft was airborne at 2120 hours. Because of the uncertainty of overflight clearances, two flight plans had been filed: the first by way of Mildenhall, United Kingdom, to Moron, Las Palmas, and Ascensionóthus avoiding Franceóand the second by direct overflight of France to Moron. The second flight plan was used and the first aircraft landed at Ascension at 1505 hours on 18 November. All aircraft had closed except for one that aborted at Moron, where it was unloaded. Its cargo was loaded onto the spare aircraft, which had joined the others by 2125 hours.l0
After meeting at Ascension Island the U.S. airlift and Belgian airborne commanders achieved a high degree of mutual understanding. U.S. Air Force personnel instructed the Belgians in jumping techniques from C-130E aircraft and in the operation of the AN/PRC-41 ultrahigh frequency (UHF) and AN/PRC-47 high fidelity (HF) single-side-band (SSB) radios that were to be used during the assault phase of the operation.
10. Hq 322 AD (MATS), After Action Report Operation DRAGON ROUGE, undtd, OI 5-65-4 (in USAFE Hist Sect files).
21
However, the arrival of the task force at the island was a suprise [sic] to the small Air Force detachment stationed there. The tents and cots had not arrived, although the C-124 aircraft on which they had been loaded had left Rhine-Main six hours before the C-130E's from Kleine-Brogel. The C-124's did arrive 16 hours after the task force.
For the first night the accommodations on the island were limited, but the Belgian troops improvised shelters and the permanent detachment fed all personnel a hot meal. When the tents were being erected on 19 November, it was discovered that only wooden tent pegs were available. They proved to be unsatisfactory when the men tried to drive them into the coral soil of barren, windswept Ascension. Metal tent pegs were therefore dispatched from Europe.
On 19 November a liaison officer from CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA also arrived, and the airlift and airborne commanders continued to discuss their plans in detail. Colonel C. Laurent, the Belgian regimental commander, was not familiar with U.S. Air Force "closelook drop procedures," which used a computed aerial release point (CARP) to determine the place of drop. He was also concerned about the drop zone he had tentatively selectedóthe golf courseóbecause an airdrop there would require too much time. The airlift commander's suggestion that the Stanleyville Airfield be used as the drop zone did not appeal to Colonel Laurent initially because heólike most paratroopersódid not relish the prospects of dropping onto concrete. However, the close-look drop proceduresóinvolving the visual identification of the drop zoneóand the CARP systemówhereby the point of release His computed by exacting navigational techniques based on extensive wind data compiled in the cockpitówere explained to him by the airlift commander and the USAFE liaison officer to the 8th Infantry Division who had accompanied the Belgian force. The liaison officer pointed out that the airborne units of the 8th
11. (1) Recorded telephone conversations, 18 Nov 64, Lt Col J. J. Murnane, USAREUR Log Div S&S Br with USEUCOM representatives, in AEAGC-O files. (2) 322d AD After Action Report, undtd, cited above. (3) Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above. (4) Inter, Lt Cot Glasgow with Lt Col Murnane, 9 Mar 65.
22
Infantry Division had used this system extensively and that they kind made a number of jumps on airfields. Since the troops would jump from side doors on the C-130E's, they might be able to steer themselves away from the concrete, so as to land on both sides of the runway. The Stanleyville Airfield was 2,300 meters long. With the aircraft in trail formation at 20-second intervals between planes, 320 men could be dropped in one pass over the strip. A planeload of 64 men, with 32 exiting from each side door, could thus be emptied in the 42 seconds during which the aircraft traveling at 125 knots, would make one pass. Colonel Laurent therefore selected the airfield as the drop zone and determined the altitude of dropóabove groundóas 700 feet, to prevent unnecessary dispersion. Tactical integrity was to be maintained by cross-loading. Thus the paratroopers in the company assigned to take Objective 2 would be the first to jump from each aircraft, while those taking Objective 3 would be next. Personnel of the company assigned to take Objective 1 would be the last to exit from each aircraft. The aircraft would approach from west to east, and the CARP would be 150 yards short of the runway. Each plane computed its own CARP because of the trail formation the airlift force was using. Halfway down the runway, the aircraft would make slight left turns to take advantage of the additional cleared area provided by the golf course and thus include it in the drop zone. Previous plans to have an airborne officer in the cockpit of each plane, to determine the release point, were abandoned.12
The sequence of events that would take place during the assault was also reviewed. After having landed and cleared the runway, the paratroopers would radio the planes their clearance to land. If radio communications failed, a T-panel would be displayed on the east end of the runway and two green flares would be fired from the airfield control tower. Dragon 1óthe airlift commander's planeó
12. (1) 322d AD After Action Rept, undtd, cited above. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 24 Dec 64, subj: DRAGON ROUGE/NOIR. OI-3-65-126 (in USAFE Hist Sec files). (3) Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above. (4) Intvw, Lt Col Glasgow with Capt Brashears, 9 Mar 65.
23
would be the first to land. Clearance to land would indicate that the airfield was not a target for organized rebel ground fire and that the runway was free of obstacles, including parachutes.
On 21 November, while still at Ascension, the aircrews were briefed on Stanleyville and the full importance of their mission.13
11. Public Affairs Policy and Press Coverage
The Department of Defense public affairs policy for Operation DRAGON ROUGE was published on 18 November. The overall objective in public information would be to minimize visibility of the operation as much as possible and to limit the picture of the United States' role. Every effort would be made to avoid contacts between the participating U.S. military personnel and the press. The responsibility for release of all still and motion pictures of the operation would rest with the U.S. Embassy in Leopoldville, which would also handle all press inquiries. The Department of State would provide the Embassy with public information guidance.14
Notwithstanding the prearranged cover plan and public affairs policy, the New York Timesóin a story datelined 20 November at Brusselsóannounced the presence of U.S. planes and Belgian paratroopers on Ascension and stated that they were so located in order to be readily available to go to the aid of white hostages being held by rebels in the Congo. Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations immediately announced that any movement of Belgian paratroopers to Ascension by U.S. aircraft might be a cause for Security Council action. At approximately the same time India offered her good offices to effect the release of the white hostages, and Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak appealed to the rebel leader, Christophe Gbenye, to order his forces to lay down their arms, in which case they would be granted a general amnesty.15 The
13. 322d AD After Action Report, undid, cited above.
14. Cable STRIO-92/64, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to COMUTSJTF Leopoldville,
19 Nov 64.
15. New York Times, 21 Nov 64, p. 1.
25
rebels postponed the execution of Dr. Carlson, but indications were that they were shifting the hostages to new locations.l6
On 23 November the New York Times followed up with a story from Leopoldville announcing that an airdrop of Belgian forces into the Congo was believed to be near, and that in the meantime U.S. and Belgian representatives were reported to be preparing major actions in the United Nations.l7 On the following day another story from Leopoldville told about Belgian paratroopers having been ferried from Ascension to the Congo.18
At 1830 hours on 21 November the task force on Ascension received orders to move to Kamina. The first aircraft was airborne within one hour 20 minutes. The other planes followed at 10-minute intervals. One aircraft aborted on this leg of the mission and once again the spare, which had rejoined the movement after repair at Moron, was used. The task force arrived at Kamina on 22 November and was ordered to hold until further orders were received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.19
Upon arrival at Kamina the combined U.S./Belgian task force was met by representatives of JTF LEO, who assumed operational control for CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. The plan for the assault on Stanleyville was completed there. Rendezvous and other procedures were agreed upon with the supporting B-26 pilots, as items of primary concern to the JTF LEO representative.
16. New York Times, 22 Nov 64, p. 1.
17. New York Times, 23 Nov 64, p. 1.
18. New York Times, 24 Nov 64, p. 1.
19. 322d AD After Action Report, undtd, cited above.
25
During the early afternoon of 22 November the task force was visited by Belgian military and civilian representatives. Both the U.S. and Belgian commanders wanted that the drop at Stanleyville be conducted on 24 November at 0400 hours, so as to allow a joint assault with the Congolese Army forces that were closing on the city from the south. This recommendation was an outgrowth of discussions between Colonel Laurent and Colonel van de Walle. Before leaving Belgium Colonel Laurent had been told that the combined U.S./Belgian operation was to have no connection with the operations of the Congolese Army forces, but his later discussion with Colonel van de Walle convinced him that mutual advantages could result from a coordinated movement on Stanleyville. Obviously, Congolese Army assistance in the search operations to discover where hostages were being held would be useful.
In the meantime, however, several messages were received from CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA that indicated that the operation might be conducted on 23 November. The task force personnel were therefore loaded into the aircraft in the evening of the 22d, where they remained until 0130 hours on the 23d, when they were unloaded because no execution order was received.20
14. The Assault on Stanleyville
a. Air Force Actions. The recommendations of the two commanders that the assault be held in conjunction with the Congolese Army forces on 24 November was accepted and appropriate orders were issued. At 0045 hours the first five aircraftócarrying the 320 paratroopers to be droppedówere airborne. The task force arrived at the drop zone on schedule at 0400 hours, ten minutes before daylight. When rifle and machinegun fire, including tracer ammunition, was directed at the aircraft, several were hit, but without effect upon the execution of their mission. Intelligence reports indicated that the airfield at Stanleyville was littered with gas drums, cars, and trucks.
20. (1) 322d AD After Action Rept, undtd, cited above. (2) Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above.
26
While the paratroopers were clearing the airfield of obstacles, the aircraft that had delivered the assault force continued to circle the objective area. Low hanging ground fog was prevalent during most of this period; the ceiling was approximately 300 to 400 feet. The airlift commander orbited at treetop level to maintain better control of later airlanding activities. At 0450 hours the first aircraft was cleared to land, but in the meantime the airlift commander's plane had been hit by groundfire, and he was forced to fly to Leopoldville, after having supervised the initial landings.
(1) The Landings. The 320 Belgian paratroopers had secured the airfield within 32 minutes, and within 45 minutes after jumping, they had cleared the airfield of all obstacles. This achievement required much manual effort. During the course of moving some of the wreckage, for example, Colonel Laurent was assisting a lance corporal in pushing a heavy truck part. The corporal turned to him and said, "The next time I count three, push." It was in this fine spirit that the dirty job was accomplished so rapidly.
The main opposition to the airborne landing came from one quadruple caliber .50 machinegun, of Chinese manufacture, located to the east end of the runway and from small arms fire from other positions. The Belgian paratroopers had suffered four casualties during the jump, but to their delight none of them had landed on the concrete. The U.S. aircraft had dropped them so precisely that they could land on each side of the runway. In line with the Belgian policy to keep native casualties to a minimum, no tactical aircraft were employed to provide cover for the operation.
(2) The Seizure of the First Objectives. During operations to secure Objective 3, a ringing telephone was promptly answered by a Belgian paratroop captain. The voice on the other end of the line urged rebel leaders to hurry to the Victoria Hotel, where the hostages were being held. As soon as the Belgians received this information they moved rapidly toward the town. As they approached a bend in the
21. 322d AD After Action Rept, undtd, cited above.
27
main route (Point X on Sketch 1) they encountered machinegun and other small arms fire that delayed their advance. Up to this time, resistance had been limited to occasional sniping from side, front, and rear as the force moved through the builtup outskirts of Stanleyville. The arrival of the first armored jeeps spread panic in the rebel ranks. Some of the rebels jumped into a yellow truck. Belgian paratroopers, mounted on jeeps and motorized tricycles, followed in hot pursuit, and both sides fired wildly as they moved.
When one block from the Victoria Hotel, the Belgians heard scattered shooting ahead As they turned a corner from which they could view the hotel, they saw 400 to 600 civilians huddled together in the square. A minute before, a rebel major had given the order to gun them down, and machine pistols had opened fire on the defenseless hostages. Twenty-eight hostages, including one AmericanóDr. Carlsonólay dead. The rebels ran away.
The civilian casualties were immediately treated by Belgian aid men. Two and one-half hours after the jump, the first of the rescued hostages were moved to the airfield for air evacuation to safehavens in Leopoldville, where they were turned over to their country representatives.
While the operation was being conducted, rebels attacked the airfield from the west, covering their advance with mortar fire, but their attack was rapidly repulsed. Sporadic small arms fire was also received from the woods to the north of the airfield. Much of this fire was directed at aircraft on final approaches during the night of 24 and 25 November.
After clearing Stanleyville of all the hostages they could find, the Belgians turned the city over to Congolese Army forces that had arrived meanwhile, and withdrew to a stream west of Stanleyville in order to defend the airfield until the evacuation was completed.22
22. (1) Tape Recording. Message from Det 1, 322d AD to JTF LEO, in AEAGC-O files. Recorded 24 Nov 64. (2) Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above.
28
Aircraft Numbers 6 and 12 took the first 100 rescued hostages from Stanleyville. While this evacuation was being accomplished, the JTF LEO C-130 landed with rations for the refugees.
The second outgoing movement of refugees included 28 severely wounded liberated hostages and Belgian paratroopers. One of the Belgian paratroopers died while being evacuated.
The evacuation phase of the operation continued for two days, during which 2,000 rescued hostages were moved.23
23. (1) 322d AD After Action Rept, undtd, cited above. (2) Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above.
29
Chapter 4
Other Operations in the Congo
a. USCINCEUR's Plans. On 21 November USCINCEUR submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a number of plans for conducting other operations to relieve hostages held by rebel forces in the Congo. On the assumption that it would be at least 48 hours after the assault on Stanleyville before the Belgian paratroopers could be ready to undertake additional operations, the execution of such operations would be contingent on the arrival of Congolese Army forces in Stanleyville during those two days. Since isolated drops of less than company-size forces could not be undertaken and at least one company had to be left at Stanleyville to man and protect the central base for any other missions, the Belgian forces could not conduct more than two additional operations. Moreover, the Belgian battalion needed 400 additional personnel parachutes, 8 armored jeeps, and four radio jeeps, which would have to be shipped from Belgium at least 72 hours before an additional operation could be executed.
USCINCEUR also assumed that the Belgian commander would wish to start such supplementary operations at 0400 hours, to achieve surprise by dropping at this time of day and to take advantage of the good visibility, minimum wind, thermal lifting, and cumulus activity that could be expected then.
30
USCINCEUR proposed the following supplementary operations:
(1) Operation DRAGON BLANC. The seizure of Bunia, approximately 400 miles east of Stanleyville, was to be considered next because many hostages, including women and children, were reported to be held at Mongwalu just north of Bunia. Bunia had a 6,000-foot, hard-surfaced runway which, although currently obstructed with oil drums, would permit the airlanding of motorized equipment and the rapid evacuation of rescued hostages by air once the field had been seized and secured. If only one company-size attack could be launched from Stanleyville, USCINCEUR recommended that it be executed at Bunia.
An operation at Bunia would involve four C-130E's, to carry 200 personnel parachutes from Leopoldville to Stanleyville before darkness on the day after the Stanleyville drop. One of these aircraft would then remain at Stanleyville to carry reinforcements to Bunia it they should be required. The other three would carry the assault forces to the objective and drop them at 0400 hours on the second day following the Stanleyville drop. This action would involve take-offs from Stanleyville on unlighted runways during the hours of darkness. While not routine, such take-offs would be acceptable under these conditions. Two other C-130E's would have to depart Leopoldville so as to arrive at Bunia 30 minutes after the assault paratroopers had been dropped. They would carry four armored jeeps and two radio-equipped jeeps. After these jeeps had been unloaded, these two planes would remain on the groundówith engines at ground idleóto evacuate hostages released by the Belgian paratroopers. The one C-130E, holding at Stanleyville with the reserve platoon on call, would not be released until the Belgian paratroop battalion commander was assured that one company could hold the objective area. Another C-130E would be needed to resupply the Bunia force on the day following the drop, subsequent support for which could be provided by Belgian DC-6's from Kamina.
(2) Operation DRAGON NOIR. USCINCEUR recommended that Paulisó225 miles northeast of Stanleyvilleóbe considered as a secondary objective for additional operations. Many hostages were held in Paulis and the town had an airfield that would be suitable for airlanding operations. However, the runway was of compacted earth and might not be suitable for use in the event
31
of rain; therefore, determination of the practicality of using this strip would have to be made by personnel in the Congo. If the planes could not land at Paulis, any hostages who might be rescued would have to be evacuated overland by truck or railroad. In either event they might be subjected to rebel interdiction. If no motorized equipmentósimilar to that planned for Buniaócould be airlanded, the combat capability of the paratroop elements would be seriously affected. Some other means for air dropping this equipment would therefore have to be devised by personnel in the Congo; otherwise an operation at Paulis would not be feasible. The execution of the operation would be similar to that planned for Bunia.
(3) Operation DRAGON VERT. Another place considered for a relief operation was Watsa, some 375 miles northeast of Stanleyville and known as a holding area for male hostages whose families had been evacuated to Bunia. It was not suitable for airlanding operations because the runway was of compact earth and its length was only 2,400 feet. An assault on this objective would therefore require the airdropping of both personnel and equipmentóa feat that would not be easy but could be accomplished. An alternative course of action would be to augment the company landed at Bunia with a platoon from Stanleyville and equip it with sufficient vehicles to conduct an overland movement to Watsaóa distance of approximately 125 miles. A personnel airdrop could be conducted on Watsa in connection with this operation, and trucks could be used to evacuate released hostages to Bunia. The Belgian planners with whom USCINCEUR had consulted had indicated that a minimum of 18 trucksóeach carrying 18 fully equipped personnelówould have to be dispatched from Belgium for this purpose. Aerial resupply for the force would have to be established from Kamina.1
b. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA's Operations Plan. On 22 November CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA published OPLAN 319E, which was essentially a summary of USCINCEUR's proposals. He assumed that the execution of supplementary operations to rescue hostages held by rebel forces in the Congo would be ordered at a time when the Belgian paratroopers would have completed the evacuation phase at Stanleyville and would have the use of its airport for further
1. Cable ECJCA-00340, USCINCEUR to JCS et al., 21 Nov 64.
32
operations. However, if Stanleyville was not available, either Kamina or Leopoldville, or both, could be used for staging. Additional equipment would have to be airlifted from Belgium to support the rescue operations envisaged by USCINCEUR. Within the capabilities of the Belgian paratroop commander, two relief and evacuation missionsóeach involving one companyówould be launched, in order of priority, against Bunia, Paulis, and Watsa. One company of Belgians would have to remain at Stanleyville to protect the base and furnish an "on-call" reserve platoon to reinforce either company-size operation. The operations at Bunia, Paulis, and Watsa would take place at 2-day intervals after the Stanleyville assault. Preparations for the airdrop of motorized equipment would have to be made to support the Paulis operation, and the attack on Watsa would have to be conducted overland from Bunia.
With his proposals for the conduct of supplementary operations in the Congo completed, USCINCEUR directed CINCUSAFE to airlift the additional motorized equipment to Leopoldville and CINCUSAREUR to provide the necessary heavy-drop rigging. However, the execution of additional operations awaited agreement between Belgium and the United States.2
c. Belgian Plans. While at Stanleyville Colonel Laurent had planned for Operation DRAGON NOIR at Paulis, using the airfield as the drop zone. The field was 1,100 meters long and the edge of its runway was close to the town. However, high trees concealed the runway on both sides, so that it would be difficult to find from the air. The force selected to take Paulis would consist of 240 men, 2 radio jeeps, and 4 armored jeeps. It would be carried in seven C-130E's. Once again little information was available on the whereabouts of the hostages.3
17. Execution of Operation DRAGON NOIR
Apparently the Belgian commander considered that only one additional operation was within the capabilities of his force.
2. (1) Cable ECJCL-00353, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR.
(2) Cable 1091/64, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to COMJTFLEO. Both 22 Nov 64.
(3) Cable STRJ-5A-1125.64, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to JCS et al., 23 Nov
64.
3. Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65, cited above.
33
At any rate Operation DRAGON NOIRóthe assault on Paulisówas the only supplementary operation to be conducted.
On 25 November the task force received word that the assault on Paulis would take place at 0400 hours on 26 November. The troops and equipment for the operation were picked up by the airlift commander at Stanleyville during the early morning hours. The arrival of the aircraft and their loading at Stanleyville proceeded without incident, and the task force arrived at its objective on schedule. However, a low-hanging fog covered the area, so that it was necessary to make two passes to establish the location of the drop zone, finally seen through the haze as a red glow in the first morning light. Once again the rebel fire was directed at the aircraft; one paratrooper was wounded as he exited from the Number 1 plane. The airfield was secured within 30 minutes of the drop, but landings were delayed for an additional 15 minutes while the sources of fire from the east end of the runway were eliminated.
Again the Belgian forces were lucky in discovering quickly where the hostages were held. The first person whom they met was a Dutch consul, who was subsequently wounded while leading Belgian patrols in their search for hostages. In 3 days motorized patrols liberated 355 hostages at scattered locations in the Paulis area. One Belgian paratrooper was killed in action and several others were wounded.
The spare aircraft designated to participate in this operation was used to evacuate liberated hostages. Thus a total of eight aircraft was employed.
4. (1) 322d AD After Action Rept, undtd. (2) Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 65. Both cited above.
34
Chapter 5
Redeployment
a. USCINCEUR's Concept. The redeployment of the USEUCOM forces to Europe could not be scheduled because of the uncertainties of the operations in the Congo. However, as of 21 November USCINCEUR envisaged that first the force would return to Kamina, when requested by the Belgian paratroop commander. At Kamina, the force would be protected from exposure to urban areas, to reduce adverse political effects. Once all elements had arrived at Kamina, the Belgian troops would be redeployed to Belgium, preferably by Sabena charter aircraft. The USEUCOM airlift would be used to transport items of military equipment that could not readily be transported by commercial flights. However, if USEUCOM airlift was used to redeploy the entire force, 16 C-130E's would be required.1
b. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA's Instructions. On 22 November CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA directed JTF LEO to airlift Belgian personnel and equipment upon request of the Belgian representative in the Congo. Concurrently all USAFE aircraft would return to Europe.2
1. Cable ECJCA-00340, 21 Nov 64, cited above.
2. Cable 1091/64, 22 Nov 64, cited above.
35
On 27 November the airlift force recovered the Belgian paratroopers at Stanleyville and Paulis and carried them to Kamina. At a meeting held there on 28 November to plan for the redeployment of the task force to Europe, it was agreed that the force would depart for Ascension at 0500 hour a on 29 November. No DRAGON ROUGE or DRAGON NOIR aircraft could overfly Spain.
The task force arrived at Ascension without incident on 29 November and remained there overnight. On the following day the tents were struck and loadedóalong with cots, a communications van, and rigging gearóinto three C-124 support aircraft furnished by USEUCOM. On 1 December the force was joyously received in Brussels, and the King of the Belgians decorated both the airlift and airborne commanders with the Order of Leo II. The 322d Air Division aircraft returned to their home station at Evreux on 2 December.3
3. 322d AD After Action Rept, undtd, cited above.
36
Chapter 6
Lessons Learned and Summary
a. Insufficiency of Planning Staffs. Restrictions imposed on the number of airlift staff personnel had caused delays in communications while the 322d Air Division was developing its plans. In addition, USAREUR stated that it had not been sufficiently represented in the planning for Operation DRAGON ROUGE.1
b. Command and Control. USEUCOM had prepared the basic operations plans, and coordination with STRICOM/USMEAFSA and other U.S. agencies was used to resolve support problems that could have been handled by the task force. The 322d Air Division therefore stated that for greater operational efficiency USCINCEUR should have retained control of the operation.2 CINCUSAFE agreed.3
1. (1) 322d AD After Action Report, undtd, cited above.
(2) Cable SX-7926, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 23 Dec 64.
2. 322 AD After Action Rept, undtd, cited above.
3. Ltr, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 24 Dec 64, cited above.
37
CINCUSAREUR, in his after-action report, held that, since the operation had taken place in the MEAFSA area, it should have been logistically supported by CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA.4
c. Other Lessons. Intelligence information had been lacking at Ascension and the "talking bird's" performance had not been completely satisfactory. While the operation could not be considered classic, CINCUSAFE was of the opinion that as a combined performance it had been outstanding.
An old military problem came to light in the after action report of the 322d Air Division. This unit stated that it had received too much harassment during operations, in the form of radio instructions and counterinstructions from many sources. Typical of this kind of traffic was the question "How many Americans are being loaded on such and such aircraft?" The necessity of relaying such messages to Belgians who were not only in the midst of fighting, but experiencing linguistic difficulties of communication, was described as "maddening." The transmittal of such messages could also lead to more serious problems. At Paulis a weak message was received to the effect that only Belgians should be evacuated on U.S. aircraftóthat other aircraft would come for the liberated hostages of other nationalities. The officer receiving this message replied that compliance with this directive would mean turning back hysterical women and children in the face of fighting that was then in progress in the immediate vicinity of the airfield. It was discovered later that the order was intended for Stanleyville and had been mistakenly transmitted to Paulis.5
The commander of the airlift force praised the devotion to duty shown by all participants. He commended especially the the [sic] discipline and efficiency displayed by Belgian paratroopers. He also stressed that the close-look drop procedures had been used for the first time in an actual operation, and that they had been a success.6
4. Cable SX-7926, 23 Dec 64, cited above.
5. (1) 322d AD After Action Rept, undtd, cited above. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAFE
to USCINCEUR, 24 Dec 64, cited above.
6. Ltr, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 24 Dec 64, cited above.
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Estimates of the number of hostages rescued by Operations DRAGON ROUGE and DRAGON NOIR varied. Colonel Laurent stated that 2,000 had been rescued at Stanleyville and 355 at Paulis; the New York Times indicated that only 211 were freed at Paulis; and Time magazine estimated that of 1,300 white hostages held at Stanleyville, all but 60 were rescued.7 When it is considered that the rescued hostages were evacuated by aircraft from different sources, and that upon their arrival at Leopoldville they were received by the diplomatic representatives of their respective countries, the difficulties in making an accurate count of the number of hostages rescued can be understood. However, as Colonel Laurent had been responsible for loading the aircraft and caring for the liberated hostages until their evacuation, his figures are perhaps more accurate.
The two operations, saving the lives of such a great number of human beings, were conducted at a cost of two Belgian soldiers killed in action and eleven wounded. Airlift personnel suffered no casualties. Nine aircraft of the airlift force were hit by rebel small arms ground fireóeach of them from two to seven timesóbut none were permanently disabled. It was estimated that, if the final approach to the drop zone had been in a V formation instead of in trail, the vulnerability of the aircraft to ground fire would have been reduced. However, an approach in V formation over the limited drop zone available in this instance would have been impossible.8
Operations DRAGON ROUGE and DRAGON NOIR demonstrated the ability of hurriedly improvised combined forces to conduct rescue operations in distant areas under adverse conditions. The well-trained Belgian troops engaged in these operations lived up to the motto of their regiment, Nec Iactantia Nec MetuóNeither Boasting Nor Fearing.9
7. (1) Sum of Rmks, 18 Feb 6p, cited above. (2) New York Times,
27 Nov 64. (3) Time, Vol. 84, No 23, 4 Dec 64.
8. 322d AD After Action Rept, undid, cited above.
9. Time, 4 Dec 64, cited above.
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Number of Copies
Department of the Army
Chief of Military History 2
Chief of Research and Development (ATTN: U.S. Army R&D
Operations Research Advisory Group) 1
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (Historian) 2
U.S. European Command (Historian) 2
U.S. Air Force, Europe (Historian) 2
U.S. Navy, Europe (Historian) 2
U.S. Army, Europe
Headquarters
Political Adviser 5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (Historical Section) 29
Combat Developments Command Liaison Officer 5
Continental Army Command Liaison Officer 3
DAD Liaison Officer 2
U.S. Seventh Army (Historian--for distribution to corps and divisions) 10
U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe 2
U.S. Army, Berlin 1
U.S. Army Southern European Task Force 1
10th Special Forces Group 1
Classifying Authority:
s/Paul R. Steckla
PAUL R. STECKLA
Colonel, GS
Executive Officer, Operations Division
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