The Pacific Theater
The war in the Pacific may be regarded as having four stages:
(a) The defensive, when we were engaged almost exclusively in protecting our shores and our lines of communication from the encroachments of the enemy.
(b) The defensive-offensive, during which, although our operations were chiefly defensive in character, we were able nevertheless to take certain offensive measures.
(c) The offensive-defensive, covering the period immediately following our seizure of the initiative, but during which we still had to use a large part of our forces to defend our recent gains.
(d) The offensive, which began when our advance bases were no longer seriously threatened and we became able to attack the enemy at places of our own choosing.
The Defensive
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese withdrew from the central Pacific and for the time being, except for the capture of the islands of Guam and Wake, confined their major attacks to the Philippine Islands and Netherlands East Indies. Our own operations were of necessity limited to that line of enemy advance. Guam was easily taken. Our forces on Wake, after gallant resistance which took a large toll of enemy attacking forces, far superior in strength, were overcome at the end of December.
Except for the forces in the Philippine Islands under General (now General of the Army) Douglas MacArthur, our strength in the western Pacific area consisted chiefly of the Asiatic Fleet, a few aviation units, and the garrisons of marines at Guam and Wake already referred to. The small Asiatic Fleet commanded by Admiral Thomas C. Hart included the heavy cruiser HOUSTON, the light cruiser MARBLEHEAD, 13 overage destroyers, some 29 submarines, two squadrons of Catalinas comprising Patrol Wing Ten, and a few gunboats and auxiliaries which could not be counted on for combat. With this force (plus the light cruiser BOISE, which happened to be in Asiatic waters when the war warning was received) we undertook to delay the enemy's advance until such time as we could muster sufficient strength to put up any real resistance. In so far as completely stopping the advance was concerned, the campaign was foredoomed, but it nevertheless contributed materially to the ultimate check of the Japanese advance, and the energy and gallantry of the officers and men participating constitute a remarkable chapter in the history of naval warfare.
During the latter part of November, when the Japanese advances along the coast of Indo-china indicated the approach of a crisis, Admiral Hart had sent MARBLEHEAD and eight destroyers to Borneo. Likewise, HOUSTON, BOISE, and the destroyer tender BLACK HAWK, had been dispatched to operate in southern waters. On the evening of 8 December therefore, after the Japanese had bombed our airfields and destroyed many of General MacArthur's planes, our submarines and motor torpedo boats, which were still in Philippine waters, were left with the task of impeding the enemy's advance. On 10 December the navy yard at Cavite, which had long been recognized as insecure, was practically wiped out by an air attack which also damaged the submarine SEALION and the destroyer PEARY; SEALION being destroyed by our own forces to prevent its capture. On the same day the Japanese effected landings on the islands, and thereafter all attempts to bring in effective quantities of supplies by sea proved unsuccessful. It should be noted, however, that on 10 December there were some 200,000 tons of Allied shipping in Manila Bay; most of it good, and some of it with valuable cargoes. All but one of these ships got clear, to the southward, under what amounted to cover by our surface forces, and escaped via the Sulu Sea and Makassar Strait. This was an important "save."
PLATE 5-THE DEFENSIVE PHASE IN THE PACIFIC
1. BATTLE OF MAKASSAR STRAIT, 24 JANUARY 1942: Japanese forces moving southward are attacked by U. S. destroyers.
2. RAID ON THE MARSHALLS AND GILBERTS, 1 FEBRUARY 1942: U. S. carriers and cruisers attack enemy bases.
3. BADOENG STRAIT, 19-20 FEBRUARY 1942: Combined forces under Rear Admiral Doorman, R.N.N. engage Japanese force moving on Bali.
4. ACTION OFF RABAUL, 20 FEBRUARY 1942: Aerial engagement near the enemy's major base in New Britain.
5. RAID ON WAKE ISLAND, 24 FEBRUARY 1942: A U.S. Task Force bombards a former American outpost.
6. JAVA SEA ACTION, 27 FEBRUARY 1942: Combined forces attempt to intercept Japanese convoys. The end of organized Allied naval resistance in this phase of the war.
7. HOUSTON AND PERTH LOST, 1 MARCH 1942: The surviving cruisers of the combined force are lost in an action near Soenda Strait.
8. RAID ON SALAMAUA AND LAE, 10 MARCH 1942: Carriers attack enemy ships in recently occupied New Guinea bases.
9. RAID ON TULAGI, 4 May 1942: The opening blow of the Coral Sea actions. U.S. carrier-based aircraft attack Japanese ships in the newly occupied Solomons.
10. BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA, 7-8 MAY 1942: Carriers exchange blows. Severe damage inflicted on the Japanese carrier force. LEXINGTON is lost, but the Japanese advance is checked.
The holding of the Army's positions on Bataan and Corregidor became only a question of time, and Rear Admiral F. W. Rockwell, who was in command of the local naval defense forces, moved with them to Corregidor on 26 December.
Admiral Hart set up his headquarters in the Netherlands East Indies. Shortly thereafter General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, of the British Army, arrived and assumed supreme command in that theater, whereupon Admiral Hart became the Commander of the Allied naval forces. Until Admiral Hart's arrival in Java, Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) William A. Glassford commanded the surface ships in southern waters, assisted by Rear Admiral William R. Purnell and other members of the Fleet Staff. Up to this point (in so far as the Asiatic Fleet was concerned) the campaign was conducted in accordance with plans worked out in the Navy Department prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
The method adopted by the Japanese in making their advances through the Philippine Islands and the Netherlands East Indies was built around their air power. After building up their strength at a given base they would overcome the consistently inferior Allied air opposition at the next point of attack and then send along heavily screened amphibious forces to make landings. As a rule, the distances were too short to permit attack by our naval forces while the enemy was en route. As soon as the enemy were in control of a new area they would repair the airfields and gather forces for the next attack. These tactics were well adapted to the geography of the Philippine Islands and the Netherlands East Indies, particularly as there was almost a total absence of interior communications in the islands occupied.
In January 1942, therefore, the Japanese had overrun the Philippine Islands, and the greatest part of our strength was in the Netherlands East Indies, for which the Japanese were obviously headed. Our submarines and motor torpedo boats were engaged in slowing down the enemy advance to give us as much time as possible to get organized for the surface actions that were in prospect in the Java Sea.
THE JAVA SEA CAMPAIGN
In that situation, Admiral Hart had to plan all our operations without air sup port except for a few Army bombers and a few fighters based on Java. Our PBY4s of Patrol Wing Ten were not suited for the type of operations in prospect, and as a matter of fact it was only the superb work of their pilots in the face of enemy fighters coupled with the mobility of our tenders that made their use possible.
By the end of December, the Japanese were preparing bases at Davao on Mindanao, and at Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago. From these points they moved south to attack Menado on the northern tip of Celebes, Tarakan in northeastern Borneo, and shortly afterward Kema, with the obvious intention of moving down Molucca Strait toward Ambon, Kendari, and Makassar Strait. By 20 January they appeared to be ready to move against Balikpapan, on the east coast of Borneo.
Collecting the few ships at his disposal (until early February all British and Netherlands surface ships had to be used to escort troop convoys into Malaya) Admiral Hart decided upon a night torpedo attack. This was delivered off Balikpapan (the action became known officially as the Battle of Makassar Strait) early in the morning of 24 January by the destroyers JOHN D. FORD, PARROTT, PAUL JONES and POPE under the command of Commander (now Captain) P. H. Talbot. Whatever the losses sustained by the enemy, the attack (one of four attempts by our cruisers and destroyers to come to grips with the enemy at sea) was brilliantly executed, and was responsible for the stalling of that particular force for some time at Balikpapan. Other amphibious forces, however, continued to advance eastward, and landed at Rabaul in New Britain and at Bougainville in the Solomons. New positions on the coast of Borneo were also seized by the enemy, and in the first few days of February they captured Ambon and began bombing Soerabaja and several other Javanese points.
In furtherance of the effort to delay the enemy drive, a striking force consisting of four cruisers and seven destroyers, about half of which were Netherlands and the other half American, was formed under the command of Rear Admiral Doorman of the Netherlands Navy. A large enemy convoy having gathered at Balikpapan, Admiral Doorman undertook to run up Madoera Strait into the Java Sea and deliver an attack, but our forces were discovered by Japanese planes and subjected to a prolonged bombing attack which prevented the carrying out of the plan. During this attack HOUSTON suffered one direct hit which destroyed her number three turret and MARBLEHEAD was forced to retire to the south coast of Java to effect temporary repairs.
Continuing their advance, the Japanese attacked Palembang in southeast Sumatra and entered Banka Strait. Admiral Doorman's force, in a second effort to interfere with the enemy operation, was again forced to withdraw by enemy planes. By 14 February the Japanese in Borneo and Celebes were in a position to advance on Bali and eastern Java, and Japanese forces in Sumatra were also threatening Java.
At this point in the campaign, in accordance with previous agreements providing that it would be conducted by the Netherlands, Admiral Hart relinquished operational command of Allied naval forces to Vice Admiral Helfrich of the Netherlands Navy, and a few days later General Wavell turned over his command and left the area.
Having been subjected to daily bombing at Soerabaja, our headquarters were transferred from Soerabaja to Tjilatjap on the south coast of Java. On 19 February Darwin (most of our forces basing there had been transferred to Tjilatjap because Darwin not entirely suitable from the beginning, was becoming untenable), on the north coast of Australia, was subjected to a heavy air raid which destroyed the airport, warehouse docks, and virtually every ship in the harbor, including our destroyer PEARY.
Enemy forces having landed on the southeast coast of Bali, and seized the airfield there, Admiral Doorman, with his composite force, attacked enemy vessels in Badoeng Strait on the night of 19-20 February. This action resulted in the sinking of the Netherlands destroyer PIET HEIN and damage to the Netherlands cruisers JAVA and TROMP and to our destroyer STEWART. Damage to the enemy in this action was impossible to assess but was believed to be considerable.
The action in Badoeng Strait was encouraging but it did little to impede the Japanese, who now controlled all the northern approaches to the Netherlands East Indies, and seemed about to move on Java. In an effort to bolster up our strength with fighter planes, LANGLEY with planes and crew on board, and SEAWITCH, with more planes, were diverted to Java. On 26 February LANGLEY was sunk by enemy bombers. PECOS, a tanker, was sunk about the same time in the same area. SEAWITCH arrived safely at Tjilatjap but was too late.
On 27 February Admiral Doorman's composite force, consisting of two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and nine destroyers, attacked an enemy force in the Java Sea, not far from Soerabaja. After maneuvering for position, and after having joined action, the composite force, for one reason and another, suffered a series of losses. These included the sinking of the British destroyer ELECTRA and the Netherlands destroyer KORTENAER, and damage to the British cruiser EXETER. Later that night the Netherlands cruisers DE RUYTER and JAVA were sunk by a combination of torpedoes and gunfire. This left only HOUSTON and PERTH, the American destroyers having expended their torpedoes and retired to port to refuel. Accordingly, HOUSTON and PERTH retired to Tandjong Priok. Although the Japanese suffered some damage, they were successful in preventing the striking force from reaching their convoys. The immediate problem was now to rescue our remaining vessels from the Java Sea, the exits to which were held by the enemy.
On 28 February EXETER, POPE, and ENCOUNTER headed for Soenda Strait and were never heard from again. On 1 March HOUSTON and PERTH, accompanied by the Netherlands destroyer EVERSTEN headed in the same direction, and except for very meager reports of an engagement in Soenda Strait, they have not been heard from since. Of the entire Allied force, only the four American destroyers managed to make their way to Australia, after a skirmish with Japanese destroyers patrolling Bali Strait.
On 28 February the Japanese laded on the north coast of Java. As no port on the island of Java was tenable as a base for our surface forces, the Allied naval command was dissolved and the American ships remaining at Tjilatjap were ordered to proceed to Australia. Of the four destroyers so ordered, EDSALL and PILLSBURY were lost en route. All other craft escaped, with the exception of the gunboat ASHEVILLE. Thus ended the gallant campaign of the Java Sea, conducted against overwhelming odds by officers and men who did the best they could with what they had.
RAIDS ON JAPANESE POSITIONS
While the situation in the Far East was growing steadily worse, and the Japanese were having things their own way there and elsewhere, our Pacific Fleet, now commanded by Admiral Nimitz, carried out its first offensive operation of the war. The targets selected were the Marshall and Gilbert Islands.
To carry out raids on these islands, there was placed under the command of Vice Admiral (now Admiral) William F. Halsey, Jr., a force consisting of the carriers ENTERPRISE and YORKTOWN; the heavy cruisers CHESTER, LOUISVILLE, NORTHAMPTON, and SALT LAKE CITY; the light cruiser ST. LOUIS; and ten destroyers. Beginning 1 February 1942 bomb and bombardment damage-very severe in some instances-was inflicted by that force upon the islands of Wotje, Maloelap, Kwajalein, Roi, Jaluit, Makin, Taroa, Lae and Gugegwe. It is quite possible that because of the success at Pearl Harbor, much of the enemy's air strength originally disposed in the Marshall Islands was withdrawn before these attacks were delivered. Except for CHESTER, which suffered one bomb hit, and ENTERPRISE, which was slightly damaged by shell fragments, none of our vessels was damaged during the entire operation, and our personnel losses were slight.
The raid on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands was so successful that several other operations following the same pattern were conducted during the following weeks. On 20 February a task force built around the carrier LEXINGTON, and commanded by Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, attempted a combination air and surface attack on Rabaul, New Britain. During the approach, LEXINGTON was discovered by enemy twin-engined bombers, 16 of which were destroyed by our fighter planes and antiaircraft, five of them by a single pilot. The element of surprise having been lost and fuel having been reduced by high-speed maneuvering, the attack on Rabaul was not pressed home.
On 24 February Admiral Halsey took ENTERPRISE, two cruisers, and seven destroyers and shelled and bombed Wake Island, which had been in enemy hands since 22 December. Considerable damage was inflicted. We lost only one aircraft during that operation. Eight days later planes from ENTERPRISE bombed Marcus Island with reasonably satisfactory results. Again, we lost only one plane.
On 10 March Vice Admiral Brown, with the carriers LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN and supporting ships, raided the New Guinea ports of Salamaua and Lae, where enemy troops had landed three days earlier. A number of enemy war vessels and transport vessels were sunk or damaged, and the attack was fully successful, even though it did not appear to delay appreciably the enemy's advance toward Australia. Our losses were light.
On 18 April Tokio was bombed by army planes which took off from the carrier HORNET the planes from ENTERPRISE providing search and fighter planes for the operation. As a carrier operation, this raid was unique in naval history in that for the first time medium land bombers were transported across an ocean and launched off enemy shores. Whatever the damage inflicted by these bombers, the attack was stimulating to the morale, which at that time, considering the surrender of Bataan, and the situation in general in the Far East, was at low ebb.
THE CORAL SEA
By the middle of April, the Japanese had established bases in the New Guinea-New Britain-Solomon Islands area, which put them in a position to threaten all Melanesia and Australia itself, and they were moving their forces through the mandates in preparation for an extension of their offensive to the southeast. Our available forces at that time were eager and ready for battle, but they were not any too strong for effective defense against major enemy concentrations, much less adequate to carry out a large-scale offensive operation.
It should be noted at this point that during the first five months of the war, nearly every engagement with the enemy had demonstrated the importance of air power in modern naval warfare. Our initial losses at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines were the result of attack by aircraft, and the enemy's superiority in the air had been one of the controlling factors in our reverses in the Far East. Similarly, our successful though inconclusive raids on the Japanese-held islands in the Pacific had been conducted chiefly by carrier-based aircraft. The results had been excellent and the costs low. As yet, however, there had been no engagement between enemy carrier forces and our own, and although we had reason to believe that most of our naval aircraft were of good design and performance, we had no basis for comparison.
When the Japanese, on 3 May, began to occupy Florida Island in the Solomons, Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) Frank J. Fletcher, who was cruising in the Coral Sea with a force composed of the carrier YORKTOWN, the three cruisers ASTORIA, CHESTER and PORTLAND and six destroyers, proceeded north to interrupt the activity. On the morning of 4 May, about 100 miles southwest of Guadalcanal, planes launched by YORKTOWN sank and damaged a number of enemy vessels at Tulagi with loss of only one aircraft, and in the afternoon, another attack group scored additional hits, with the loss of two fighters.
On 5 May, Rear Admiral Fletcher's force had joined other Allied units, one of which was a task group including the heavy cruisers MINNEAPOLIS NEW ORLEANS, ASTORIA, CHESTER and PORTLAND, and five destroyers. There were two flag officers in the task group, Rear Admiral (now Admiral) Thomas C. Kinkaid and Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) William W. Smith. The other unit, consisting of the Australian heavy cruiser AUSTRALIA, and the light cruiser HOBART, plus the American heavy cruiser CHICAGO and two destroyers, was under the command of Rear Admiral J. G. Crace, Royal Navy, and was operated in conjunction with the carriers LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN and four destroyers, which were under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) Aubrey W. Fitch.
On the afternoon of the 6th, enemy forces had become sufficiently consolidated in the Bismarck Archipelago-New Guinea area to indicate an amphibious operation to the southward, perhaps against Port Moresby, on the southeast coast of New Guinea. As enemy forces would have to round the southeastern end of New Guinea, Rear Admiral Fletcher stationed an attack group within striking distance of the probable track of the enemy fleet, and the remainder of his force moved northward in an attempt to locate enemy covering forces.
On the morning of the 7th, contact was made with the Japanese carrier SHOHO, which was promptly attacked and sunk by aircraft from LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN. We lost only one dive bomber in the attack, but the same morning Japanese carrier planes sank our tanker NEOSHO and the destroyer SIMS.
The next morning, contact was made with two enemy carriers, four heavy cruisers, and several destroyers. One of the carriers was attacked and severely damaged by our carrier aircraft, and as was anticipated, enemy aircraft counterattacked about an hour later. During the counterattack, both YORKTOWN and LEXINGTON were damaged the latter rather severely. Both carriers and their planes shot down a considerable number of enemy planes during the engagement, and our aircraft losses were small by comparison, but early in the afternoon an explosion on board LEXINGTON made her impossible to control. She was therefore abandoned, and ordered sunk by one of our own destroyers. Nearly all of her personnel were saved.
Thus ended the first major engagement in naval history in which surface ships did not exchange a single shot. Although the loss of LEXINGTON was keenly felt, the engagement in the Coral Sea effectively checked the Japanese in their advance to the southward. Our losses of one carrier, one tanker, one destroyer, and a total of 66 planes were considerably less than estimated Japanese losses. Our personnel casualties totaled 543.
The Defensive-Offensive
MIDWAY
The engagement in the Coral Sea marked the end of the period during which we were totally on the defensive. There followed a lull during which both sides were preparing for further operations. Our immediate problem was to anticipate as nearly as we could what the next move of the enemy would be, as we had lost touch with the heavy Japanese forces which had participated in the Coral Sea action.
It was clear that the Japanese would not long remain inactive. Naturally enough, our various important outposts would be good targets, with Dutch Harbor and Midway offering them the best chance of success, either in the nature of a raid or of an invasion. Furthermore, an operation directed against these points would permit the enemy to retire without too great loss or complete annihilation in case their plans did not work out. At the same time, we had to consider the possibility that they might renew actions in the Coral Sea. It was a plain case of calculating the risk involved in stationing our forces. A mistake at that point would have proved costly.
Considering the chance that the enemy knew little concerning the location of those of our ships which had not participated in the Coral Sea engagement, but certainly was aware that most of our available carrier and cruiser strength was then in southern waters, it seemed reasonable to expect that the Japanese would make the most of the opportunity to strike us in the central and/or northern Pacific. Such an attack was likely because of the prospect of success in the immediate operation, and because if successful, the advance to Australia and the islands in the south Pacific could be accomplished in due course with comparative ease, once the enemy had cut our lines of communications.
Acting on our best estimate of the situation, our carriers and supporting vessels were recalled from the south Pacific. YORKTOWN was patched up temporarily, and scouting and patrol lines were established well to the westward of Midway Island. Our total forces available in the central Pacific consisted of the carriers ENTERPRISE, HORNET and YORKTOWN, seven heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 14 destroyers, and about 20 submarines. These were divided into two task forces, one under the command of Rear Admiral (now Admiral) Raymond A. Spruance (cruisers of this task force were commanded by Rear Admiral Kinkaid) and the other under the command of Rear Admiral Fletcher. Another flag officer, Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, was attached to the second task force. In addition, there was a Marine Corps air group based on Midway, augmented by Army bombers from Hawaii.
On the morning of 3 June, enemy forces were sighted several hundred miles southwest of Midway, on an easterly course. The composition of the force sighted was not determined at that time, but it was clearly a large attack force with supporting vessels. Late in the afternoon this force was bombed by a squadron of B-17's under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney, Army Air Corps. While results of the attack were not definitely determined, hits on several ships were reported. On the morning of 4 June, contact was made with enemy aircraft headed toward the island of Midway from the northwest, and immediately thereafter, two carriers and the enemy main body were picked up in the same vicinity. Although the enemy aircraft were not prevented from dropping their bombs on Midway, the Japanese air attack force was nevertheless subjected to heavy fire and the enemy plane losses were large. Meanwhile, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps planes from Midway attacked carriers, battleships, and other vessels, inflicting serious damage on one enemy carrier.
At this point, our own carriers took a hand in the engagement. Having been launched from a position north of Midway, a torpedo squadron from HORNET (the now famous Torpedo Eight) without the protection of fighters, and without accompanying dive bombers, attacked a force of four enemy carriers. All planes in the squadron were shot down and only one pilot survived, but the squadron made several hits on the enemy carriers. About an hour later, torpedo squadrons from ENTERPRISE and YORKTOWN attacked the same carriers, and also suffered heavy losses, but registered hits on two carriers. These attacks were followed by dive bombers from ENTERPRISE which smothered two carriers, and by more bombers from YORKTOWN which hit a third carrier, a cruiser, and a battleship. Two carriers had been set on fire and put completely out of action. A third [SORYU] was damaged and was sunk later by the submarine NAUTILUS.
Planes from the only Japanese carrier remaining undamaged attacked YORKTOWN, and although this attack force was annihilated, it succeeded in making three bomb hits. Shortly afterward, enemy torpedo planes scored two hits on YORKTOWN, and orders were given to abandon ship. About two hours later, planes from ENTERPRISE attacked the undamaged Japanese carrier and left her a mass of flames and immediately thereafter, when a squadron from HORNET arrived, the carrier was blazing so furiously that it was possible to concentrate on a nearby battleship and a cruiser, both of which were hit.
At this stage of the engagement, it was apparent that we had won control of the air and it remained for the aircraft from Midway to put on the finishing touches. Army Flying Fortresses attacked an enemy heavy cruiser and left it smoking heavily. Other planes scored hits on a battleship, a damaged carrier, and a destroyer. By the end of the day the Japanese were in full retirement.
On the morning of the 5th, aircraft from ENTERPRISE and HORNET made an ineffective attack on an enemy light cruiser, but planes from Midway discovered two enemy cruisers, one of which they crippled, and scored a number of hits on them. poor visibility on the 5th prevented further operations.
On 6 June, HORNET planes located an enemy force consisting of two heavy cruisers and three destroyers and made hits on the two cruisers. Planes from ENTERPRISE also scored hits on those two cruisers and later in the day HORNET planes successfully attacked two more cruisers and a destroyer. On the same day, in an effort to save YORKTOWN, which had been taken in tow, the destroyer HAMMANN went alongside to put on board a salvage party. While she was alongside, YORKTOWN was struck by two torpedoes from an enemy submarine, and HAMMANN by one. HAMMANN sank within a few minutes and the next morning YORKTOWN also sank.
The Battle of Midway was the first decisive defeat suffered by the Japanese Navy in 350 years.* Furthermore, it put an end to the long period of Japanese offensive action, and restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific. The threat to Hawaii and the west coast was automatically removed, and except for operations in the Aleutians area, where the Japanese had landed on the islands of Kiska and Attu, enemy operations were confined to the south Pacific. It was to this latter area, therefore, that we gave our greatest attention.
The Offensive-Defensive
CAMPAIGNS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
The Landings in the Solomons
From the outset of the war, it had been evident that the protection of our lines of communications to Australia and New Zealand represented a "must." With the advance of the Japanese in that direction, it was therefore necessary to plan and execute operations which would stop them.
Early in April, the Japanese had overrun the island of Tulagi, where (on 4 May 1942) they were attacked by our carrier-based bombers just before the Battle of the Coral Sea. In July, the enemy landed troops and laborers on Guadalcanal Island and began the construction of an airfield. As the operation of landbased planes from that point would immediately imperil our control of the New Hebrides and New Caledonia areas, the necessity of our ejecting them from those positions became increasingly apparent Developments in New Guinea, where the enemy had begun a movement in the latter part of July, paralleling his Solomons penetrations, increased the necessity for prompt action on our part.
The counter operation-our first real offensive move in force-was planned under the direction of Vice Admiral R. L. Ghormley, who, in April, had assumed Command of the South Pacific Force, with headquarters at Auckland, New Zealand. Forces participating were the First Marine Division, reinforced by the Second Marine Regiment, the First Raider Battalion, and the Third Defense Battalion, supported by naval forces consisting of three major units, two of which were under the command of Vice Admiral Fletcher. These were an air support force under Rear Admiral Leigh.
* The Korean Admiral Yi-sun administered a resounding defeat to the Japanese Admiral Hideyoshi (so-called father of Japanese Navy) in 1592 off the Korean Coast.
PLATE 6-THE OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE PHASE IN THE PACIFIC
1. U.S. LANDING, 7 AUGUST 1942: U.S. Marines establish foothold on Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the first Allied offensive of the Pacific War.
2. BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND, 9 AUGUST 1942: Japanese night attack on naval forces protecting landing. One Australian and three U.S. heavy cruisers lost, other units damaged.
3. BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS, 23-25 AUGUST 1942: Powerful Japanese naval forces intercepted by U.S. carrier-borne aircraft. Enemy breaks off action after loss of carrier support.
4. BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE, 11-12 OCTOBER 1942: U.S. cruisers and destroyers in a surprise night attack engage a sizeable enemy force near Guadalcanal.
5. BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS, 26 OCTOBER 1942: Blows are exchanged by U.S. carriers and Japanese carriers operating with a powerful enemy force moving to support land operations at Guadalcanal. Two enemy carriers put out of action and four enemy air groups decimated.
6. BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL, 13-14-15 NOVEMBER 1942: Enemy concentrates invasion force at Rabaul. U.S. naval forces covering reinforcements for troops on Guadalcanal meet and decisively defeat this force in a series of violent engagements in which heavy losses are sustained by both sides.
7. BATTLE OF TASSAFARONGA, 30 NOVEMBER 1942: A Japanese attempt to reinforce is defeated at heavy cost. NORTHAMPTON lost, three U.S. heavy cruisers severely damaged.
Japanese complete withdrawal, 7-8 FEBRUARY 1943.
8. FIRST BATTLE OF KULA GULF, 6 JULY 1943: U.S. cruisers and destroyers intercept the "Tokyo Express." HELENA lost.
9. BATTLE OF KOLOMBANGARA, 13 JULY 1943: The circumstances of the engagement of 6th July are repeated. Three Allied cruisers severely damaged by torpedoes.
10. BATTLE OF VELLA GULF, 6 AUGUST 1943: Japanese destroyers escorting reinforcements are intercepted by our forces. Several enemy destroyers sunk.
Noyes, consisting of three carriers, one new battleship, five heavy cruisers, one antiaircraft light cruiser and a number of destroyers; and an amphibious force under Rear Admiral (now Admiral) R. K. Turner, composed of six heavy cruisers (two of them Australian), one light cruiser (Australian), destroyers, and 23 transports. The third task force, under Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) John S. McCain (now deceased), was composed of land-based planes of various types based in New Caledonia, the Fijis, and Samoa. Under the plan, they were to cooperate closely with the planes under the command of General MacArthur in New Guinea and Australia. Marine units were formed up in New Zealand during June and July, under the command of Major General (now General) A. A. Vandegrift, USMC.
After leaving New Zealand, and after effecting rendezvous with combat units, the entire invasion force conducted a realistic rehearsal en route to their objective. On the morning of 7 August, the landing force, which took the enemy by surprise, made landings on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. There was little opposition initially on Guadalcanal, but on Tulagi the Japanese had constructed dugouts, and when they began heavy fire, progress was slow and costly. The enemy delivered an air counter- attack in the afternoon, but it was ineffective.
By the next afternoon, our Marines were in complete control of Tulagi Island and were making satisfactory progress on Guadalcanal, where they had taken possession of the airfield. The immediate objectives of the operation had therefore been obtained, at the cost of one transport sunk, one destroyer damaged and subsequently sunk, and one destroyer damaged. Plane losses amounted to 21 fighters.
Battle of Savo Island
We had repulsed air raids on the 7th and 8th with only moderate losses, but those attacks had considerably delayed the unloading of our transports and cargo vessels. Moreover, in spite of heavy plane losses inflicted on the enemy, further attacks on our vessels were a surety, perhaps by surface craft and perhaps by enemy planes based on Santa Isabel Island. At this critical time it became necessary for our carriers to withdraw from their covering position because of lack of fuel, and also because the Japanese had shown considerable air strength and were suspected of having submarines available, to which we did not care to expose our carriers.
In that situation, the cruisers of the screening forces under the command of Rear Admiral V. Crutchley, Royal Navy, took up a night disposition designed to protect the area between the Guadalcanal and Florida Islands and the channel on either side of Savo Island. The northern group covering the latter area consisted of the heavy cruisers VINCENNES, QUINCY, and ASTORIA screened by the destroyers HELM and WILSON. The southern group consisted of the Australian cruiser CANBERRA and CHICAGO, screened by PATTERSON and BAGLEY. Two destroyers, RALPH TALBOT and BLUE, were stationed not far from Savo Island. Late in the evening of 8 August, a conference was held on board Rear Admiral Turner's flagship, MCCAWLEY. This conference included Rear Admiral Crutchley.
A force of enemy cruisers and destroyers entered the area undetected from the northwest at about 0145 and, aided by flares dropped by enemy planes, opened fire on our screening groups with guns and torpedoes. the result of the surprise and of the Japanese fire, which was sufficiently effective to inflict severe damage on our vessels in a few minutes, was that there was little effective return fire. The action ceased at about 0215 at which time the Japanese force, having rounded Savo Island, left the area on a northeasterly course. During those thirty minutes QUINCY, VINCENNES, ASTORIA and CANBERRA were so severely damaged that they subsequently sank, and CHICAGO, RALPH TALBOT, and PATTERSON were damaged.
The surprise, which was the immediate cause of the defeat, was the result of a combination of circumstances. Because of the urgency of seizing and occupying Guadalcanal, planning was not up to the usual thorough standards. Certain communication failures made a bad situation worse. Fatigue was a contributing factor in the degree of alertness maintained. Generally speaking, however, we were surprised because we lacked experience. Needless to say, the lessons learned were fully taken into account.
The immediate consequence of this cruiser battle was the retirement of the enemy force, without any attack being made on our transports unloading men and supplies on the beaches of Guadalcanal. The loss of the four cruisers, however, and the subsequent loss of two aircraft carriers left us inferior in strength for several months. The Japanese did not take advantage of this opportunity to engage in a fleet battle with the balance of power on their side, probably because they did not know-and we did not let them know-how severe our losses were.
The Fight for Guadalcanal
Except as it affected the security of the islands to the south, and Australia and New Zealand, the island of Guadalcanal by itself was not particularly important, but, having been selected by us as the point to step in and check the advance of the enemy, it became a focal point in the fighting front established. After we had landed there, the immediate situation was that of opposing ground forces on the island, and as each depended on naval forces for supplies and reinforcements it was inevitable that there would be naval engagements until the issue was decided.
After the battle of Savo Island, the Japanese began bombing Marine positions and making the adjacent waters almost untenable during the daylight hours. At night, enemy surface forces bombarded our surface installations almost at will. The Japanese, however, were unable to bring up reserve ground forces from the northern Solomons.
So far as naval activity was concerned there was a lull of about ten days. During that time the Japanese, who reacted violently to the reverses suffered in the initial ding, collected all available reinforcements near Henderson Field. The reinforced troops immediately attacked. The result was a night battle at Tenaru River in which the Marines were completely victorious.
Meanwhile, the enemy was concentrating his forces in the Rabaul area. By 3 August it was apparent that a major action was imminent.
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons
In anticipation of an enemy move in force, Vice Admiral Ghormley had concentrated two task forces southeast of the island of Guadalcanal. These were built around the carriers SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE and included the battleship NORTH CAROLINA the cruisers MINNEAPOLIS, PORTLAND, NEW ORLEANS and ATLANTA, and 11 destroyers. On the morning of 23 August a transport group was sighted by a search plane about 250 miles north of the island.
During the night our combined force moved north and contact was made the next morning. In the afternoon of the 24th, planes from SARATOGA sank an aircraft carrier [RYUJO] and in addition damaged a cruiser and a destroyer. While these attacks were in progress, a flight of about 75 planes attacked ENTERPRISE and her escort vessels and inflicted moderately severe damage on ENTERPRISE in spite of the intense antiaircraft fire from escorting ships, particularly NORTH CAROLINA. That night, Marine air attack groups from Guadalcanal attacked and damaged two more enemy destroyers, and the next morning destroyed a transport. In addition to the foregoing attacks, Army planes believed they scored a hit on a cruiser, planes from SARATOGA reported hits on a battleship and two cruisers, and Marine pilots reported damage to still another cruiser. As a result of the action, the Japanese were all but stripped of carrier support and broke off the fight although their powerful surface forces were still largely intact.
Following the engagement in the eastern Solomons, no major action took place in the South Pacific area for a period of about six weeks. During those six weeks, however, the supply lines had to be kept open to Guadalcanal. Japanese submarines and air forces were active in the vicinity, and there were numerous scattered actions, which cost us the carrier WASP, the destroyers OBRIEN, BLUE, COLHOUN, GREGORY and LITTLE, and several other ships damaged. Also the Japanese made almost nightly runs of what came to be termed the "Tokio express" from the Buin-Faisi area to Guadalcanal, and enemy air forces bombed Marine positions by day and by night.
By 13 September enemy ground troops had been reinforced, and another attack was directed at Henderson Field. Although the issue was in doubt for several hours, the Marines, thanks to replacements and artillery support, succeeded in decimating the attacking force.
In spite of offensive operations directed against enemy ground troops and supporting naval forces by our ground troops and by our Marine air forces, the enemy by the end of September had succeeded in putting practically an entire new division on the island. In addition, more strong Japanese fleet units had been assembled to the northward, and the situation again was threatening. Reinforcements to the Marines had now become a necessity even though made in the face of enemy naval and air superiority. Contemplated reinforcements included Army elements available (the 164th Infantry).
Battle of Cape Esperance
After our carrier planes had attacked enemy shipping in the northern Solomons as a preliminary, our naval forces in the area were disposed in three groups. One was built around the carrier HORNET to the westward of Guadalcanal. A second, to the under the command of the late Rear Admiral Norman Scott, was stationed south of Guadalcanal pending developments. Rear Admiral Scott's force consisted of the heavy cruisers SAN FRANCISCO, SALT LAKE CITY; the light cruisers BOISE, HELENA; and the destroyers BUCHANAN, DUNCAN, FARENHOLT, LAFFEY and MCCALLA.
On the afternoon of 11 October enemy forces were reported in "the slot" between Choiseul Island and the New Georgia group, headed for Guadalcanal. Simultaneously, Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was attacked by about 75 enemy aircraft. Rear Admiral Scott therefore headed north with his force, which rounded the northwestern end of the island about two hours before midnight. Just before midnight contact was made, and our force opened fire.
Taken by surprise, the enemy did not return the fire for nearly ten minutes, during which time our cruisers made the most of the opportunity and delivered a devastating fire on the enemy force. In less than five minutes four enemy targets had disappeared; two more were put out of action by HELENA and BOISE; and FARENHOLT, DUNCAN, and BUCHANAN each scored torpedo hits on enemy cruisers. In addition, BUCHANAN wrecked an enemy destroyer with gunfire and set an unidentified enemy ship on fire.
When the Japanese opened fire, BOISE found herself engaged with a heavy cruiser, and although the enemy cruiser soon burst into flames, BOISE was damaged. During the exchange, SALT LAKE CITY scored hits on an enemy auxiliary and destroyer. At this stage of the battle, Rear Admiral Scott ceased firing to rectify his formation, and as most of the enemy targets had disappeared there followed a short lull.
SALT LAKE CITY, HELENA, and SAN FRANCISCO reopened fire with telling effect. The BOISE damage (fire) had been brought under control, and she reentered the action, engaging a heavy cruiser and an unidentified ship, but upon receiving further damage she was forced to retire. SALT LAKE CITY, meanwhile, had covered BOISE and, assisted by SAN FRANCISCO concentrated her fire on an enemy heavy cruiser until the action was broken off by the enemy.
During the engagement DUNCAN was so badly damaged that she had to be abandoned and FARENHOLT was damaged. SAN FRANCISCO had been hit, and as previously stated, BOISE was severely damaged. Even so, the engagement was a victory for us, attributable in part to surprise and confusion, and in part to the accuracy of our gunfire.
During the succeeding days, in spite of the reverses suffered in the Battle of Cape Esperance the Japanese continued their attacks on Guadalcanal. Notwithstanding heavy losses inflicted on them, they succeeded in getting a number of transports through, and landed nearly another entire division. Our air attacks, however, left that division with little equipment, few rations, and inadequate artillery support. Meanwhile support for our Marines had been arriving, and General Vandegrift had been able to improve his position. He now had better air support, made more effective by new landing strips constructed by the Seabees, but as shelling by enemy units continued, he was still in need of strong naval support, especially as the Japanese gave no signs of discontinuing their efforts to launch a full-scale attack.
Enemy submarines and aircraft renewed their efforts to interrupt our communications, and it became increasingly clear that the next Japanese move would be supported by powerful surface and air units. The destroyer MEREDITH was sunk on 15 October while engaged in keeping our line of communications open, and a few days later the heavy cruiser CHESTER was damaged by enemy submarines, but our naval forces were reinforced by the new battleship SOUTH DAKOTA and the damaged ENTERPRISE was again ready for duty. Our naval forces were now divided into two parts, one being the WASHINGTON group under the command of Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) W. A. Lee, Jr. (now deceased), and the other consisting of two carriers, one battleship, three heavy cruisers, three antiaircraft light cruisers and 14 destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Kinkaid. The former group, reinforced by the ships surviving the Battle of Cape Esperance, remained in the vicinity of Guadalcanal. The other moved northwestward in an effort to engage the enemy.
On the night of 23-24 October the Japanese began a land assault at the mouth of the Matanikau River, and although thrown back with heavy losses continued their attack the following day. On the 25th, enemy ground forces were supported by naval gunfire from two Japanese cruisers and four destroyers which slipped into Savo Sound, and on the night of 25-26 October the enemy ground offensive reached its peak. At this point the Japanese moved their naval units in force toward Guadalcanal.
The Battle of Santa Cruz Island
Early in the morning of 26 October our patrol planes made contact with three enemy forces. One of these forces included a carrier. Another consisted of two battleships, one heavy cruiser and seven destroyers. The third, which included two carriers, was attacked by the patrolling planes, and hits were scored on one of the carriers.
Simultaneously, our carriers launched three attack waves, one from ENTERPRISE and two from HORNET. While en route, the ENTERPRISE attack group encountered Japanese planes. After a short engagement during which some of our planes were shot down, it located the enemy force containing the battleships and made bomb hits on one of them. The first HORNET wave reached the enemy carrier group without interference and reported at least four 1000-pound bomb hits on a carrier. Other HORNET aircraft in that group registered three torpedo hits on a heavy cruiser. The second HORNET group discovered an enemy cruiser force and succeeded in bombing two heavy cruisers and a destroyer.
While our aircraft were delivering their attacks, our own carriers were being attacked by enemy carrier aircraft. HORNET suffered one bomb hit and was set on fire by an enemy bomber which purposely dived into the carrier's stack. Blazing gasoline was spread over the signal bridge, which was further damaged by one of the bombs carried by the plane. Resulting fires were extinguished in about two hours, but while the dive bombing attack was being delivered, a torpedo attack developed and HORNET received two hits which disrupted her power and communications. The torpedo hits were followed by three more bomb hits and another suicide plane crash which started more fires. Of 27 attacking aircraft, 20 were shot down by antiaircraft fire but the attack, which lasted 11 minutes, left HORNET dead in the water with many fires on board and with a decided list. Our wounded personnel were promptly removed by destroyers, the fires were extinguished in about a half hour, and HORNET was taken in tow by NORTHAMPTON but in the afternoon she was again attacked by torpedoes and dive bombers and had to be abandoned and sunk by our own forces.
Just before noon, ENTERPRISE was subjected to an attack by 24 enemy dive bombers, of which seven were shot down by antiaircraft fire in which SOUTH DAKOTA participated. Shortly after, she weathered two attacks by torpedo planes and one more attack from dive bombers.
The first dive bombing attack resulted in three hits on ENTERPRISE. Of the torpedo planes making the first attack, one dived onto the destroyer SMITH setting her on fire forward and exploding the plane's torpedo. By energetic measures, however, SMITH brought the flames under control and was able to make port. During this action dive bombers scored a hit on SOUTH DAKOTA wounding her commanding officer, Captain (now Rear Admiral) T. L. Gatch, and inflicted considerable damage on the light cruiser SAN JUAN.
There were no further attacks and the two task forces were ordered to retire independently. During the night they were pursued by Japanese surface units, which turned back when it became clear that the enemy attacks were not succeeding.
Enemy planes estimated to have taken part in the attacks on HORNET and ENTERPRISE numbered between 170 and 180. Of that number 56 were shot down by antiaircraft fire and about the same number by our own planes. Our own losses were HORNET, the destroyer PORTER, which was torpedoed while rescuing personnel of one of our planes, and 74 aircraft. We sank no enemy vessels in the engagement, and our carrier strength in the Pacific was now dangerously low, but there were partial compensations. Two enemy carriers had been put out of action and four Japanese air groups had been cut to pieces.
Battle of Guadalcanal
For a brief period on 26 October, following the all-out enemy attack, the question of whether or not we could retain Henderson Field hung in the balance. A counterattack by Marines and by Army troops, however, restored our lines-the enemy lost 2200 men killed in that attack-and General Vandegrift took the offensive on both flanks. Except for a minor setback the following day, this constituted the last serious threat by enemy land forces on Guadalcanal.
The enemy still exercised control over the waters adjacent to Guadalcanal, and for the next two weeks our forces were engaged in scattered actions calculated to interfere with that control. Our submarines attacked Japanese supply lines, inflicting Considerable damage, and on the morning of 30 October our light cruiser ATLANTA and four destroyers bombarded enemy positions near Point Cruz. On the next day the Marines, supported by naval gunfire, crossed the Matanikau River and by 3 November had advanced beyond Point Cruz. On the evening of 2 November the Japanese had landed about 1500 men and some artillery east of Koli Point but were unable to support that unit, and after our naval forces bombarded the beach heads, destroying stores and ammunition, the force was driven into the jungle and eventually exterminated On 7 November our aircraft from Henderson Field inflicted heavy damage on an enemy light cruiser and two destroyers and shot down a number of enemy planes.
By this time it must have been apparent to the Japanese that their position was not being sufficiently improved by their continued night landings from surface craft dispatched from neighboring islands (our PT boats based at Tulagi attacked them repeatedly, sinking a destroyer and many landing craft). As evidence of that realization they again began to concentrate surface forces in the Rabaul-Buin area and by 12 November were estimated to be ready with two carriers, four battleships, five heavy cruisers, about 30 destroyers and enough transports for a decisive invasion attempt. To oppose this force we had two new battleships, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, three antiaircraft light cruisers, and 22 destroyers. The damaged ENTERPRISE was not ready for action and we were outnumbered in land-based aircraft.
Our troops on Guadalcanal had been reinforced on 6 November, but more supplies and reinforcements were vitally needed. Under these circumstances, Vice Admiral Halsey, who on 18 October had replaced Vice Admiral Ghormley as Commander, South Pacific Force, realized that we would have to cover our supply lines and at the same time counter the expected enemy offensive, otherwise our position in the south Pacific would be seriously jeopardized. Following this general plan, Rear Admiral Turner was placed in charge of the supply operation and the late Rear Admirals D. J. Callaghan and Scott assigned to command the covering forces. In addition, Rear Admiral Turner was to be supported by a task force commanded by Rear Admiral Kinkaid, built around the damaged ENTERPRISE and the battleships WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA.
On the morning of 11 November, three of our cargo vessels escorted by Rear Admiral Scott's task force reached Guadalcanal and began unloading off Lunga Point. Loading operations were interrupted by an air attack about four hours later which damaged the transport ZEILIN and by a second air attack two hours after that. Our protecting aircraft and antiaircraft batteries took a heavy toll of both attacking air groups. We lost a total of seven planes. Our escorts, under Rear Admiral Scott, retired to Indispensable Strait for the night.
On the morning of the 12th, the second contingent of ships with supplies and reinforcements, under Rear Admirals Turner and Callaghan, arrived and joined forces with Rear Admiral Scott. Unloading was immediately begun. As on the previous day, the enemy delivered an air attack in the afternoon but so effective was our air opposition that only one of about 25 bombers and torpedo planes escaped. One damaged enemy plane, however, dived onto SAN FRANCISCO, starting a number of minor fires and killing 30 men.
Meanwhile, our scouts had located strong enemy forces bearing down on Guadalcanal from the northwest, disposed in three groups. To meet that force Rear Admiral Turner assigned two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, two antiaircraft light cruisers and eight destroyers to Rear Admiral Callaghan, and withdrew with the transports and cargo vessels, escorted by three destroyers. The plan was for Rear Admiral Callaghan to fight a delaying action, so that the battleship-carrier force under Rear Admiral Kinkaid would have time to intercept the Japanese landing forces believed to be en route.
After Rear Admiral Callaghan's force had escorted the transport group clear of the area, it reentered the sound shortly after midnight through Lengo Channel for the purpose of searching the vicinity of Savo Island. Near Lunga Point three groups of enemy ships were picked up to the northwestward and shortly afterward a fourth group to the northward. Our own force was a single column, with four destroyers in the van, five cruisers in the center, and four destroyers in the rear. In that situation, which was by no means as clear then as it is now, it being a very dark night with no moon-accurate identification of enemy ships was almost impossible, and in the darkness the forces nearly collided with each other before a gun was fired.
The action began when the Japanese illuminated our ships with searchlights and both sides opened fire at close range. Immediate results of the exchanges of gunfire were favorable to us. An enemy ship in the right hand group blew up within a minute under the fire from SAN FRANCISCO and other ships; and on the other side, two enemy cruisers burst into flames. Other vessels were set on fire, and ATLANTA believed she sank one of a division of Japanese destroyers crossing ahead of her. Simultaneously, ATLANTA after suffering some hits herself, took a light cruiser under fire. At this point ATLANTA was struck by a torpedo and with all power lost, her rudder jammed. While she was circling, an enemy heavy cruiser battered her heavily, starting intense fires and killing Rear Admiral Scott and many other personnel on board.
A few minutes later SAN FRANCISCO found herself engaged with an enemy battleship in the enemy center group. In addition to the fire of SAN FRANCISCO the battleship was attacked by LAFFEY; and CUSHING although badly damaged, scored torpedo hits on her. LAFFEY during this part of the action, was hit by a torpedo and later blew up. CUSHING was put out of action by gunfire.
BARTON was also torpedoed and sank almost immediately, but O'BANNON closed with the battleship and made more torpedo hits. By this time, PORTLAND had wrecked a destroyer, but had been torpedoed herself; and JUNEAU, having lost all fire control, retired from the action.
SAN FRANCISCO assisted by PORTLAND (which responded to Rear Admiral Callaghans radio, "We want the big ones"), concentrated fire on the battleship; HELENA meanwhile engaging an enemy cruiser firing at SAN FRANCISCO. At this point, a salvo from the enemy battleship smashed SAN FRANCISCO'S bridge, killing Rear Admiral Callaghan, Captain Cassin Young, commanding officer of SAN FRANCISCO, and many other officers and men; but SAN FRANCISCO continued to fire, and before she was put out of action she had also accounted for a destroyer.
To recapitulate the damages sustained in the first 15 minutes of the action:
CUSHING had been put out of action by gunfire and was dead in the water; LAFFEY had sunk; STERETT and OBANNON had been damaged; ATLANTA was burning; and SAN FRANCISCO and PORTLAND were badly holed. JUNEAU had been forced to leave the action, and BARTON had blown up. HELENA had suffered minor damage. Only AARON WARD, MONSSEN, and FLETCHER remained undamaged.
The three undamaged destroyers continued the attack with gunfire and torpedoes each scoring hits on cruisers and destroyers, MONSSEN in addition having red torpedo hits on the damaged enemy battleship. In delivering those attacks, however MONSSEN suffered damage which forced her to be abandoned, and STERETT, also damaged by gunfire, had to retire. The action, which lasted 24 minutes, and which was one of the most furious sea battles ever fought, was terminated when FLETCHER torpedoed an enemy heavy cruiser. During the last few minutes of the action the scattered Japanese forces had been firing at each other.
After the firing ceased, HELENA, SAN FRANCISCO, and FLETCHER joined up, proceeded out of the bay, and later fell in with JUNEAU, OBANNON and STERETT. At daylight the next morning PORTLAND observed a Japanese battleship [probably HIYEI which is known to have been sunk in this action] circling slowly northwest of Savo Island, with a cruiser standing by. ATLANTA was near the beach, but her fires had been extinguished. CUSHING and MONSSEN were on fire, and AARON WARD was dead in the water. Observing an enemy destroyer south of Savo Island, PORTLAND, still turning in circles, sank it. Our planes interrupted the Japanese battleship firing at AARON WARD.
CUSHING and MONSSEN finally went down, and as the conditions on board ATLANTA were impossible to control she had to be sunk on the afternoon of the 13th.
Just before noon on the 13th, the damaged JUNEAU was attacked by an enemy submarine and sank almost immediately with heavy personnel losses.
On the morning of 13 November, ENTERPRISE launched a flight of torpedo planes which found the Japanese battleship and fired three torpedoes into it. Other attacks on the battleship were made by Army planes and other land-based aircraft from Guadalcanal and Espiritu Santo, and sometime during the evening the battleship sank.
On the morning of the 14th, a strong enemy force of cruisers and destroyers shelled Henderson Field. A few planes were destroyed, but the field was not damaged, and the bombardment was broken off when the force was attacked by our PT boats. Subsequently, planes from Henderson Field (including ENTERPRISE planes there) attacked and hit two heavy cruisers, one of which was later subjected to a second attack by ENTERPRISE planes. Other planes hit a light cruiser, and still another attack group from ENTERPRISE scored hits on a second light cruiser.
As anticipated, an enemy transport force, preceded by a heavy advance guard of battleships, cruisers and destroyers, was discovered north of Guadalcanal. This obviously was the main invasion force, and was escorted by fighter planes. Throughout the 14th, this transport group was subjected to heavy air attack by our forces, which resulted in the destruction of six transports, the probable destruction of two more, and the damaging of four. The four damaged vessels continued to Guadalcanal and beached themselves on Cape Esperance that evening Our losses in these attacks were slight.
Rear Admiral Lee, with WASHINGTON, SOUTH DAKOTA, and ENTERPRISE had been unable to reach the scene of the action before early evening on the 14th. Upon arrival he was ordered to conduct a search, his objective being to intercept and destroy enemy bombardment forces and the transport force itself.
Shortly after midnight a Japanese force was reported north of Savo Island, headed west. Contact was made by WASHINGTON which immediately opened fire on the leading target. SOUTH DAKOTA also opened fire, selecting the third ship as her target. Both targets disappeared and were presumed sunk. Simultaneously, four of our destroyers, which were leading the battleships, attacked an enemy group of six to ten ships, which also were taken under fire by the secondary batteries of our battleships. During this part of the action, PRESTON was sunk by gunfire, BENHAM was damaged by a torpedo, and WALKE was hit by both torpedoes and gunfire. WALKE was abandoned and sank in a few minutes. The remaining destroyer, GWIN was damaged and forced to retire.
At this stage of the action all of our destroyers had been eliminated but neither WASHINGTON nor SOUTH DAKOTA had been hit. WASHINGTON soon located new targets, one of which was a battleship, and immediately opened fire. SOUTH DAKOTA fired on an enemy ship which had turned on her searchlights. The enemy in returning the fire concentrated on SOUTH DAKOTA. The result of this exchange was that SOUTH DAKOTA shot out all lights, and apparently sank one of the illuminating vessels, but was herself hit, suffering considerable damage to her upper works. WASHINGTON continued to fire at the battleship, and after setting her on fire and after inflicting damage on other ships, forced the enemy to retire. The enemy battleship [KIRISHIMA] is known to have been sunk in this action.
The action having been broken off, and SOUTH DAKOTA and WASHINGTON having become separated, both ships retired, and joined up the next morning. At daylight on 15 November, the four Japanese vessels which had beached themselves on Guadalcanal were bombed by aircraft from Henderson Field, and shelled by Marine artillery. The destroyer MEADE, which now exercised complete control in the area, all by herself, then completed the destruction of the beached ships by leisurely bombardment. The three day fight ended with an air engagement between ENTERPRISE fighters from Henderson Field and a flight of about 12 Zeros.
The Battle of Guadalcanal, in spite of heavy losses we sustained, was a decisive victory for us, and our position in the southern Solomons was not threatened again seriously by the Japanese. Except for the "Tokio express," which from time to time succeeded in landing small quantities of supplies and reinforcements, control of the sea and air in the southern Solomons passed to the United States.
After the Battle of Guadalcanal, our forces on the island retained the offensive, hunting down the Japanese in the jungles and gradually driving them westward. The 1st Marine Division was gradually withdrawn and replaced by army troops, and in December General Vandegrift turned over command to Major General (later Lieutenant General) A. M. Patch, USA (now deceased).
At the end of November, however, another powerful Japanese attempt to relieve Guadalcanal was suspected, and in order to counter such a move, Admiral Halsey placed a force consisting of the heavy cruisers MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, NORTHAMPTON and PENSACOLA, the light cruiser HONOLULU and four destroyers under the Command of Rear Admiral C. H. Wright.
The Battle of Tassafaronga (Lunga Point)
On 30 November, Rear Admiral Wright reached the entrance to Savo Sound, where he was joined by two more destroyers. Late that night, while crossing the sound, his force made contact with seven enemy ships, and, as the range closed, the destroyers in the van opened fire with torpedoes. Shortly afterward all ships were directed to open fire.
Immediate results of the fire appeared decidedly favorable but because of the visibility we were unable to get a clear picture of the enemy formation, and there was a temporary lull in the action.
MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS soon engaged new targets, one of which blew up. At this time, however, both MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS were struck by torpedoes and a few minutes later PENSACOLA and NORTHAMPTON were also torpedoed, the latter being so badly damaged that she had to be abandoned. Undamaged ships undertook to close with the enemy but were unable to regain contact.
The effect of this engagement was to break up a Japanese reinforcing attempt, but only at severe cost. Our three damaged cruisers, however, reached port safely and were repaired and refitted.
The Evacuation of Guadalcanal
With the exception of encounters with the "Tokio express," surface naval action in the Guadalcanal area ended with the Battle of Tassafaronga (Lunga Point).
On land, our forces gradually compressed and weakened the enemy, and by January the Japanese ground forces on the island, which had not been adequately supported, occupied a most unfavorable position. Under these circumstances, and bearing in mind the events of the past few weeks, it was reasonable to expect another effort on the part of the enemy to retake Guadalcanal. The Japanese had had time to repair and reorganize their surface forces and to replace their carrier air groups, and therefore when there were heavy increases in shipping at Buin and Rabaul late in January, and a stepping up of air activity, it appeared that they were ready to move. Ships available to Admiral Halsey to prevent such a move now consisted of three new battleships, four old battleships, two carriers, three auxiliary carriers, three heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, two antiaircraft light cruisers and numerous destroyers-a force considerably stronger than any we had had in the area up to that time.
On 27 January a convoy left New Caledonia for Guadalcanal. On 29 January the heavy cruiser CHICAGO (a unit of the covering force for the convoy) was torpedoed and badly damaged by enemy planes in a night attack, and the next afternoon she was again attacked by planes, the damage inflicted being so severe that she sank immediately after being abandoned. In an effort to cover CHICAGO, the destroyer LAVALLETTE was also torpedoed.
The convoy reached Guadalcanal without damage, unloaded, and departed on the 31st. On the following day Army troops were landed behind enemy ground forces at Verahue. While engaged in covering the landing craft used in this operation two destroyers, NICHOLAS and DEHAVEN were attacked by enemy dive bombers, and DE HAVEN was sunk.
In anticipation of another attack on the island our forces were disposed south of Guadalcanal, and aircraft dispatched by Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur carried out daily attacks on enemy air fields in the Bismarcks and northern Solomons.
The first week in February the "Tokio expresses" were increased in size, and it soon became apparent that the enemy was evacuating what little strength he had left on the island. On the night of 7-8 February 1943, exactly six months after our landing in the Solomons, the enemy completed his withdrawal. On 8 February our troops on Guadalcanal, which had been closing in on the enemy from both sides, joined forces, and the first Solomons campaign, except for incidental mopping up, ended.
NEW GEORGIA AND BOUGAINVILLE CAMPAIGNS (INCLUDES NEW GUINEA OPERATIONS)
The evacuation of Guadalcanal on 8 February 1943 was by no means an indication that the Japanese were retiring from the Solomon Islands. On the contrary, there was ample evidence that they would make every effort to retain their positions in the Solomons and in New Guinea. Conversely, having pushed them out of the southern Solomons area, our next undertaking was to push them out of the northern Solomons.
The most important enemy position in the northern Solomons was the airfield they had constructed on Munda Point on the southwest coast of New Georgia Island, but construction of a secondary base near the mouth of the Vila River on the southern tip of Kolombangara Island had begun in the latter part of December. These two airfields constituted a threat to our position on Guadalcanal, about 200 miles away, and were therefore repeatedly attacked by aircraft from Guadalcanal during January, February, and March. In addition, our surface forces conducted a series of bombardments of those positions. Munda was bombarded on the night of 4 January by a task group of cruisers and destroyers. The Vila-Stanmore district of Kolombangara Island was shelled on the night of 23-24 January. On the nights of 5-6 March and 12-13 May both airfields were bombarded simultaneously. Neither the air attacks nor the bombardments were successful in putting the airfields out of commission for more than a day or two at a time.
On 21 February our forces made landings in the Russell Islands, 60 miles northwest of Guadalcanal, and immediately began the construction of strong defenses.
On 1 March, in an attempt to reinforce New Guinea, the Japanese sent two convoys totaling 21 vessels through the Bismarck Sea. Both convoys were discovered and were almost completely destroyed by United States Army and Allied aircraft in a three day running attack.
Extensive preparations were now being made for the invasion of New Georgia, and although there were no noteworthy naval engagements for some time, aerial operations were intensified throughout the South Pacific area. Japanese raids were frequent and heavy even though carried out at severe cost to the enemy. During this period of stepped up air operations, our advance base in the Russell Islands was in constant use by our planes.
On 16 June one of the most furious air battles of the Pacific war was fought over Guadalcanal. A force of enemy aircraft estimated at 60 bombers and 60 fighters was met by slightly more than 100 United States fighters manned by Army, Marine Corps and Navy pilots. As a result of this encounter 107 enemy planes were shot down at a cost of six United States fighters lost, one landing ship (tank) and one cargo vessel damaged.
On the night of 29-30 June, as a preliminary to the invasion of New Georgia, a task group of cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral A. S. Merrill bombarded Vila-Stanmore and the Buin-Shortland area near the southeast end of Bougainville Island. After the operation was underway, both Munda and Vila airfields were repeatedly bombed.
On 30 June surprise landings were virtually unopposed in the Woodlark and Trobriand Island groups between the Solomons and New Guinea, and at Nassau Bay on New Guinea. On the same day landings were made simultaneously by the Army at Rendova Harbor and by Marines at Viru Harbor. Two groups of destroyers covered the landing at Rendova, and effectually silenced enemy land batteries on Munda Point. Enemy aircraft attacking our transports and destroyers were beaten off by our protecting fighters or shot down by ships' antiaircraft batteries, but not until they had succeeded in torpedoing and sinking the transport MCCAWLEY.
On 2 and 3 July landings were made on New Georgia and at Vangunu Island to the southeast of New Georgia.
During the night of 4-5 July a task group of United States cruisers and destroyers bombarded enemy positions and gun installations on the islands of Kolombangara and New Georgia, in order to support landings at Rice Anchorage. During this bombardment the destroyer STRONG was sunk by a combination of torpedo hits and gunfire from the shore batteries. Immediately after the bombardment more landings were effected for the purpose of seizing the harbors of Enogai and Bairoko.
Battle of Kula Gulf
As the "Tokio express" was making nightly runs through Blackett Strait and Kula Gulf to supply and reinforce the Japanese at Vila and elsewhere, an American task force of cruisers and destroyers, under the command of Rear Admiral W. L. Ainsworth, was dispatched to intercept the enemy. Early in the morning of 6 July contact with two enemy groups was made in Kula Gulf. Our forces opened fire with devastating effect on the first enemy group and subsequently took enemy ships in the second group under an equally effective fire. Enemy fire consisted chiefly of torpedoes. While the amount of damage inflicted on the enemy could not be accurately determined, it is probable that two Japanese destroyers were sunk in this action.
During the action the cruiser HELENA was torpedoed and sunk. Some of her personnel were rescued on the spot, and others made their way to Vella Lavella Island where they were later rescued.
Battle of Kolombangara (Second Battle of Kula Gulf)
During the second week of the New Georgia campaign our ground forces consolidated their positions at Rendova, Rice Anchorage, Viru, and began to close in on Munda. Meanwhile, the Navy continued to protect American ground troops and to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his Munda garrison.
On 12 July another task group under Rear Admiral Ainsworth again intercepted the "Tokio express." As a result of the engagement which followed (on the 13th)-the enemy was again disposed in two groups-the first enemy group was badly shot up, and one cruiser was probably sunk. The second, however, inflicted considerable damage on our forces-the cruisers ST. LOUIS and HONOLULU were damaged by torpedoes, and the destroyer GWIN was set on fire and had to be sunk. The New Zealand cruiser LEANDER suffered a torpedo hit while engaged with the first enemy group.
The two engagements in Kula Gulf were costly, but they removed a threat of naval action by the enemy which might have jeopardized our landings on the north coast of New Georgia. Furthermore, they effectively prevented the Japanese from using the Kula Gulf route to supply and reinforce their garrisons at Vila and Munda.
Our ground troops on New Georgia slowly converged on Munda, which was also subjected to bombardments from the sea and air. Other air attacks were delivered by Allied airplanes at Ballale, at Vila, at Vovine Cove, at Buin, at Kahili airdrome and at Shortland Harbor. The biggest single attack consisted of the dropping of 186 tons of bombs on Munda on 25 July. During the 37 days of the Munda campaign our planes destroyed an estimated 350 Japanese aircraft at a cost of 93.
Munda airfield was captured on 5 August, almost exactly one year after the first landing on Guadalcanal, and six weeks after New Georgia was invaded. The fall of Munda climaxed the central Solomons campaign, and Bairoko Harbor, eight miles to the northward, was the last remaining Japanese strong point on New Georgia Island. Vila, on the southern tip of Kolombangara Island, was virtually neutralized as soon as the Seabees and Army engineers rebuilt the Munda air strip.
The Battle of Vella Gulf
Our rapid consolidation of our control over the sea routes and the heavy ship losses sustained by the enemy during June and July made it necessary for the Japanese to support their forces at Kolombangara by barge traffic moving at night close to the coast of Vella Lavella. As our PT boats inflicted considerable damage on enemy barges and landing craft in that area, the Japanese, on 6 August 1943, undertook to send equipment and troops, escorted by a cruiser and three destroyers, into Vella Gulf between Vella Lavella and Kolombangara Islands. This operation, which was calculated to support enemy forces at Vila, led to the third surface action in the area within a month. A task group of American destroyers commanded by Commander (now Commodore) Frederick Moosbrugger took the enemy force by surprise shortly before midnight. In an engagement lasting about 45 minutes, the three Japanese destroyers were believed sunk. Our forces suffered no damage.
Invasion of Vella Lavella
Vella Lavella Island, about 14 miles northwest of Kolombangara, was selected as the next objective in the central Solomons campaign. Although the island was not occupied by the Japanese, and no opposition in force was expected, preparations were made to resist air attacks from enemy airfields to the north.
On 15 August three transport groups succeeded in making landings as planned. The anticipated enemy air attacks materialized, but did not seriously interfere with the landings, as our own air support broke up their attacks.
Action of 17-18 August
On 17 August four enemy destroyers and a number of barges were reported en route from Bougainville on a southeasterly course. Four of our destroyers, under the command of Captain T. J. Ryan, Jr., intercepted and attacked the enemy force north of Vella Gulf at night. Our forces scored heavily with gunfire on enemy destroyers and barges, whereupon the enemy force broke off the action. Our destroyers sustained no losses.
The campaign on New Georgia ended successfully with the occupation of Bairoko Harbor on 25 August. The Japanese lost heavily in attempting to evacuate personnel across Kula Gulf to Vila, when PT boats attacked and sank numerous barges filled with enemy troops. As a result of the occupation of Bairoko, Kolombangara Island, which was still occupied by a Japanese garrison, was now between our forces controlling New Georgia to the southeast and those occupying Vella Lavella to the northwest. Positions secured on Arundel, which was occupied on 27 August, made it possible to bring artillery to bear on the Japanese installations at Vila.
With his air power weakened, the enemy decided to evacuate Vila during the month of September. Again barges were used for the evacuation, with costly results to the enemy. Toward the end of the month of September our destroyers conducted a particularly damaging attack on barges, which up to that time had been attacked chiefly by aircraft and PT boats. Enemy personnel losses during the evacuation of Kolombangara were undoubtedly heavy, and it was assumed that these heavy losses were the cause of increased activity to the northward shortly thereafter, particularly in the vicinity of Bougainville.
Action of 6 October
On the night of 6 October a task group consisting of three destroyers, CHEVALIER, SELFRIDGE, and OBANNON, commanded by Captain F. R. Walker, sighted a superior force of enemy ships south of Choiseul. The enemy was disposed in two groups, one of which appeared to consist of a light cruiser and four destroyers, the other of four destroyers.
Our destroyers, in spite of their being outnumbered, closed in and attacked with gunfire and torpedoes. The result was the repulse of a superior force and the inflicting of considerable damage, at the cost, however, of the CHEVALIER which was torpedoed and sunk.
By 6 October the enemy completed evacuating his troops from Kolombangara and Vella Lavella Islands, and the central Solomons campaign ended.
Bougainville Campaign
Attacks on Bougainville and the small islands to the north and south of it began about three weeks after the evacuation of Kolombangara, our air forces meanwhile having softened up the airfields of Kahili, Ballale, and Karu by daily attacks.
On 26-27 October Mono and Stirling in the Treasury Islands were invaded and occupied; on 28 October a landing was made on Choiseul Island; and on 1 November landings were made on Bougainville Island. The landings on Mono Island were preceded by bombardments by a task force commanded by Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) T. S. Wilkinson. Another task force under Rear Admiral Merrill bombarded enemy positions at Bonis on Bougainville and at Buka immediately preceding our landing. Rear Admiral Merrill's force then proceeded to the Shortland Islands off the southern coast of Bougainville and delivered another bombardment on Morgusaia Island.
In the meantime a landing force of Marines under the command of Lieutenant General Vandegrift (who had returned to the area following the death of Major General Barrett) landed at Empress Augusta Bay, about midway up the west coast of the island of Bougainville.
Action of 2 November
Shortly before noon on 1 November an enemy task force of four cruisers and eight destroyers was observed at the southern end of St. George's Channel, but an attempt by Rear Admiral Merrill's force to intercept was not successful, as the enemy retired before action could be joined. On the following morning, however, a Japanese force consisting of three groups of four ships each was picked up and attacked. After having suffered considerable damage, the enemy again retired. We lost no ships and sustained relatively light damage in this engagement.
The next day our ships, which had retired to Empress Augusta Bay, were attacked by enemy aircraft but suffered no appreciable damage.
Army troops reinforced the Marines at Empress Augusta Bay on 8 November, and, after consolidating our beach heads, took the offensive against enemy troops on the island. On 8 November the enemy delivered an air attack on a force of our light cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral L. T. DuBose. The attack was not successful, in that we were able to protect our transports from enemy attacks while the transports were retiring from Bougainville.
On the night of 12-13 November, while engaged in covering transports en route to Torokina Point, Rear Admiral Merrill's task force was attacked by enemy forces.
On 17 November Japanese planes attacking another of our echelons bound to Torokina succeeded in sinking the destroyer transport MCKEAN.
Action of 25 November
On 25 November four of our destroyers, patrolling the area between Buka and Cape St. George on the southern tip of New Ireland, attacked a superior enemy force with torpedoes and gunfire, inflicting considerable damage on the enemy. None of our ships was damaged.
During the month of December, American land-based aircraft continued vigorous operations against Japanese positions throughout the northern Solomons, with the result that enemy airfields in the Buka-Bonis areas were completely neutralized. Meanwhile, our troops and supplies continued to move unopposed into the base at Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay.
On 20 December a force of American destroyers bombarded a Japanese concentration on northeastern Bougainville and on the 23rd, a task force of cruisers and destroyers bombarded the Buka-Bonis area. On the 27th, another force shelled the Kieta area.
Operations in New Guinea
Concurrently with the attacks on Japanese positions in the central Solomons, a powerful attack had been launched in the New Guinea Theater. On the night of 29-30 June Allied troops made a successful landing on Nassau Bay, about ten miles south of the Japanese base at Salamaua, and moved up the coast to Mubo and Komistum. After the landing, the Navy assisted in the new offensive by the use of planes and PT boats to harass enemy landing barges and prevent reinforcements from being put ashore. Task units of our destroyers also assisted by bombarding enemy defenses and installations.
On 3 September our amphibious forces were ready to move against the enemy's naval and air bases in the Huon Gulf area, and a task force of destroyers and smaller craft successfully landed the Australian 9th Division and other troops near Nopoi. During the following days other task forces escorted more landing craft to the beaches, successfully fighting off air attacks, and on 7-8 September bombarded positions in the vicinity of Lae. On 11 September Allied forces captured Salamaua and five days later Lae, thereby giving our naval forces additional bases.
The next objective of the Allied amphibious forces was Finschafen on the eastern end of the Huon Peninsula. On the morning of 22 September a task force of destroyers and landing craft proceeded to a beach about six miles north of Finschafen and after a brief bombardment landed a strong Australian force. Enemy air attack was ineffectual. On 2 October Finschafen was captured and our PT boats sank a number of barges loaded with enemy troops attempting to get clear of the island. On the following day our destroyer task forces suffered their first loss when the destroyer HENLEY was torpedoed and sunk.
On 2 January an Allied landing in force was made on Saidor on the New Guinea coast. There was no opposition to the landing, and there were no personnel casualties.
On 13 February a final occupation of the Huon Peninsula was completed by the meeting of Australian units coming from the eastward with the 32nd United States Division.
Rabaul
As our forces moved toward control of the Solomons and New Guinea, it became possible to strike more directly at Rabaul. This Japanese-held port was in a key position to control the general area to the south.
On 5 November a task force under Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) F. C. Sherman, built around aircraft carriers, delivered an air attack on Rabaul. Bombs and torpedoes directed at shipping at anchor resulted in heavy damage to enemy heavy cruisers and destroyers present. Although our planes met Japanese air resistance, we shot down about 25 enemy planes at the cost of three of our own. This carrier-based strike was supplemented the same day by a large group of Liberators, which did severe damage to Rabaul's waterfront.
A week later there was a second series of air attacks on Rabaul. This time two American task forces were engaged. Rear Admiral Sherman's ships sent in a large flight of planes, and although unfavorable weather prevented inflicting as much damage as on the prior raid, hits were scored on Japanese destroyers outside the harbor. The same day a task force under Rear Admiral A. E. Montgomery sent in a large flight of planes to attack Rabaul shipping. Heavy damage to cruisers and destroyers in the harbor was reported. Our planes shot down 24 enemy aircraft at the cost of seven of our own.
Early in the afternoon of 11 November a Japanese air attack was delivered against the carriers under Rear Admiral Montgomery. No damage was done to our ships and something over 50 enemy planes were shot down by a combination of our own planes and antiaircraft fire. We lost three planes in the encounter. Another flight of Liberators attacked Rabaul on 11 November.
During the last ten days of December the major Japanese base on Rabaul was struck by land-based planes operating from bases in the Solomons and elsewhere in the South Pacific area. On 25 December planes from a carrier task force attacked Kavieng, another important enemy base on the northern tip of New Ireland. Reports indicated the damaging of a destroyer, the sinking of two cargo ships and three barges, and damage to other enemy units afloat. Upon its withdrawal, our task force was heavily attacked by enemy planes, but received no damage. On 28 December Kavieng was again attacked, this time by our shore-based aircraft.
The attacks on Rabaul were significant in that they destroyed and damaged Japanese men-of-war (always a main objective of our aircraft), which were thereby prevented from resisting our offensive in the northern Solomons, New Guinea or the Gilbert Islands.
In the western end of New Britain island, successful landings were made at Arawe on 15 December and at Cape Gloucester on 26 December by amphibious forces from the Southwest Pacific Force.
On 1 January another carrier strike on Kavieng was delivered by a task force under the command of Rear Admiral Sherman. This task force was supported by a group of battleships under the command of Rear Admiral Lee. Primary targets were two enemy cruisers and destroyers about to enter the port. Preliminary reports indicated that the attacks on the cruisers were successful. and that both were either sunk or beached. One of the destroyers was hit by a heavy bomb and both were strafed. Information is lacking as to the effect on the destroyers, but both were believed heavily damaged. Between 20 and 30 enemy aircraft intercepted the attack. Eleven were shot down. Our losses were two fighters and one bomber.
On 4 January a task force successfully attacked two destroyers off the entrance to Kavieng.
On 8 January cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Ainsworth bombarded the Shortlands without incident.
On 15 February an Allied landing in strength on Green Island, 120 miles from Rabaul, was virtually unopposed. On 18 February two destroyer task groups, one commanded by Captain (now Commodore) R. W. Simpson and the other by Captain A. A. Burke, bombarded Rabaul and Kavieng without suffering damage from enemy air attack. The task force making the landing was under the command of Rear Admiral Wilkinson, assault forces being composed of American and New Zealand troops. A task force of cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Ainsworth covered the advance and retirement of the assault forces. The aircraft task force under Vice Admiral Fitch and a support force of cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Merrill participated in the operation.
Occupation of the Admiralty Islands
On 29 February amphibious forces from the Southwest Pacific Force under the command of Rear Admiral W. M. Fechteler (these forces included the 1st Cavalry Division, dismounted) conducted a reconnaissance in force on Los Negros in the Admiralty Islands. As the reconnaissance revealed insufficient enemy strength to warrant withdrawing our reconnaissance forces, the island was promptly occupied. Covering forces were cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) D. E. Barbey. This was a brilliant maneuver in the campaign in that part of the Pacific, conducted under the direction of General MacArthur.
The Offensive
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC CAMPAIGN
Our only operations in the central Pacific following the Battle of Midway had consisted of a diversionary damaging raid on the island of Makin, in the Gilberts, by a small party under the command of Captain J. M. Haines. On 17-18 August the submarines NAUTILUS and ARGONAUT transported officers and men of the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion to the island, where they annihilated the Japanese garrison and did severe damage to enemy installations.
Toward the end of August 1943, while Allied forces in the southwest Pacific were advancing toward the Japanese bases at Rabaul and Truk, and while other forces in the Aleutians were consolidating their positions, Admiral Nimitz organized important units of the Pacific Fleet for a series of assaults on the enemy's outposts in the central Pacific. These task forces succeeded in capturing certain islands on the eastern rim of the enemy's defenses and in diverting the Japanese from the northern Solomons and New Guinea. In addition, these operations represented valuable combat training for new air and surface units of the fleet.
Capture of the Gilbert Islands
The Gilbert Islands are a group of coral atolls lying athwart the equator. They had been held by the British up to the outbreak of war in December 1941, when they were seized by the Japanese. Their location is of great strategic significance because they are north and west of other islands in our possession and immediately south and east of important Japanese bases in the Carolines and Marshalls. The capture of the Gilberts was, therefore, a necessary part of any serious thrust at the Japanese Empire.
In August, September, and October, carrier-based air strikes on Marcus, Tarawa, Apamama, and Wake served to soften Japanese installations and keep the enemy guessing as to where our next full-scale attack would be delivered. The attack on Wake was particularly effective as it included considerable bombardment in addition to air attacks. Enemy air opposition was overcome, and a heavy toll of enemy planes was taken, both on the ground and in the air. During October and early November, planes from our bases attacked the Japanese in the Gilberts and also the Marshalls. The Japanese retaliated by raiding our establishments in the Ellice Islands.
During October and November, various units of the Pacific Fleet were placed under the command of Vice Admiral Spruance, who was designated Commander, Central Pacific Force. Vice Admiral Spruance had commanded one of the task forces at the battle of Midway and had more recently been Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Rear Admiral Turner, who had been in command at sea during the campaigns in the Solomon Islands, was placed in charge of our amphibious forces and Major General (now Lieutenant General) H. M. Smith, USMC, in charge of the landing forces. Other forces in the command were placed under Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) H. W. Hill. The entire force consisted of battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts, transports and numerous auxiliaries and landing craft. Shorebased aircraft were commanded by Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) J. H. Hoover.
During the second week in November, while operations in the Bougainville area and attacks on Rabaul were in progress, the force under Vice Admiral Spruance headed west. On 19 November our cruisers bombarded Tarawa, and on the morning of 20 November our attack groups were off both Tarawa and Makin Islands.
Heavy shore bombardments by battleships and cruisers preceded the landing at Makin. Army units which landed there met little opposition at first, and although the Japanese eventually put up a stiff resistance the issue there was never in serious doubt. The capture of Makin was announced on 22 November.
The assault on Tarawa was bitterly contested. Tarawa was heavily fortified, and garrisoned by about 3,500 Japanese troops on Betio, the principal island in the group. They had been attacked repeatedly from the air for weeks preceding the assault and on the day before they had been heavily bombarded. In spite of these attacks, which silenced the Japanese heavy guns, wrecked everything above ground and killed approximately half of the enemy troops, their dugouts, pillboxes, and bomb-proof shelters were still partially intact.
The enemy was able to concentrate his forces beside the only beach where a landing was possible. In spite of fire support from the air and from ships, our casualties were heavy. The fighting which ensued was considered by many to be the most intense of any in the war, and the personnel of the 2nd Marine Division, under the command of Major General Julian C. Smith, and of the naval units which accompanied them in their landing, demonstrated magnificent courage and tenacity. The assault lasted nearly four days, at the end of which the island was captured.
During the assault period on both Tarawa and Makin, our transports, covered by their escorts, lay off the islands unloading. In some cases, ships were able to enter the lagoons and unload. During this period enemy submarine attacks which developed off Tarawa were successfully combatted, but LISCOME BAY an escort carrier, was torpedoed and sunk off Makin. Rear Admiral H. M. Mullinnix, and the commanding officer, Captain I. D. Wiltsie, and a large number of officers and men were lost. Enemy air attacks were successfully driven off by our own aircraft.
After the completion of the assault phase of the operation, our task forces withdrew to their bases to the north and south. Carrier task groups, under Rear Admirals C. A. Pownall and A. E. Montgomery, attacked enemy air bases in the Marshalls on 4 December, the main attack being directed against the atoll of Kwajalein, where enemy naval and merchant vessels, aircraft and shore installations were heavily struck with torpedoes and bombs. A lighter attack was made on the island of Wotje. Another task force under Rear Admiral Lee proceeding southward from the Gilberts attacked the island of Nauru. Carrier planes bombed the island, and battleships subjected it to heavy bombardments, starting large fires and destroying a number of planes.
During the remainder of the year, Army and Navy land-based planes carried out repeated attacks on enemy holdings in the Marshall Islands and at Nauru, inflicting considerable damage on ships and shore installations. Enemy air attacks on our newly acquired bases in the Gilberts were delivered, but no serious damage was sustained.
Operations in the Marshall Islands
On 29 January offensive operations on the largest scale yet undertaken were directed against the Marshall Islands by task forces under the command of Vice Admiral Spruance. On that date simultaneous attacks were delivered on Kwajalein by carriers commanded by Rear Admiral F. C. Sherman, on Roi by carriers commanded by Rear Admiral Montgomery, on Taroa by carriers commanded by Rear Admiral J. W. Reeves, and on Wotje by carriers commanded by Rear Admiral S. P. Ginder. In addition, cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral E. G. Small bombarded Taroa and Wotje, and shore-based aircraft under Rear Admiral Hoover bombed all four islands, together with Mille and Jaluit.
On 30 January carrier attacks were resumed on Kwajalein by forces under Rear Admiral Reeves and the island was also bombarded by battleships. Roi was again attacked by Rear Admiral Montgomery's carrier force, and in addition was heavily bombarded by battleships. Taroa and Wotje were again struck by a carrier force under Rear Admiral Ginder and in addition were bombarded by cruisers. Forces under the command of Rear Admiral Small assisted in the bombardment of Wotje and Maloelap. Ebeye was struck by carrier forces under Rear Admiral Reeves, and Eniwetok was attacked by carriers under Rear Admiral Sherman. Mille, Jaluit and Wake were bombed by shore-based aircraft.
Other forces under Admiral Spruance's command in this operation consisted of a joint expeditionary force (southern attack group) under Rear Admiral Turner. Defense forces and land-based aircraft were under the command of Rear Admiral Hoover. Rear Admiral Hill commanded an attack group and Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) R. L. Conolly another (the northern attack group). Expeditionary troops were under the command of Major General H. M. Smith. The carrier task forces were commanded by Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) M. A. Mitscher.
On 31 January the forces commanded by Rear Admiral Hill proceeded against the atoll of Majuro, but found no Japanese present there. On the following day troops were sent ashore and the atoll was occupied.
On 2 February landings were made on Roi, Namur and Kwajalein. Roi was secured and enemy resistance on Namur was confined to the northern part of the island. By the middle of the afternoon all organized resistance on Roi and Namur was overcome and the Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division (Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC) assumed command ashore. Our casualties on these two islands were less than 100 killed and 400 wounded. Simultaneously four smaller islands were occupied. At Kwajalein our troops (7th Division, United States Army) made considerable progress against increasing resistance.
By 5 February our troops on Kwajalein had captured the island, and by the 8th, the entire atoll was in our possession.
Taroa, Wotje, Jaluit, Mille and Ponape were bombed and/or bombarded at frequent intervals during the remainder of the month.
On 17-18 February forces under the command of Vice Admiral Spruance delivered an attack on the island of Truk. The first part of the attack by carrier-based planes was followed up by battleships, cruisers and destroyers. Heavy damage was inflicted on the enemy, both in ships sunk and damaged, and in planes shot down and destroyed on the ground. This attack, which was delivered with devastating effect, was particularly satisfying as it was generally regarded as partial payment for the debt incurred when Pearl Harbor was attacked.
Forces participating in the attack on Truk included carriers under the command of Rear Admiral Mitscher (under whom were Rear Admirals Reeves, Montgomery and Sherman); cruisers commanded by Rear Admirals DuBose, J. L. Wiltsie, and Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) R. C. Giffen; and battleships under Rear Admirals G. B. Davis, E. W. Hanson, and Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) O. M. Hustvedt.
On 17 February an expeditionary task group under the command of Rear Admiral Hill (assault troops were headed by Brigadier General T. E. Watson, USMC) landed on Eniwetok Atoll, which had previously been bombarded and bombed over a period of several days. Supporting forces included carriers under Rear Admirals V. H. Ragsdale and Ginder, cruisers commanded by Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) J. B. Oldendorf and Rear Admiral L. H. Thebaud.
On 18 February, after extensive bombing and bombardment, Engebi Island was captured. With the capture of Eniwetok on 20 February, announced by Rear Admiral Hill, control of the Marshall Islands, which were Japanese possessions before the war, passed to the United States. The operations in the Marshall Islands carried out by the forces under Vice Admiral Spruance were characterized by excellent planning and by almost perfect timing in the execution of those plans. The entire operation was a credit to all who participated, and is a noteworthy example of the results that may be expected from good staff work.
Raids on the Marianas
On 22 February (East Longitude Date), a task force under the command of Rear Admiral Mitscher, en route to deliver attacks on Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas, was detected by enemy search planes and subsequently attacked by enemy bombers and torpedo planes. The task force suffered no damage, shot down a number of planes and proceeded to deliver attacks on the objectives stated the next day. During the attack several enemy ships were sunk and damaged. About 30 enemy planes were shot down and 85 or more were destroyed on the ground. In addition, numerous small craft were destroyed. At the same time our aircraft raided Guam.
Supporting Operations
NORTHERN PACIFIC CAMPAIGN
Since the Aleutian Islands constitute an aerial highway between the North American continent and the Far East, their strategic value is obvious. On the other hand, that chain of islands provides as rugged a theater for warfare as any in the world. Not only are the islands mountainous and rocky, but the weather in the western part of the islands is continually bad. The fogs are almost continuous, and thick. Violent winds (known locally as "williwaws") with accompanying heavy seas make any kind of operation in that vicinity difficult and uncertain. The Bering Sea has been termed a "storm factory," because during the winter months the storms form up there and, at the rate of one or two a week, travel east and southeast.
In May 1942, when we were calculating the various risks involved in the disposition of our forces, Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands was considered to be a definite possibility as an enemy objective. A task force to operate in that area was therefore organized and placed under the command of Rear Admiral R. A. Theobald. His command included all American and Canadian Army personnel in the north Pacific, including sea and air units.
On 3 June 1942, just as the battle of Midway was beginning, Dutch Harbor was attacked by Japanese high altitude bombers, presumably from enemy carriers. The attacking force was not located immediately, because the fog set in, and the intention of the enemy was therefore obscure. Within a few days, however, it was discovered that the enemy force had turned westward and effected landings on the islands of Kiska and Attu, where they were erecting buildings.
During June and July, in spite of the weather, our submarines and aircraft, by a series of attacks, succeeded in preventing the arrival of major Japanese reinforcements. Army Air Force bombardment squadrons and units of the Royal Canadian Air Force contributed notably to these operations, as they did to the operations of the succeeding months. On 7 August Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, with a force of cruisers and destroyers, bombarded the shore installations on Kiska, but because of poor visibility the damage inflicted could not be ascertained. The bombardment served, however, to indicate the need for air bases closer to the islands occupied by the Japanese and as a consequence we occupied the island of Adak, in the Andreanof Group, at the end of August. In January 1943, we occupied Amchitka, considerably closer to Kiska, and by February our fighter planes were able to operate from there. By that time, we also had made good progress in establishing and equipping the base on Adak. Meanwhile, Kiska was attacked almost daily by planes from the Andreanofs.
Because of weather conditions and the employment of our forces in other theaters, no attacks, other than bombing raids, with the exception of the bombardment previously referred to and the bombardment of Holtz Bay and Chicagof Harbor, Attu, on 18 February by cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) C. H. McMorris, were delivered on the islands until the spring of 1943.
Battle of the Komandorski Islands
In that situation, the enemy, late in March 1943, undertook to support the two garrisons by sending through a small but heavily protected convoy. Early on the morning of 26 March, a unit of our North Pacific Force, commanded by Rear Admiral McMorris, encountered the advancing enemy force, which included heavy and light cruisers, some destroyers and cargo ships, about 65 miles south of the Komandorski Peninsula. Our force, although outnumbered, closed for attack.
The engagement which followed developed into a running gunfire duel between our cruisers SALT LAKE CITY and RICHMOND and enemy cruisers. This was followed by a torpedo attack delivered by our destroyers, upon completion of which the enemy retired in the direction of Paramushiru, 500 miles to the westward. Our damage was small and our casualties were light. While the damage inflicted on the enemy is not definitely known, a superior enemy force, after being engaged for three and one-half hours, had been prevented from supporting Japanese garrisons at Kiska and Attu.
The Capture of Attu
During the month of April, severe weather interfered considerably with our operations, but later in the month a detachment of cruisers and destroyers was sent to bombard the island of Attu.
Meanwhile, plans had been completed for an assault on Attu, and a force consisting of battleships, an auxiliary aircraft carrier, destroyers, auxiliaries and transports was placed under the command of Rear Admiral Rockwell, who operated under the direction of Rear Admiral Kinkaid. In addition to Rear Admiral Rockwells force there was a unit consisting of cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Giffen and another under Rear Admiral McMorris. The entire operation was to be supported by the Army Air Forces under the command of Major General Albert E. Brown. These troops were embarked in the transports.
On the morning of 11 May landings were made on the north coast of Attu, and our troops proceeded inland. In the afternoon other landings were made at Massacre Bay, and also at Holtz Bay. These landings were covered by our naval forces, and in the bitter fighting which followed, various naval units assisted Army troops by furnishing fire support and air cover. Enemy attacks on our naval forces were ineffective. On 31 May the "mopping up" stage ended, and the island was in our possession. Enemy forces there had been virtually annihilated.
Occupation of Kiska
Following the assault on Attu, preparations were made for a similar assault on Kiska. In anticipation of that assault, Kiska was heavily bombed during July and August, and on numerous occasions was also bombarded by our naval forces.
When assault troops landed on the island on 15 August it was found that it had been evacuated by the Japanese under cover of the fog. Thus, the Aleutian campaign ended, with our forces once more in possession of the entire chain of islands.
Although it had no connection with the campaign herein described, the bombardment of Paramushiru by a task force under the command of Rear Admiral W. D. Baker was carried out on 4 February 1944. Large fires were started. No damage was sustained by our forces. The bombardment is included in this part of the report because it took place in the northern Pacific.
SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
Because of their ability to operate effectively in enemy controlled waters the weakness of our Asiatic Fleet was partially compensated by virtue of the 29 submarines assigned to it-our submarines took the offensive immediately upon the outbreak of war. When our surface forces retired to the south from the Philippine Islands, submarines [under the command of Captain (now Rear Admiral) John Wilkes] succeeded in delaying the enemy's advance and in giving intermittent support to our forces remaining in the islands. As the Japanese advanced through the Netherlands East Indies and into the Solomons, submarines continued to interrupt enemy lines of communications, and since that time have continued their attacks on enemy men-of-war and merchantmen with telling effect.
At the beginning of the var Rear Admiral T. Withers was in command of the submarines in our Pacific Fleet. Rear Admiral R. H. English, who relieved him in May 1942, was killed in an airplane accident in January 1943. Since that time the uniformly excellent operation and administration of Pacific Fleet submarines has been continued under the direction of Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, who previously commanded submarines of the Southwest Pacific Force. Rear Admiral R. W. Christie succeeded to command of the submarines in the Southwest Pacific Force.
Atlantic Fleet submarines have been commanded since the spring of 1942 by chiefly fitting out and training, have done much to make effective combat submarine operations possible within a minimum time after each submarine joins the Pacific Fleet.
Without adequate shipping, Japan can not hold out, much less support her forces, in the islands of the Pacific. Furthermore, the Japanese shipyards have limited capacity. Her shipping, therefore, was a natural target for our submarines, and they have taken a tremendous toll.
For reasons of security, our submarine operations throughout the Pacific can be discussed only in very general terms. No branch of the naval service, however, has acquitted itself more creditably. Submarine commanding officers are skillful, daring and resourceful. Their crews are well trained and efficient. Their morale is high, and in direct ratio to the success of submarine operations. Materially our submarines are in excellent shape, and we have kept up to the minute in all features of design and scientific development and research.
The versatility of our submarines has been so repeatedly demonstrated throughout the war that the Japanese know only too well that in no part of the Pacific Ocean are they safe from submarine attack. When the full story can be told, it will constitute one of the most stirring chapters in the annals of naval warfare.