Combat Operations Atlantic-Mediterranean
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
DURING the past year the combat operations of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet have been concerned primarily with antisubmarine activities, in coordination with the sea frontier commands. Escort systems in certain trans-Atlantic convoy routes are also the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. As was announced in the monthly statements of the President and the Prime Minister, the antisubmarine war has been on a fairly low scale during the past year. The German submarine force apparently has been engaged in "licking its wounds" after the rough handling it received in 1943. Its operations were badly interfered with by the invasion of the Continent in June, which knocked out the many U-boat bases on the French coast and forced the Germans to use bases less conveniently located in Norway and the Baltic. It is assumed that the long period of relative quiescence has been employed for building more effective types of submarines. The possibility of a renewed outbreak of submarine activity must, therefore, be guarded against. The remarks in my previous report as to the necessity for complete secrecy concerning our antisubmarine methods still hold. I consider it of the greatest importance that the material and technique we have developed for dealing with the submarine menace be kept to ourselves until the conclusion of the war, to the end that the Japanese may not be able to apply our antisubmarine methods against our submarines operating in the Pacific.
An important duty of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet has been the maintenance of what might be called a general reserve of battleships, cruisers and other ships needed to make up a balanced task force. While possibility of a breakout of what was left of the German surface fleet remained, this force was held in readiness to deal with surface raids on Atlantic commerce. From time to time, particularly during the landings in northern and southern France, these ships were assigned first to the invasion of Normandy and then to the Eighth Fleet for the invasion of southern France. With the successful accomplishment of these operations, the need for heavy surface ships in the Atlantic area was reduced, and a large part of this general reserve has been shifted to the Pacific Fleet.
One of the little publicized but valuable tasks of the Atlantic Fleet has been to train for service elsewhere the large number of ships and landing craft built on the Atlantic coast. This has enabled the best use to be made of the facilities on the east coast. and has prevented overcrowding of the congested harbors on the Pacific coast. The same system is used in training patrol plane squadrons, which insofar as is practicable are fully trained in the Atlantic Fleet before being transferred to combat duty in the Pacific. The fact that during the past year some 3300 ships and craft were "shaken down" in the Atlantic Fleet operational training command indicates the magnitude of these training operations. An important element in this activity is the preparation of new submarines for war, carried on by the Submarine Force of the Atlantic Fleet, and the education of submarine officers and men in the schools at the Submarine Base at New London. The outstanding success of our submarines in the Pacific is in a large measure due to the sound preliminary training they receive in the schools and the school submarines in the Atlantic.
The Atlantic Fleet has worked in close cooperation with the British, Canadian, French, Brazilian and Netherlands Navies. The Brazilians have developed a very efficient antisubmarine force of surface ships and aircraft which, operating as an integrated part of the South Atlantic detachment of the Atlantic Fleet, took its full share of the task of knocking out the German submarine effort directed against the convoy routes off the east coast of South America. Netherlands vessels have continued to serve with distinction in our antisubmarine forces.
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE-THE NORMANDY INVASION
After a long period of careful planning, the assembly of United States Army and Air forces in Great Britain for the invasion of France began early in 1943. The military organization set up for the cross-channel invasion involved ground, naval and air forces of a number of our Allies. The United States naval contingent was assembled and trained under the Commander Twelfth Fleet (Admiral Stark), who at the appropriate time turned it over to the operational control of the Allied Naval Commander in Chief.
The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, General (now General of the Army) Dwight D. Eisenhower, arrived in London and assumed command in January 1944. Meanwhile, his three principal subordinates had already been appointed: Allied Naval Commander in Chief, the late Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, RN; Commander in Chief Twenty-first Army Group, General (now Field Marshal) Sir Bernard Montgomery, RA; and Air Commander in Chief, the late Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, RAF.
The success of our amphibious operations in North Africa, Sicily and Italy had demonstrated that, given air and sea superiority, there would be small doubt of our initial success, even against so strongly fortified a coast as northern France. The critical factor was whether, having seized a beachhead, we would be able to supply and reinforce it sufficiently fast to build an army larger than that which the enemy was certain to concentrate against ours. The operation thus had two phases of almost equal importance-the assault and the build-up. In both, the Navy would play a key part.
The Baie de la Seine beaches in Normandy were selected for the assault because of their proximity to the relatively undamaged ports of southern and western England and because they were within easy range of fighter plane bases in England. The region was not so heavily fortified as the Pas de Calais area, and could be more easily isolated from other German forces by destruction of the Seine River bridges. The major deficiency of this region was the lack of a good harbor for a quick build-up after the assault. Thus artificial harbors had to be devised to meet the deficiency.
The date of the assault was determined chiefly by weather and tide conditions. The late spring or early summer presented the most favorable weather prospects, and the long days enhanced our air superiority. A spring tide was desirable so that as many as possible of the beach obstacles would be exposed at low water and landing craft could be floated far up the beach at high tide. The time of day was determined so as to allow some daylight for preliminary bombardment before the troops landed, and a half-tide for beaching the first wave, in order to enable the landing craft to pass over rocks which existed at certain of the beaches.
There was little chance of effecting substantial surprise. The final assembly of ships and craft in British ports was so large as to be beyond concealment. All that could be done was to confuse the enemy as to the time and place of the landing.
Joint Army-Navy training began in September 1943. In the spring of 1944 several large scale rehearsals were conducted in order to perfect our technique and to achieve effective coordination between the troops and the vessels of the expeditionary force.
The general scheme of the operation provided for landing United States troops in United States vessels on the western half of the area to be attacked, while the British and Canadians took the eastern half. The naval assault force was consequently divided into the Western [United States] Task Force and the Eastern [British] Task Force. The Western Naval Task Force, under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) A. G. Kirk, transported and landed the First United States Army, commanded by Lieutenant General O. N. Bradley. This task force was comprised of two assault forces: "O," commanded by Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, Jr., and "U," commanded by the late Rear Admiral D. P. Moon, and a follow-up force commanded by Commodore C. D. Edgar. Each assault force in turn contained the necessary transports, bombardment ships, landing craft, escort craft, gunfire support craft, mine sweepers and control craft required to transport and land Army forces. Force "O" was designated to land elements of the V Corps, including the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions on "Omaha" beach, which was the Vierville-Colleville sector of the Baie de la Seine, extending from Port-en-Bessin to Carentan Estuary. Force "U" landed elements of the 7th Corps on "Utah" beach, near St. Martin-de-Varreville.
The United States Eighth Army Air Force, the United States Ninth Army Air Force and the Royal Air Force were available in the United Kingdom at the time of the invasion. During the final preparatory period (D-minus-90 to D-day) air bombing commitments included industrial, strategic and coast defense targets in northern France, the low countries and western Germany. As D-day approached, attacks were intensified until the maximum effort of planned heavy, medium and fighter bomber missions were executed the night of 5-6 June. A low ceiling on the morning of 6 June hampered the scheduled pre-landing bombing of "Omaha" beach by heavy bombers; to which some of the difficulty later experienced in gaining a foothold on "Omaha" beach may be attributed. The fighter cover throughout the operation limited the German air force to ineffective sporadic night attacks. The old United States battleships ARKANSAS, TEXAS and NEVADA delivered naval gunfire support, beginning with the preliminary bombardment, and continuing until the troops had advanced beyond range of their major calibre guns. The cruisers TUSCALOOSA and QUINCY and some 30 United States destroyers functioned as fire support ships, together with units of the British, Free French and Dutch Navies. Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo commanded the fire support group of Force "U" and Rear Admiral C. F. Bryant the comparable group in Force "O."
About 124,000 United States naval officers and men participated directly or indirectly in the invasion. Of these, 87,000 were aboard landing craft and small escort vessels, 15,000 were aboard the combatant ships, and 22,000 were attached to the amphibious bases in England.
By 1 June, when the loading of troops began, 2,493 United States Navy ships and craft had been assembled for the operation, and of these only 14 were unable to take part because of material difficulties.
On 3 June all troops had been loaded and briefed, but because of weather conditions the timing of the operation was still undetermined. At least four days of good weather were needed, commencing with D-day, which was initially set for 5 June. It was apparent on 3 June that unfavorable weather was developing, and early on 4 June the order for a postponement of 24 hours was broadcast. By the evening of 4 June, much improved conditions were forecast for the morning of the 6th, although there were some doubt as to how long the favorable condition would continue. However, because of tide and light considerations, the uncertainty of the weather immediately following D-day was accepted, and on the evening of 4 June, a confirmation of 6 June as D-day was broadcast.
The terrain where the landings were made was of great natural defensive strength, augmented by many strongly protected and cleverly concealed gun emplacements, machine gun nests and pill boxes, together with slit trenches, tank traps, and antitank ditches. In addition, between the high and low water levels on the beaches there were installed several rows of underwater obstacles consisting of hedgehogs, tetrahedrons and pole ramps interconnected by barbed wire and thickly sown with mines. Artillery and machine guns were placed for enfilading fire along the beaches, and in some cases were completely concealed and protected from seaward by concrete walls covered with earth.
The assault plans contemplated overcoming these defenses by the employment of naval gunfire and air bombardment to destroy or neutralize as many of the emplaced installations as possible, to breach the underwater obstacles under cover of an assault by infantry and tanks, and to storm the remaining defenses with succeeding waves of infantry supported by naval gunfire.
The Assault on "Omaha" Beach
Force "O," the larger of the two American assault forces, had as its target the Vierville-Colleville sector of the Normandy beaches, called, for the purpose of these landings, beach "Omaha." On its eastern flank was Port-en-Bessin, which marked the dividing line between the British and American areas. On its western flank was the Carentan estuary, which separated it from Force "U's" beach, "Utah," on the Cherbourg peninsula.
The ships and craft of Force "O" loaded at Portland, Weymouth and Poole on the south coast of England. Cross-channel convoys began moving on 5 June, and were joined by Rear Admiral Bryant's fire support group, which had assembled at Belfast. No enemy action hindered the movement, but a choppy sea with a 20-knot wind from the southwest made landing operations difficult, though possible. Mine sweepers cleared channels, and ARKANSAS, TEXAS and other combat ships opened their scheduled fire on shore batteries. Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the planned air bombing was badly hampered by weather conditions, and certain LCT(A)'s [landing craft armed with M-4 tanks] and amphibious tanks failed to reach the beach on schedule. In addition, the 352nd Field Division of the German Army happened to be holding exercises in the area, and immediately joined the coastal defense troops in opposing our attack.
The tanks, infantry and demolition parties which landed at H-hour were subjected at once to a heavy cross-fire from artillery, mortars and machine guns, and losses were severe. Troops continued, however, to move in toward the beach, and by 1030 the entire landing force had been committed, though numerous personnel both of the assault waves and the Army-Navy shore party were pinned down on the beach just above high water by enemy fire. Destroyers and gunfire support craft stood in as close to the beach as the depth of water would allow and engaged all enemy guns which they could observe. The first encouraging news came at 1100 when German soldiers began to leave their posts and surrender. At 1300 Colleville was taken, and by 1330 our troops had begun a general advance up the slopes of the beach. At about 1430 Commodore Edgar's follow-up force arrived with the remaining regiments of the 1st and 29th Divisions; by late afternoon, except for sniping and occasional artillery and mortar fire, hostile action against the beach area had ceased, and the work of organizing the beaches for further unloading was progressing in orderly fashion.
Our heavy ships had no trouble in putting the enemy's major shore batteries out of action promptly. Our chief difficulties came from the light artillery and machine guns which the enemy had sited to fire up and down the beach instead of out to sea. These guns, which were very difficult to detect, waited for our troops to land before opening fire. Specially trained Navy Shore Fire Control Parties attached to Army units were put ashore early in the assault to inform our ships by radio of the location of such targets, but many of them were unable to set up their radio equipment because of casualties and enemy fire. At this juncture 8 United States and 3 British destroyers closed the beach and took many enemy positions under fire. This unplanned bombardment, which was directed in part from the ships and in part from those Shore Fire Control Parties which had succeeded in establishing communications, deserves great credit. The battleships and cruisers for the most part fired with air spot at targets designated by Shore Fire Control Parties or by planes which were busily searching for enemy guns inland from the beaches. By 1300 on 6 June the Shore Fire Control Parties had begun to function according to schedule. Acting on their directions. TEXAS and the other ships repeatedly took enemy troops, tanks and vehicles under fire several miles inland. On D-plus-2 day, for example, TEXAS' 14-inch guns demolished the railway station at Isigny and effectively scattered a convoy of German vehicles moving through the town square. It is not surprising that a German Government broadcast on 16 June, recorded by the BBC expressed admiration of the military value of this naval gunfire. These "floating batteries," it said, "enabled the invaders to achieve overpowering artillery concentrations at any point along the coast." By D-plus-4 day, when the Army's forward line reached the forest of Cerisy, the enemy was beyond the range of our ships.
On the morning of 7 June, the first of the build-up personnel convoys of transports arrived off the beach. Just to seaward of the assault area the transport SUSAN B. ANTHONY struck a mine and eventually sank, though all personnel aboard were taken off. During the forenoon, surveys for the establishment of the artificial harbor and the small craft shelters were begun.
The Assault on "Utah" Beach
The mission of Force "U" was to establish tank-supported infantry on the beach area, designated "Utah," near St. Martin-de-Varreville. Consisting of approximately 865 vessels and craft, Force "U" was organized in ports along the English coast between Plymouth and Torquay, although the fire support group of heavier ships assembled at Belfast.
The safety of Force "U's" cross-channel movement lay with three squadrons of United States and three flotillas of British mine sweepers. In general, all waters through which our convoys were to pass were suitable for mining, and the final leg of the course assigned Force "U" lay squarely across a very probable mine field on Cardonnet Bank. The only casualty occurred when the mine sweeper OSPREY was sunk.
The assault on "Utah" beaches progressed substantially as planned. Bombardment by the fire support ships, supplemented by aerial bombing, preceded the landing of waves of amphibious tanks and landing craft carrying troops of the 4th Infantry Division, which were supported by rocket-firing landing craft. Our forward troops encountered no small arms fire, and the little artillery fire directed against the beach from several distant batteries proved inaccurate and ineffectual. Main battery fire from NEVADA and QUINCY had breached the seawall in five places, materially aiding our advance inland. Our amphibious tanks, proceeding through rough waters under their own power, managed to survive the heavy swells, engaged enemy installations on the forward beachhead and pressed on inland.
Following the initial assault against "Utah" beach, the landing of subsequent waves proceeded with but slight deviation from schedule. Nearly all of the beach obstacles were exposed and Army engineers and Navy demolition teams were able to clear lanes for the passage of subsequent waves of troops and vehicles. Although our concentrated air and naval bombardment had temporarily neutralized the enemy's coastal batteries, thus affording the earlier assault waves a reasonably safe landing, the enemy from 1100 onwards brought the beach under accurate artillery fire. Aided by Shore Fire Control Parties, our support ships replied. Some of the enemy batteries were extremely hard to knock out, but by early afternoon all but three had been silenced. These tended to come to life unexpectedly and to fire a few rounds when landing craft offered good targets. Otherwise they caused little hindrance to the work on the beaches. During the first twelve hours we landed 21,328 troops, 1742 vehicles and 1695 tons of supplies.
In the course of the "Utah" landings the destroyers MEREDITH and GLENNON, the destroyer escort RICH the mine sweeper TIDE and several landing craft were lost.
During the next few days the batteries of the fire support ships were turned against targets well inland and to the west as the VII Corps fought its way toward Cherbourg, and requests for these support missions continued until the Army had advanced beyond the ships' range. Our troops were now more than half way across the Cotentin peninsula, and were advancing northwest along the coast towards Cherbourg against stubborn opposition.
The Normandy Build-up
Once the Army had been successfully established on the beaches, the Navy's primary responsibility was supply. The enemy had fortified and defensively manned the ports to such an extent as to make the military cost of direct attack upon them extreme. On the other hand, to attempt the assault of a continent over open beaches, affording no protection from the vagaries of the weather, would place the entire operation in jeopardy.
The solution of this problem was one of the most dramatic creations of the war-the artificial harbors, or "Mulberries," and the small boat shelters, or "Gooseberries." There were to be two of the former-
"Mulberry A" in the American sector (at St. Laurent in "Omaha" area), and "Mulberry B" in the British sector at Arromanches-and five "Gooseberries," three in the British sector and one on each of the two American beaches.
The "Gooseberries," created by sinking a number of old warships and merchant ships in a line in 2.5 fathoms of water just off the beaches, were to provide a refuge for small craft in rough weather. The blockships were to proceed to the beaches under their own power, and be sunk quickly by internally placed explosives. The "Gooseberries" were a relatively simple undertaking.
The "Mulberries" were much more complicated. Conceived by the British, the tremendous task of manufacturing and assembling the many components had to be carried out with complete secrecy, lest the enemy gain a clue as to our intention to assault a harborless part of the French coast.
It was necessary to tow "Mulberry" units and other essential parts of the invasion armada across the channel. This inconspicuous but important role was carried out by a large pool of British and American tugs. The latter had come across the Atlantic under their own power, many of them manned by civilian masters and crews who had had little experience with naval or military operations. TUG CONTROL operated from Lee Tower, Lee-on-Solent, and was headed by Captain (now Commodore) Edmond J. Moran, USNR.
On 7 June all elements had been towed from England, and Rear Admiral Hall, Commander of Force "O," at "Omaha" beach, gave permission to begin "operation Mulberry" Specially trained Seabees sank hollow concrete caissons, each mounting an AA gun, in designated positions by flooding through built-in valves. Inside the breakwater thus formed were established two Loebnitz floating pierheads. These were connected to the beach by a floating roadway composed of bridgework mounted on pontoons, and two sunken causeways constructed of the same material used in pontoon causeways and Rhino barges. Protecting both the breakwater and the blockships of the nearby "Gooseberry" was a line of steel caissons secured end to end and moored to buoys. The work of installation and construction of "Gooseberries" and "Mulberries" progressed rapidly and smoothly, with all blockships in place by D-plus-4 day.
By this time the delays caused by the unfavorable weather and by the failure of the assault at "Omaha" to proceed as planned had been overcome, and the build-up began to move rapidly and on schedule. At "Utah," in spite of the problems of handling a great number of ferry craft in a small area, often under shell fire, unloading was nearly up to schedule by D-plus-4 day. On the 8th the first pontoon causeway had been successfully established at "Utah," although at the outset it could not be employed because of shell fire. During the first week of occupation we succeeded in landing approximately 74,000 troops, 10,000 vehicles, and 17,000 tons of supplies.
Then came the storm. During the night of 18 June the wind began to freshen, and by mid-afternoon of the 1 9th it was blowing a moderate gale from the northeast. Ferry service ceased, all craft took shelter inside the "Gooseberry" or "Mulberry," and unloading of almost every type was brought to a halt. It continued to blow steadily for the next three days, with the seas making up to destructive proportions. When the storm ended on the morning of 22 June, the beach was a shambles. More than 300 craft had been washed up high and dry, many of them damaged beyond salvage. The only ferry craft undamaged were the DUKWís, which had remained safely parked ashore during the storm.
The blockships of the "Gooseberry" shelter had held together, although several of them had broken their backs and all had settled, but the storm had been disastrous to the "Mulberry." The concrete caissons had either broken apart or had become submerged in the bottom sands. The roadway to one of the Loebnitz pierheads had been smashed by the impact of LCTís driven against it, and many of its pontoons were flooded. The causeway had held together but was twisted. Many of the steel caissons had carried away from their moorings and had drifted about as a menace to shipping. Others were flooded and half submerged.
The British "Mulberry" suffered less from the storm than the American, which was exposed to heavier seas and had been built on deeper sands, where the scour was far more severe. Consequently, it was decided to abandon the American harbor. The British one was completed, partly with material salvaged from the American.
A major port was absolutely necessary if unloading schedules were to be maintained through the fall and winter. The first to fall to our troops was Cherbourg.
Bombardment of Cherbourg
To assist the VII Corps, which was advancing on the port of Cherbourg from the land side, the fire support group of the Western Naval Task Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Deyo, bombarded the shore batteries which commanded the waters leading to Cherbourg harbor. These enemy coastal defenses consisted of 20 casemated batteries [guns covered by steel and concrete walls and roofs], three of which had 280-mm guns with an estimated range of 40,000 yards [approximately 20 miles].
The force, consisting of the battleships NEVADA, TEXAS and ARKANSAS, United States cruisers TUSCALOOSA and QUINCY, British cruisers GLASGOW and ENTERPRISE, and 11 destroyers, approached the coast shortly before noon on 25 June. The intention was to avoid engaging the enemy batteries as long as possible in order to close the shore and provide the support requested by our troops. The Germans, waiting until our ships arrived well within range, opened fire. The destroyers interposed with smoke, but the enemy fire increased in volume, and shortly afterwards the mine sweepers, which had preceded the force, were obliged to withdraw to the northward.
By 1230 the enemy's fire had become so heavy and accurate that our ships were directed to maneuver independently, and they steamed back and forth in a line ranging from four to eight miles offshore. While the heavy ships fired at targets inland designated by Shore Fire Control Parties and spotting planes, the destroyers endeavored to silence the enemy coastal batteries. The latter were only partly successful, and our ships continued to be under shore fire until, having completed their mission, they retired shortly before 1500. This abnormal exposure of ships to heavy shore guns, without adequate counterfire, was well warranted by the urgent need of supporting our invading troops. The Army later reported that of 21 firings requested on inland targets 19 were successful.
Of the seven heavy ships engaged (battleships and cruisers) all but one were either hit or had fragments on board, and all were closely missed frequently. The destroyer OBRIEN was considerably damaged, and the destroyers BARTON and LAFFEY slightly damaged. Personnel casualties-14 dead and 28 wounded for the entire force-were remarkably small. The VII Corps occupied Cherbourg two days later, assaulting and capturing the remaining shore batteries from the rear.
Under the command of Commodore W. A. Sullivan, task forces composed of British and American salvage and fire fighting units did phenomenal work repairing ships and craft, and clearing the major ports for dockside unloading of cargo. This important but difficult task was performed with rapidity. Cherbourg's port facilities were in operation early in July. Although we soon secured several minor ports, a second major port was not available until Le Havre surrendered on 12 September. It was opened to small craft in three days, and was in full operation within a month. For some time, however, shipping in the approaches to Le Havre was seriously harassed by enemy mining. Although organized resistance in Brest ended on 19 September, its facilities were so damaged, and it was then so distant from the battle front, that it did not appear worthwhile to restore the port.
With the approach of winter, it became apparent that only three liberated ports in northern France could be operated on a year round basis. These were Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Rouen, unloading having begun at the last port in mid-October. Antwerp in Belgium, a British commitment, became early in December an important avenue of supplies to our troops. A United States Naval Port Office was opened there, and daily unloadings of up to 22,000 tons of United States stores were handled.
EIGHTH FLEET-ITALY
Support of the Anzio Beachhead
On 22 January 1944 a combined British-American operation secured a beachhead at Anzio on the west coast of Italy, some 60 miles behind the German lines. The landing progressed as scheduled against slight initial opposition; however, the enemy reacted strongly, and rapidly assembled a powerful force around the beachhead. Resistance and counter-attacks were so severe that extraordinary effort was required to maintain and support the Army in this area; the capacity of the small captured port of Anzio and the adjoining beaches was so small that scarcely any part of the Army was free from enemy observation and artillery fire. The beachhead was raided by enemy aircraft 277 times during the first twelve weeks after landing. On 25 May the beachhead forces joined those advancing from the main front; throughout the four months preceding this junction, cruisers and destroyers constantly furnished gunfire support by bombardment of enemy targets on shore. Screening and patrol vessels guarded the anchorage from air-surface attack and amphibious craft transported supplies and fresh troops from the Naples area to Anzio, returning with prisoners and other personnel.
Continuously throughout the year British and U. S. Eighth Fleet motor torpedo boats were on patrol to intercept enemy corvettes, torpedo boats and the barges with which the enemy desperately sought to carry on coast-wise support of his armies in Italy. Destruction of enemy naval strength and coastal commerce in the Ligurian Sea was the prime objective.
Capture of Elba
An amphibious assault resulting in the capture of the island of Elba was carried out on 17 June by a naval task force under the command of Rear Admiral T. H. Troubridge, RN. United States destroyers, mine sweepers, patrol and landing craft formed part of the combined force. One of the immediate objects in securing the island, which is situated only five miles from the coast of Italy, was to set up a heavy battery opposite the mainland to curtail the movement of enemy supply convoys which hugged the coast. The army forces to be landed comprised the French 9th Colonial Division and support elements totaling 11,200 more under the command of General of Army Corps Henri Martin, French Army. Although the attacking forces outnumbered the defenders about five to one, the strongly defended beaches were well alerted and several hours of severe fighting were required to secure the initial beachhead. All organized resistance ended on 19 June.
EIGHTH FLEET-INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE
Landings in southern France were an integral part of the over-all Allied strategy in Western Europe, and as conceived were a logical sequence to the invasion of northern France. By the beginning of 1944, planning was underway and Vice Admiral Hewitt, Commander Eighth Fleet, had been appointed naval commander for the operation with the designation of Commander Western Task Force. Beaches finally selected for landings were east of Toulon, in the Cavalaire-Frejus area, since the necessary forces and supplies required for a quick thrust up the Rhone Valley could be advantageously landed there.
The general situation in the western Mediterranean was favorable for amphibious operations during the summer. The submarine menace was rapidly being brought under control, and enemy naval surface strength was not a serious threat. As a result of losses sustained in the invasion of Normandy, the enemy air force was no longer able to operate in strength in the Mediterranean. The coast to be assaulted had fair beaches with strong enemy defenses; however, these defenses lacked depth, and the enemy had few available reserves for counter-attack.
All forces allocated for the invasion of southern France were included in the Western Task Force under the over-all command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, General (now Field Marshal) Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson. Tactical command was jointly exercised by the Naval Commander, Vice Admiral Hewitt; the Army Commander, Major General (later Lieutenant General) A. M. Patch (now deceased); and the Air Commander, Brigadier General G. P. Saville. Command of the joint Army and Navy forces of the Western Task Force after embarkation was vested in the Naval Commander until the Commanding General landed and assumed command of the Army forces on shore.
Intensive bombing of targets in southern France in support of the invasion commenced on 29 April with a damaging raid on the airport installations of Toulon. Thereafter, according to a plan carefully coordinated with the allied bombing of Europe from England, the assault area was isolated by destruction and damage to bridges, tunnels, viaducts and railroad yards, without definite indication to the enemy of the precise location of the projected landings. This bombing was carried out by the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force and comprised about 5,400 sorties which dropped 6,700 tons of bombs.
On 9 August the first of the assault convoys sailed from Naples, and thereafter further convoys left other ports in order to arrive in the assault area on the morning of the 15th. All convoys arrived on schedule, and 880 ships and craft and 1,370 shipborne landing craft were present. This allied naval force included 515 United States, 283 British, 12 French and 7 Greek ships and craft and 63 merchant ships of various nationalities.
About eight hours before the main landings, French commandos and units of the First Special Service Forces were landed near Cape Negre and on the Hyeres Islands by forces under command of Rear Admiral L. A. Davidson. Rear Admiral T. E. Chandler (subsequently killed in the Philippine Islands in January 1945) commanded a group of gunfire support ships of this force. No resistance was met on the islands and only inaccurate machinegun and small arms fire on the mainland.
In the meantime, diversionary groups were operating to the eastward in the Nice-Cannes area and to the westward between Toulon and Marseille, where a mock landing and repulse were staged at LaCiotat, producing considerable enemy reaction.
The bombing in tactical support of the landings commenced before daylight on D-day. This was followed at dawn with heavy and medium bombing for one hour and twenty minutes by more than 1,300 aircraft along a 40 miles front. The execution of this plan, in conjunction with naval gunfire and barrages of rockets, appeared to paralyze the enemy defenses on all the initial assault beaches.
Preceded by this coordinated neutralizing attack of 1,300 aircraft and 53 gunfire support ships, the assault took place at 0800, about two hours after daylight, on 15 August. The main amphibious landings were carried out in three principal sectors. The attack in the Frejus-St. Raphael sector was made by forces under the command of Rear Admiral S. S. Lewis; the St. Maxime-St. Tropez area under the command of Rear Admiral B. J. Rodgers; and the attack on the beaches in Pampelonne and Cavalaire Bays under the command of Rear Admiral F. J. Lowry. Gunfire support groups for these main landing forces were commanded by Rear Admiral Deyo, Rear Admiral Bryant and Rear Admiral R. M. Mansfield, RN, respectively. Two escort carrier groups operating off the coast furnished airplane spotters for the shore bombardment, provided protection for our assault forces against air attack, and assisted the Army Air Force in its attack upon the enemy. This naval air force was under command of Rear Admiral Troubridge, RN with Rear Admiral Durgin commanding one of the groups.
The amphibious assaults of 15 August established a firm beachhead. Eleven army divisions were used in the operation. The United States Army 3rd, 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions and the French 1st Armored Division comprised the assault forces. The remaining divisions, landed during the follow-up and build-up periods, were entirely French. With strong air support, the Army continued vigorous and rapid thrusts inland and successfully kept the enemy from making a concerted stand. The weakened German defense was stunned by the power and effectiveness of coordinated blows from sea and air.
On the morning of 17 August an operation by a light diversion force was carried out in the Ciotat area. Returning from this operation the destroyer ENDICOTT and two small British gunboats encountered two German corvettes, which were engaged and sunk about 13 miles from Cape Croisette Light; 211 survivors were taken prisoner.
On 18 August, rapid progress by the Army continued, and sustained naval effort was required to speed up unloading to meet the requirements of our rapidly advancing forces.
In the days that followed, United States ships engaged German coast defense batteries along the coast and repulsed attacks by light enemy forces. By 29 August the last defenders of Toulon and Marseilles had surrendered. With the capture of these ports, naval emphasis was shifted to mine sweeping and port clearance. Ships and craft were released from duty in the assault area as rapidly as their services could be spared. On 1 September U. S. Naval Detachment Marseille was established. While Army engineers were clearing the land side of the port of Marseille with full Navy cooperation, additional Seabee personnel were engaged in the rehabilitation of part of the port of Toulon. On 25 September, with the closing of the last beaches used for maintenance, the amphibious phase of the campaign was considered ended. During this phase, naval vessels carried out 850 separate shore bombardment missions, with more than 54,000 rounds fired, and mine sweeping forces swept 550 mines. The invasion of southern France achieved highly satisfactory results with comparatively small losses. As no further large scale amphibious operation appeared in prospect in the Mediterranean, forces were returned as rapidly as practicable to the United States for use in other war areas.
Atlantic Operations
THE operations of the United States Navy in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters culminated in the victory of the Allied nations in Europe. The success of the joint antisubmarine campaign and the tremendous achievements in shipbuilding were essential preludes to the landings in Normandy and southern France and the great land offensive, which in three months carried the Allied Expeditionary Forces to the German frontier and brought total victory on German soil six months later. This victory was possible because ships were available and their protection by the Navy effective.
ANTISUBMARINE OPERATIONS
In the antisubmarine campaign our Atlantic Fleet had responsibility for Atlantic areas under United States operational command, and the British Admiralty was responsible for North Atlantic and European operations in which United States naval task forces participated. In the British control areas Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe assured proper liaison between the Admiralty and the Tenth Fleet organization in my Headquarters, which was responsible for convoy and routing of United States shipping and the development of plans, weapons, and tactics to be employed in antisubmarine operations.
In the final month of the European war, German submarines made a last determined effort, in great strength, to reach the eastern coast of the United States. That attempt was thwarted by a powerful task force of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, which, during an engagement lasting several days, destroyed five U-Boats. The United States Navy's final successful action against German submarines occurred on 6 May, only two days before V-E day, when a U-boat was sunk off Block Island by the destroyer escort ATHERTON with the frigate MOBERLY assisting. The development of new techniques, the intensive training of antisubmarine crews, and the persistence with which the U-Boats were hunted offensively all played vital parts in the surrender campaign. German submarines began to surface and surrender shortly after V-E day, and U.S. Atlantic Fleet escort vessels brought several of them to the United States east coast ports.
A review of antisubmarine and convoy operations since 1939 illustrates clearly these major naval contributions to victory in Europe. The summarized statistics on the Battle of the Atlantic are as follows:
German Allied Submarines Shipping New Construction Net Gains
Sunk Sunk | U.S. | British | Total | Or Losses
(Number) (In thousands of tons)
1939 (4 months) 9 810 101 231 332 -478
1940 22 4,407 439 780 1,219 -3,188
1941 35 4,398 1,169 815 1,984 -2,414
1942 85 8,245 5,339 1,843 7,182 -1,063
1943 237 3,611 12,384 2,201 14,585 +10,974
1944 241 1,422 11,639 1,710 13,349 +11,927
1945 (4 months) 153 458 3,551 283 3,834 +3,376
--- ------ ------ ----- ------ -------
Totals 782 23,351 34,622 7,863 42,485 +19,134
From the foregoing statistical summary the chief features of the Battle of the Atlantic are clear:
(a) Until the closing months of 1942 the German submarines were continuing to reduce the available total of Allied tonnage;
(b) Antisubmarine operations resulted in the sinking of an average of 12 German submarines per month after 1 January 1943, or a total of 480 in the two years 1943-44;
(c) American shipyards alone produced an average of a million tons per month of new merchant ships after 1 January 1943, or a total of 24,000,000 tons in two years.
In the 12 months from 1 June 1944, 135 convoys arrived in United Kingdom ports from overseas with a total of 7157 merchant ships totaling more than 50,000,000 gross tonnage. The escort of this shipping and the provision of trained naval armed guard crews aboard the merchant vessels were among the primary tasks performed by the United States Navy in the prosecution of the war in Europe. The Navy's antisubmarine campaign with the British-United States integrated convoy system was in great part responsible for the vital shipping necessary for the Allied land offensive which broke into the Fortress of Europe in 1944 and overwhelmed the Germans ashore in 1945.
TENTH FLEET
On 15 June 1945 the Tenth Fleet was dissolved. This effective organization was established 20 May 1943 under my direct command, with Headquarters in the Navy Department, to exercise unity of control over United States antisubmarine operations in that part of the Atlantic Ocean under United States strategic control. The first Chief of Staff of the Tenth Fleet was Rear Admiral Francis S. Low, who was relieved in January 1945 by Rear Admiral A. R. McCann.
To the Tenth Fleet were assigned the following tasks:
(a) Destruction of enemy submarines.
(b) Protection of Allied shipping in the Eastern, Gulf, and Caribbean Sea Frontiers.
(c) Support of other antisubmarine forces of our own and of the other Allied nations operating in the Atlantic areas.
(d) Exercise of control of convoys and shipping that were United States responsibilities.
(e) Correlation of United States antisubmarine training and materiel development.
To accomplish these tasks the Tenth Fleet was organized into four principal divisions: Operations; Antisubmarine Measures (materiel, training, analysis and statistics, and operational research); Convoy and Routing; and a Scientific Council composed of distinguished civilian scientists.
The Tenth was a fleet without a ship. However, this highly specialized command coordinated and directed our naval forces in the Battle of the Atlantic, making available the latest intelligence to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and to other fleet and sea frontier commanders who directed the actual operations at sea, and supplying antisubmarine training and operating procedures to our forces afloat. The Tenth Fleet correlated the antisubmarine developments of the various technical bureaus of the Navy Department and the fleet training schools concerned with antisubmarine activities. In addition, it worked closely with the General Staff of the United States Army and with the British Admiralty and Canadian Naval Headquarters to avoid duplication and confusion, and to insure that maximum effort would be directed against the German underseas fleet. The effective work of the Tenth Fleet contributed outstandingly to the success of the United States naval operations in the Battle of the Atlantic.
U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
During the spring and summer of 1945 the United States Naval Forces in Europe were faced with a series of varied responsibilities. Until the surrender of Germany the Navy was actively engaged in coastal offensive operations and in supporting afloat the United States Army's build-up of men and supplies, which included assistance in areas as far inland as the Rhine; with the capitulation of the enemy came the establishment of United States naval commands in Germany to aid in the military occupation and government of that country and in the enforcement of the surrender terms. United States naval components also assumed duties with the Allied Military Missions to Denmark and Norway similar to those already established in France, Belgium and Holland. With the end of the war in Europe, the Navy speeded up the process of closing out the multitude of bases and other facilities which had been established earlier in the war in the United Kingdom, on the Continent, and in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.
Rhine River Crossing
The crossing of the Rhine River in March 1945 will be remembered as one of the spectacular achievements of the American forces during the closing months of the European war. In this operation the United States Navy had the honor of taking part as a floating segment of General of the Army Eisenhower's forces. LCVPís and LCMís, which had been used with great success in the coastal Normandy invasion, were again employed to carry our troops on rivers. The naval crews assigned to the operation began training in England in October 1944 and held their final practice maneuvers on the Continent later in the winter. Considerable ingenuity and improvisation were necessary to overcome technical difficulties, the craft employed having been constructed for salt water use and not as river craft in the fresh water of the swift-flowing Rhine. Five LCVP units of 24 craft each were formed in England and later moved to the Continent and placed under the operational control of United States Army commanders and administrative control of Vice Admiral Alan G. Kirk, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces France; of these, three actually participated in the crossings.
The first LCVP unit went into action with the United States First Army at the Remagen bridgehead on 11 March 1945, assisting, under heavy gunfire, in the erection of treadway and heavy pontoon bridges, in ferrying troops, and in patrolling the river. At Oppenheim on 23 March another LCVP unit carried portions of General Patton's Third Army across the Rhine, and the following day made a second crossing under heavy enemy fire at Boppard. Another crossing had been planned at St. Goar, but because of enemy resistance the operation was staged instead at Oberwesel, where, on 26 March, other units of the Third Army were ferried across. Still another crossing was made at Mainz. The LCVP units also served with the United States Ninth Army in its crossing of the Rhine south of Wesel, which occurred almost simultaneously with the Third Army's advance.
U.S. Naval Forces France
A second major operation in which the United States Navy played an important part during the last days of Nazi resistance was that directed against the German-held pockets in western France. Vice Admiral Kirk was placed in operational command of the French naval task force which was assembled for the attack. The United States Navy supplied fuel, training facilities, a repair unit, aircraft, and 24 LCVPís. The operation, which was directed against the enemy forces in the Ile d'Oleron and at the mouth of the Gironde River, began with a general naval bombardment at 0750 on 15 April. For five days the naval task force assisted the French ground forces with naval bombardment and aerial reconnaissance in the assault on Royan and the Point de Grave area at the mouth of the Gironde. By 20 April this section was cleared of the enemy and the assault on the Ile d'Oleron began the following day. Twenty-four United States LCVPís manned by French crews were used and supported by extensive naval bombardment. The actual landings on Ile d'Oleron took place on 30 April and all enemy resistance ceased there on 2 May. With the general capitulation of the enemy on 8 May, the remaining German pockets at La Rochelle, Lorient, St. Nazaire, etc., were occupied by French forces accompanied by American naval observers.
While the Rhine crossings and the attacks on the German pockets were going on, the Navy was continuing its less publicized but equally important task of assisting the Army's build-up of troops and materiel through its port operations, both along the English Channel and in the southern French ports. Men and munitions poured onto the Continent through Marseilles, Toulon, Cherbourg, Le Havre and Rouen. At the great port of Antwerp alone almost 20,000 tons of supplies were unloaded daily.
From the United States Navy's airfield at Dunkeswell in Devon, patrol planes of Fleet Air Wing Seven maintained a constant search of shipping lanes for enemy submarines. When the surrender of Germany came on 8 May, the German High Command was ordered to instruct its U-Boats at sea to surface, radio their position, jettison their ammunition, fly a black flag and proceed by fixed routes to prescribed ports. The first U-boat to comply with this order surrendered on 9 May to a PB4Y-1 plane of Fleet Air Wing Seven on patrol off Lands End, England.
U.S. Naval Forces Germany
With the disintegration of the enemy armies and the movement of Allied forces deeper into Germany, the organization of the United States naval command for Germany was put into effect. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Germany, became responsible for all United States naval forces operating in Germany. As head of the Naval Division of the United States Group of the Allied Control Council, Vice Admiral Ghormley acted as General of the Army Eisenhower's adviser in all naval matters and conferred with the other Allied naval commanders in Germany on such questions as repairs of shipping and disposition of enemy naval vessels. In June Vice Admiral Ghormley established his headquarters in Frankfurt. On 1 July he assumed operational control of all naval forces on the Continent assigned to occupation duties or to the support of the Army in the European Theater of Operations. These included, in addition to the forces in Germany, the United States Naval Components of the Military Missions to Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium, the United States Naval Group France, and the Naval Division of the Allied Control Commission for Austria.
Under Vice Admiral Ghormley's command in Germany was Rear Admiral A. G. Robinson, who, as Commander of U.S. Ports and Bases Germany, was charged with the operation of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven in the American-controlled Weser River Enclave. Rear Admiral Robinson's headquarters were established in Bremen on 15 May. This task force began operating at once, supervising the disposition of captured and surrendered naval personnel, clearing the port areas for incoming shipping, and seizing prize merchant ships which had been captured there. Of these the liner EUROPA was by far the most important. A modern ship in relatively good condition, she was converted into a troop transport almost immediately; although somewhat hampered by lack of facilities and skilled labor, EUROPA was commissioned as United States Navy AP-177 and manned by naval personnel. She sailed from Bremerhaven on 11 September to Southampton to embark her first load of almost 5000 returning American troops.
Bremen and Bremerhaven, as the two United States naval controlled ports in Germany, had an important role to play in the occupation of the country. They served as important supply and evacuation ports for the United States occupation forces; their shipyards and repair facilities, under United States naval control, were used for the repair of German and Allied ships in the area.
Another United States naval command whose work was accelerated by the surrender of Germany was the U.S. Naval Technical Mission Europe, under Commodore H. A. Schade. This organization, which is under the operational control of the Chief of Naval Operations, is the agency for the collection of intelligence information from the surrendered nations for the use of the United States Navy. Working closely with the Army G-2 Staff Division and with Allied Intelligence Services, the U.S. Naval Technical Mission Europe has uncovered a vast amount of data concerning German wartime industrial and scientific developments, the status of experiments on secret weapons, etc.
U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
In March 1945 the U.S. Eighth Fleet, which had been under the command of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt since March 1943 was dissolved; in April the naval forces and bases in the Mediterranean Theater were placed under the administrative control of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. These forces, commanded by Vice Admiral W. A. Glassford as Commander U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters, thereby became a task force of the Twelfth Fleet.
Although the over-all strength was reduced, small naval detachments were maintained in Italy to support the United States Army there, to assist United States merchant shipping, and to continue United States naval representation on the Allied Commission for Italy.
Changes in Command
In the Azores United States naval forces were engaged chiefly in patrolling routes used for Army aircraft being returned to the United States. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe assumed administrative control of the Azores forces in July 1945.
A little over two months after the signing of the German surrender at Rheims, the Supreme Allied Military command under General of the Army Eisenhower was dissolved. On 14 July control of the American, British and French military and naval forces reverted to their respective national commands. For the American forces General of the Army Eisenhower remained the Supreme Commander with a composite United States Army-Navy-Air European Theater Staff. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe in London retained administrative control of all remaining United States naval forces in the theater. On 16 August Admiral Hewitt relieved Admiral Harold R. Stark as Commander, Twelfth Fleet and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
Redeployment
When the fighting in Europe ceased, the United States Army was faced with the gigantic task of redeploying millions of its forces. Some of its men were to be sent home for discharge; others were to be ordered to the Far East. During the summer of 1945 through its various port parties and naval detachments, the Navy cooperated closely with the Army in speeding troop movement. Over 53,000 men were embarked from northern French ports in May, and in June more than 210,000. The July figures approached 350,000. The southern French ports of Marseilles and Toulon were also used for this work. From Le Havre and Antwerp many shipments of war materiel no longer needed in this theater were sent back to the United States.
Similarly the United States Navy developed its own redeployment program, transferring to the United States or to the Pacific forces and materiel no longer required for naval activities in Europe. Hundreds of amphibious ships and craft which had been used for assault operations and for the support of the Army build-up were no longer needed and were returned to the United States. Nearly all United States naval advanced bases, supply and repair facilities, etc., in Britain and the Mediterranean were now unnecessary and their closing proceeded at a rapid rate.
In Great Britain the summer months of 1945 saw the closing of the amphibious bases at Falmouth, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Portland-Weymouth and Southampton. With the end of the submarine menace the planes of Fleet Air Wing Seven, based at Dunkeswell, Devon, were returned to the United States. In France, Italy and in North Africa the operation of most of the liberated ports was rapidly returned to the national authorities. Port detachments were maintained at Le Havre, Marseilles and Naples to aid in the Army's redeployment program. When the command of U.S. Naval Forces France was abolished as a separate task force on 1 July, a naval task group, under Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Germany, was substituted therefor. In the Mediterranean, United States naval activities were likewise reduced. Naval Operating Base Oran was closed out and a naval detachment took its place in July. During the same month the office of Commander, Moroccan Sea Frontier was abolished. The naval facilities at Port Lyautey, Casablanca, Dakar and Agadir were organized as a naval task group. The naval advanced base at Bizerte was decommissioned and reductions were effected at Palermo and Naples.
U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET
During the entire war combat vessels, auxiliaries, and landing craft were built and trained in large numbers on the east coast of the United States for duty in the Pacific. With the capitulation of Germany, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet was able to increase and intensify the redeployment of ships, men, and supplies to the Pacific. By 1 June Atlantic convoys were stopped, and all available escort ships and tankers thus released were made ready for operations against the Japanese. Large numbers of landing craft were returned from Europe and overhauled for Pacific duty. The further necessity of providing refresher training for the crews of these ships and craft devolved upon the Atlantic Fleet Operational Training Command. The Battle of the Atlantic had been chiefly a war against submarines; now all training was concentrated upon meeting the requirements of the Pacific war for accurate antiaircraft firing and shore bombardment. During the period covered by this report the Operational Training Command, Atlantic Fleet, trained some 995 ships for duty in the Pacific, of which 358 were new ships receiving the normal shakedown and 637 were ships which had been engaged in some phase of the European war.
Similarly, the Air Force Atlantic Fleet turned with increased intensity to the training of carrier air units and shore-based patrol squadron for the Pacific Fleet. Typical of the changing nature of the carrier training program was the decommissioning of all composite squadrons, which had produced such effective results against the U-Boats, and the commissioning of air groups for the large new carriers of the MIDWAY class. These new air groups are approximately one and one-half times the size of a normal carrier air group.
The surrender of Japan, occurring when the Atlantic Fleet redeployment program was at its height, necessitated rapid readjustments. Many ships, which were on their way to the Pacific or had just reached the forward areas, were ordered to return to the east coast ports. Instructions were promulgated indicating the status of vessels in the postwar Atlantic Fleet, and an appraisal of berthing areas for the Atlantic Fleet Reserve ships was pressed to completion. Similarly the program for revising, absorbing or decommissioning shore-based Atlantic Fleet activities was accelerated. In the South Atlantic a similar process had long since begun. In March 1945 the Rio-Trinidad convoys were discontinued. Then on 15 April the Fourth Fleet became a task force of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, with Vice Admiral W. R. Munroe as task force commander and Commander, South Atlantic Force. The roll-up of forces continued, and on 13 August Vice Admiral Munroe hauled down his flag; the remaining naval activities in the South Atlantic were placed under the Commandant, Naval Operating Base Rio de Janeiro.