Igor N. Venkov. "How the Berlin Garrison Surrendered, 2 May 1945." Army History 17 (Winter 1990/1991): 20-25

The surrender of the Berlin garrison on 2 May 1945 occupies a central place among the most impor tant events of the final days of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). The apparatus controlling the German state and military was paralyzed once and for all with the fall of Berlin. Germany lost any chance of continu ing the fight in an organized way, thereby acceleMting our victory. At midnight on 8 MayÑsix days after the fall of BerlinÑField Marshal Wilhelm Keitel signed the "Act of Military Surrender" of Germany on behalf of the German High Command.

In view of the complexity of events surrounding the surrender, I have attempted to examine only certain aspects of it, namely: the situation which led the Fascist leadership to surrender, the German leader ship's attempts to arrange a truce, the negotiations between the German envoys and the Soviet command, and the surrender process itself. These aspects of the surrender have not received the proper attention in our literature, and what has been discussed is not histori cally reliable, since it was not based on genuine docu ments.

The Berlin Garrison, 9 March-24 April 1945

On 9 March Lt. Gen. Hellmuth Reymann, Commandant ofBerlin,signed anorder concerning defense preparations for the capital of the Reich. The basic mission of the forces in Berlin was to "defend the capital to the last man and the last shell."

Adolf Hitler attributed great importance to the defense of the approaches to Berlin and the city itself. On 19 March he signed a scorched earth order, requir ing the destruction of all roads, means of communica tion, industrial complexes, and other facilities in Ger many which mightbe of use to the Soviet forces. Cities were to be transformed into fortresses. Hitler's head quarters report of 12 April, signed by Armed Forces High Command (OKW) chief Keitel, S.S. Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler, and party chancel lery director Martin Bormann, noted the personal re sponsibility of military commandants for the defense of the cities. They were subject to the death penalty if a city fell.

The Germans applied the lowest, basest, harshest measures to the of ficers and soldiers ordered to defend Berlin. As a scare tactic, corpses of German soldiers dangled from ropes in many of Berlin's streets with placards such as: "I am a deserter," "I am hanging here because I didn't believe in the Fuehrer," etc. To force the troops to fight to the end, Hitler issued a special order on 16 April to the armed forces, stating specifi cally: "Anyone who orders you [soldiers] to retreat is subject to immediate arrest or, if necessary, is to be shot, regardless of his rank." To raise the morale of the Berlin garrison personnel, Joseph Goebbels was named commissar of defense for Berlin. But all of the orders, special steps, and the draconian measures taken, attested to the fact that Berlin was doomed to destruction and the population to annihilation.

While there was relative calm in Berlin during the first half of April, panic literally broke out later in the month among the Fascist and militarist elite. For example, the OKW log records an episode on21 April as follows: "When the breakthrough to Berlin by Marshal [Georgi K.] Zhukov's forces became obvi ous, and when refugees from the east appeared in the grip of panic in the streets...Goebbels was the first to lose control of himself. At 1100, under the wail of sirens signaling a tank attack, his associates gathered in the film room of his private residence for their regular meeting...Goebbel's face was deathly pale.... He was the first to see that the end had come.... His inner stress poured out in a terrible paroxysm of hate.... 'The German people,' he cried, '...what can be done with such a people, if they do not want to fight anymore.... All the plans of National Socialism, its ideas and goals were too lofty, too noble for this people. They were too fainthearted to accomplish them. In the east they run. In the west they will not let the soldiers fight and they meet the enemy with white flags. The German people deserve the fate which now awaits them...."' Goebbels' frantic assessment prompted this note in the OKW log: "The final act of the dramatic ruin of the German armed forces is beginning for the High Command."

The Berlin Garrison, 25-30 April 1945

Forces of the Fourth Guards Tank Army of the First Ukrainian Front (Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan S. Konev, commanding) joined the Forty-Seventh and Second Guards Tank Armies of the First Belorussian Front (Marshal Zhukov, commanding) west of Berlin, in the area of Potsdam, on 25 April and thereby completed the encirclement of Berlin. The Berlin defense group numbered less than two hundred thousand troops, three thousand guns and mortars, and two hundred-fifty tanks and assault guns. An order from Hitler had named General Helmuth Weidling, commander of the 56th Tank Corps(which was among the surrounded units), as commander of the defenses of Berlin. On the same day (25 April) Soviet and American forces came together for the first time in the area of Torgau on the Elbe. By the time Berlin was surrounded, the enemy had put into action the All Army Group of S.S. Obergruppenfuehrer Steiner (S.S. Third Corps commander) and Hitlerjugend forma tions. Battalions and divisional groups were hastily organized from odd units.

Despite the catastrophic situation, Hitler still be lieved that the struggle for Berlin was not lost. At 19:15 on 25 April he sent a radiogram to Admiral Karl Doenitz in which he called the fight for Berlin the "battle for the fate of Germany." He ordered Doenitz to renounce all immediate missions of the navy and to support the struggle for Berlin by transfer ring troops by airto the city itself and also by water and land to reinforce Berlin's defenders.

The attempts by the Fascist leadership to halt the advance of the Soviet forces were unsuccessful, which heightened the panic among Hitler's ruling clique even more. Hermann Goering was arrested and ex pelled from the party, and Heinrich Himmler was suspected of treason, but he was still feared, since the S.S. troops remained in his hands.

On 26 April Soviet forces occupied all the sub urbs, and a battle developed for the central districts of the city. Breaking up the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the Soviets divided the surrounded German forces into three small groups, which were isolated from one another and cut off from communicating with the High Command. Their situation became absolutely hopeless. On 27-28 April the situation had become critical for the enemy defenders, a situation made even worse by the fact that the encircling perimeter had moved thirty to fifty kilometers west of the city, so that no help could be expected from the outside.

Hitler, however, demanded that the surrounded units fight to the last soldier and that the attempt to ad vance reinforcements to Berlin continue. General Hans Krebs at 12:30 on 28 April ordered all troops engaged between the Elbe and Oder to go on the attack and to advance without delay to relieve the city. Field Marshal Keitel was personally dispatched to the troops north of Berlin to direct operations.

At 23:00 on 29 April in Dobbertin (in southern Mecklenburg) Jodl received the following radiogram from Hitler: "I order you to report to me immediately: 1. Where are Wenck's spearheads? 2. When will they attack again? 3. Where is the Ninth Army? 4. To where is it breaking through? 5. Where are Holste's [XXXXI Panzer Corps] spearheads?" After pro longed reflection Keitel answered the radiogram as follows: "To 1. Wenck's point is stopped south of Schwielow Lake. Strong Soviet attacks on the whole east flank. To 2. As a consequence Twelfth cannot continue the advance to Berlin. To 3 and 4. Ninth Army is encircled. A Panzer group has broken out west. Location unknown. To 5. Corps Holste is forced to go on the defensive...."

In view of the hopelessness and impossibility of further fighting, General Weidling, commander of the Berlin defenses, proposed to Hitler a plan for the city garrison to break out of the encirclement. Hitler re jected the plan, however, and ordered him to defend and hold Berlin at any price. Hitler then put his political testament in writing on 29 April, naming Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz his successor as presi dent of the Reich and supreme commander of the armed forces of Germany.

The Berlin Garrison After 30 April

Despite the measures taken by the Fascist leader ship, the situation in Berlin remained extremely diffi cult. The main German Panzer force, still in Wilm ersdorf but with some units south of the Reichssport feld, had been smashed. Radio sets from individual sectors had stopped checking in. Only a single tele phone connection was operational to one of the antiair craft artillery bunkers at the Tiergarten, in front of which there were already more than ten Soviet tanks. Hitler, afraid of being taken prisoner and being made to answer for all his crimes, committed suicide on 30 April.

Peacemaking Attempts by the Fascist Leaders

After all the irreparable harm they had done, the Fascist leaders, instead of surrendering, took steps toward conciliation. General Weidling described these actions as follows: "At the Reich Chancellery, I was taken directly to the Fuehrer's room. Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels, Reichsleiter Bormann and General Krebs were present. General Krebs explained the following to me: l ....the Fuehrer had committed suicide during the second half of the day, about 15:15; 2. His body had been buried in a shell hole in the garden of the Reich Chancellery; 3. The strictest silence had to be preserved concerning the Fuehrer's suicide.... 4. Of the outside world, only Marshal [Joseph] Stalin had been infommed by radio of the Fuehrer's suicide; 5. Lieutenant Colonel Zeifert, a sector commander sub ordinate to Brigadeniilehrer Monke, had already re ceived the order to establish communication with local Russian commanders, who would be requested imme diately to conduct General Krebs to the Russian high command; 6. General Krebs was to report the follow ing to the Russian high command:

a) the Fuehrer's suicide;

b) the contents of his testament, which specified a new German government as follows: Reich President Grand Admiral Doenitz; Reich Chancellor-Dr. Goebbels; Minister for Party Affairs-Reichsleiter Bormann; Minister of Intemal Affairs-Seyss-Inquart; War Minister-Field Marshal Schoemer,

c) a request for a truce until the new govemment could gather in Berlin....

"On 1 May between 02:00 and 03:00 it was finally possible to move General Krebs through our lines.... He retumed about 12:00. As any sensible person might assume, his negotiations with the Russian high command conceming a truce were unsuccessful. The high command demanded the unconditional surrender of Berlin. On that condition it was promised that the govemment named by the Fuehrer could be assembled in Berlin. Then followed the statement that everything possible would be done on the part of the Russians to deliver Grand Admiral Doenitz to Berlin quickly, and that the Russian radio would be used for this purpose.

"... Goebbels continued to cling to the Fuehrer's order forbidding surrender.... It was quite clear to me personally what the answer must be. Nevertheless, I did not wantto take this important step independently, and I asked my closest colleagues to state their opin ions openly....

"We managed to establish radio contact with the local Russian command posts. I crossed the Land wehrkanal at 05 :00.... From the Russian division head quarters we went on to the army headquarters. There for the last time I gave the order to down their weapons to the Gemman soldiers who were still fighting in some parts of Berlin. The order was sent out with my staff officers, accompanied by Russian interpreters.

"When we arrived at ammy headquarters, a delega tion from the German propaganda ministry appeared. Dr. Fritzsche, a ministry councillor, also called upon all German soldiers to stop fighting immediately in the interests of the population of Berlin. The Russian command authorities assisted us with great courtesy in ending the senseless, insane fighting as quickly as possible.... Helmuth Weidling."

Weidling was a Fascist general. It is possible that what he has said includes inaccuracies and departures from the truth. Even so, his information lets us see the Fascist leaders in their last days and hours.

Negotiations of the German Envoys With Representatives of the Soviet Command

For a long time we believed that the negotiations were conducted at many command levels, including the staffs of the Fifth Shock Army (Colonel-General N. Berzarin, commanding) and the Mnth Rifle Corps and the 301st Rifle Division of this ammy. As archive documents reveal, however, these staffs did not con duct negotiations. The negotiations with representatives of the Nazi Gemman command on the surrender of Berlin were carried on by the command of the Eighth Guards Army. Extracts from documents of the Fifth Shock Army, the Ninth Rifle Corps, and the 301 st Rifle Division reveal the following:

From the Combat Operations Log of the Fifth Shock Army

"At 23:00 on 30 April 1945, in the sector of the boundary between the 1050 Rifle Regiment of the 301 Rifle Division and the 102 Rifle Regiment of the 35 Rifle Division of the Eighth Guards Army, deployed in front of the stone wall of block '152' (the Gestapo building), the first truce envoys (one lieutenant colo nel, two lieutenants and an interpreter) from the enemy side appeared with a white flag and were accompanied by an officer (the first to approach them) of the 102 Rifle Regiment of the 35 Rifle Division to the head quarters of his regiment for preliminary negotiations...Note: All negotiations were held at the Eighth Guards Army HQ...."

From the Combat Operations Log of the Ninth Rifle Corps

"A truce envoy (lieutenant colonel) arrived from the enemy in the sector of the 1050 Rifle Regiment for surrendernegotiations at 00:00 [sic] on 1 May 1945. In connection with this, firing ceased on both sides at 01:30. The chief of staff of the enemy garrison (a general) was called upon for talks, and the chief of intelligence of the Eighth Guards Army conducted negotiations with him by authority of Marshal G. K. Zhukov...."

From the Combat Operations Log of the 301st Rifle Division of the Ninth Rifle Corps

"During the night of 30 April the division pre pared for a decisive assault on the Gestapo building and the Ministry of Aviation and brought up artillery, rearunits and reserves. Thecommandpostofthe 1050 Rifle Regiment was located in the building of the Danish consulate. Assault groups of the First Battal ion had tried that day to penetrate the stone wall surrounding the Gestapo building but had failed. Lieu tenant Colonel Gumerov, commander of 1050 Rifle Regiment, ordered a ten-minute softening up by the artillery, after which the Germ ans raised a white flag.... A few minutes later our soldiers noticed a group of truce envoys and reported to Captain Yaprintsev, battalion senior adjutant. The group of envoys was noticed at the same time by an of ficer of the 102 Rifle Regimentofthe 35 Rifle Division. Theofficertookthe envoys to his HQ...."

Archival documents of the Fifth Shock Army and its Ninth Rifle Corps and 301st Rifle Division thus fail to confirm that they conducted negotiations with German truce envoys concerning the surrender of the Nazi German garrison of Berlin. Moreover, the docu ments contain references indicating that such negotia tions were conducted by the command of the Eighth Guards Army.

Archival Documents of the Eighth Guards Army and the 35th Guards Rifle Division Concerning the Negotiations

The combat operations logs, communiques, and dispatches of headquarters of the Eighth Guards Army and its 35th Guards Rifle Division describe in detail not only the negotiations per se, but also the actions of the parties in organizing these negotiations. The compilers of the documents, realizing the historic significance of the negotiations, attempted to leave nothing out; actions were described in great detail with meticulous accuracy. Of all the material available, we shall examine only those aspects which describe the process as it really happened.

At 23:30 on 30 April 1945 truce envoy Lieutenant Colonel Zeifert came to the forward line of the 102 Guards Rifle Regiment of the 35 Guards Rifle Divi sion with a packet addressed to the command of the Soviet forces.

Documents presented to Colonel Smolin, com mander of the 35 Guards Rifle Division, and Colonel Lebed, chief of staff of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps, certified that Lieutenant Colonel Zeifert was author ized by the German high command to negotiate with the Soviet command to establish the place and time for General of Infantry Krebs to cross the front line in order to deliver to our command a message of special importance. The conditions for crossing the front line were established at 03:00 on 1 May, and General Krebs, accompanied by general staff Colonel von Dueffing, an interpreter, and one soldier, was brought to the 35 Guards Rifle Division headquarters.

A combat dispatch of the 35 Guards Rifle Division for 1 May 1945 reports the following: "... At 01 :00 on 1 May 1945, in the area of the 102 Guards Rifle Regiment, a German truce envoy with the rank of lieu tenant colonel crossed the front line accompanied by an interpreter and two soldiers. The lieutenant colonel stated that he was authorized by the German command to request of the Soviet command an agreement to enter negotiations on the question of surrender. Re ceiving a positive response, the lieutenant colonel re ported to his commanders, and at 05:00 a German general arrived at our position and was taken to the division commander's observation post. The deputy commander of the 4 Guards Rifle Corps and the deputy commander of the Eighth Guards Army arrived there also and after a brief discussion with the German general left with him to see the commander of the Eighth Guards Army...."

The German general mentioned in the dispatch was General Krebs. He stated that he had been com missioned by Goebbels and Bormann to deliver a message of special importance to the Russian high command. AtO3:30 on 1 May 1945 General Krebs and Colonel von Dueffing were taken to Colonel-General Chuykov, commander of the Eighth Guards Army, who received the message of the German envoy by authority of Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov. A document signed by Goebbels and Bormann and de livered by Krebs officially reported Hitler's suicide, the formation of a new government and the authoriza tion of Krebs to negotiate for a truce.

After familiarizing himself with the documents, Colonel-General Chuykov stated that he was not au thorized to conduct negotiations of any kind with the German government. Only the unconditional surren der of the Berlin garrison could be discussed. He reported to Marshal Zhukov on the meeting and the contents of the documents. Zhukov and Krebs had a telephone conversation at 05:00 on 1 May 1945. Zhukov confirmed the proposal of unconditional sur render of the Nazi German forces and told Krebs that he would report to his government on the course of the negotiations.

General of the Army Vasili D. Sokolovskiy, deputy commander of forces of the First Belorussian Front, arrived at Eighth Guards Army headquarters and proposed that General Krebs send Colonel von Dueffing with a representative of the Soviet command to Goebbels to present the demands of the Soviet command and to establish telephone contact through the frontline. Colonel von Dueffing duti~ully reported to Goebbels and then telephoned Krebs to summon him back on behalf of Goebbels.

Before his departure General Krebs requested that the Soviet proposals be put into final form, which was done by General of the Army Sokolovskiy. The gist of these proposals was that cessation of military opera tions would be possible only after the unconditional surrender of the Nazi German forces to all the Allies (the Nazi leaders were playing for time by proposing a truce and cessation of combat operations in Berlin only). Further resistance by the Berlin garrison would result in needless bloodshed and death among the innocent citizens of Berlin.

After the negotiations Krebs left at 14:00 on 1 May to report to Goebbels. An S.S. colonel arrived at 18:00 with a packet containing the German government's reply, signed by Bormann and Krebs, which declined the Soviet commander's demand for unconditional surrender. The Nazi leaders once again demonstrated their recklessness and total indifference to the lives of millions of ordinary Germans who had blindly en trusted their fate to them. In the face of such a response the Soviet command was forced to renew combat operations to take Berlin. At 19:15 on 1 May, after forty-five minutes of heavy artillery fire, a general attack by Soviet forces began, after which telephone communication with the Germans was broken off. The assault on the surrounded garrison in the central part of Berlin did not cease during the night.

The Process of the Berlin Garrison Surrendering

At 00:40 on 2 May the radio unit of the 79 Guards Rifle Division intercepted a message in Russian from a portable radio set of the 56 Panzer Corps: "Hello, Hello! This is the 56 Panzer Corps. Please cease fire. We are sending truce envoys to the Potsdam Bridge.... They will be identified by a white flag on a red background. We await your reply." The message was reported to the army commander, who ordered a ceasefire in the sector and that the envoys be received.

At the appointed time the German truce envoys, headed by Colonel von Dueffing were met. Von Dueffing stated that they had been authorized by General Weidling, commander of the 56 Panzer Corps, to announce the cessation of resistance and the surren der of the corps. The commander of the 47th Guards Rifle Division, after determining the time the 56 Pan zer Corps would require for complete disarmament and the organized transfer of personnel, sent von Duef fing to General Weidling with the Soviet command's reply, i.e., thatthe surrender was accepted; the units of the corps were to be completely disarmed and trans ferred to the Soviet command by 07:00 on 2 MayÑ General Weidling and his staff were to give them selves up by 06:00. This Soviet demand was met.

At 06:00 General Weidling and two other general officers crossed the front line and surrendered. They were taken to the command post of Colonel-General Chuykov, who checked their documents and asked them a few questions. Then the army commander suggested that Weidling sign an order of surrender for the entire Berlin garrison and deliver the order to the defenders using officers of the 56 Panzer Corps with Soviet representatives.

General Weidling composed the following order: "Every hour of fighting increased the terrible suffering of the civilian population of Berlin and our wounded; anyone who falls for Berlin dies in vain. On agreement with the high command of the Soviet forces, I demand that the fighting cease immediately." This order was announced by radio through an amplifier for the en emy garrison, which had continued its resistance.

Representatives from the First Deputy Minister for Propaganda, Dr. Fritzsche, arrived at the com mander's command post. They stated that Goebbels had committed suicide during the night of 2 May and that Fritzsche was the only representative of the Nazi regime left in Berlin. Dr. Fritzsche sent word of his agreement to give the order of surrender for the Berlin garrison and the entire German Army. A lieutenant colonel, representing the Soviet command, was sent to Fritzsche with a response and a demand that Fritzsche issue an order for unconditional surrender of the entire German Army, and that he come to Eighth Guards Army command post for further negotiations.

Dr. Fritzsche accepted the demand, issued the order for surrender, and presented himself with his aides at the command post. All resistance by the Berlin garrison had ceased by the evening of 2 May. Archival documents of both the Eighth Guards Army and the Fifth Shock Army, therefore, confirm that the com mand ofthe Eighth Guards Army received the German truce envoys. No battle was waged by forces of the Soviet Army for direct capture of the Reich Chancel lery building. The German garrison defending the chancellery had surrendered along with the forces of the 56 Panzer Corps defending the government block in Berlin before the moment of general surrender on 2 May 1945.

Col. Igor N. Venkov, archivist of the Soviet General Staff, is a member of the editorial staff of the National Book of Memory.