

**It's Tea Time, but What Flavor?
Regional Variation in Sources of Support for the Tea Party Movement**

Stacy G. Ulbig and Sarah Macha
Department of Political Science
Sam Houston State University
SHSU Box 2149
Huntsville, TX 77341-2149
936-294-1468
Ulbig@shsu.edu; sam051@shsu.edu

ABSTRACT

The Tea Party movement has gained much support and media attention over the past several years. Debate rages, however, about the sources of support for the movement. Some argue that supporters are drawn to the movement by concerns about the state of the U.S. economy. Others believe the movement attracts those who are most disgruntled with the size and direction of the national government. Further, charges of racism and anti-immigrant attitudes among movement supporters continue to arise. Finally, some wonder what role moral issues that have been so prominent in national politics for more than a decade play in this movement, if any. We believe that much of this debate results from the varied attraction of the Tea Party movement across the nation. While supporters in one region might be drawn to the Tea Party by economic or size of government concerns, supporters in other areas are likely drawn to the movement by concerns more particular to their region.

Using data from a June, 2010, nationwide USA Today/Gallup Poll, we investigate the sources of Tea Party support, with a particular eye toward whether the basis of support varies by geographic region. We find that traditional, moral values play no role in increasing support for the movement, further substantiating claims that the movement formed in reaction to the Republican Party's shift toward its neo-conservative wing over the past three decades. Counter to much popular sentiment, we find that racism plays no role in movement support either. Though Tea Party supporters are more likely to be white Southerners and to express more racist attitudes, these attitudes do not appear to *cause* a person to support the movement. We do find that economic concerns, anti-government sentiment, and views about illegal immigration play important, but varied roles in movement support across the nation. Viewing illegal immigration as a threat to the nation increases support for the Tea Party movement, but only in the West. Economic concerns are the key factor increasing movement support in the East, while anti-government sentiment boosts support in the Midwest and both play key roles in the South where anti-government sentiment drives support more than economic concerns.

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The Tea Party movement has been one of the most “derided... minimized... and disrespected movements in American history. Yet, despite being systematically ignored, belittled, marginalized, and ostracized by political, academic, and media elites, the Tea Party movement has grown stronger and stronger” (Rasmussen 2010: pg 4; see also Harris 2010; Parker 2010). While the Tea Party movement has gained much support and media attention over the past several years, debate rages about the sources of support for the Tea Party. Some argue that supporters are drawn to the movement by concerns about the state of the U.S. economy. Others believe the movement attracts those who are most disgruntled with the size and direction of the national government. Further, charges of racism and anti-immigrant attitudes among movement supporters continue to arise. Finally, some wonder what role moral issues that have been so prominent in national politics for more than a decade play in this movement, if any.

We believe that much of this debate results from the varied attraction of the Tea Party movement across the nation. While supporters in one region might be drawn to the Tea Party movement by economic or size of government concerns, supporters in other areas are likely drawn to the movement by concerns more particular to their region. Using data from a June, 2010, nationwide USA Today/Gallup Poll, we investigate the sources of Tea Party support, with a particular eye toward whether the basis of support varies by geographic region. We find that traditional, moral values play no role in increasing support for the movement and, counter to much popular sentiment we find that racism plays no role in movement support either. Though Tea Party supporters are more likely to be white Southerners and to express more racist attitudes, these attitudes do not appear to *cause* a person to support the movement. We do find that economic concerns, anti-government sentiment, and views about illegal immigration play important, but varied roles in movement support across the nation. Viewing illegal immigration as a threat to the nation increases support for the Tea Party movement, but only in the West. Economic concerns are the key factor increasing movement support in the East, while anti-government sentiment boosts support in the Midwest and both play key roles in the South where anti-government sentiment drives support more than economic concerns.

THE GROWTH OF THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT

The movement's name calls on the first American patriots and guerilla activists, led by Sons of Liberty fighter Sam Adams, in their protest of British taxes, specifically the Townshend Act and Tea Act, which forced English colonist to buy tea from the East India Company with heavy taxation. On the night of December 16, 1773, the Sons of Liberty famously threw 342 chests of tea into Boston Harbor while dressed as Mohawk Indians. Calling on these patriotic themes, Tea Party rallies often prominently feature revolutionary signs and flags promoting that same spirit, most notably the "Don't Tread on Me" flag and various signs with quotations from the Founding Fathers. Many Tea Party supporters claim Tea stands for Taxed Enough Already, again a harkening back to the Sons of Liberty.

Like the patriots of the American Revolution, the Tea Party movement shares many similarities with historical populist movements, usually spurred by people who have felt in some way violated by their government. Such movements include the "Know-Nothings" prior to the Civil War, the People's Party of the late 1800s, and the Union Party of the 1930s touting the "forgotten man," referring to FDR's working poor. Like the Tea Party movement, which has been called "the most controversial and dramatic development in U.S. politics in many years" (Mead 2011), these movements shook the political scene. "Over the course of American history, the populist instinct, now resurgent in the Tea Party movement, has oscillated between a desire to transform and so create a new order of things, and a desire to restore a yearned-for (or imagined) old order" (Fraser and Freeman 2010: 76).

The contemporary Tea Party movement did not start with the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, but rooted in a populist history, ideologically started with the fiscal conservative principles first articulated politically on the national stage by Barry Goldwater in his presidential campaign of 1964 (Rasmussen 2010). Goldwater's bestselling pamphlet entitled the *Conscience of a Conservative* boldly claimed, "the radical, or Liberal, approach has not worked and is not working" and that the "Powercrats," as he called contemporary Democrats, think the average American is "too damned dumb" to make his or her own individual choices, be they fiscal or personal (Shermer 2008). "[H]e might be called the original 'tenth' – that is, a serial quoter of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which reserves for the

states (or to the people) all powers not expressly granted to the federal government, with which he justified hamstringing all efforts by Washington to rectify social or economic injustice” (Fraser and Freeman 2010: 79).

In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan ushered in a period of limited government and fiscal conservatism, but the movement faltered for a period under his successor, George H.W. Bush, and then reverberated in the rhetoric of wealthy outsider Ross Perot in his failed but strong showing as a third party candidate in the presidential election of 1992. Perot supporters, as opposed to other voters, had more cynicism toward government and were more likely to believe that government wastes taxpayer money (Koch 1998). Indeed many Perot supporters were fiscal conservatives and libertarians who felt the Republican Party had swayed too far to the right on social issues (Rasmussen 2010). Perot’s presidential bid gave momentum to the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress and eventual Contract with America, listing numerous principles Perot had earlier supported.

The 1994 Republican Revolution and current Tea Party movement, as noted by Scott Rasmussen, are similar but have two key differences. “First, the Contract with America was an elite orchestrated, top-down movement designed to appeal to the mainstream” (2010: 42), whereas the Tea Party movement is a bottom-up movement. Second, the 1994 Contract of America was driven by a certain amount of social conservatism whereas the current Tea Party movement is driven by fiscal conservatism focusing on limited government, fiscal responsibility and good governance reform (Rasmussen 2010; Zemike 2010a, 2010b). Libertarians felt marginalized under President George W. Bush, former Republican Congressional leaders Trent Lott and Dennis Hastert. Furthermore, because of the economic bailouts started by George W. Bush and continued by President Obama, along with the Obama stimulus and healthcare bills, that one time libertarian fringe, focused on fiscal responsibility, has manifested itself into the current movement seeking to take back the Republican Party from social conservatism and rescue the country from fiscal irresponsibility (Rasmussen 2010).

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT

While the historical origins of the Tea Party movement can be traced rather directly, the contemporary causes of Tea Party support are less clear. “Supporters have hailed [the movement] as a return to core American values; opponents have seen it as a racist, reactionary, and ultimately futile protest against the emerging reality of a multicultural, multiracial United States and a new era of government activism” (Mead 2011). The scant academic research available mirrors the public’s reaction, offering a number of differing contentions about the attraction of the Tea Party movement, ranging from libertarian concerns for smaller government and lower taxes to fears about societal changes along racial and ethnic lines. Interestingly, the moral “family values” that have come to characterize much contemporary political debate are largely missing from the litany of causes cited for the rise of the Tea Party movement.

There is some common agreement that the movement appeals to those holding a healthy libertarian ideology, drawing heavily among anti-taxation and smaller government proponents. Spurred by economic crisis, most Tea Party supporters identify reducing the size of the federal government and lowering the deficit as important national priorities (Courser 2010), and this “passionate resistance to governmental taxation and regulation” (Tilden 2011: 214) serves to unite them behind the Tea Party label. At the same time, movement supporters express a strong distrust or lack of confidence in the government’s ability to handle the nation’s problems (Courser 2010). Taken together, these sentiments lead some to describe the Tea Party movement as a libertarian and anti-establishment organization that views hardworking and average American people to be those most affected by the unfortunate turn of economic events (see Cunningham 2010).

At the same time, many see the movement playing into racial and ethnic fears caused by rapidly changing national demographics. Paranoia, fear, and phobic racism have been cited as themes in the contemporary populism espoused by the movement (Fraser and Freeman 2010; Tilden 2011), with some seeing support springing mostly from those with a fear “of change, fear of decline, fear of strangers and an unfamiliar world” (Cunningham 2010: 24). Typically these fears are cast in terms of age-old racial

tensions, with the predominantly White middle class and working class (Berlet 2011) cast as expressing “a visceral anger at the cultural and, to some extent, political eclipse of an America in which people who looked and thought like them were dominant” (Fraser and Freeman 2010: 81). Though less prominent, there is also some evidence that anti-immigrant attitudes may be part of this fear as well (Fraser and Freeman 2010), with Tea Party supporters scapegoating of immigrants, as well as people of color (Berlet 2011) to further their cause. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that some would claim that the movement is comprised of “a range of right-wing fringe and hate groups, including white supremacists [and] xenophobes” (Tilden 2011: 214).

While little agreement about the core causes of movement support emerges, the literature holds the common theme that the movement represents a very incoherent one with no single actor or group able to claim the national leadership of the “party” (Courser 2010). Without a consistent ideology, coherent set of policies, or common core set of beliefs (Harris 2010; Tilden 2011), many view the Tea Party movement as nothing more than “an amorphous collection of individuals and groups” (Mead 2011). Those seeking to identify clear policy stances from the group have been stymied by debates between prominent leaders in the movement (Baker 2010; Mead 2011; O’Rourke 2010). It is little wonder, then, that many see the movement as “a house of contradiction, a bewildering network of crosscutting political emotions, ideas, and institutions” (Fraser and Freeman 2010: 75).

Yet it is precisely this nationwide diversity that we believe helps explain the many contradictory claims about the sources of support for the Tea Party movement. As seemingly contradictory as the movement itself, we believe it is possible that no one is correct and yet everyone is correct. We suspect that while moral values probably play little role in the movement’s momentum, economic concerns, anti-government sentiment, racial fears and anti-immigrant attitudes all play some role. Importantly, however, the impact of these different factors will vary across the nation. Since the Tea Party movement seeks to appeal to those most disgruntled within the existing political parties, the factor that will be most important in drawing supporters will depend on the context within which voters find themselves. Tea Party movements in regions with a history of racial strife are likely to appeal strongly to those holding more

racist attitudes, while those facing the pressing problem of illegal immigration are likely to poll well among those with strong anti-immigrant sentiments. Similarly, movements in parts of the nation hit hardest by the failing economy are likely to draw heavily from those with economic concerns and those in areas with a history of conservative fiscal policy are likely to find a home with those holding strong anti-government sentiments. In any region, however, those driven by traditional “family values” issues are not likely to be drawn to the movement since they can readily find a home in the existing Republican party.

We therefore expect traditional, moral values to play little, if any role, in boosting support for the Tea Party movement in any part of the nation. Further, we expect that economic concerns, anti-government sentiment, racial attitudes, and feelings about illegal immigration to be important but for the impact of these factors to vary across the United States. While economic and anti-government sentiments are likely to drive support for the movement in multiple regions of the country (especially the Eastern and Midwestern regions) racial attitudes are more likely to be linked to Tea Party movement support in the South and concerns over immigration are likely to be tied more closely to support in the Western region.

DATA AND MEASURES

To investigate regional variations in the sources of Tea Party movement support, we employ data from a June, 2010, USA Today/Gallup Poll.¹ The study interviewed a random sample of 1,014 adult American citizens about a range of political topics, including support for the Tea Party movement in America. Respondents were coded as residing in one of four U.S. Census Bureau regions – East (New England and Mid-Atlantic states), Midwest (East Central and West Central states), South (states of the former Confederacy and border South states), or West (Rocky Mountain and Pacific coast states).²

We take support for the Tea Party movement as our key dependent variable, and code support as a dichotomous variable (1=supporter; 0=non-supporter). Respondents were asked whether they

¹ The data (USAIPOUSA2010-08) are available for download from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research data archive.

² The East region includes: ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, NY, NJ, PA, MD, DE, WV, DC; the Midwest Region includes: OH, MI, IN, IL, WI, MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, KS; the Southern region includes: VA, NC, SC, GA, FL, KY, TN, AL, MS, AR, LA, OK, TX; the West region includes: MT, AZ, CO, ID, WY, UT, NV, NM, CA, OR, WA, HA, AK.

considered themselves to be “a supporter of the Tea Party movement,” “an opponent of the Tea Party movement,” or neither. Nationwide a little more than one-third of those interviewed (37.2%) report being supporters of the movement, while more than half (56.3%) said they are not supporters, claiming to be either opponents or neither supporters nor opponents. Further, there is some minor regional variation in movement support, with support being the highest in the South and the lowest in the East. (See Table 1 for question wording and coding, as well as basic descriptive statistics of all variables.)

[Table 1 about here]

We predict support for the Tea Party movement with feelings about the U.S. economy and the U.S. government, issues stances on traditional/moral values and illegal immigration, and attitudes toward racial minorities. Feelings about the U.S. economy are measured with a question asking respondents to identify the “most important problem facing this country today.” Respondents were encouraged to give up to three responses. Our measure is the number of responses each respondent gave related to the economy. Thus, this measure ranges from 0 to 3, with a nationwide mean of just less than one mention of the economy as the most important problem. As Table 1 illustrates, concerns about the economy are widespread with more than half of respondents in each region mentioning the economy as a problem at least once. Still, those in the East seem to be more concerned than others. Slightly more than two-thirds of respondents in the Eastern region (67.1%) mention the economy as a problem at least once while those in the other regions report lower levels of concern.

Anti-government sentiment is captured with a single, dichotomous item asking respondents whether they believe that “the federal government is more part of the problem” (coded 1) or “more a part of the solution” (coded 0) when it comes to the “issues facing the country today.”³ Nationwide, nearly two-thirds of Americans (65.9%) report the federal government to be more a part of the problem than the solution. Southerners report the highest level of anti-government sentiment, 69.2% of Southern respondents view the federal government as problematic.

³ Respondents were also allowed to volunteer that the federal government is both a part of the problem and solution. Such responses were included in our analysis and coded 0.

Views on traditional/moral values were tapped with a single question about whether the “government should promote traditional values” or “should not favor any set of values.” We use a dichotomous measure, with the 47.2% of Americans believing the government should promote traditional values coded 1 and the 49.8% reporting that the government should not favor any set of values or reporting mixed attitudes coded 0. Not surprisingly, those living in the Midwest and South report the highest levels of support for governmental promotion of traditional values, with more than half of the respondents in each of these regions feeling the government should promote such values.

Issue stances on illegal immigration were gauged with a question about “how serious a threat” the respondent felt illegal immigration was “to the future well being of the United States.” Respondents were asked to place themselves on a five point scale, ranging from one, “not a serious threat” to five, “an extremely serious threat.” Nationwide, the mean threat level reported was 3.8 on the five-point scale. Interestingly, there is remarkably little variation across the regions, with average threat ratings ranging from 3.6 in the West to 3.9 in the South.⁴

Racial attitudes were measured with a four-item index asking respondents whether they felt African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people (a) “because most African-Americans just don’t have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty,” (b) “mainly due to discrimination,” (c) “because most African-Americans have less in-born ability to learn,” and (d) “because most African-Americans don’t have the chance for the education that it takes to rise out of poverty.” Responses to each item were coded dichotomously, with more racist sentiments coded one (i.e., agreement with the first and third statements and disagreement with the second and fourth) and less racist sentiments coded as zero. Despite the many gains made in race relations in this nation, there is still some evidence of racist feelings. Nationwide, respondents agreed expressed 1.7 of the more “racist” statements.

⁴ This similarity in concern over illegal immigration might be due to the timing of the interviews. Respondents were interviewed in the midst of massive media coverage of Arizona’s restrictive illegal immigrant law (SB1070), which was signed on April 23, 2010 and went into effect on July 29, 2010.

As we might expect, Southerners expressed slightly higher levels of racist sentiment (with a mean of 1.9 statements), while those in the East and West report the lowest levels (with 1.6 statements).

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

To explore the varied relationship between each of these factors and support for the Tea Party movement, we perform a series of multivariate regression analyses. Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable (1=supporter of movement; 0=non-supporter), we employ probit regression. Additionally, we include controls for a number of demographic variables thought to have an impact on movement support, including respondent's sex, race, income, marital status, education level, partisanship, and ideology.⁵ We expect that male, Anglo, married, wealthier, more educated, conservative, Republican respondents will be more likely to express support for the movement.⁶

As the results presented on Table 2 illustrate, traditional values do not appear to be linked to support for the Tea Party movement in any part of the nation. Thus, as we expected, support for the movement has little to do with the promotion of such values. In fact, notwithstanding statistical significance, the negative coefficients for the traditional values measure in the East and Midwest models, as well as the overall model, suggest that those who support government promotion of traditional values are *less* likely to support the Tea Party movement. Overall, our findings support the contention that the Tea Party movement is, in some part, a reaction to the Republican Party's movement toward the neo-conservative, moral-majority wing over the past three decades.

[Table 2 about here]

While the findings regarding the role of traditional values are perhaps not surprising, the wholly insignificant coefficients associated with the racial attitudes variable provide some new insight. Despite what some argue, racism seems to play no role in driving up support for the Tea Party movement. In no region of the nation is Tea Party movement support associated with higher levels of racist sentiment. In

⁵ See Appendix A for details on question wording, variable coding, and descriptive statistics of all control variables.

⁶ Concerned that the income measure was suppressing our number of valid cases, we also ran all the models excluding the income measure. While the number of cases in each model slightly increases, the statistical and substantive results are unchanged by this exclusion.

fact, notwithstanding statistical significance, a negative relationship between racist attitudes and support for the movement emerges in the precise region where we would expect a strong positive relationship – the South. It thus appears that the common and persistent charges that the Tea Party movement is, at base, a racist one are misplaced.

Our data offer two points of evidence for reconciling this statistical non-finding regarding racial attitudes with the common perception of a racist movement. First, the Tea Party movement may be painted as a racist one because Tea Party supporters are more likely to be white Southerners. While less than one in five (19.4%) minority non-Southerners and about 36% of Anglo non-Southerners report supporting the movement, almost half of white Southerners (47.1%) express support.⁷ This fact might lead many to falsely conclude that racial hatred is driving the movement. Second, our evidence bolsters that of some previous studies (see Campo-Flores 2010) illustrating that supporters of the Tea Party movement express more racist attitudes than non-supporters. As Table 3 illustrates, movement supporters express higher levels of racist sentiment on the overall racial attitudes index and on each of the four items in our racial attitudes index.⁸ Tea Party movement supporters are more likely to believe that African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people because African-Americans are not as motivated to pull themselves out of poverty and have less in-born ability to learn. Similarly, movement supporters are less likely to believe that these differences are due to discrimination or poorer educational opportunities. Our findings thus suggest that supporters of the Tea Party movement do indeed look more like stereotypical racists (i.e., white Southerners) and do, in fact, express more racist attitudes on a range of measures. At the same time, our results illustrate that, in comparison to other factors, racist attitudes are not what draws people to the movement. Tea Party supporters may indeed be more racist than non-supporters, but this racism is not what *causes* them to be movement supporters.

[Table 3 about here]

⁷ Only 14.8% of Southern non-Anglo respondents express movement support.

⁸ The difference in mean racial attitude index scores for Tea Party supporters and non-supporters is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ (two tailed).

Our results further reveal interesting and expected regional patterns when it comes to concerns about illegal immigration and the economy, as well anti-government sentiment. While anti-immigrant attitudes prove to be most important in the West, economic concerns and, especially, anti-government sentiments appear to be the strongest predictors of Tea Party movement support in the non-Western regions of the nation.⁹ In the East, economic concerns seem to be the key predictive factor, while anti-government sentiment plays the largest role in the Midwest. Finally, in the South, both factors are important.

In the West it's about Illegal Immigration, Maybe

In the Western region, and only this region, anti-immigrant attitudes appear to increase support. In fact, views on illegal immigration appear to be the sole factor (besides being Conservative) increasing movement support in this part of the nation, and exhibit a substantial impact on the likelihood that a person will support the movement. To compare the substantive effects of the various statistically significant factors, we calculate predicted probabilities and present them in Figure 1. For comparison, the impact that Conservatism has on Tea Party support is displayed in Figure 1 as well (indicated with the white bar on the right side of each regional cluster). As this figure illustrates, a typical Westerner who perceives illegal immigration to be an “extremely serious threat” to the nation is much more likely to support the Tea Party movement than one who does not view illegal immigration as a threat.¹⁰ The former has about a 12% chance of being a Tea Party supporter, while the latter exhibits only about a 0.2%

⁹ Anti-government sentiment represents the single most powerful influence on movement support, a fact supported by our data when it comes to Presidential and Congressional approval. When we add presidential disapproval as a predictor in our model, it is the single most important predictor of Tea Party support (and many times the *only* significant predictor).

¹⁰ Predicted probability of supporting the Tea Party movement was estimated using the regression results presented in Table 2. For the baseline probability, all issue variables were set to their minimum values and all control values set to their median values. Probabilities for each issue area were calculated using the maximum value for the issue and the median values for all control variables. So, in this example, the “typical” Westerner was a non-conservative, non-Republican, married, Anglo, male, with a technical degree, earning \$50-\$75K per year who did not mention the economy as the most important problem facing the nation, did not see government as more of the problem than the solution, did not believe the government should promote traditional values, and had the lowest racism index score.

chance. This impact dwarfs that exhibited by Conservatism, which only increases movement support by about 3.3%.

[Figure 1 about here]

While impressive, the magnitude of the immigration effect must not be overstated. The influence of this variable is likely influenced by the context within which the interviews were conducted. Respondents were interviewed in the midst of massive media coverage of Arizona's restrictive illegal immigrant law (SB1070), which was signed on April 23, 2010 and went into effect on July 29, 2010. Respondents, especially those in the West, were likely to have issues of illegal immigration in the forefront of their minds. Thus, it is not surprising that such a strong statistical relationship emerges here.

Given these possible contaminating effects in the West, we explored the possibility that the link between immigration attitudes and movement support were serving as a proxy for economic concerns. Perhaps Westerners were expressing fears over illegal immigration in reaction to the perception that valuable jobs were being filled by illegal immigrants in a tough economic climate. To investigate this possibility, we correlated the illegal immigration concerns item with a measure of respondents' perceptions about how serious a threat unemployment is to the future well-being of the United States (measured on a five-point scale where 1=not a threat and 5=extremely serious threat). While these two items are positively and significantly related in all regions, the magnitude of the effect is strongest in the West.¹¹ These findings suggest that while immigration attitudes are an important predictor of Tea Party movement support in the West, economic issues related to minority relations might be playing a role as well.¹²

¹¹ Correlations by region: West=0.3403; Midwest=0.3356; East=0.2391; South=0.1974 (all significant at $p < 0.01$).

¹² As a secondary test of the possibility that concerns about illegal immigration might be serving as a proxy for economic concerns, we substituted a measure of feelings about minority job discrimination for the racism index in our regression models. This job discrimination measure was comprised of two variables: (a) the second item in our racism index (reference discrimination) and (b) a question asking respondents if they felt "minorities in this country have equal job opportunities as whites, or not." We find this "job discrimination" index is positively and significantly related to support for the Tea Party movement in the West, but in no other region. At the same time, the immigration measure remains statistically significant as well.

These statistical results are borne out by the results of recent elections in the West where conservative candidates, even established Republicans found themselves having to conform to Tea Party belief's concerning immigration. "Maverick" John McCain found himself fighting for primary survival against Tea Party candidate J.D. Hayworth, and was forced to play to the Tea Party supporters in the state supporting more stringent immigration reforms such as Governor Jan Brewer's immigration law (Allen 2010; Hunt 2010). McCain changed his tone and released an ad where he declared, "complete the danged fence," campaigned across the state with the governor, attended Tea Party rallies and ultimately gained an official endorsement from the governor. This new tough immigration stance played well with his supporters and Tea Party activists, pushing McCain to a decisive victory over Hayworth in the Republican primary and an easy victory in November.

A similar story played out in New Mexico, where Tea Party favorite Susana Martinez, a former prosecutor, made immigration the center of her gubernatorial campaign, touting her record on her website and in campaign ads for going after illegal immigrant law-breakers (Gomez 2010; Lacey 2010; Massey 2010). While Martinez argued against Governor Bill Richardson's policy of granting illegal immigrants driver's licenses, she stopped short of embracing an immigration policy paralleling the Arizona law and won the governorship with 54% of the vote, becoming the first Hispanic female to hold the office

Interestingly, much of the immigration rhetoric in this region was tied to the availability of jobs. In both Utah and California, candidates tied their immigration appeals to hiring of illegal immigrants. Three-term Senator Robert Bennett of Utah faced, and ultimately lost, a tough fight in the primaries against Tea Party favorite Mike Lee (Burr 2010; Canam 2010; Lee 2010). Among the top issues of the race, not surprisingly was immigration. Bennett found his centrist approach to immigration reform increasingly unpopular as Lee espoused a hard-line immigration policy that mirrored Arizona's law and would punish businesses hiring undocumented workers, and even denied birthright citizenship. Lee's stances on illegal immigration pushed him to a win with 62% of the vote.

Even in the strongly blue state of California, moderate Republicans found themselves having to take right of center stances on immigration. Senatorial candidate Carly Fiorina backed the Arizona law, but stopped short of supporting a repeal of the 14th Amendment and received the endorsement of Sarah Palin. Gubernatorial candidate Meg Whitman, who did not back the Arizona law, also stated, “I am 100 percent opposed to granting amnesty to immigrants who entered the country illegally . . . We need to build an ‘economic fence’ with a strong e-verification system that holds employers accountable for only hiring documented workers” (Whitman 2010). Both Fiorina and Whitman lost their elections in California, their stances on immigration not playing well in California.

In the East “It’s the economy, stupid”

For Easterners, believing the economy is the most important problem facing the nation increases support for the Tea Party movement (see Table 1). The typical Easterner who mentions the economy as the most important problem three times has about almost a 4% chance of supporting the movement. In contrast, a typical Easterner who does not mention the economy is the most important problem at all exhibits only about a 1.3% chance of supporting the movement. Though this impact is not especially strong, it is close to the impact that Conservatism exhibits. Further, in the East it appears that those who are married and call themselves Republicans are also more likely to be Tea Party movement supporters. Interestingly, the wealthier in this region are less supportive of the movement, suggesting that the movement may not be drawing those who believe that taxes on the wealthy are too high.

Again, anecdotal evidence from recent elections bears out these statistical findings. In the East, particularly the battleground state of Pennsylvania, Senatorial candidate Pat Toomey and gubernatorial candidate John Corbett, both seeking to appeal to Tea Party supporters, kept to the issue that mattered most to Pennsylvania voters - the economy (Barnes 2010; Wereschagin 2010). In a heated debate with Democratic opponent Joe Sestak, Toomey asked, “Where are the jobs? The idea that just borrowing and spending federal money is going to generate prosperity is just a fallacy.” Toomey also flaunted his business experience as an investment banker and his doctorate in political economy from Harvard adding, “Joe has not experience in business and doesn’t understand the consequences of the really bad policies

he's proposing. I understand business" (Wereschagin 2010). Corbett, though not a favorite of the Tea Party, was forced by a Tea Party challenger in the gubernatorial primary to move his position right of center on economic issues. He signed a pledge to not raise taxes and as Attorney General of Pennsylvania, added his state to the list of states challenging president Obama's healthcare law. In his defense of the lawsuit, Corbett, appealing to Pennsylvania voter's economic rationale, claimed the federal government was interfering with intrastate commerce.

A Rejection of Government in the Midwest

In the Midwest, anti-government sentiment represents the sole factor (besides Conservatism) increasing support for the movement (see Table 1), and the impact of this sentiment is strong (see Figure 1). While the typical Midwesterner who does not believe the government is part of the problem has about a 3.3% chance of being a Tea Party supporter, one who sees the government as "more a part of the problem" than the solution has about an 18.2% chance of being a supporter. This effect is among the strongest effects we observe, and it trumps the impact of Conservatism in this region as well.

The campaign rhetoric in this region readily corroborates our findings. In a surprising turn of events, Wisconsin voters ousted three-term Senator Russ Feingold in favor of Tea Party supported businessman Ron Johnson (Bivins, 2011; Oliphant 2010; Schaper 2010). Feingold, in an attempt to appeal to the anti-government sentiments of Tea Party supporters, called the Patriot Act an invasion of personal freedom for giving the government expanded surveillance powers to combat terrorism. Johnson, who said of the Tea Party "their issues are my issues," criticized Feingold's votes of federal government programs such as Obama's healthcare law and the economic stimulus bill. Johnson claimed that Feingold, "wants government control over our lives. He likes high spending" (Oliphant 2010). When asked what inspired him to run for office, Johnson, a political novice, said it was the passage of the federal healthcare law which he called, "the greatest assault to our freedom in my lifetime" (Bivins 2011). Feingold's eighteen years of government experience seemed to be a turn-off for voters who looked more favorably upon Johnson's private sector experience in the plastics manufacturing business. Feingold even acknowledged this stating, "People are hurting, and they have a right to look at what you've done. They have a right to

say, ‘OK, this guy’s been in office – is he part of the solution or part of the problem?’” (Schaper 2010). In one of their debates, Johnson harped upon this very issue claiming of Feingold, “He’s been in politics all his life. He’s never created a job. I have” (Oliphant 2010). Wisconsin was a state roughly hit by the recession losing many manufacturing and construction jobs and in the end the people of Wisconsin went with Johnson, voting him in with 52% of the vote.

Ohio was also deeply impacted by the recession, losing an estimated 400,000 jobs under Democrat Ted Strickland’s governorship. This opportunity was ripe for former Republican Congressman and Tea Party favorite John Kasich to make the anti-government argument (Memoli 2010; Zeleny 2010a, 2010b). Kasich, a key conservative Representative in the 1990s who helped to balance the federal budget, argued that what Ohio needed was less government intrusion. Strickland, however, aligned himself with national politicians, further fueling Kasich’s rhetoric, making it an “us” versus “them” argument that ultimately prevailed.

South offers a Mix of the East and Midwest

Finally, in the South, both economic concerns and anti-government sentiment increase support for the movement (see Table 1), and anti-government sentiment exhibits about twice as strong an impact as economic concerns (see Figure 1). While economic concerns increase the likelihood of movement support by about 4.3%, anti-government sentiment boosts the chances of support by almost 18%. While a typical Southerner who views the government as more a part of the problem than the solution has almost a one in four (23.9%) chance of supporting the movement, a similar person who does not see the government as the problem has only about a 6% chance of supporting the movement. Economic concerns move the likelihood of supporting from about 6% to only about 11%. In fact, the role that anti-government sentiment in the South plays in Tea Party movement support is the strongest in our analysis.

The importance of anti-government sentiment in this region was readily on display in recent elections. The first official Tea Party victory of the mid-term election occurred when Rand Paul, a longtime favorite of the movement, won the Kentucky Senate seat with 56% of the vote. While Paul had various distractions in the campaign, overall he stuck to a message that was anti-government (Gerth 2010;

Phillips 2010). “The people are sick and tired of an overreaching government, of a deficit out of control – they want their government back” (Gerth 2010). Paul even went so far as to call the Obama administration “un-American” for its tough rhetoric against BP for the oil spill (Phillips 2010), and when asked about government run healthcare, pointed toward the incompetence of the federal government claiming, “You want people to be in charge of health care, just think how good they were in distributing water at the Superdome after Katrina. Ineptness is the role of government. It is what we typically see from the federal government” (FOX News 2009).

Texas’ gubernatorial election offered equally as strong anti-government appeals. Governor Rick Perry easily won reelection in Texas and did so with a hard-line Tea Party wave of anti-Obama, anti-federal government rhetoric that led to the insinuation of state secession. In front of an enthusiastic Tea Party rally in Austin, Perry said, “We’ve got a great union. There’s absolutely no reason to dissolve it. But if Washington continues to thumb their nose at the American people, you know, who knows what might come out of that” (FOX News 2009). Later Perry had to clarify his remarks citing the overall frustration Texans have with the federal government, “They’re sick of Washington overspending. They’re sick of Washington mandating to states how to run their businesses” (Barabak 2009). Perry shaped the campaign against the current federal government, so much so that Democratic opponent Bill White refused to be seen with Obama when the President visited Texas (Satija 2010). Immediately following his unprecedented win of a third term as Texas Governor, Perry released a book expressing his anti-government sentiments entitled *Fed Up! Our Fight to Save America from Washington*.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Overall, our expectations about the impact that varied sources of Tea Party movement support were generally borne out. We found that traditional, moral values play no role in increasing support for the movement, further substantiating claims that the movement formed in reaction to the Republican Party’s shift toward the neo-conservative wing over the past three decades. Counter to much popular sentiment, we find that racism plays no role in predicting movement support, either. Though Tea Party supporters are more likely to be white Southerners and to express more racist attitudes, these attitudes do

not appear to *cause* a person to support the movement. We do find that economic concerns, anti-government sentiment, and views about illegal immigration play important, but varied roles in movement support across the nation. Viewing illegal immigration as a threat to the nation increases support for the Tea Party movement, but only in the West. Economic concerns are the key factor increasing movement support in the East, while anti-government sentiment boosts support in the Midwest and both play key roles in the South where anti-government sentiment drive support more than economic concerns.

Our statistical findings comport well with the campaign rhetoric displayed across the nation in mid-term Congressional and gubernatorial races. In the West, even veteran Republican candidates found themselves appealing to Tea Party supporters on the issue of illegal immigration, while in the East Tea Party supported candidates kept the focus mainly on the economy. Meanwhile, campaigns across the Midwest called on anti-government themes to rally support from key Tea Party constituents, and some Southern candidates railed so adamantly against the federal government that they harkened the possibility of state secession.

Overall, our results help to explain the common perception of the Tea Party movement as a discombobulated grassroots movement with no coherent policy platform. While there are few issues that unify movement supporters nationwide, distinct regional policy priorities exist. Our finding that the movement appeals to voters in different regions in different ways, helps to explain why “all kinds of people sought to hitch their wagons” to the movement (Mead 2011). Because voters in different parts of the nation are drawn to the movement for different reasons, it makes sense that voters as diverse as “[a]ffluent suburban libertarians, rural fundamentalists, ambitious pundits, unreconstructed racists, and fiscally conservative housewives all can and do claim to be Tea Party supporters” (Mead 2011).

Our results further speak to the role the Tea Party movement might play in the 2012 Presidential election. A key factor in this election will be Obama’s ability to maintain victories in many of the states he won in 2008. The key debates likely to be at the center of conversation in these states include those that are key to predicting Tea Party movement support - unemployment, immigration, and the increasing anger of the mounting national debt. While Obama himself has acknowledged the anger and frustration

of the people in the country, voters sympathetic to the Tea Party movement remain unconvinced his policy stances are the right ones. In the Midwest, where our analysis shows anti-government concerns have been a key element in sustaining support of the movement, swing states like Michigan and Ohio have had sustained unemployment of about 9-10%, and will likely be unfriendly territory to Obama. In the West, the issue of illegal immigration continues to grab headlines, and economic concerns continue to plague voters in the East. Across the South, animosity toward the federal government has not eased. Disgruntled voters may retaliate at the ballot box seeking an alternative, opening themselves to the rhetoric offered by Tea Party supporters.

Should economic conditions improve, the performance of recently elected (or re-elected) governors stands to be equally as important to Obama's reelection chances. A number of these Republican Governors in important electoral states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, New Mexico, Wisconsin, Virginia, New Jersey and Michigan, have strong Tea Party appeal. Obama will have to walk a delicate tightrope in hoping those states recover from the recession, but that voters acknowledge the President and his policies as making the difference, not the actions of these Tea Party supported Republican Governors.

The Tea Party movement would likely be less important in the 2012 election if other issues become central to the debate. It is always possible that the President's response to an unexpected event or disaster could lead to a rise or plummet in his popularity with the American people and ultimately marginalize the Tea Party movement's influence. While such events are not predictable, one issue currently looms large - the growing tensions in the Middle East. Foreign policy debates have so far not been motivating factors for the Tea Party movement, and in fact, have served to pit the movement's leaders against one another with some arguing for a new form of isolationism and others seeking a more interventionist course (Baker 2010; O'Rourke 2010). If voters become motivated more by foreign policy debates, Tea Party supporters might become even less unified, and hence, less of a political force. At the same time, it is possible that the patriotic themes pervading the movement might lead supporters to unite and become even more electorally important.

Whatever the issues at play in the next election season, Obama is likely to face a better organized and prepared Tea Party opposition than he faced in 2008, especially at the grassroots level. Tea Party supporters, many of whom were political novices in the 2010 mid-term elections, will undoubtedly be more seasoned come 2012. Tea Party groups have formed and spread like wildfire across the country and while many Americans are not actually part of the Tea Party or call themselves supporters, the message of the Tea Party movement is echoing louder as the groups become more savvy and organized. This reverberation for calls of smaller government and lower taxes might appeal to Independent voters, especially those hurting financially.

APPENDIX A
MEASURES, CODING, & DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FOR CONTROL VARIABLES¹³

| | U.S. (N=1014) | East (N=182) | Midwest (N=247) | South (N=370) | West (N=215) |
|--|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Male: <i>Respondent's sex as coded by interviewer</i> | | | | | |
| (1) Male | 51.2 | 51.6 | 51.8 | 50.0 | 52.1 |
| (0) Female | 48.8 | 48.4 | 48.2 | 50.0 | 47.9 |
| Anglo: <i>"I am going to read you a list of racial group . . . tell me whether you are . . . a member of that racial group -</i> | | | | | |
| (1) Anglo | 85.2 | 91.2 | 91.1 | 78.9 | 84.2 |
| (0) Not Anglo | 13.2 | 8.2 | 7.3 | 19.5 | 13.5 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 1.6 | 0.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 2.3 |
| Income: <i>"Is your total annual household income before taxes . . . "</i> | | | | | |
| (1) Less than \$10,000 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 5.9 | 3.8 | 1.4 |
| (2) \$10,000 - \$19,999 | 6.6 | 4.4 | 8.6 | 7.6 | 5.6 |
| (3) \$20,000 - \$29,999 | 10.8 | 9.3 | 14.4 | 9.5 | 12.1 |
| (4) \$30,000 - \$39,999 | 10.0 | 12.1 | 9.7 | 10.3 | 7.9 |
| (5) \$40,000 - \$49,999 | 11.4 | 9.9 | 11.3 | 10.8 | 14.0 |
| (6) \$50,000 - \$74,999 | 17.1 | 19.2 | 17.8 | 16.2 | 15.8 |
| (7) \$75,000 - \$99,999 | 11.7 | 13.2 | 10.1 | 10.8 | 14.0 |
| (8) \$100,000 - \$149,000 | 10.6 | 7.7 | 10.1 | 12.2 | 10.7 |
| (9) \$150,000 - \$249,1001 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 3.2 | 6.2 | 6.0 |
| (10) \$250,000 - \$499,999 | 1.8 | 3.3 | 0.4 | 2.7 | 0.5 |
| (11) \$500,000 and over | 0.8 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 0.9 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 10.5 | 12.1 | 10.1 | 9.5 | 11.2 |
| Married: <i>"Which of the following best describes your marital status: currently married, living together, living together with a partner, widowed, divorced, separated, or never married?"</i> | | | | | |
| (1) "Married" | 55.3 | 54.9 | 52.2 | 58.9 | 54.3 |
| (0) Not "Married" | 42.6 | 44.0 | 44.1 | 39.7 | 45.7 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 2.1 | 1.1 | 3.6 | 1.4 | |
| Education: <i>"What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?"</i> | | | | | |
| (1) None, or grade 1-4 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| (2) Grade 5, 6, or 7 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.5 |
| (3) Grade 8 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0 |
| (4) High school incomplete, Grades 9-11 | 4.7 | 6.0 | 4.9 | 5.4 | 2.3 |
| (5) High School graduate, Grade 12 | 20.7 | 20.9 | 24.3 | 21.6 | 14.9 |
| (6) Technical, trade, or business after high school | 4.2 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 3.0 | 4.7 |
| (7) College/university incomplete | 25.7 | 15.9 | 27.1 | 25.9 | 32.1 |
| (8) College/university graduate or more | 42.9 | 51.1 | 36.0 | 42.7 | 44.2 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 0.9 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.5 | 1.4 |
| Conservative: <i>"How would you describe your political views - very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, very</i> | | | | | |
| (1) "conservative" or "very conservative" | 45.6 | 36.8 | 47.0 | 52.4 | 39.5 |
| (0) Not "conservative" or "very conservative" | 51.0 | 61.0 | 49.0 | 45.1 | 54.9 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 3.5 | 2.2 | 4.0 | 2.4 | 5.6 |
| Republican: <i>"In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent? . . . [if Independent] "As of today, do you lean more to the Democratic or the Republican party [or neither/other]?"</i> | | | | | |
| (1) "Republican" or "Leaning Republican" | 45.2 | 36.3 | 44.9 | 48.9 | 46.5 |
| (0) Not "Republican" or "Leaning Republican" | 53.5 | 63.0 | 53.0 | 49.7 | 52.1 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 1.4 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.4 |

¹³ Cell entries are frequency percentages.

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Table 1
Question Wording, Coding, and Descriptive Statistics
for Independent Variables

| | U.S. (N=1014) | East (N=182) | Midwest (N=247) | South (N=370) | West (N=215) |
|--|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Tea Party Supporter: <i>"Do you consider yourself to be -"</i> | | | | | |
| (1) "a supporter of the Tea Party movement" | 37.2 | 30.2 | 31.6 | 37.6 | 37.2 |
| (0) "an opponent of the Tea Party movement" or "neither" | 56.3 | 67.6 | 64.0 | 56.8 | 56.3 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 6.5 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 5.7 | 6.5 |
| Economy: <i>"What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?" (up to three mentions)</i> | | | | | |
| 0 mentions of economy | 40.5 | 31.9 | 38.1 | 46.5 | 40.5 |
| 1 mention of economy | 51.7 | 56.6 | 55.1 | 46.8 | 52.1 |
| 2 mentions of economy | 7.6 | 11.0 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 7.4 |
| 3 mentions of economy | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Anti-Government: <i>"When it comes to the issues facing the country today, in general, do you think the federal government is . . ."</i> | | | | | |
| (1) "More part of the problem" | 65.9 | 64.3 | 63.2 | 69.2 | 64.7 |
| (0) "More a part of the solution" or "both" | 32.7 | 35.2 | 35.2 | 28.9 | 34.4 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 1.4 | 0.5 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 0.9 |
| Traditional Values: <i>"Some people think the government should promote traditional values in our society. Others think the government should not favor any particular set of values. Which comes closer to your own view?"</i> | | | | | |
| (1) "Government should promote traditional values" | 47.2 | 39.6 | 52.2 | 52.2 | 39.5 |
| (0) "Government should not favor any set of values" or mixed | 49.8 | 58.2 | 46.2 | 43.8 | 57.2 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 3.0 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 4.1 | 3.3 |
| Illegal Immigration: <i>"How serious a threat to the future well-being of the United States do you consider each of the following . . ."</i> | | | | | |
| (5) Extreme serious | 31.0 | 35.2 | 27.5 | 33.8 | 26.5 |
| (4) Very serious | 33.6 | 25.8 | 36.4 | 34.9 | 34.9 |
| (3) Somewhat serious | 23.8 | 24.7 | 23.1 | 24.9 | 21.9 |
| (2) Not very serious | 7.4 | 11.0 | 9.3 | 3.8 | 8.4 |
| (1) Not a threat | 4.1 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 7.9 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 |
| Racism: Additive index of four items (ranges 0-4; means reported) | | | | | |
| | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.6 |
| <i>"On average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are -"</i> | | | | | |
| <i>"because most African-Americans just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty."</i> | | | | | |
| (1) Yes | 39.1 | 33.5 | 38.1 | 45.7 | 33.5 |
| (0) No | 55.6 | 60.4 | 55.9 | 48.6 | 63.3 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 5.3 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 3.3 |
| <i>"mainly due to discrimination."</i> | | | | | |
| (1) No | 67.6 | 68.7 | 67.6 | 71.1 | 60.5 |
| (0) Yes | 30.2 | 29.7 | 30.8 | 24.9 | 39.1 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 4.1 | 0.5 |
| <i>"because most African Americans have less in-born ability to learn."</i> | | | | | |
| (1) Yes | 8.7 | 6.6 | 10.9 | 10.0 | 5.6 |
| (0) No | 89.3 | 92.9 | 86.6 | 87.0 | 93.5 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 2.0 | 0.5 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 0.9 |
| <i>"because most African Americans don't have the chance for the education that it takes to rise out of poverty."</i> | | | | | |
| (1) No | 53.6 | 46.2 | 55.5 | 56.5 | 53.0 |
| (0) Yes | 43.9 | 51.6 | 42.9 | 40.0 | 45.1 |
| Missing ("Don't Know" or Refused) | 2.5 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 3.5 | 1.9 |

Note: Cell entries are frequency percentages.

Table 2
Impact of Various Factors on Tea Party Support

| | U.S. | East | Midwest | South | West |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Economy | 0.202 * (0.091) | 0.614 * (0.277) | 0.032 (0.178) | 0.329 * (0.151) | 0.084 (0.258) |
| Anti-Government | 0.811 ** (0.153) | 0.628 (0.455) | 1.047 ** (0.284) | 0.884 ** (0.266) | 0.503 (0.449) |
| Traditional Values | -0.083 (0.118) | -0.285 (0.335) | -0.169 (0.242) | 0.010 (0.201) | 0.158 (0.298) |
| Illegal Immigration | 0.216 ** (0.061) | 0.200 (0.175) | 0.140 (0.116) | 0.128 (0.106) | 0.555 ** (0.170) |
| Racism Index | 0.016 (0.057) | 0.031 (0.162) | 0.058 (0.113) | -0.131 (0.099) | 0.178 (0.147) |
| Male | 0.228 * (0.115) | 0.239 (0.322) | 0.223 (0.227) | 0.374 * (0.190) | 0.073 (0.309) |
| Anglo | 0.262 (0.193) | -0.021 (0.560) | 0.240 (0.619) | 0.428 * (0.288) | 0.162 (0.473) |
| Income | -0.035 ** (0.031) | -0.306 ** (0.099) | 0.028 (0.066) | -0.017 (0.050) | 0.023 (0.081) |
| Married | 0.257 * (0.122) | 0.784 * (0.374) | 0.038 (0.264) | 0.549 ** (0.204) | -0.160 (0.327) |
| Education | 0.038 (0.047) | 0.153 (0.116) | -0.048 (0.100) | 0.008 (0.080) | 0.135 (0.124) |
| Conservative | 0.774 ** (0.127) | 0.698 * (0.356) | 0.712 ** (0.258) | 0.686 ** (0.221) | 1.313 ** (0.318) |
| Republican | 0.673 ** (0.129) | 1.272 ** (0.363) | 0.332 (0.266) | 0.826 ** (0.225) | 0.611 (0.380) |
| Constant | -0.328 ** (0.444) | -3.130 * (1.240) | -2.543 * (1.058) | -3.122 ** (0.677) | -5.289 ** (1.305) |
| Number of Cases | 763 | 138 | 195 | 270 | 160 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.331 | 0.450 | 0.252 | 0.336 | 0.510 |


Notes: Cell entries are probit regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). *p<0.05; **p<0.01 (two-tailed).

Table 3
Comparison of Tea Party Supporters and Non-Supporters

| | Non-Tea Party Supporter (N=612) | Tea Party Supporter (N=352) |
|---|--|--|
| Racism: Additive index of four items (ranges 0-4; means reported) | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| <i>"On average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are -"</i> | | |
| <i>"because most African-Americans just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty."</i> | | |
| (1) Yes | 34.3 | 47.3 |
| (0) No | 65.7 | 52.7 |
| <i>"mainly due to discrimination."</i> | | |
| (1) No | 60.8 | 84.0 |
| (0) Yes | 39.2 | 16.0 |
| <i>"because most African Americans have less in-born ability to learn."</i> | | |
| (1) Yes | 8.0 | 9.8 |
| (0) No | 92.0 | 90.2 |
| <i>"because most African Americans don't have the chance for the education that it takes to rise out of poverty."</i> | | |
| (1) No | 46.1 | 71.0 |
| (0) Yes | 53.9 | 29.0 |

Note: Cell entries are valid percentages (missing cases are excluded).

Figure 1
Impact of Different Factors on Support for Tea Party



Note: Probabilities estimated using regression results presented in Table XX. For the baseline probability, all issue variables were set to their minimum values and all control values set to their median values. Probabilities for each issue area were calculated using the maximum value for the issue and median values for all control variables.